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Germany Prepares for War

A Nazi Theory of "National Defense"

BY EWALD BANSE

WITH ELEVEN MAPS



Harcourt, Brace and Company

NEW YORK

First published in Germany as
Raum und Volk im Weltkriege
TRANSLATED BY ALAN HARRIS

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MAY 1 1968

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY QUINN & BODEN COMPANY, INC., RAHWAY, N. J.

Typography by Robert Josephy

PUBLISHER'S PREFACE

[This foreword has been written by the British publisher for the British edition of this book. For reasons which will be clear on reading it, it has not been submitted to or approved by either the author or the German publishers. It is included in the American edition because it gives an accurate and detailed picture of the transactions concerning the book, and because it provides an effective answer to the claims of the German Government that the book is the work of an "irresponsible theorist." The title, *Germany Prepares for War*, has been chosen by the American publishers as fairly describing the doctrine of the book.]

EWALD BANSE, the author of this book, has enjoyed the title of professor only since February 1933, when the Nazi Government immediately on their accession to power appointed him Professor of Military Science at Brunswick Technical College. He is the author of several books, dealing with military and geographical subjects, two of which, *Wehrwissenschaft* (Military Science) and the present book, have established his position in Germany as the leading exponent of Nazi military aims, and have made his name familiar to readers abroad as the uncompromising advocate of barbaric methods of warfare. In these two books, Professor Banse teaches the youth of Germany that war is a principle of regeneration in which a people may find true glory; that in the waging of war not the means but the end has to be considered, and that the infection of drinking water with typhoid bacillus and the dissemination of plague through artificially-infested rats is as justifiable an instrument of war as the cannon.

Banse is the leading figure in the great mobilization of intellect which, as Leland Stowe has shown in his important book, *Nazi Germany Means War*,¹ is keeping pace in the Third Reich with the mobilization of human and

¹ Faber and Faber, 2s. 6d. net.

mechanized material for military purposes. In July 1933, the Nazi Government formed the "German Society for Military Policy and Military Sciences"—*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wehrpolitik und Wehrwissenschaft*—the avowed purpose of which was to help realize "the essential ideas of Professor Banse." The purpose of the Society, as Leland Stowe explained in the only account published either in Germany or abroad of a secret meeting the Society held in Berlin on October 6th and 7th, a week before Germany left the Disarmament Conference,² was to lay its plans for educating German leaders and the German people in military preparedness. The Society is composed of the pick of the best military brains of the old and new Reichs, representatives of the Reichswehr (the regular German army) and the Chief of Staff; high officers of the Brownshirt army and the Steel Helmets, Professors of Military Science at the other German Universities; and, last and most important, Professor Banse.

The secret session of the Society in Berlin lasted for two days. No detailed account of its proceedings at this meeting leaked out, but sufficient of what occurred has been learnt to know that a series of definite tasks was allotted to the various members, chiefly the constant engendering of the fighting spirit in German youth, in accordance with the tenets of Professor Banse.

Within a week of this secret meeting, Germany walked out of the Disarmament Conference, and the chancelleries of Europe buzzed with rumors of Germany's eventual plans. Professor Banse's small book, *Wehrwissenschaft*, was discovered by the press of the foreign countries, and agitated demands for its suppression were made. Finally, when the storm of protest reached a volume that could not be ignored, the Reich announced that the book would be banned. The sincerity of this step remained questionable, however, when it was learned that Professor Banse would still continue to hold his chair of Military Science at Brunswick. The text-

² Pp. 43-45, *Nazi Germany Means War*.

book was to go, but its author and his fellow disciples in other German universities were to be allowed to continue to teach its doctrines verbally.

Just at this moment Mr. Wickham Steed, in a letter to *The Times*, revealed the existence of another book of Professor Banse's, the present volume, which he characterized as "a much more formidable work than *Wehrwissenschaft*." Mr. Wickham Steed wrote:

To the Editor of *The Times*

Sir,—In your leading article this morning upon the Disarmament Conference you say:

"What is needed above all is the abandonment of war-teaching to the youth of Germany; and in this connection let it be acknowledged with sincerity and frankness that a beginning has at least been made with the suppression of the military manual of the notorious Professor Banse."

It is fair to assume that this manual, to which your Berlin Correspondent first drew attention, has been suppressed because of its effect upon public opinion abroad, and not necessarily because the Hitlerite authorities disapprove of it in principle. Otherwise they would surely have begun by suppressing a much more formidable work by the same learned professor entitled *Raum und Volk im Weltkriege*, which was published last year. It bears the sub-title "*Gedanken über eine nationale Wehrlehre*" or "Thoughts Upon a Doctrine of National Defence."

Among the eleven maps upon the military positions during the Great War is one, No. 8, which illustrates a future invasion of Great Britain. This map assumes that the whole Dutch and Belgian coasts would serve as bases for a German invasion, that the East Anglian peninsula could easily be taken and held by an invading force, and that, when this had been done, a second and subsidiary invasion could be carried out from the Irish Free State to strike at the industrial Midlands and also at the Clyde. The significance of this map is shown in two chapters on England and the char-

acter of her people (pp. 252-263), in which the map is expressly referred to. The following passage from p. 263 is peculiarly attractive:

"It is very important to judge English popular character in the event of an enemy invasion. The people, to a man, would certainly rush to arms, and would allow themselves to be mown down in heroic tenacity in front of the Ouse line, or the chalk and jurassian heights, before giving ground step by step. But it is a question whether this people would stand the test of hunger. For centuries bodily comforts have sorely spoiled them, and they would hardly bear real privations (which during the Great War they never knew, despite rationing). A part of the people would stand even this out of patriotism, but another part would give up the game—which it would no longer feel to be a game—sooner. We confess that it is charming to imagine and to portray the downfall of this proud and secure people at some future time, a people which will have to obey foreign lords in a county unconquered since 1066, or will have to renounce its lucrative colonial empire. Every Englishman and Englishwoman would regard these sentences as a monstrosity, indeed a blasphemy, if they ever came to know of them."

The whole book, which, with maps, runs to 424 pages, is written in this spirit. It holds out prospects equally pleasing to Denmark, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland (it insists that the only way to rid the world of the Polish question would be to partition Poland once again), Switzerland, and, of course, France. German Switzerland and German France (French Flanders, Alsace, Lorraine), German Belgium (Flanders, Brabant, Eupen, Malmedy), Luxemburg, and Holland, with the Dutch Colonial Empire, are naturally to be brought into the new German Empire.

But, for present purposes, the most interesting passage in the book is its conclusion, which calls for the establishment of a Reich Department for military science to be placed under the Reichswehr Ministry and to care for the scientific military invigoration (*Ertüchtigung*) of the German people. An Institute of Research for Military Science, it

suggests, might also be expedient. And Professor Banse ends by expressing the earnest hope that the Government will soon decide to do these things and find "the right men" to carry them through.

Thus the choice of Professor Banse himself, as the foremost of the "right men" to teach military science to German youth, was singularly facilitated. The suppression of his little manual may perhaps distress him; but he will doubtless bear without murmuring so mild a test of his patriotism if only his more important work and his enlightening doctrine remain untouched.

I am, Sir, yours obediently,

October 26.

Wickham Steed

The fact that Professor Banse still held his important post, and that this other and more important book was still in wide circulation, suggested that the Nazi powers were actuated in their decision to suppress *Wehrwissenschaft* by the pressure of foreign opinion rather than by a desire to discredit Professor Banse or to dissociate themselves from his teaching. It seemed to us as publishers that the English public should be given an opportunity to judge the character of Professor Banse's teaching and to realize what ideas, fateful, perhaps, for our own security, the German youth was imbibing from its leaders. The course of events following our decision to publish an English translation of the book may be left to speak for themselves. If what is written here constitutes an indictment of a powerful nation and its leaders, it cannot be denied that the actions of that nation, both in propagating this book and in their attempts to prevent us from publishing it in an English translation, are justification for making it.

ON November 2nd, then, immediately after the publication of Mr. Wickham Steed's letter in *The Times*, Mr. Lovat Dickson went to Oldenburg, and on the afternoon of November 3rd interviewed Herr Gerhard Stalling, the head of the very old-established German firm

of that name, who had published Professor Banse's book. The interview, which commenced at three o'clock in the afternoon, lasted until six o'clock in the evening, when a contract was signed whereby this firm purchased outright the English language rights of Professor Banse's book.

The concurrence of times and dates is important, for *The Times* of the next day bore the following announcement, dated from Berlin, November 3rd:

NAZI BAN ON WAR BOOK BANSE'S "SENSELESS BABBLINGS"

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

BERLIN, Nov. 3

The German Government has confiscated *Raum und Volk im Weltkrieg*, by Professor Ewald Banse, Professor of Military Science at Brunswick High School and author of the manual *Military Science*.

Military Science was reviewed in *The Times* on September 6, and its confiscation was announced on October 20. Attention was drawn to *Raum und Volk im Weltkrieg* in a letter from Mr. Wickham Steed in *The Times* on October 27, in particular to a passage confessing that "it is charming to imagine and to portray the downfall of this proud and secure people [the English] at some future time, a people which will have to obey foreign lords in a country unconquered since 1066, or will have to renounce its lucrative colonial empire."

The announcement of the confiscation says:—

"This book also has unfortunately given anti-German propaganda abroad occasion to throw doubt on the peace policy of the German Government. The book, is, of course, only the private work of an irresponsible theorist and is in no wise directive for the policy of the Government. For the

rest, the strategic theories developed by Professor Banse in this book are so absurd that they are not taken seriously by German public opinion. The book has nevertheless been confiscated. The German Government desires thus irrefutably to show that it formally disclaims these senseless babblings, and is resolved not to allow its policy of peace to be in the least disturbed by the propagandist exploitation of such private works."

*It is only fair to add that Professor Banse, as the exponent at Brunswick High School of the new science introduced in recent times, is a servant of the State, and is not entirely a private person.*³

In effect, the book for which a contract had been signed on the previous evening, had been banned that day by the German Government. The book had been banned, too, without reference to its publisher, who had not, as is usual in the suppression of a book, had his stocks of the offending title seized and been warned to withdraw all copies from sale. Such was the only possible inference, for it is impossible to conceive that under a dictatorial régime such as exists in Germany, a publisher would dare to sell the rights of a book which the Government had suppressed. It looked very much as though the Nazi régime had been even more half-hearted in their banning of this book than they had been in the suppression of Professor Banse's less important *Wehrwissenschaft*; and a statement to that effect was made by Mr. Lovat Dickson in a letter to *The Times* which was published on November 14th.

Under the terms of the contract with the German publisher, a sum of £50, a part payment of the whole sum named for the English language rights, was to be made immediately on Mr. Lovat Dickson's return to London. On November 9th, a check for this amount was forwarded to the German publishers, accompanied by a letter referring to the notice in *The Times* of the banning of the book, and asking if this fact could be verified by them. No answer was

³ The italics are ours.

ever received to that letter, although the check which accompanied it was subsequently passed through the Bank by the German publishers.

Although no answer was made to that direct question, a week later a letter arrived from the German publishers referring to Mr. Lovat Dickson's letter in *The Times*, and protesting against "the unheard-of suspicion" that that letter cast on the German Government. At the same time evidence was forthcoming that the Nazi régime proposed to do all in their power to prevent the appearance of the book in English.

A German gentleman, not an official of the Government, nor ostensibly bearing their authority, approached us, and, pointing out the unhappy effect the publication of the book would have on the affairs of his country at this critical time, asked us what financial consideration would induce us to refrain from publishing it. Solely to test the anxiety of the present régime in Germany about the book, and to see to what extent they were prepared to go in their efforts to suppress it, we named a fantastic sum. The German gentleman returned to Berlin to discuss the matter with Dr. Goebbels' Department of Propaganda; and, after seeing them, telephoned an invitation to Mr. Lovat Dickson to go himself to Berlin to see the Department and to discuss the matter. The invitation was declined.

Within a few hours of this telephone conversation another gentleman presented himself at our office. He quickly revealed himself as cognizant of all that had taken place in regard to the book. He begged us to refrain from publishing it; using the argument that it would serve to arouse unfriendly feelings between two friendly peoples, and would misrepresent Nazi aims in this country.

He took his leave, promising that we would hear something more from his Government. But the next word came not from his Government officially; it came from a Berlin lawyer of prominence. His letter was a three-page document accompanied by a *prozessvollmacht* announcing that (a) the

book was banned in Germany, (b) since the contract was signed in Germany, and, therefore, subject to German law, the book must be regarded as banned in England also, (c) we must forthwith renounce the rights which purported to have been granted to us by the contract, (d) failing our compliance we should be liable to damages under the Berne Copyright Convention for publishing a book for which we had no legal copyright.

Further letters have reached us from the same source to the same import. As well, we have been informed officially that no German publisher will be allowed hereafter to have any dealings with us; a threat that loses some of its significance now that so many German authors of distinction are refugees from the land of their birth.

THERE is little doubt that attempts will be made on the appearance of this book in England to belittle Professor Banse's position and influence in Germany. It is in anticipation of such attempts that this narrative of events in connection with the acquisition of the book is made here. Many people believe that Germany is setting the pace for a new war which will outstrip in horror anything that occurred in the last struggle. We publish this book because it reveals the preparations that are being made *at the present moment*, preparations infinitely more appalling than those which preceded the last war.

Professor Banse continues to hold his governmentally-installed chair of Military Science in Brunswick. Not even the detrimental effect the notice of his activities has on opinion abroad can dislodge from his post the man who more than anyone else is the teacher in military matters of modern Germany; the man who, if, as many well-informed observers think, another European war of German origin is inevitable, will have done more than anyone to give it the proportion and character it is bound to attain.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

HISTORICALLY and culturally, we have reached a turning-point in our destiny. The day of comfort and make-believe and paper and shouting "hurrah" and dunderheadedness is over, and the day of discomfort and hard thinking and grim resolve and cold steel has begun. A grim, iron age lies before us. We cannot go on dreaming and building pretty castles in the air; we have to harden our hearts and make the idea of the nation the pivot on which all our thinking turns.

National sentiment, which does not absolutely demand a royal house to attach itself to but can flourish in a republic too, means self-respect; international sentiment means self-abandonment. The first is healthy egotism, the second is a throwing-up of the sponge, a degeneration of the tissues. The internationalist is a bastard in blood and a eunuch in intellect. Man's greatest works always spring from the national soil, even when they are not actually directed to national ends.

The sword will come into its own again, and the pen, after fourteen years of exaggerated prestige, will be put in its place. The sword has lain rusting in the corner for fourteen years in the German countries, while the pen has had the stage to itself; and as a result we have gone to the dogs. Certainly the pen is good, but the sword is good too and often far better, and we want both to be equally honored among the German people. A man can only protect himself against assault with the sword; if he tried to do it with the pen he would make himself ridiculous and get the worst of it. That is exactly what has been happening to Germany and Austria, and likewise Danzig, for fourteen years. The

pen is good and the sword is good. But the sword is the older weapon, and it is the final, the ultimately decisive one—therefore let it have first place.

We are on the threshold of an iron age. For us, it stands under the sign of the Third Reich. The Third Reich shall free us from all the chains we are still dragging about with us from feudal and medieval times—shall set up the rule of the best men in the nation—shall once more unite all the German-speaking peoples of Central Europe under one flag—shall restore to the most spiritually creative and profound people on earth that inward leadership of the world for which the world will one day cry aloud in horror at Anglo-Saxon mechanization and Russian universal destruction. We want an empire in which we can once more profess and call ourselves Germans without fear of being sat upon, as the writer of these lines was during the interregnum. We believe that the creator of this empire is already on the move—that he is already knocking at the door—nay, that he is already inside the city, in our midst.

Mighty empires are not founded by treachery, deceit or huckstering; they only grow out of the clang of swords. The Third Reich, as we dream of it—from the Flanders coast to the Raab, from Memel to the Adige and the Rhone—can also only be born in blood and iron. Ideas and works and armies must march and fight and die before the vast and splendid structure of the Third Reich rises from the ground of the western world. Ideas and work and military service must go hand in hand in future, if culture is to survive, industry to flourish, and the state to maintain itself. These three are henceforth inseparable.

England having given the world war a character that no previous war had possessed, that of a military *plus* economic war, in future the pen and the hammer, the scythe and the sword have all to be mobilized if a war is to be waged with any chance of success. Henceforth war is not a contest between armies or even nations, but between countries, philos-

ophies and economic systems. The coming war, the great war that will decide the fate of the German people, will ultimately be fought out deep down in the souls of the belligerent nations. The soul is the starting-point of human thought, human action and human events. From it and it alone radiate those forces which control brain and hand, achievement and failure, courage and cowardice.

The theme of this book is the significance of territory and industry and communications and national psychology for war and the conduct of war, and also, up to a point, for the art of statesmanship. It will discuss things which impressed themselves on the mind of the geographer as he studied the world war and which strike him as important, especially as they were often insufficiently attended to, or neglected altogether, during the war, and always with disastrous results.

The author, who has written numerous works on lands and peoples and has pondered deeply over the problem of the relations between the face of the country and the souls of its inhabitants, a problem which he was, incidentally, the first to recognize;—the author earnestly desires in this book to make his little contribution to the moral recovery of the German people and the building up of the Third Reich. He lives in the hope that the government will pay some attention to what he has to say, for the history of the world war has taught him what fatal results may ensue from disregard of the requirements of modern warfare.

Owing to lack of space, for which these hard times are responsible, this book remains a sketch, suggesting problems rather than solving them. Indeed, it would not be too much to assert that it contains themes and materials for a dozen books; our principal neighbors especially—France, the Little Entente, England, Russia, Italy—each deserve a separate study from the standpoint of military geography or the science of defense.

The author must, however, perforce content himself with

the hope that his work will serve to show what the problems are, make the whole subject intelligible to the general public, and induce the government of the Reich to pay attention to some of his conclusions. Let every man serve his country in the sphere for which he is best fitted.

EWALD BANSE

Brunswick, 2 September, 1932.

PART ONE

WAR AND WORLD WAR

I. WAR AS A GEOGRAPHICAL PHENOMENON

I. STATESMANSHIP AND WAR

WAR, it has been said, is the continuation of statesmanship by other methods. The obvious meaning of this is that it is the business of the sword to complete what the pen has initiated but not carried through to a finish. The framers of this definition appear to have overlooked the fact that it only applies to one party, namely, the victor. But what about the other party, the vanquished? In his case war is not the continuation but a reversal of his policy; it is an attempt to retrieve political mistakes by violent measures.

What is statesmanship and what is warfare? Statesmanship is the art of regulating a state's relations with all other states in such a manner as to secure for it a maximum of security and, maybe, superiority. Statesmanship draws its strength from national, military and economic sources and brings it to bear on the outside world through the agency of an individual statesman.

While, therefore, it is ultimately dependent on geographical conditions, its effectiveness is quite independent of them and entirely a matter of the individual leader's quality: thus the architect of the Second Reich had infinitely smaller resources at his command than its destroyer. Indeed, the great statesman only reveals his full quality under the handicap of a weak position, where he has to contend with apparently insuperable obstacles.

Statesmanship is the skillful management of geographical resources and the skillful exploitation of geographical possibilities. If there is any sphere in which the human spirit can remove mountains, it is here. The story of the rise and fall of empires is like an endless frieze in illustration of this

truth. Statesmanship is not a science that can be taught and learnt. Either a man is born for it or he remains forever an apprentice in this, the subtlest art that God has vouchsafed to the human race. Most statesmen have remained apprentices, just as most poets, musicians, painters and architects have—hence their time-bound insignificance.

What is warfare? It is the art of employing the military resources of the state, its concentrated striking-power, against the enemy in such a way that he submits to your will. The essential difference between statesmanship and warfare is that the former takes the long view, while the latter is a short-term expedient. Consequently, the statesman's policy is based on the whole resources of a country, and thus has practically unlimited material to work with, whereas warfare uses only a part of them, though in a highly concentrated form, and its resources are thus limited. It follows from this that statesmanship seeks to accumulate and conserve and looks a long way ahead; whereas war recklessly squanders its resources, staking everything on the sudden stroke and looking only a short way ahead. Statesmanship pursues its end by indirect, roundabout means; war makes straight for its objective and tries to force its way through. Statesmanship aims at the preservation and aggrandizement of its own country, war at the annihilation of the other country; the former is directly constructive, the latter can only render the progress of one party possible by destroying the other.

War derives its nourishment from a country's spiritual and economic strength and translates it into military action through the agency of a leader; this in turn creates better opportunities for statesmanship than were previously forthcoming. War thus has a narrower basis than statesmanship, it draws upon a smaller range of a country's available resources; but those that it needs it uses, and uses up, in far larger quantities. It is enough for the statesman to know that the nation, *i.e.* a vaguely conceived mass of voters, is behind him; whereas the commander of an army has to reckon with the physical and spiritual capacity of a con-

siderable fraction of that nation, and with the degree of efficiency of a hastily reconstructed economic machine. The politician hardly ever has to face a direct test of his actions, the commander continually and in every detail. The statesman works in a certain detachment from the masses of the people; he may achieve success without their aid, or even against their will; he may even make an impression on foreign countries with nothing behind him but a reputation gained in earlier days. The commander, on the other hand, is always dependent on the actual value of his army at the moment; if that lets him down, the highest abilities are of no use to him. Prestige counts for nothing in the field, death only spares the strong.

Statesmanship is always the ultimate end of the state, warfare only a means to that end. Hence the commander must always—apart from questions of a purely military character—be subordinate to the statesman. Politics are the expression of a permanent state of affairs, and imply peace with all its potentialities of spiritual and economic development; warfare is the expression of a temporary state of convulsion and comprises the whole gamut of death and destruction, heroism and cowardice, the distortion of economic and the narrowing-down of spiritual life, with sudden isolated high lights. Peace means organic evolution, war a sudden burst of development—in either case without prejudice to the question whether the development is in an upward or a downward direction. Peace is the ideal state, but it carries with it the risk of stagnation and somnolence; war, on the contrary, is the grand stimulant and uplifter; quickening the whole pace of existence and opening up a completely different and, in most cases, novel world of ideas. The contrast between them is exemplified in two sharply contrasted types of humanity. Peace puts a premium on the good citizen, the man whose life is tied to a regular sequence of work and pay, food and recreation, procreation and burial, and whose main virtues are, generally speaking, industry and economy. In war, on the other hand, such things are at a discount;

what is wanted there above all things, including the bourgeois in soldier's dress, is the warrior, a type which contributes nothing of value in peace-time, but once in the field, immediately stands out by reason of its unexpected virtues, virtues diametrically opposite to those of the bourgeois. Everything now depends on a highly exceptional order of activities, to do with discipline and the handling of arms, attacking and killing, heroism and contempt of death. While peace promises the industrious citizen a safe reward, war, by its very nature, does nothing of the kind to the hero. The citizen does the state the best service by keeping himself most carefully alive; the warrior does it his highest service when he falls.

Thus the statesman and the general, the citizen and the warrior, stand in a strange antithetical position towards each other. Neither is possible without the other, yet they are frequently at odds, and strive to rectify each other's mistakes.

II. WAR, GEOGRAPHY, AND THE SCIENCE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

War is, above all things, a geographical phenomenon. It is tied to the surface of the earth; it derives its material sustenance from it, and moves purposefully over it, seeking out those positions which are favorable to one side, unfavorable to the other. It selects the best of the male population and inspires them with the fighting spirit or implants chilling fear in their bosoms, according as it favors one nation and handicaps the other; in which matter climatic and racial factors, national ideals and, finally, the aims of the government all play their part. That state which, directed by the genius of the great statesman and the great commander, brings all its geographical potentialities, from the iron and corn in the ground to the perfection of transport and the heroism of the common man, in a state of healthy intensification into military action against an enemy not hopelessly

superior from the beginning—such a state has a good chance of emerging victorious, as Germany did in 1870. That state, on the other hand, which, under the leadership of inadequate statesmen and commanders, is forced by the enemy's terrible superiority to strain its powers to the utmost and beyond from the beginning, will be defeated, unless a very special guardian angel takes pity on it. Such was the position of Germany in the world war; her guardian angel denied final success to all her victories.

The conception of geography has changed very greatly in the past twenty years. "Geography" today means, in a word, the best method of describing the countries of the world and their inhabitants in such a fashion that their individual characters, in relation to the mutual interplay of historical, territorial and psychological factors, may stand out as clear-cut and vivid as possible.

When one surveys a region from a higher level, one soon finds its variegated contents grouping themselves into two categories, two orders of problems, the solution of which is, in the last instance, the supreme object of all geographical work, and indeed the one thing that gives geography its deeper significance. These two categories are the land and the people. In the land the totality of the natural features of a region and the additions made to it by men's hands combine to form an exterior which represents the resultant of those elements and reveals it at the first glance. Everything a region contains—the shape and structure of the ground, the sky and atmosphere, vegetation and crops, buildings and means of communication—coalesces in the land to form a concrete picture. All the rest—race and nationality, historical past and economic activity, cultural achievement and psychological structure—solidifies in the people to form an intelligible character.

The land is the external appearance of a region, while the people are the partly visible, partly invisible spirit behind it. Present-day geography attaches a special importance to the establishment of intimate relations between these two

focal points, which it treats as two closely interwoven groups of ideas. The older geography dealt neither with the land nor with the people, but remained on the far lower intellectual level of physical features and population, between which it was unable to discover any intimate relation.

If we apply our interpretation to the geography of the war, it immediately becomes clear that behind the events of any war stand the two closely dovetailed notions of the territory and the people, laying down certain lines which the commander has to follow and within which he has to keep if he is not to go off the rails. Neglect of the intimate and absolutely indissoluble connection between Man and the land severely shook our war morale and helped to undermine it. In these days a state which loosens the tie between its people and the soil, which lets itself breed a landless proletariat and fails to set any new ideal before it, which allows itself to be encircled by stronger alliances in spite of its own lack of economic self-sufficiency, which accords equal rights with its native population to minorities which are foreign to the country and its people, which has studied neither the geography nor the psychology of its future enemy in such a way as to be able to form a clear judgment of him from both points of view in advance, which, finally, has failed entirely to provide its people with an inspiring battle-cry for the most terrible of wars;—such a state has no chance of victory. If a government is incapable of recognizing the close connection between the land and the people in its territory and putting it to good political and military use, what, we ask, is the use of such a government? It is not the business of a government just to keep on some sort of terms with neighboring states and maintain an efficient army—no, its first duty of all is to preserve an organic harmony between the land and the people and to weld them into a compact mass: everything else, everything to do with politics and armies, will follow almost automatically. As regards the education of the masses and the spiritual self-reliance of the middle-classes, the most important thing today is to give

the body politic iron defenses, based on the land, on blood and on culture: no enemy will dare to challenge such a country, for it creates the shining armor and produces the efficient statesman that it needs.

It is a mistake to suppose that a government can create a great nation and a great culture: the truth is rather that a nation can only produce a permanent good government out of the fullness of its culture. And it looks as if the time for this had at last arrived for Germany.

The above trains of thought, which take their rise to a large extent in geography, but derive their subject-matter from every branch of knowledge and have the common object of strengthening our national armor, form such a compact body that they positively constitute a new national discipline, the science of national defense. We may define this as the study of countries and peoples—one's own and others—with the object of increasing one's own military strength. It is primarily concerned with all questions of geography, industry, communications and national psychology, which it treats along two different lines: it first establishes general rules and principles and then draws a picture of each separate state from the military point of view. In this way one's own nation will acquire an intellectual and spiritual orientation which will enable it to face future wars with greater intelligence and confidence than it showed in the world war.

III. THE PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF WAR

All the inherent physical characteristics of a country come into play here—geographical position, area, land and water, frontiers and sea-coast, formation and climate, vegetation and crops, rivers and lakes, settled and unsettled territory.

1. *Geographical Position.*—The geographical position of a state determines its military security or insecurity in advance. It endows it with a smaller or larger number of neighbors, gives it the protection of coasts or mountains or deserts

or, alternatively, handicaps it by surrounding it with countries of vastly superior size and wealth which are always threatening to swamp it.

In this respect, inside the western world, the greatest contrast is provided by the buffer-state of Germany and the island of Great Britain. Germany—*i.e.* that part of Central Europe which is inhabited by German-speaking people—which extends from the mouths of the Rhine to the Vienna basin, from the Vosges and the Neuenburgersee to the other side of the Dnieper, from the Etschtal to Königsau;—Germany, except for the Alps and the Vosges, has no sound natural frontier, with the result that it has been nibbled at, pushed back, overrun and overreached on every side by its neighbors, who have played upon its lack of spiritual unity, a lack that has its ground in racial differences. Great Britain, on the other hand, owing to its remote, insular position has hardly ever been overpowered from the outside; one has to go back to the Norman conquest of 1066 and the irruption of the Angles and Saxons for instances of an invasion. As a result, political and cultural development, the growth of spiritual unity and a national will among the people, could proceed comparatively quickly, instead of by fits and starts as in Germany. Of course Germany's position in the center of the main stream of western history enabled her to play a much greater and more influential part in that history; whereas England's remoteness kept her insignificant as long as western history remained the history of a single self-contained portion of the globe. But as soon as it began to embrace the whole earth, whereupon the ocean inevitably became the arterial network holding it together, then Great Britain's position, right in the middle of the Atlantic coast of Europe, became the most favored one; it not only made her the gateway of Europe but beyond that gave her a maximum of insular security. Germany only occupies an important central position so long as Europe remains an enclosed continent; once it is opened up to the world, she becomes out of the way, a positive backwater, which has to create

its own importance, and in either case can only maintain her security with difficulty. Great Britain, on the other hand, whatever its degree of importance, always enjoys a perfectly secure position.

The same is not true of the other two arbiters of present-day Europe, France and Russia. France shares a certain central position with Germany and a certain maritime position with England, but it has more secure frontiers than Germany, and not at all the marginal position of England, its face being predominantly turned eastwards. In the case of France the advantages and disadvantages of the geographical position are fairly evenly balanced. With Russia it is just the opposite. Russia is so remote and so closely attached to the vast mainland of Asia that from many points of view it hardly counts as part of Europe at all. Its remoteness and its huge territory do, of course, give it pretty complete military security, as was proved in 1812 and in 1915-17; but, as against that, it is both shut off from access to the ocean and excluded from the march of western events.

The military preparations of the aforementioned four countries are determined in advance by their geographical position. If Great Britain wants to play a part in world affairs beyond her own coasts, she has got to be a sea-power and have a strong navy and a big merchant fleet behind her; it is not absolutely necessary for her to maintain a large army. Russia can do without a fleet but has to maintain a very large army in order to defend her exceptionally long frontiers and to make her power felt at such a distance. France can afford to neglect neither her fleet nor her army, for she can easily put either her inland or her maritime position to good use, though the former counts for more, of course. And Germany? Germany is first and foremost a land power; she can only keep her end up, or even survive, in the face of the numerous neighbors with designs on her territory, by means of a large army. Owing to the ease with which the North Sea can be closed she can only become a sea power with the consent, or after the defeat, of England.

A country's geographical position is perhaps more than any other geographical characteristic (except its racial and national psychology) a matter of fate, which determines its happiness or unhappiness in advance. Thus Germany's central position is responsible for her peculiar mixture of races, which in its turn causes an inner diversity, so that the inhabitants of her border districts often exhibit a strong inclination to fraternize with neighboring nations. The roots of that preference for things foreign exhibited by so many Germans are ultimately to be found in the peculiar position of the country. Conversely, the insular isolation of Great Britain has counteracted the effects of her heterogeneous mixture of races, and given the national character a firmer outline. It is equally true that the German spirit is essentially more many-sided, more richly creative, and goes deeper than the English; but from the point of view of political coherence and military striking-power this is by no means an unmixed blessing.

Geographical position is not, however, purely a matter of relations with neighbors: a country's attitude to the sea is also a function of it. That a country with no access to the sea can never produce a race of sailors stands to reason; but the converse, that a nation living by the sea must necessarily be a nation of sailors, as a mechanistic geography will have it, is by no means true. The proximity of the sea is a question of physical fact; but the attitude to it, that is to say, the use made of it for economic, commercial and military purposes, is a purely psychological question. Some nations and races never feel at home on the sea, in spite of having lived on its shores from time immemorial—*e.g.* the Negroes, the Alarodians (now Turkish-speaking) of Asia Minor, which is surrounded on three sides by the sea, the Bulgarians, the Indians and the Russians. The English are a particularly instructive example. Until the sixteenth century they never took to the water at all, in spite of being surrounded by the sea on all sides: it was the swing-over of world trade which took place then that forced them to change their

tune. From a nation of farmers and shepherds they became sailors, traders, imperialists and industrial workers. Clearly, a country's psychological attitude to the sea may change, the sea itself being merely a stimulant to temporary seafaring activity. As a converse to England one may instance Phœnicia, whose people in the early classical period were famous as excellent sailors, whereas its present population consists of orange-growers and silk-worm breeders, whom the sight of the blue sea which laps the slopes of Lebanon never tempts to venture themselves on it. The truth is that it is not the sea as such but the possibilities it holds out to an enterprising nation that make people take to it. A nation that produces sailors, that makes the blue ocean wave its element, across which adventure beckons;—such a nation looks upon the sea as a continuation of its territory, as a great broad highway which leads to a thousand treasures that are its for the taking. A nation, on the other hand, that remains unmoved by the sight of the sea and feels no urge to sail a boat on it, sees nothing but a horrible, unplumbed, salt, estranging desert, whose blue horizon marks the end of the world. In Germany the position is as follows:—the population of our coasts and river-mouths has always provided the personnel for a certain, and at times (*e.g.* the Hanseatic period and the Second Reich) even large and powerful, fleet; but in the peculiar circumstances that existed from the 1890's till 1918, a considerable portion of our inland population also went to sea and, be it noted, constituted by no means the least admirable element in our navy and our mercantile marine.

From the military point of view, geographical position and attitude to the sea determine the choice between coast-defense and naval aggression as a policy. A definitely maritime and insular position demands both, if the country is to count politically; in particular, the maintenance of an aggressive-spirited navy will be the keystone of its armament-policy. England and in recent years Japan are the obvious examples. A definitely inland country will always look upon

its navy as a subsidiary branch of its national defenses and attach chief importance to its army, as Russia shows. But countries like France and Germany, with both continental and maritime interests and both inland and maritime frontiers to defend, often maintain, in addition to their army, a respectable navy which enables them to defend their shores by action on the high seas or even to attack those of the enemy. By the time of the world war the German Empire had built up the second largest fleet in the world, but neither the government nor the people had learned to think navally, with the result that no proper use was made of this splendid weapon. In the half-century that had elapsed since the foundation of the Empire we had not got to understand the sea or, in consequence, the wider world, yet we insisted on trying to shine in that sphere; it was this discrepancy between our maritime ambitions and capabilities that was primarily to blame for the unfavorable position in which we found ourselves for the world war.

The moral is, that the will to the sea and even the possession of a splendid fleet are not enough to make a sea-power. Something more is required, to wit, a familiarity, a close intimacy with the sea that makes the whole nation think in terms of it and get the surge of the ocean wave into its very blood. The government cannot simply say, "From today onwards we are a nation of sailors"; no, the people and the sea have gradually to get used to one another and learn to reckon with one another, which is, of course, harder for Germany with her central position than for an island like Great Britain. When the latter turned herself from a nation of farmers into a nation of sailors she had no particular traditions of land-power to get rid of; Germany, on the other hand, has behind her a glorious and eventful history linking her with the continent (the Hansa towns had no influence on Germany as a whole), and finds it difficult to break away from it and turn to the sea, as the failure of her first effort in 1914-18 shows. France has never been lucky in her naval enterprises and has always

recruited her best sailors from the essentially un-French inhabitants of the Breton coast.

It seems, then, that a nation can never be both things, a land-power and a sea-power, with equal completeness, that it has to choose one or the other. Or is it after all possible that the compact mass of ninety-two million Germans in Central Europe may achieve both—hegemony in Europe and supremacy in the world outside? The fact that a riddle has not been solved does not prove that it is insoluble.

2. *Space as Such*.—An extremely significant, and from the military point of view supremely important, feature of any region is its mere area. Spaciousness makes for larger ideas and freer movement; it induces a feeling of greater distinctness from neighboring countries and therewith of increased security. Wide spaces tend to make people extravagant and presumptuous, whereas lack of space makes them economical and careful. The former breeds fatalists who let things drift and wait for the inevitable to happen, the latter prompts to prudence. Nations with a large territory can afford to retreat indefinitely before an invader and leave distance (*i.e.* his enormous distance from his base) to destroy him; a nation with a small territory has little room to retreat; it soon reaches its last line of defense, where it must conquer or die. The former is more apt for defense, the latter for attack. For the former, loss of territory is far from spelling defeat; the latter has to be prepared to fight tooth and nail for the smallest scrap of ground.

Russia and France are good examples of this. Both in 1812 and in 1915 the enemy penetrated deep into Russian territory, yet was unable to bring the government or the nation to its knees. On both occasions the difficulties of the enemy steadily increased as he got further from his base and his supplies of provisions and ammunition became more and more inadequate. The French suffered from lack of railways, the only things which minimize large distances; the Germans had enough of them, but were handicapped by the fact that they could only put a relatively small force

into the field. On the other hand, one has only to occupy a relatively small area in order to bring France to her knees. The parts of France that matter from the point of view of industry, war-material and public opinion, are all fairly near the north-eastern frontier; so that an army invading the country that way only has a very short way to go from its base, and its line of communications can be efficiently established in a few days. Besides, the whole soul of France being concentrated in its capital, the capture of Paris means the end of hostilities, and is therefore necessarily the principal object of any invader. In a war with Russia the objective must be always the destruction of her army; mere territorial gains as a result of driving it back are of no value whatever. In the case of France the essential thing is to occupy the all-important north plus the capital, both things being impossible, of course, without the defeat of the French army, so that they and it are almost synonymous.

This is the truth that the Germans came up against in 1914 and 1915. They wanted to push the French army back southwards and south-eastwards across the Marne, without also capturing Paris (see map 2). The extremely well-fortified Paris area, which remained on our right flank, made it possible for the French to keep a Sixth Army in reserve; it was this Army which turned the scale in the battle of the Marne and threw back our right wing. Paris may thus be said to have saved its country; indeed in the ensuing race of the two armies for the coast, its railway stations played a very important part, for they enabled the French to shift troops from their right to their left wing with the utmost rapidity. As regards Russia, the Germans missed their opportunity of enveloping the Russian army from the two sides of East Prussia and Galicia and annihilating it in 1915 (see map 6). Not having enough troops for this, they forced it back by a series of successful frontal attacks, until the Russians reached a comparatively advantageous position between Riga and Czernowitz, behind which they had a convenient base and could shift troops without difficulty. The loss of

territory was not a particularly serious matter either to the government or the nation, particularly as the provinces involved were non-Russian. The Russian revolution was not caused by it, but by the defeat of the army and the collapse of the industrial war-machine, after which the government, which was hated anyhow, ceased to be feared.

Space, wide or restricted, is the ruling power behind all military schemes and events. Plenty of room favors the defender, lack of it the attacker. Enveloping movements are easier to carry out in a small space; a retreat is favored by a large space, but soon comes to an inevitable end in a confined one. Wide spaces involve the attacker in exhausting marches, but enable the defender to retire gradually, stopping to offer resistance wherever and whenever he likes. Where distances are large the only way for the attacker is to get rid of them: this can be done if he knows how to translate space into time, *i.e.* to conquer distances by rapid means of communication. Railways, motor vehicles, whippet-tanks, cavalry and aeroplanes are the appropriate weapons of offense for large spaces.

3. *Frontiers and Coasts*.—One of the crucial features of any territory is its frontier, be it wet or dry. Wherever an organic thing, a plant, say, is dispersed over a certain area, one finds a decrease in density and strength towards the edge: but where two highly active and highly antithetical elements border upon one another, the expression of their individualities becomes intensified at the line of demarcation and takes on the character of attack and defense. The earth has two great frontiers of this kind to show us—the coast, where the land and sea contend with one another and come to terms; and the political frontier, along which two different and often hostile sets of aims and ambitions confront one another.

Nowhere does a nation need to take such care to mind, maintain and impose its nationality as in its frontier districts; nowhere has it to concentrate so much on defending itself against the evil designs of its neighbor. A country's

will to preserve its individuality is most clearly embodied in its outlying provinces; these are the prime representatives of its self-defensive spirit. The fact that the dwellers on the western borders of our realm—the North-Frankish Dutch and Flemings, the Frankish Luxemburgers and Lorrainers, the Alemannic Alsatians and Swiss—have lost all desire to be Germans or form part of the German State, is one of the root-causes of our weak position, and, of course, only explicable as the result of France's age-long hammering of our western frontier. We are paying heavily today for the First Reich's neglect of frontier problems (which are of even more decisive importance than internal ones). That was one of the contributory causes of the loss of the world war by the Second Reich. If we had been in peaceful possession of the coast of Holland and Flanders, and the channel ports from Amsterdam to Dunkirk (formerly even to Calais) had remained German, and if we had had the willing coöperation of the Alsatians and Lorrainers, we could have made short work of both England and France.

A frontier is the no-man's-land between two traditions, the line of demarcation between two forces. Hence, if the political and the national divisions coincide, it is the obvious battleground. The ideal frontier is clearly one which fits in with the situation and the conformation of the ground in such a way as to give one country a maximum of security and the most advantageous jumping-off ground against the other. France possesses in the western Alps an excellent natural frontier along the line of the passes, which gives her all sorts of military advantages. She also possessed, until 1918, an excellent natural frontier in the line of the Vosges, which left us, like the Italians in the former case, with all the disadvantages of having to climb up the steeper side.

National frontiers are seldom convenient for military purposes; they need judicious emendation by the state. The state will take care, among other things, to push the political frontier out beyond the national and linguistic frontier in pursuit of military security and strategic advantage, as

France did for centuries and again in 1918. The line of the upper Rhine and the lower Saar, combined with the demilitarization of German territory up to 30 miles east of the Rhine, gives the French army such a good jumping-off place that the next war is absolutely bound to be fought on German soil. The corresponding desirable frontier from the German point of view would run from somewhere west of Schönberg (Belfort) across the upper regions of the Meuse, west of Epinal, Toul, Valmy and Laon and along the Somme to Abbeville (see map 1).

Security demands that a country take care that its frontier has as few weak spots and as many vantage-points as possible. The north-eastern frontier of France is today essentially offensive in character (see map 4), which was only true of the Metz-Donnon section in Lorraine up to 1914; as regards this last, the Schlieffen-plan envisaged a French irruption into Lorraine through our weak left wing as a desirable contingency: unfortunately our Lorraine army advanced too precipitately and thus itself saved the enemy from falling into a dangerous trap.

A good natural frontier which takes advantage of the lie of the land needs very little fortification: in the first place, it fulfills its function even without being particularly strongly defended, through presenting all sorts of difficulties to the enemy; and in the second, it offers a very good vantage-point for vigorous attacks. Only a bad natural frontier requires to be strongly fortified, because it is easily rushed; and the extensive works and strong permanent garrisons which it necessitates make it a very expensive luxury. Moreover, bombardment by artillery and air is so effective that fortifications can easily be blown to bits. Fortifications cannot be moved; by requiring strong garrisons they weaken the army in the field, which is after all of more importance; they can be bottled up relatively easily and, on the top of everything, they soon become obsolete. For that reason the French have abandoned their fortifications since the war as being too rigid and have created fortified areas at important cen-

ters, connected by deeply dug-out positions and supported by barricades (see map 4).

A special form of frontier is the coast. Its distinguishing feature is that instead of two countries being immediately contiguous, there is an empty space between them, which, however, lends itself to an attack by either side. Only, the change from one element to the other means that the struggle takes on an entirely different form: the defender has to man a fleet if he is to put to sea, the attacker to bring over an army if he is to land on the enemy's coast. It is not a matter of just rushing a frontier: a fundamental change has to take place, and that, of course, presents uncommon difficulties. The Anglo-French attack on the Dardanelles in 1915 showed how hard it is even for a very strong fleet to effect a landing in the face of the opposition of a much weaker enemy. It is still more difficult to effect one on a treacherous coast such as the sandbanks of the German North-Sea coast, where the shallowness of the water compels an ocean-going fleet to anchor miles out to sea, leaving the troops to proceed in boats and on foot across the sands for miles under the enemy's fire. During the whole war the English never made the slightest attempt in this direction even at Westenland on the island of Sylt, the one and only place where ships of war can anchor a few yards from the shore.

A sand-banked coast may be self-defending, but there is always one place where it is open to attack, and that is its river-mouths. The best way to protect these is by removing sea-marks and beacon-lights and sowing mines; fortifications, for the reasons given above, are best left alone. In any case the best form of coast-defense is a railway-line plus a road running parallel to the coast-line but some distance from it, by which troops and heavy guns can be rushed to the threatened landing-place. Coast-defense troops must not be distributed evenly along the whole coast, but must be kept in readiness at the most naturally accessible points, so that they can be rushed to the spot at high speed in an emergency, on

receipt of aeroplane signals, it may be. In this way, perhaps with the additional support of submarines and battleships, the defender can manage with a minimum of troops and avoid the destruction of his fixed fortifications which may, besides, prove useless if the landing does not take place near them. And if the enemy should succeed in landing a force, it can always be bottled up, provided the place is, as it almost certainly will be, a remote one. A landing is only dangerous in cases where there is an island just opposite the coast (such as Heligoland) to serve as a base from which he can strike at vital spots—*e.g.* in Germany, Wilhelmshaven or Kiel or the Kiel Canal. Such vital spots are, of course, far more numerous on an island: a landing in England would constitute a far more serious menace to the country's vital centers than one in East Friesland, say; for an enemy who penetrates sixty miles into England, no matter from which coast he starts, strikes at its heart, whereas the very best he could hope for in Germany would be to reach Hamburg.

If it is difficult for the very strongest sea-power to attack a resolutely defended coast, it is correspondingly easy for a powerful fleet to use its own coast and territorial waters as a base of operations—or so one would have thought. The world war has, however, shown that this does not necessarily follow. The English fleet did not, it is true, attack the German coast, but, with the help of westerly winds and currents, it sowed the North Sea with mines to such an extent that our high-seas fleet could only venture forth with the greatest caution and under cover of mine-sweepers. It is in fact the nature of the sea rather than the shape of the coast that affects the movements of a fleet, and unfortunately the North Sea is a great sack of salt water in which the German fleet lay imprisoned.

4. *Land-forms.*—The size of a territory does not depend wholly on its area but also on its orographical features; indeed, the relation between height and width is so important that a smaller but level space may appear much bigger than a larger but broken-up one. Flat country enables armies to

operate on a wide front; mountains, on the other hand, impose a narrow one. It follows that the plain is the battleground of large armies, the mountains of small ones; or, to put it in another way, sheer numbers are more important in the plain than in the mountains; or, in still another way, mountains help the weaker side—even where it is the aggressor, as the German advance against the Rumanians in the Transylvanian Alps in 1916 showed. The reason is that in the network of mountain valleys even the largest army in the world cannot advance on a wider front than a quite small one, so that the forces actually confronting one another are always of equal strength. The maintenance of communication between the parties in the valleys by connecting-files advancing across the ridges and over the tops of the mountains is not usually very successful, because climbing-feats of this sort are exceedingly exhausting and in any case can only be carried out by small numbers. A particularly important feature of mountain warfare is the possibility of surrounding the enemy by the aid of lateral valleys, which enable resolutely led troops to clear the enemy out of the mountains without a frontal attack at all and thus make even the best positions untenable.

The plain and the mountains are at the opposite ends of the topographical scale. In the plain the eye travels horizontally in all directions; the sky is often more interesting to the imaginative onlooker than the earth itself; the way-faring man is a little dot, and as such either feels himself the center about which the plain around him revolves, or a drop lost in the infinite ocean. In the mountains the eye is always running up against a mountain wall; beetling rocks confront one on every side, and nature seems much more closely related to the individual man, because he is more aware of her details. The plain holds aloof from Man, the mountains open their arms to him. Such is the position considered esthetically; but from the military point of view the relative merits of the two types of country are quite different. The plain is the more convenient; in fact, it may be

called the natural theater of operations for large armies, as it interferes neither with their drawing up nor with their deployment; whereas mountains do everything to make neatly executed maneuvers impossible. An operation on such a scale as the German advance into Russia in 1915 could not have been carried out across the Alps. Flat country makes coördination possible, mountains destroy it. No general can defy this law of military geography with impunity. The leftward flanking movement of the Turks in December 1914, the idea of which was to go straight across the high mountain-ranges of Armenia and envelop the Russians, was thought out entirely in terms of the plain, not the mountains; it came to grief not only over the deep winter snow but also over the height and precipitousness of the mountains and the rough and broken character of the country.

If Alpine country is simply highland country on a vastly larger scale, hilly country may be called a slightly lesser form of plain. In highland country the mountain-masses are of moderate size, and differences of altitude run to a few hundred feet; plateaux and rounded humps, with valleys running up into them and foaming streams are the characteristic features. In alpine country altitudes are twice as great or more; hence steep inclines are the general rule, and plateaux and humps give place to great precipitous ridges and peaks separated by steep shelving ravines; the upper slopes are snow-covered either eternally or for the greater part of the year and many of the passes are impassable during winter. The supreme importance of passes as the only means of communication between valleys is no doubt the most prominent distinguishing feature of alpine as opposed to highland country. Highlands have no passes; the way from one valley to another is more usually over some sort of plateau and is not restricted to a single narrow line. In alpine country, if you try to get out of a valley via the head, you find yourself shut in by mountain walls, on the other side of which the valley slopes down again. From this we may deduce the following law of military geography;—a highland range is his

who holds the inner table-land, an alpine range his who holds the passes. France controls the western Alps because the passes belong to her, not to Italy; consequently an attack by Italian troops on this side is pretty well doomed to failure from the start, which greatly reduces the value of Italy as an ally against France.

In hilly country the movement of troops is not very much more difficult, as far as the mere undulating character of the ground is concerned, than on the flat. It is only visibility that suffers, which means that troops can be massed under cover. In hilly country it is even possible to find protection against horizontal fire. The only things that might impede progress are marshes on the lower levels and woods on the higher.

While we are on this subject, there are two features that demand attention, the margin of the mountains and the mountain valley. Like all frontiers, the margin of the mountain is a confrontation of contradictory elements; it means a change of altitude and direction, differences in water-supply and vegetation, denser settlement, valley-gateway scenery. This in turn necessitates a complete change in the character of military operations; unity is lost and the big formations are split up into separate columns. The advancing army on entering mountain-country has to switch over to guerilla warfare and be prepared for attacks on its flanks and even on its rear. Conversely, an army descending from the mountains has to reckon with the numerical superiority of the enemy in the plain, who has it in his power to inflict a defeat at the moment of deployment from column-of-route to line-of-battle, a defeat that may become decisive owing to the line of retreat being blocked by the mountains.

The mountain valley is, taken by itself, undoubtedly the most dangerous form of country in existence for an advancing army. The high steep slopes, impossible to see over and difficult to climb, which enclose it enable a far inferior force to defend it with success. This is particularly true of alpine valleys, where humps and moraines, steep slopes and pre-

precipitous ledges, walls of rock and overhanging crags, concealed heights and hidden coombs afford the defense an infinite number of vantage-points which not even artillery fire and aeroplanes can be guaranteed to clean up. A ledge of rock with a waterfall dropping down over it may form a gigantic and absolutely insurmountable barrier; the one possible way to the top is probably a narrow zig-zag footpath, which only *alpini* with light mule-drawn guns can negotiate; ordinary troops are completely held up.

Obviously, plain-dwellers cannot do their best as soldiers in the mountains, and vice-versa. To be able to perform his duties efficiently among high mountains, a man needs training, both for the muscles of his legs and of his heart, in coping with differences of altitude, and has to be accustomed to rapid changes of atmospheric pressure; moreover, he needs a quite different sort of eye for country: he must be able to judge distances and see a very long way. Mountain warfare also, of course, demands special equipment—snow-boots and crampons, guns that take to pieces, pack-mules and all the rest of it. Let no general staff imagine that plain-bred troops can be turned into mountain troops by special drill and equipment—far from it. The *alpino* must be at home in the mountains, the blood of countless generations of alpine peasants, cowherds and chamois-hunters must run in his veins, so that a long climb up four or five thousand feet and down again at once, with a thorough wetting on the way maybe, is nothing to him. It must come as a matter of course to him to take big short-cuts over stiff slopes. His eye must be able to identify a brownish spot hidden between the gray of the rock and the green of the pines on the other side of the valley several miles away as a chamois, and his mountain-sense must be so strongly developed that he at once strikes the right way, with due regard to the direction of the wind, to get him round to the animal in the shortest possible time. Troops of this character are able to hold up even a stronger enemy and make his advance a very slow and tricky busi-

ness. Plain-bred troops in their place would fail utterly, however excellent in themselves.

5. *Climate*.—After the ground, the most important phenomenon engaging the commander's attention is the air. The air is the element in which the soldier lives, moves and has his being, which acts on his skin and affects his nerves, and has a mysterious power of elating or depressing him in such a degree that the issue of a battle may depend on it. There is a windy, very dry sort of air which acts on the system like champagne, tunes up all the vital powers to the utmost degree and spurs on the veriest laggard to deeds of daring. And there is another kind, windless and moisture-laden—to be found not only in the tropics, where it is the regular thing during the rainy-season, but also in our part of the world, before a thunderstorm or when the sirocco is blowing—which creeps along the veins like lead and takes away all energy. Where it is just a passing accident of the weather, a general need not pay any special attention to it; but as soon as it becomes a question of long periods, he has to take it into account. In a heavy hothouse atmosphere an army cannot be made to march in thick clothes and heavy packs with impunity, and its offensive spirit must not be put to too severe a test.

In the science of national defense, as in that of meteorology, too little attention is paid to the momentary psychological effects of climate. (The permanent influence of their climate on the various races will be discussed in several contexts further on.) A gloomy gray sky hung with low slate-colored clouds, the sullen light, unrelieved by shadow, which it sheds over the earth, probably one icy blast after another, and at intervals a heavy downpour of rain which makes the roads slippery and hard going—such conditions very quickly find a psychological expression in a discouraged, embittered and even despairing frame of mind, which has made many a man, for the moment, let all ideas of martial glory go hang. The southern sun of the desert, beating down from an unchanging blue sky, gets right into the sweating

open pores and encloses the parched body like a burning fiery furnace, till you can hardly drag one foot after another out of the sand; not a bit of shade anywhere; even rests are no good where there is no shade and the air is like an oven; your water-bottle is exhausted, your gums ache with dry heat, your rifle feels as if it weighed a ton and its barrel is so hot that you can barely touch it;—an army struggling with conditions like that is also ripe for sudden destruction. Atmospheric pressure also has a strong psychological effect; it diminishes, of course, as one goes higher, and the amount of oxygen in the air diminishes with it. This is another reason, in addition to those mentioned on p. 25, why lowland troops cannot be advantageously employed in highland or mountainous country; their hearts are not equal to the combined strain of breathing in the rarefied air and violent exercise. A general must therefore reckon with a rapid increase of casualties with every hundred feet he climbs after about 4,500 feet above sea-level. Disturbances which were only mental at first soon become physical, in the form of headaches, giddiness, singing in the ears, bleeding at the nose, vertigo and fainting, so that the men are in very poor condition for resisting the attacks of an enemy accustomed to the mountains.

The movement of the air, or wind, may also, in extreme cases, play a part in the struggle, *e.g.* in a burning sand-storm in the desert or a snow-storm, both of which destroy visibility and make it difficult to preserve direction. Besides that, wind affects the trajectory of a projectile, particularly in the case of artillery, the movements of aircraft and the spread of poison-gas. In this respect Germany's position in the heart of the west, and thus half-way between a definitely oceanic climate in the west and a definitely continental climate in the east, is extremely unfavorable; in both cases our troops have the prevailing wind against them, a fact which often obtruded itself in an alarming and even dangerous manner in the early days before methods of letting off poison-gas had been perfected. A strong wind further

makes flying more difficult, and this gives the enemy a chance to carry out important movements in the way of relieving, transferring and concentrating troops.

The temperature of the air is important not only for its psychological effects but also for its effects on the country. A drop below freezing-point makes even a slight wind seem icy and turns precipitations into snow. In flat country snow obliterates all landmarks; but on a mountain it makes certain steep masses of rock stand out sharply and enables one to take precise bearings, which is especially useful to artillery. Considered as a covering for the ground, snow is always a nuisance: it hinders all movement and tires out men on the march very rapidly. The melting of the snow in spring is often particularly troublesome, making the roads and fields impassable, as happens in Russia especially and in all mountain country. The most useful cold-weather phenomenon from the military point of view is ice when it forms bridges of sufficient thickness over rivers or makes marshy areas of the size of the Pinsk marshes passable. Its opposite, excessive heat and dryness, cannot dry up really large marshes, as they are on the ground-water level. In central Europe the heat in summer never rises to inconvenient heights for more than a short time, at most a few weeks; it can easily be dealt with by thinner clothing and plenty of drinking-water. In southern countries it demands more careful attention of course: troops must be given thin, light-colored clothing, larger water-bottles, and, for marshy regions, protection against mosquitoes. The only completely safe protection against sun is the *topi* made of light cork and ventilated; it must never be taken off as long as the sun is out, and is also very useful against the full moon, which is highly dangerous in the south. It is possible to get moon-stroke as well as sun-stroke, as the author himself once learned to his cost in north Africa.

The amount of moisture in the air determines not only the pressure of steam, which is noxious to body and soul alike, but also the large or small amount of precipitations.

The more moisture the air contains—whether it is hot or cold makes no difference—the more unbearable it is, like a Turkish bath in the one case, like a cellar in the other. When the thermometer is above freezing-point all precipitations take the form of rain. Rain limits visibility (except that the distance often becomes particularly clear after it, owing to its cleansing effect on the air, the colors in the ground showing up especially vividly), and it also incommodes the man who has it in his face and distracts his attention. But the most important effect of heavy rain is the change it brings about in the earth's surface, by messing-up roads and flooding rivers, ponds and swamps. Only well-built roads with properly made foundations and surfaces drained by deep ditches and, if possible, tarred, such as are the rule in England today, can stand up against the heaviest rains. In countries where the roads are bad, *e.g.* the whole of eastern Germany, rain, combined with traffic, rapidly transforms them into deeply furrowed morasses, which each successive lot of troops makes wider by walking along the side. Every spring in Galicia and Poland one saw wagons stuck fast in these road-morasses (*rasputizza*) up to their axles. The exchange of heavy transport-wagons for light conveyances of the local type gets over the difficulty tolerably well, though, of course, the only really efficient remedy is to re-make the roads, for which purpose the geological expert would have to locate supplies of stone and rubble as near as possible to them.

6. *Ground-water, Rivers, and Lakes.*—In this terrestrial form water assumes an increased importance for the commander. It adapts itself to the lie of the land, forms part of the surface of the earth, and has to be taken into account as a permanent condition in planning any operation. There is a great difference from the point of view of military science between well-watered and ill-watered or absolutely waterless countries. In the first-named there is no difficulty about water-supply, but great difficulty about the movement of troops, *inter alia*; in waterless countries the position

is just the opposite. Thus it may be said that water as a substance is always a help, but as a feature in the landscape always a hindrance. In the former case most importance attaches to streams and springs, whose plentifulness and value it is the business of the geologists and hygienists to determine. In the second, rivers, swamps and lakes are all important, for they cut the country up into definite sections and enable the weaker force to put up a successful resistance. Every river-valley, on account of its shape and particularly its long stretch of water, is such an effective barrier that it retards any advance by its mere existence and enables a defending force to put a powerful spoke in the wheel of an offensive. In flat country the river-valleys, being the only naturally strong positions, play the same part as the ridges in mountain country; what passes do in the mountains, bridges and fords do in the valleys, namely, force an advancing line to compress itself into a perpendicular dropped plumb on one point, the only difference being that river-passages are much more exposed to artillery-fire and aerial bombs, as they are in a more open position and therefore more easily got-at from all sides. Hence crossing a river under fire in general accounts for more lives than crossing a pass. The obstructive efficacy of a river-valley depends, even more than on the river itself, on the existence of a marshy belt along its banks, such as can be crossed neither in boats nor by swimming and is in many cases completely impassable. A far-sighted government is therefore recommended to leave valleys near the frontier as they are, if they are conveniently situated, and not drain them. The north-east of France has the tremendous advantage, from the point of view of defense, that most of its river-valleys are so placed as to be useful in beating off an enemy. It would be a great help to any enemy of France if he could some day have a few of these valleys at his disposal for defense against French attacks; the upper reaches of the Moselle and the Aisne, also the Somme, would suit the purpose admirably.

Very large sheets of water do not afford such good military protection, for they enable the enemy not only to transport troops and war-material in great quantities, but also to employ a fleet, an arm which may work havoc on a land-force, since it can always retire after bombarding it. Broad but very shallow expanses of water, on the other hand, such as swamps and artificial inundations, are an extremely effective method of stopping an enemy's progress. They must be too deep to wade but not deep enough for any kind of craft, a requirement best fulfilled where the bottom is muddy and thus adds to the depth as far as the pedestrian is concerned by sucking him in. Our right flank was brought to a standstill in Flanders on October 30, 1914, purely by an inundation produced by opening the sluices of Nieupoort. Since the War the French government has made arrangements by which certain sections of French Flanders (from Calais to Douai) and Lorraine (south of Saarbrücken) can be flooded in case of need (map 4).

Ground-water, to which no military importance had hitherto been attached, proved an important factor in position warfare. Ground-water is rain-water which filters through porous substances like sand, gravel, sandstone or chalk till it reaches an impermeable stratum—clay, marl, slate or granite—and collects there. From the point of view of military geography it is important because it supplies all wells and springs and, if it rises high, also floods trenches and dug-outs. To judge the ground-water is the job of the military geologist, who is in a position to estimate the possibility of counter-measures, such as lowering its level by boring through the seam on which it rests or moving the position to a drier spot, possibly quite close by. Of course, where the ground-water lies immediately below the surface, as in Flanders and all river-valleys, the only alternatives are to concrete the position or move to drier ground.

All lines or sheets of water, be it noted finally, form a particularly effective defense against attack by tanks, that bitter scourge of our final rear-guard action on the western

front. Tanks need firm ground to be steered properly; on slippery or wet ground they become unsteady and unmanageable. River-valleys, swamps, ponds and lakes put all tanks completely out of action.

7. *Vegetation.*—The vegetation of any particular region is of no less importance for its military character than for its scenic qualities and color-values. Cultivated or overgrown country enables one to do more without being seen, besides supplying an army with food and fodder; uncultivated or exposed country supplies it with nothing and makes it difficult to find cover. Troops in the desert or on snow and ice can only hope to remain unobserved in one way, by protective coloring in the form of white or yellow clothing. In woods and bushes, heath or steppe, even in fields or meadows, they have a good chance of hiding behind the vegetation or merging in the color of their background.

Wooded and cultivated country not only provides cover and, among other things, food, but also gives the men an increased feeling of security, even where modern weapons succeed in getting through big tree-trunks. Park-land, which combines visibility with cover and enables an army to remain in some sort of touch with the outside world, is often more efficacious than woodland in heightening the sense of security. Thick woods are very apt to make men feel lost and bewildered, particularly when shots from an invisible hand come whistling through the branches. Wood-fighting, owing to the danger of missing one's way and losing direction and the length of time during which a cool-headed sniper can carry on without being detected, is one of the most suspect forms of warfare, especially where troops unaccustomed to the woods are pitted against trained sharpshooters.

In modern war woods have one great value: they make it possible to move up and concentrate large masses of men without attracting the attention of the enemy, even of his air-scouts. There can be no better position for artillery, staffs and observation-stations than in a wood, as long as the

upper branches of the trees round them are carefully preserved from being cut down for firewood or building. In the north-east of France (as the author himself observed in the Champagne country) there are any number of young plantations of pine-trees, a few hundred yards long and a few dozen yards thick, one set some two hundred yards behind the other and all facing east or north-east. They provided excellent cover and may well owe their existence to systematic forethought.

Great importance will in future attach to the margins of woods, as they afford excellent protection against tank-attacks; the serried ranks of trees stop the tanks and enable resolute storm-troops to come up to them unobserved and finish them off by hand-to-hand fighting. Cavalry has always tried to avoid woods, as everybody knows. Woods are the infantry-man's paradise, and he is most advantageously placed at the wood's edge: there, or behind a marshy section of a river-valley, he is equal to any tank- or cavalry-attack. Armies ill-supported with tanks will in future have to pay increased attention to these natural features.

Steppes, savannahs, heath- or meadow-country, fields and pasture-land, on the other hand, are the paradise of mounted and mobile troops, presenting practically no natural obstacles and giving plenty of room for them to spread themselves out, so that they can easily approach and outflank the enemy's position. In the open steppe a force of infantry would have no chance if attacked by a mounted and mechanized enemy, for he alone can cope with the distances, being able to get across them faster than infantry can. Now, speed means everything in the steppe or the desert—above all, water, which nobody can do without.

8. *Settlement*.—It is of capital importance for the strategic qualities of a region, no less than for its general aspect, whether it is settled or unsettled, and if settled, whether sparsely or densely. Unsettled regions give an impression of yawning vacuity, and even when they are in themselves beautiful they are depressing and not really attractive. Set-

tled ones strike the stranger as more home-like. Man only feels at home with nature when he has mastered her and set the mark of his spirit on her by various buildings. A steppe, even a desert, takes on a new aspect the moment one sees the black streak of the palms of an oasis shimmering on the horizon; a vast formless expanse of primeval forest loses much of its terribleness if it is broken up, relieved and made lighter by clearings. The most miserable hut seems more beautiful here to wanderers who have lost their way than a mansion in a well-kept park.

From the point of view of military geography, however, the fact that a region is settled may have various effects. Scattered farms with small resources are not of much help to a big army except in so far as they provide the staff with a roof over its head. Again, very densely populated areas—especially definitely industrial districts with their factories and mine-shafts, slag-heaps and railway-lines, their towns and their villages all touching one another—act as great obstacles, or safe strongholds, as the case may be. Being so built-over they prevent a stronger enemy from deploying freely and enable a weaker one to put up an obstinate defense. It looks as if it was this property of industrialized country which induced the Schlieffen plan to turn south even before reaching the industrial districts of northern France, *i.e.* to the east of them, with the unfortunate result that the chance of capturing the Channel coast, with its ports which later exercised a decisive influence on the struggle, was missed. What difficulties and losses fighting actually inside an industrial area involves was demonstrated in August 1914 between Liege and Namur, where the street-fighting, in itself a terrible form of warfare, took particularly brutal forms, owing to the treacherous Walloon character, still further degraded by proletarianization. The peculiarity of street-fighting is that in it everything is leagued against the invader; every house becomes a fortress belching fire from its cellar and ground-floor windows; every wall, every door becomes a mountain which has to be scaled

afresh, every side-street a trap. The defender, knowing the ground inside out, can almost always get away with impunity when the situation seems to demand it, and resume the fight elsewhere in the most unexpected manner. Every garden, court, passage, window, alley-way and square gives him the chance to spring a new surprise, whereas the attacker is like a man feeling his way in the dark.

A special form of industrialized country is the modern great city. It is equally dependent on the country for its food, and can therefore be isolated from it and starved out, or drained dry by cutting off its water-supply (Paris *e.g.* gets its water from the Genevese Alps); but this demands a relatively strong investing force. For a defender who is prepared to let it suffer, the great city is a very strong position; but the thought of all that has gone to the making of its architectural, economic and spiritual fabric, and the difficulty of replacing it, will usually cause him to surrender it without a struggle. In many cases a mere threat to such a sensitive nerve-center is enough to secure its evacuation; Paris in August 1914 and again in May 1918 is an example. An invasion of England would probably achieve a striking success by merely threatening great industrial cities like Birmingham, Manchester, Newcastle and London; for the destruction of these would mean the end of England as an industrial, commercial and naval power. Even if the great city as such is a source of strength, it is extremely sensitive to attack, and in the long run as little capable of holding out against air-raids, gas and shelling as against starvation and drought; particularly as a great city destroyed is no longer a great city and has therefore lost the justification for its existence.

Settled territory when it is laid waste becomes a devastated area, such as was to be seen all along the permanent lines of trenches, in the part of east Prussia ravaged by the Russians, and, as a result of systematic destruction, in front of the Siegfried Line. The only creature who can survive in such areas, apart from the rats, is the well-dug-in soldier

who sticks to his ground like a limpet in this underground burrowing warfare, however often it is blown up. Everything that served peaceful purposes is irreparably destroyed here, only the system of defense is in perfect working order. Woods and fields, towns and villages, houses and farms, streets and gardens look as if they had been shorn off, or resemble fallen-in heaps of earth between which active life only manifests itself under cover of darkness.

9. *Landscape*.—Over and above the individual features of the country, the total effect of the whole, the landscape itself, must not be neglected by the science of defense. The visual impression which a piece of country makes on a stranger entering it, when translated into psychological terms, affects his martial spirit. Lowland troops invading alpine country labor under a sense of the vastness of nature and of their own littleness; they are handicapped from the start, for their morale only is upset and weakened. Steep, dark mountain-sides, thundering water-falls, the treacherous green glint of glaciers and the whistling of the icy mountain wind are all things to intimidate a man who is unaccustomed to them. Similarly, the sight of the shadeless, glaring desert landscape, all reddish-yellow and blazing blue, has a terrifying effect on the town-dweller. Or it may be southern troops are pitchforked into a cold, sunless country, full of grey mists and clouds, all dark greens and blue distances: they lose all pleasure in life, all fighting spirit, the melancholy of the northern landscape eats into their souls and destroys their stamina to such an extent that panic is quite liable to seize hold of these children of the sun and cause them to flee in disorder from their grim surroundings. It is not only the climate that upsets southern troops in the north and northern troops in the south by freezing or roasting them as the case may be; it is also the psychological effect of an overwhelmingly strange and therefore hostile nature, which destroys their nerve and produces homesickness and the desire to get away at all costs.

It is possible that such aversion from unfamiliar scenes

may be obviated by previous rational instruction concerning their peculiarities. Once Man has grasped a thing with his intellect, it loses much of its emotional significance for him. A furnace-like, reddish-yellow desert of sand-dunes, which dazzles his eyes and exhausts his legs, becomes less terrifying to the individual man when he knows how it has been produced by the wind blowing in a certain direction and how far it extends, than when he looks upon it as an endless hell inhabited by evil spirits.

IV. THE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF WAR

Territory and population have a material relation to each other, which is expressed by the density of population, *i.e.* the total number of people divided by the number of square kilometers. In our open country seventy to seventy-five persons to the square kilometer represents a healthy state of affairs, that is to say, one in which the ground is properly cultivated and every individual can make a decent living. If the figure rises to 120 or 130, it implies an overstraining of economic capacities, the corn being forced on by artificial manure and profitable seams being worked for industrial purposes. Where, in our country, it falls below twenty-five, it implies a failure on the part of Man to possess the earth. The figure of seventy-five—in our plains, of course—indicates a sound, adequately populated peasant country with large farms; 125 or over means industrialized country, with a cleavage between peasants and townspeople and opposition between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. To quote examples, Germany, Belgium and England are seriously over-populated, France is comfortably populated, Russia is, for the purposes of modern war, under-populated.

Now, if we consider these three stages from the point of view of the economics of war, we shall find that over-populated countries are easily able to raise large armies and also to equip, arm and reënforce them properly, but not to secure their food-supply out of their own resources in a long war.

Under-populated countries are equally able, if their territory is large (and only then), to raise vast armies and also to feed them, provided their network of communications is adequate; but they cannot out of their own resources equip or arm them for a long war. In the former case, the well-armed soldier goes hungry, in the latter the well-fed soldier soon exhausts his ammunition and is left defenseless. A moderately populated country, on the other hand, can produce enough food for its own purposes, perhaps even a surplus, and can also find its own equipment and munitions; the latter may run a little short after a time, but it will always be in some measure equal to the demands of a war on the economic side at least.

The moral is that over- and under-populated countries are totally incapable of carrying on a long war without economic dependence on external sources of supply, whereas moderately populated ones are in a much better position to do so. Hence a war against either of the two former has to be waged with both economic and military weapons, but with an enemy of the last-named type is a purely military contest. The foundation of all economic war is the blockade, which cuts the enemy off from the outside world and starves him of food and raw materials. In the world war England was the one country to grasp the truth and transcendent importance of this from the beginning, and she acted on it with merciless consistency. The commercial English showed a greater grasp of realities than the two heroic nations, France and Germany, who placed all their hopes of victory in the points of their swords.

The way England got through the war, while Germany, shut off from the world, was starved out, is an illustration of the first case, the collapse of almost-isolated Russia of the third.

In earlier times, when sparsely populated, self-supporting countries maintained small armies, peace was more expensive, from a military point of view, than war. In peace-time the mercenary army cost a lot of money and produced noth-

ing; it was only during actual war that it paid its way, by living on the inhabitants of a foreign, or even its own, country. The expense of re-equipment during hostilities was negligible, as the consumption of war-material was so small.

Today the whole situation is reversed. A peace-time army is certainly expensive, but nothing to one on active service; for a piece of enemy country, supposing it is occupied, cannot do much to feed an army of millions on the modern scale, and the consumption of war-material is so prodigious that financial resources are strained to the utmost. A modern war, even supposing it subsequently pays for itself, is an orgy of wealth-destruction while it lasts.

It was only with the growth of population and manufacturing-capacity, and the extension of the economic systems of the European nations till they embraced the whole world, that war could assume a double aspect, economic and military. No non-self-supporting country (*e.g.* Germany, and still more England, as regards foodstuffs, Russia as regards manufactured goods) can carry on a war today unless it maintains economic contact with the outside world. Such a country will only be able in the future to maintain itself as a political and military power with the aid of economically advantageous alliances. The moment it is politically isolated, its position in the event of war is hopeless from the very start. Hoarding of supplies may put off the evil day, it may even in exceptional cases render a favorable military issue possible; but it can hardly check the unfavorable course of events. For the hoarders either hoard too much, in which case huge stocks go bad and get wasted; or they hoard too little, and thus do not prevent the final disaster. Besides, such stocks are always liable to premature destruction through treachery or surprise attack. The destruction of material in the world war exceeded all previous calculations many times over. Slightly industrialized counties in particular can no longer carry on a long war off their own bat, now that industry has brought in the battle of material alongside of the strategic contest. Three days of such a battle can

almost disarm a large army, unless it immediately receives adequate new supplies. Russia, with hardly any industry and almost cut off from her industrialized allies, began to suffer from lack of reserves as early as the end of 1914—not from any lack of recruits, of whom there were more than enough, but because her industry could only clothe and equip relatively small numbers. Among the new levies one rifle had to do duty between anything from five to ten men. The existing supply of rifles was completely used up within three months of the outbreak of war, and it was only from April 1915 onwards that the armament-factories began to produce somewhat larger supplies; the situation was only relieved after long delays by consignments from Japan and America. The non-industrial character of the country thus most markedly delayed and hampered the training of new levies, which were in many cases sent to the front unarmed, to pick up the arms of the dead.

Foodstuffs and Raw Materials.—The question of a country's equipment for war needs the most careful thinking out. The shortage or absence of a comparatively uimportant raw material—such as nickel, for instance—may seriously hamper the conduct of the war; if a more important one is involved, it may paralyze it. The Englishman Lord Curzon once remarked, "We won the War on waves of oil." Lack of oil, on the other hand, was a very serious obstacle to the Central Powers; for we were only able to produce just enough petrol for our aeroplanes, motor-transport and U-boats, not for tanks, to which we were unable to pay the attention they deserved. If Germany continues in the future to be cut off from the oil-fields of the world without finding an ally among the powers that control them, she will be unable to carry on a war; for her own oil supplies have so far proved utterly inadequate. The only thing that could restore our freedom of movement would be the liquefaction of coal.

Now, which are the most important materials, without which modern war—*i.e.* war on a huge scale both in men and material, and of long duration—cannot be carried on

at all? Among foodstuffs the crucial ones are:—rye, potatoes, fat, sugar, cattle for slaughtering, horses, alcohol; perhaps also cocoa, coffee and tea. Among raw materials for industry, the most important are:—coal, oil, iron, copper, nickel, lead, sulphur, manures; also timber, wool and cotton, rubber and perhaps silk. Germany could provide all the necessities of life (except, of course, those that came from the colonies), and probably even in tolerably sufficient quantities, granted timely restrictions all round and a system of rationing for the whole country. As regards raw materials for industry, coal is the only case where she would be able to meet the increased demand; for the rest she would continue to depend on the accumulation of stocks and on imports. Since it will probably not be possible to keep stocks of everything needed for war-industry in sufficient quantities and good condition, such a state is always bound to be dependent on another one that is capable of supplying it with those materials. The chief oil-fields of the world being in the hands of the United States, England, Russia and Rumania, it follows that Germany will never be able to carry through another war unless she can make sure of an undisturbed supply from one of these four countries; for an army without motor-transport ceases to be a mobile army. It is nevertheless conceivable that we might, by means of vast underground bomb-proof reservoirs, accumulate oil in advance to enable us to carry on for at least one year or a little longer. But there are other raw materials which are less easily stored. And in any case this kind of hoarding is expensive and uncertain at the best of times; for world prices may fall heavily, involving the loss of millions of public money, or again, enemy spies may destroy your stocks of many materials; even the largest and best-guarded reservoir of oil may be destroyed at one blow by a single lighted match.

There are thus six possible ways of being economically prepared for war. A country may either (1) possess and manufacture all the necessary raw materials within its own

borders—this is the simplest and best way, but scarcely realizable outside the United States; (2) have the command of the sea, and therefore of world trade, as England has; or (3) be allied with a nation in one of these two first positions, in which case its ally need only supply the raw materials essential for war, not manufacture them; or (4) grab hold of a suitable country from which it can take the necessary raw materials for the duration of the war; or (5) on the principle that security is more important than money, lay in sufficient stocks to enable it to stand a war, or at least fight on till it conquers raw-material-producing territories from the enemy; or (6) the last and most desperate case, a country may be faced with a supreme struggle for its very existence, the issue of which rests from the beginning with the will of God and the heroic temper of its soldiers. All questions of alliances are likely in the future to be powerfully affected by economic considerations of this kind.

If I have spoken with only qualified approval of the hoarding of raw materials for war, that does not, obviously, apply to ready-manufactured articles, such as arms, ammunition, uniforms and other military equipment. These are just the things of which stocks exceeding all estimates must be lying ready before the outbreak of war, in order that the enormous, incalculable (and, in the world war, terribly under-estimated) destruction and wear and tear may be made good at once. As time no less than space spells advantage in war, delay in replenishing depleted stocks may have a particularly disastrous effect at the beginning.

The military security of "key" industrial areas and depots is of course a matter requiring the most careful attention from the outset. The best system is to have them in the center of the country and in the most inaccessible, and thus easily defensible, areas. France has of late years concentrated its war-industry more and more in its central plateau, far removed from the insecure north. The western position of the Ruhr basin—not to mention the Saar and Upper Silesia—is the worst Achilles' heel of our war-industry; an alert

enemy can reach it by air within a few hours of the declaration of war, and invade it by land in a couple of days. In addition to the industrial areas, the network of communications also, of course, needs special protection, both the routes leading to the army and the routes by which raw materials come in from abroad. This, however, takes us into the sphere of the geography of communications in war.

Only a nation of traders could have conceived, developed and carried through the economic strategy of war. England, by her blockade of Germany in the world war, has won for herself this sorry title to fame, and she will have no right to be surprised if this weapon is one day turned against her and she is herself blockaded and starved out. England completely cut off direct supplies to our ports, and even prevented supplies from reaching us via neutral ports by restricting the quantity of goods entering them to the bare minimum necessary for the neutrals' own use, so that they had no surplus to hand on to us. Moreover, at England's instigation, all German property in enemy countries was confiscated and all German interests were wiped out; for German competition in the world's markets was to be crippled as thoroughly and as permanently as possible. England's primary war-aim was no doubt the destruction of the Germany navy, which was held to constitute a threat to her world supremacy and her insular security; but she was also fighting for the destruction of German commerce, in so far as it had made itself felt as a competitor in the markets of the world.

V. THE GEOGRAPHY OF COMMUNICATIONS IN WAR

Transportation, whether of human beings, cattle or goods, originates in the desire for an advantageous change of place, and employs appropriate means, which are set in motion in such a way as to avoid obstacles arising from friction or high costs. As far as war is concerned, transport is limited to those movements which are necessary to the attainment of

its objectives. Such movements subserve the purposes either of purely military transport, that is to say, the movement of the army and the fleet, or of war-industry—both by land and water, of course, in either case.

War is the setting in motion of the concentrated forces of two countries against each other. It is therefore in the highest degree an affair of the geography of communications, since all movement is in some sort dependent on the properties of the earth's surface as regards area and contour. All traffic, whether peaceful or otherwise, seeks the line of least resistance and snatches what advantage it can from the earth. The commander also strives to make his dispositions in such a way that his troops may benefit by the lie of the land while the enemy are hampered by it, or even prevented altogether from moving. There is no human activity so firmly rooted in geography as commanding an army. From its mobilization and deployment to the battle-field, and thence to the pursuit or the retreat, and finally to the occupation of the enemy's country or the surrender of one's own—war is movement all the way, and therefore closely bound up with questions of military geography.

Two fundamentally different phases have, however, to be distinguished here. The first, consisting of mobilization and deployment, can be planned beforehand and demands lengthy preparation, in which railways, first brought within the domain of strategy in about 1859 by Moltke, play the chief part. Hence the number of strategic railways heading towards the frontier and the enemy cannot be too large. Since the War the French have built a series of railways, forming a regular line of spikes, to their north-eastern frontier, where they can unload vast numbers of soldiers at a moment's notice (see map 4). The second phase, which consists of the approach to battle, maneuvers during battle, and the pursuit or retirement, cannot be completely determined beforehand; for, quite apart from the lie of the land and the sudden change for the worse in the means of communication, the enemy also has his little say in the matter, and

his ideas remain concealed till the moment when they become facts. The commander whose mind does not move fast enough here will also lessen the mobility of his army. This lack of mobility may have serious, even fatal, effects in the first phase too. In the War, for instance, the German higher command declared itself unable to carry out a surprise attack on Russia on the eastern front: it was unable to shake off its dependence on the railway system, which was devised with an offensive on the west in mind. Hence it has been justly said that railways are good servants but bad masters.

All movements of troops must be governed by the unshakeable rule, "Be as strong as you possibly can at the decisive point, and only as strong as you absolutely need at other points." Disregard of this fundamental principle is proof of a defective acquaintance with the geography of the theater of war, and, in a war on more than one front, of a false estimate of the strength of at least one of the two enemies. In August and September 1914 Germany broke this age-old rule in two ways, first by sending too few troops to the West for a rapid victory and too many to the East for just holding the enemy, and secondly, by having in the West too many men on the unimportant left and too few on the decisive right. Austria-Hungary also broke this rule, inasmuch as she was too weak on the Russian front, but on the less important Serbian front too strong for merely holding the enemy and yet not strong enough to attack him successfully.

The eye of the strategist will look upon the country and its means of communication in a different light according as he is concerned with attack or defense. The attack seeks to make use of a country's advantages, the defense of its disadvantages. A wide expanse of bog like the Pinsk marshes served the Russians as a natural defense, which they incorporated in their front, thus effecting a very desirable economy in men and material; whereas the Germans tried to find a way round such a formidable obstacle. Ignorance on the part of the commander of the peculiar nature of a coun-

try's communications leads to defeat or diminishes success. The German advance in the spring and summer of 1915 in Russia failed to grasp—or rather, owing to the complete “westernism” of the higher command, rejected—the possibility, so abundantly offered by the geographical situation, of enveloping the enemy from the East-Prussian and the Galician sides; with the result that the advance had to be carried out frontally at the cost of heavy losses. The Russians, who were unable to sustain even the frontal attack of the Germans, in the course of their retreat made extremely effectual use of the numerous rivers running north and south to delay the German advance, and thus managed to preserve their army as an entity. Mountain ranges, transverse river-valleys, large sheets of water and marshes are the most serious obstacles to the movement of armies; on the other hand, flat or undulating plains (provided their great size does not have the effect of lengthening distances and so losing time), hilly country, high plateaux and longitudinal river-valleys are favorable to them. The defender will prefer the former, the attacker the latter.

In this connection the general geographical position of the country also counts for something. Here Germany had the great advantage of the inner line during the War. Her railway-system had two strategic foci, one in the West, the other in the East or South. The railways of the Allies had, generally speaking, but one. The German railway-system was thus far more useful and made it possible to move troops rapidly from one front to the other, often without the enemy's noticing it. The German victories of 1914-15 in and about East Prussia over the superior numbers of the Russians would have been impossible without the help of the railways; owing to lack of aerial reconnoissance the Russians never knew about our sudden, rapidly changing maneuvers till the last moment, so that they were confronted each time by a new and superior force.

In the war on sea, the isolated character of the North and Baltic seas was indeed fatal to us but very convenient to the

English. The enemy had only to block up the two exits of the North Sea with ships and mines in order to cut us off completely from the ocean (see map 9). Thus the paralyzing of our high-seas fleet was not merely the result of Admiralty incompetence but also a consequence of our unfavorable geographical position. Once the chance of using the fleet to keep our two exits to the ocean open had been missed at the beginning of the war, the consequences of that position were bound to tell on us in the most inexorable and disastrous fashion. The German navy—whether for political or strategic reasons makes no difference—had missed what was undoubtedly a sporting chance of getting rid of that handicap. Now, the actual theater of operations presents no fundamental obstacle to the movement of a fleet. Its commander may set it in motion merely for coast-defense purposes, or he may send it out for purposes of blockade and mine-warfare, or he may lead the high-seas fleet out to battle on the high seas or even to invade an island kingdom, or, finally, he may start a guerilla-war of U-boats—whichever it be, he will encounter no resistance from the element in which alone a fleet can move, namely water, but at most from the sky over it, if a storm blows up, or more likely from the counter-measures of the enemy himself. Hence naval warfare—paradoxical as it may sound—depends less on geography than land warfare, and does not require such a subtle understanding of the earth's surface. Naval strategy is to military strategy as fighting with swords is to fighting with bayonets.

In former times the means of transport were marching, riding on horseback or in carriages, and on the water rowing- or sailing-boats. They are none of them obsolete even today, but railways, motor vehicles and aircraft, and on the water steamboats, motor-boats and U-boats have been added. The existence of new means of transport implies not only greater rapidity of movement on the march and in battle, together with an increase in the quantity of men and material transported; it introduces an entirely new situation, in that it

carries operations up into the air and down under water. Now this, in conjunction with the development of wireless telegraphy, makes it possible to keep a much closer watch on the enemy's movements; indeed, operations can now be carried out over the head of the enemy's army or fleet and a long way behind their backs, which was impossible formerly. The reason is that the air allows unfettered movement in all directions, and leaves one free to carry the war far into the enemy's country, and this will be even more true once it becomes possible to transport large bodies of men by air. Military aviation thus means the partial supersession of the earth's surface, on which all transport has so far depended; it is clear on all hands that apparently immutable principles are never to be relied upon anywhere.

The use of modern means of transport in war naturally increases the degree to which military policy depends on mineral-deposits and the armament industry. A highly industrialized country has complete command of them; an industrial country without minerals is at the mercy of one that is rich in them; while a country with little industry cannot successfully carry on a war of movement at all. This once more proves the truth, so often enforced by the experience of the past few decades, that the machine, while it speeds up production on the one hand, on the other hand increases Man's dependence on raw materials. A large army on the move at once begins to slow down, or even to come to a standstill, as soon as it gets about sixty miles from a railway, and even the motor-car is not yet an adequate substitute for the train in the handling of large masses.

Warfare is largely a matter of transport facilities; this applies to the actual operations, no less than to mobilization and deployment. Every battle, whether it is a frontal or a flanking action, depends on the army's having been set in motion in the one proper way in those exact circumstances. The effective control of transport thus becomes a weapon in itself, though a double-edged one; for while a genius can do wonders with it, a bungler can do untold harm.

VI. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GEOGRAPHY OF WAR

1. *Race, Nation, Temperament.*—A country does not consist merely of territory and soil, climate and vegetation, industry and transport. Man, as inhabitant, subject or citizen, is also an integral part of it, indeed it is he who first gives it content and meaning. The statistical relations between Man and his country are summed up in the notion of population; but the spiritual relation between them expresses itself in the symbolic word "nation" or nationhood or nationality. Countries governed by absolute rulers are inhabited by subjects, but those in which the government is drawn from the people, by citizens.

Some countries are inhabited by a single people, others by several peoples. The former are more united in purpose, stronger in attack, easier to lead. Some nations—perhaps all the nations in the world—were originally formed by the coalescence of several races, but in the course of their common history one of these races has dominated the rest and has contributed those precious elements which ultimately constitute complete nationality—language and facial type, popular disposition and definiteness of outline, character and a national ideal. The German people constitutes the most compelling proof of this: it is built up of six principal races which have been reduced to the common denominator of Germanism. The other races have lost their own cultures, their former languages and their old independence of spirit and submitted themselves to the German will. Nevertheless their contribution to the whole that is German culture has not been without influence on it; this, no less than the peculiarities of geographical position, is a reason why the destiny of the Germans in central Europe—as opposed to England, Scandinavia and northern France—has been a peculiarly and essentially German one. It must not be forgotten that the heterogeneous elements which have subordinated themselves to a dominant racial caste

have only done so with their conscious wills; the force of those races to which they belong lives on in their instincts and inner compulsions. The effect of this on a nation, culture or state is that there is always, slumbering beneath the surface, a spirit of resistance to the ruling caste, which may at any moment be awakened and mobilized against the controlling principle by an enemy, external or internal. The German people is the best possible example of this too, alas; for those sections of it whose blood is most mixed have readily lent themselves to the nefarious designs of Germany's foreign foes and allowed themselves to be tempted into secession, as the history of our western frontier from Holland to Alsace-Lorraine and Switzerland, of the Confederation of the Rhine, formed to further French interests, and of the Marxist movement, led, tutored and paid by foreigners, shows.

A race, and in a less direct way a nation, is a summation of spiritual forces, which, left to the free play of instinct, can only work themselves out in a definite direction. The body as such is a mere secondary phenomenon, the expression of an inward compulsion and capacity, a conglomeration of cells controlled from there; it is merely the manifestation of the spiritual. This must not be understood to mean that every body, every face is a direct revelation of the inner nature, that one can argue directly from the outward appearance to the hidden essence; this stony path is strewn with too many obstacles in the way of paltry misunderstandings and false indications and ambiguities due to mixture of race. Generally speaking it is not the individual who gives us the synthesis of external and internal; it is in the combination of individuals—the tribe or the nation—in which the ideal is fittingly embodied.

To judge a nation's physical capabilities, one must start with its psychological make-up—a thing no army command ever seems to have done. For a commander to judge his own or the enemy's troops by their outward appearance, perhaps even by the impression they make on parade, is

utterly wrong, and leads to most misleading conclusions about their fighting spirit and stamina. Valuable as training is, in the end—that is to say, under severe and prolonged strain—what tells most is the spirit of the individual human beings who with their myriad individual souls compose an army. An iron determination and a recognition, springing from the uttermost depths of the soul, of the necessities of war will brace even slack muscles and exorcise the fear of death; whereas, on the contrary, the biggest muscles and the most perfect training cannot bolster up a national army's failing faith in an ideal. This is proved by the comparative achievements in the field of the Austro-Hungarian armies, which were largely made up from discordant nationalities, and those of the German, French and Serbian armies, which were completely united in spirit.

Both in war and peace, the higher command must always treat the psychological as the most important factor—along with arms, equipment and training—in their plans and calculations. This applies equally to one's own troops and the enemy's. In each one of the mass armies of the world war the corps and divisions recruited from one particular locality either particularly distinguished themselves or proved untrustworthy. On our side, for instance, the Bavarian divisions showed a special aptitude for impetuous attack, the Lower-Saxon for stubborn resistance, while the Upper-Saxon in some cases were not equal to the severest tests. The capacities of the fighting breeds, the natural good soldiers, might be put to still better use, if they were not mixed with others of a totally different character, as we, with appalling lack of discrimination, unfortunately mixed them. Where a unit is composed of born fighters and born pacifists mixed, in a single campaign no less than in a protracted war, the pacifist element will always influence the war-like element rather than *vice-versa*, and the unit's military value will thus in all cases be diminished. Neither training nor the example of its leaders will be of much use here, for neither really touches the deepest springs of character. In the shadow of

death a man's true character comes out and all the world can see whether he is a fighter or a pacifist.

The formation of specially reliable fighting units must therefore not be governed by the red-tape methods of local headquarters, convenient as they may be, but by an intelligent grasp of the psychology of each group, which tells one what may be expected of it in the field. An army command which looks upon every male citizen as a normal soldier or tries to make him one by training, will come to grief, as soon as the blood-test of battle becomes too severe or too protracted. Any racially homogeneous unit is stronger than a racially heterogeneous one. This has been proved over and over again, from the days of the old German phalanx of kinsmen, which often charged the enemy chained together, and the stubborn fighting spirit of the village communities which lived on in the Swiss mercenaries right into the eighteenth century, down to the local divisions in the world war. The ties of kinship and a common origin give rise to a feeling of solidarity and an enhanced sense of responsibility where each man feels his comrade's eye upon him and so all march with equal courage into the valley of the shadow of death. The man who shirks or takes to his heels or deserts can never show his face again in his home. It is possible that the revolution of November 1918 would have been doomed to failure if the armies under the command of the sovereigns had been composed entirely of their subjects, who might have rallied round the throne and saved their princes from shamefully throwing up the sponge. The best confirmation of the above view is to be found in the conduct of the Austro-Hungarian armies. These were mostly compounded of completely different and warring races which hated and despised each other and—with the exception of the Germans and the Magyars, which leaves the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians, Rumanians, Italians, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians and Jews—were bent on disrupting the dual monarchy and only too ready to coquette with the enemy. The value of these miscellaneous troops was

always doubtful, and only the presence of purely German or purely Magyar units made it possible to place any confidence in them. The English have long proceeded on racial principles in India, where the native regiments are not recruited indiscriminately from the whole population, but each from its own people—*e.g.* the Sikh regiments from the Sikhs, the Ghurka regiments from the Ghurkas, and so on.

It is not merely its own but also the enemy army's psychological structure that demands the most careful attention on the part of the army command. The German policy at the beginning of the war on two fronts against France and Russia was based on a psychological estimate of Russia as the less well-prepared and less serious enemy, whom it was enough, for the moment, merely to hold. That this calculation proved slightly out was no doubt due to our failure to consider the influence of the French in speeding up the Russians. However, another psychological calculation on the part of the Germans proved itself right in the following year. When Italy declared war in May 1915, thus to all appearance most seriously endangering the success of our offensive in Russia, begun three weeks previously, instead of allowing ourselves to be stampeded into abandoning it or weakening it by transferring troops to the Italian frontier, we quietly went on with it, relying on our true estimate of the timidity, lack of organization and military incompetence of the Italians. Psychology here proved its military importance by a brilliant triumph.

2. *The Warlike and the Pacific Temperaments.*—There are warlike races, nations, stocks and classes, and there are pacific ones. Among the former we must distinguish the aggressive type and the tenacious type; the warlike spirit is equally strong in both, but it takes different forms; in the former case it shows itself in the lust of battle for battle's sake; in the latter it needs a recognized necessity to bring it out. The slim Nordic race exemplifies the former, the thick-set Phalian the latter. The Dinaric race, the nomadic branches of the Mediterranean race in the East (Bedouins

and Tuaregs), and many Negro races may be said to belong to the actively warlike group, while many Indians belong to the passively warlike. On the other hand, the Mongolian planters are an essentially and fundamentally pacific race (one must not be misled by examples of a different disposition, as these are explained by crossing with other races); so are the offshoots of the Eastern race descended from them, and the East-Baltic race with its Nordic and Phalian admixture, also the Mediterranean race, the flash-in-the-pan of whose easily kindled enthusiasm must not deceive us.

The actively warlike man is the man who does not fight to live, but lives to fight. War is his element. His eagle eye is ever on the alert for chances and opportunities of fighting; with his slight frame, which looks as if it were built for cutting through obstacles, he comes down like a wolf on the fold. This born warrior hurls himself without thinking into the *mêlée*; so far from trying to avoid or mitigate a quarrel, he looks for it and greets it with a cheer. For him battle is the everlasting yea, the fulfillment and justification of existence. He is hopelessly handicapped for the work of civil life; wherever swords are being sharpened in the world, there you will find his clear-cut profile. If he had his way, there would always have to be trouble somewhere. He will even put his sword at the disposal of a foreigner, if he provides him with a good fight. The essentially Nordic original aristocracy of the West and beyond it has always been the largest contributor to this class, and has shed its blood on every battlefield in the world. Fighting for fighting's sake, not in defense of hearth and home, is the watchword of this kind.

The passively warlike man is in no sense a worse fighter, but he fights to live instead of living to fight. War for him is an exceptional state, for which he has first to prepare and orient his mind. His sturdy body is rooted in the soil and unwilling to part from it; he would rather defend it than go forth to conquer, his glance reveals no lust of battle, only rage and indignation at being compelled to fight. War

to him is a sacred business, an abnormal condition, a moral duty towards house and home; it answers to his urge to defend his personal and national liberty against attack. If he becomes a professional soldier, a mercenary, he does so not from an ungovernable love of fighting, but because his native soil cannot support him and because he is conscious of being equal to the requirements of the soldier's life. As a mercenary, laying about him with his two-handed sword, this type has stood on many a battle-field also. "Stood"—the word suits his manner of fighting. He does not rush ahead like the lightning, as the other type does, but marches on irresistibly, mowing down everything in his way. It is perhaps in defense that his special virtues shine most brightly; he digs himself in with stoical determination and hangs on down to the last man. Anyone who has seen certain North-German and Anglo-Saxon troops under heavy fire or hard-pressed by pursuers knows what I am talking about.

How utterly different from both these war-like types is the peace-loving man, the pacifist! Peace is the only state for which he is fitted and he will do anything to preserve it; he will endure any humiliation, including loss of liberty and even the most severe damage to his pocket, in order to avoid war. His dim, lusterless eye betokens servility (which does not rule out impertinence), his clumsy body is obviously built for toiling and stooping, his movements are slow and deliberate. This type is the born stay-at-home, small-minded, completely flummoxed by the smallest interruption of the normal course of events, looking at the whole world from the standpoint of his little ego and judging it accordingly. To this bourgeois or philistine, the warrior is the sworn foe, the deadly enemy who only exists to destroy his miserable rest. It remains a source of mixed wonder and horror to him that anybody can jeopardize his peace and security from mere pugnacity or on idealistic grounds. That is just the essential difference: the warrior, whether of the active or the passive type, wagers his whole habitual existence, all he possesses, on the point of his sword, when it is

a matter of maintaining his ego, his point of view, in a word, his honor, which is more to him than his individual life; the man of peace, be his muscles weak or strong, values honor and renown less than his own little life, which seems so great and important to him; he sets the individual destiny above the destiny of the nation.

We have thus three fundamentally different types; but since all nations are of mixed blood, there is always the possibility of cross-breeding as well as mutual influence between the three psychological attitudes to war. By compulsion (*i.e.* military training) or even just the example of the two warrior types, certain portions of the pacifist type, both among the youth and among grown men, may be worked up to a temporary exhibition of what looks like a war-like spirit; but a commander must not let uniforms and peace-time performances on the parade-ground deceive him as to the true nature of such troops; he must not ask more of them than he can reasonably expect, for a sheep will never grow into a wolf, even if you put him into wolf's clothing. Perhaps it is better to keep men of that type away from the real fighters, for they have in their hands, or rather in their mouths, a terrible weapon, namely, the pacifist spirit, which radiates from them and fastens on the soul of the warrior, and may, in conjunction with the horrors of modern warfare, undermine and crush even a heroic spirit. The demoralization of the German army, systematically begun by Marxism in 1916, originated with the pacifist type, and found a congenial soil in the pacifists scattered all over the army, from which it finally attacked the warriors too, when hunger had made them ripe for it.

It is a fundamental error on the part of a commander to regard every man merely as a number equal in value to all the others, and an army as the sum-total of such numbers. This attitude may have done well enough in the days of small mercenary armies, when only the warlike type became soldiers; but with indiscriminately recruited armies, and especially in these enlightened days, the uniformity is only

on the surface; in reality every army is divided into the above three categories and, further, into innumerable individuals, whose private wills are not broken by training, particularly where men of mature age are involved, as in the world war.

A commander who desires to make his whole army enthusiastic for war must get down to the roots of the pacifist temperament and aim at the psychological reëducation of the pacifist soldier. Training plays its part here, of course; but it is still more important to educate him up to the patriotic ideals of those who are ready to sacrifice their lives for hearth and home and nation. You cannot turn a pacifist into a glutton for battle, but you may be able to get him to the point of being ready to fight through fear of disgrace or material loss, or because he realizes that when an enemy threatens, the integrity of individual property depends on the integrity of the state—in a word, from conviction rather than enthusiasm. It is, of course, highly improbable that this emergency soldier will be of any use as a leader. The selection of officers should depend less on school reports and family than on appearance and bearing. The old families who could once be counted upon to produce officers whose dashing spirit left nothing to be desired, are now mostly of such mixed blood that membership of them is no longer in itself a guarantee of a warlike spirit.

Differences in the manner of reacting to the horrors of modern mechanized warfare also belong to the realm of psychology. These differences appear to be a matter of racial culture. Thus it was found in the world war that colored troops, even those that were spirited in attack, generally collapsed when subjected to intensive bombardment in their dug-outs. Their nerves were not equal to the prolonged assault of noise and missiles and gas and the risk of being blown up. The same is true, in a milder degree, of dark-skinned troops from southern Europe. Soldiers of Nordic or Phalian, perhaps also East-Baltic, blood were better able to stand such horrors. People of a more primitive racial char-

acter, and hence in their uncomplicated psychic structure nearer to the animal, will gayly face the relatively silent danger arising from the simpler weapons of war, but they shrink from a complex, omnipresent danger which presents itself in a mechanized form; their minds cannot grasp a situation of that kind with its multiplicity of perils; they are utterly unable to cope with it, and break down under the strain. Primitive man, not having adjusted himself to the machine—how should he, not having discovered it?—cannot, of course, do so in the hour of danger. He collapses under heavy shell-fire. Western man, on the other hand, who invented modern machinery, understands it and can cope with it even when he is afraid of it. It may kill him, of course, but there is nothing supernatural about it for him. To the colored man a bombardment is synonymous with the end of the world, the destruction of all things, and primitive man feels himself as one with the Whole; to the white man, particularly if he is a man of strong personality or intellectual culture, it is always only a fraction of the totality of events which constitutes the world, and thus loses its overwhelming character.

3. *The Psychology of One's Own People.*—No matter how many different kinds of temperament a nation may contain, it is those spiritual struggles alone which take place in the moment of danger, when critical decisions have to be taken, that decide its destiny. It is of no use to a great nation to have produced the greatest poets and composers and painters and thinkers, if it loses its head at the fatal moment and makes decisions which bring it to destruction. Iron nerves, a steady eye, the power of discerning the controlling unity behind a mass of diverse particulars and a sure instinct for the one thing that must be done—these are the things that help a nation to political greatness and success in war.

Just as the statesman has imperceptibly to direct the spiritual capacities of his people in such a way that they appear to find an outlet in his will (the able statesman ought always to be the culminating point of the best will of the nation and to give it political expression), so in relation to its mili-

tary capacities must the commander be the fist which gives effect to the muscles of the arm and the concentrated will, and it is his business to direct these psychological forces in the way they must, can and will be directed, to the benefit of the state and the nation. The good statesman must know what he may expect of his people, the good general what he may demand of them. The former must have the masses behind him, the latter must push them in front of him. If the statesman is the executor of the national will, the commander is the director of the national power. Hence the latter wields—for a short time—the greater and more absolute authority, he is more of a dictator. But the very shortness of his tenure of unlimited power demands that his instrument, the army, considered as the expression of the national will to power, should be a finished article when he takes it into his hands. Whereas the statesman can go on working at his material, which is the nation as a whole, for years, with his eye on the distant goal.

No statesman and no commander can go beyond the spiritual limitations of his nationality. If genius is (as it usually, though not invariably, is) merely the personification of the creative forces belonging to a particular country, it cannot in any case go an inch beyond them. They are the necessary basis of the commander's calculations: if he demands more, he will come to grief; if he stretches them to their utmost without exceeding the bounds of possibility, he will carry the day. An Italian general who expected South-Italian troops to conquer Germany or France steadily step by step would find himself sadly let down; a French general who tried to make Senegalese divisions face trench-warfare in the winter in north-eastern Germany would be heavily defeated; and an English general who expected a regiment of Yorkshiremen to make a victorious onset against French and German strategy might easily find—indeed he has found—that stolid sticking-power is helpless against mobility and flexibility and cannot at the best of times do more than hold the front.

Strategy means a thorough knowledge not merely of the possibility of victory but also of the spiritual quality of one's own and the enemy army. What is the use of the most strongly fortified position, if the men are not equal to a bombardment followed by a bayonet-charge? And what is the good of the most beautifully thought-out plan of action, if the men fail to do what is required of them?

The commander must know which types of soldier are represented in his army, and the proportion of stormers, stickers and scuttlers in the troops at his disposal. An attacking force consisting entirely of stormers (in the psychological sense!) will of course achieve far greater success than one composed of a mixture of stormers, stickers and scuttlers. On the other hand, it would be a stupid mistake, and might have serious consequences, if a commander put stormers into a position only needing to be held, where stickers and perhaps even just scuttlers would serve the purpose. In the former case only stormers are in their proper place, in the latter only stickers; the others are in their wrong place, hence the best use is not being made of their particular virtues. This raises the question whether a nation's stickers ought not to be organized in separate units of their own and its stormers likewise, to be used as the occasion demands; each type would thus be sure to do the best of which it is capable on every occasion. It goes without saying that a division composed entirely of born stormers will accomplish more and with smaller losses than several divisions in which the stormers are kept back by the stickers or even held up altogether by the scuttlers.

A commander must not expect more from his countrymen than they are capable of performing. This does not mean that he is not to set high aims before them and to do his best, by every means which training, exhortation, insight into national character, and strategy afford, to make them achieve them. Through his army he must keep his finger on the pulse of the nation, observe every little irregularity in its beat, and know the moment when the country has

reached the end of its tether. The German higher command broke this rule in the summer of 1918, when it failed to see the moral breakdown of the troops—which, in view of the fearful demands made on them, only needed one more reverse to precipitate it—coming until it was too late. A special board of control, composed of competent military psychologists, attached to headquarters could easily have foreseen the danger and issued a warning. May the German General Staff of the future profit by this example!

4. *The Psychology of the Enemy*.—Nations go to war because one wants to impose its will on the other and the other objects; but the actual conflict is simply a test of strength and is governed by its own laws. This test of strength is only apparently a question of armaments and preparations; in reality and at the bottom it is a moral affair, in the course of which it must become clear which of the two parties has the stouter heart and the tougher character. He who would measure his strength against another's must not only be in good form himself, but must also know his adversary thoroughly. If he does not, he may meet with some very unpleasant surprises. An insignificant-looking opponent will often reveal powers with which one did not credit him, and produce reserves in places where no one expected them. He may even suddenly get help from quarters of which one never thought—one's own friends, for instance, who may leave one in the lurch.

One can never take one's opponent—any opponent, whether another nation or an opposing party—too seriously. It is fatal to under-rate him; this has been proved over and over again in every colonial war during the past hundred years, and the fact that big Austria-Hungary was unable to dispose of little Serbia without our help speaks volumes. It is surprising how often the story of David and Goliath repeats itself. He who takes the field believing in his own victory as a foregone conclusion, is pretty certain to be defeated. For victory means concentrating all one's strength to the utmost, putting one's whole soul into the struggle,

and having no desire left but to fight and win. "I shall fight before Paris, I shall fight in Paris, I shall fight behind Paris," cried Clemenceau, but the Germans turned back at the Marne though they need not have done so.

To see the enemy, in his greatness, his strength, his whole self, as the incarnation of the powers of darkness and hence to become desperate—that is what gives the unexpected victory to the little man. Victories are nearly always won by people of whom nobody would have thought it possible, least of all themselves. The allied monarchs retired before the young Republic at Valmy, the despised German was victorious at Sedan, and in naval wars the smaller fleet has always won—the English have been the weaker side at every step in their progress towards the command of the sea, and a battle of Jutland as early as 1914 might possibly have deprived them of it with surprising speed. It is when one credits one's enemy with tremendous power and particularly when one expects the most unexpected, the most damaging, the most cunning and the meanest things of him, that one summons up all one's strength and sets one's teeth, ready to face any odds. The man who under-rates the enemy over-rates himself and thereby turns the odds against himself.

The essence of all preparation for war is getting to know one's enemy, studying his strong and his weak points in laborious detail. This prevents waste of strength and resources, which would otherwise be expended in wrong directions, and enables everything to be concentrated on the vital points in the enemy's position. One must know whether the enemy is weak or strong, whether he is of a stubborn or yielding disposition, whether he is implacable or inclined to negotiate, whether his nerves are sensitive or the reverse, whether he has character or not, whether he is nimble-witted or slow-witted, apt to go to pieces or hard as steel, accessible to enemy propaganda or not. This may be illustrated by examples taken from the Great War.

The Germans under-rated most of their enemies and over-rated their allies, at least their principal ally, whose con-

ceased disintegration into separate nationalities they had never properly realized. Above all, the Germans had no notion of the tenacity and organizing power of the Anglo-Saxons on both sides of the Atlantic. Nobody in responsible circles ever expected that England would raise an army a million strong and send it to France within a year, and would put close on 10,000,000 men all told into the field. No one would have dreamed that America would have more than 2,000,000 men in France within eighteen months of declaring war. And why not? After all, these Englishmen and Scotsmen, and these Americans, are our closest kinsmen and endowed with very much the same capacities for thought and effort, action and achievement. They are all, at bottom, descendants of Lower-Saxon and Southern Scandinavian peasants, with an infusion of blood from the rest of Teutonic Europe, these Germans, Scandinavians, English, Scotch, Irish—the other mixtures are of no great importance. Had our rulers before the War been able to think in terms of races and peoples, they would have had a better idea of the strength of our Anglo-Saxon cousins and would have reckoned with it, instead of regarding them as pure thalassocrats and backboneless bluffers. Their incredible tenacity in the pursuit of their ends, their tireless energy in thinking out new expedients and, above all, their unshakeable determination, which nothing but death can overcome, to get the enemy down;—these are qualities of which there is no lack among us either, but, owing to a less happy mixture of blood, they are not so generally diffused through the nation, with the result that we were not prepared for such a high degree of them in our opponents.

Our Anglo-Saxon enemy, on the other hand, was well aware of a certain side of our character, for which the above-mentioned racial mixture is responsible, and exploited it to his own great profit. The German, who concentrates on the matter in hand and is inclined to do things for their own sakes, does not readily engage in propaganda of his own, but is extremely sensitive to other people's. He believes

that his cause, his just cause, is bound to triumph whatever happens, and scorns the meretricious aids of propaganda. On the other hand, he is an easy prey to the influence of foreign propaganda, as he does not see through its hollowness, but looks to the non-existent reality behind it. The English knew all about this weak side of the German character from the very start, and its exploitation formed an important element in their war-policy. At a time when England had only five divisions in the field, her propaganda had already brought our cause to the verge of ruin in the eyes of the world, and most nations gave us up for lost. The enemy's campaign of lies continued to prove itself horribly effective as the war went on, and finally made our position untenable. Our national character denied us the means of effective retort.

Of the French too we had formed a wrong estimate. They were supposed by us to be degenerate, soft and effeminate. Our rulers did not know that the French upper class consists of hard-bitten Northerners who know how to impose their authority on the masses and maintain it by brute force. The Frenchman not only made a nimble and skillful soldier, with a much better idea of conducting himself on the field of battle than the Englishman, whose strong suit is rather holding on and sticking it out; but he also proved a bitter and determined foe, who knew very well that the war was a matter of life and death for his people and his country. His determination and his intelligence—these were his two strong points. In view of the latter it was a bad blunder on the part of our higher command, in launching their fourth great offensive in July 1918, to follow exactly the same tactics as had been successful in the three previous ones. This time the French evacuated their front line, let the German guns waste their ammunition on it, and awaited the onset of the infantry three or four miles further back, where they inflicted a bloody defeat, which was the turning point of the War.

On the other hand, we over-rated the Russians. It is true

that they completed their mobilization in an unexpectedly short time, but the relations between the people and the government were already shaky when the war began and could stand no further strain. But for our folly in proclaiming an independent Poland, we might have had the Revolution as soon as Autumn 1916, after the failure of Brussilov's offensive, instead of waiting till March 1917, and we should also have been spared Rumania's entry into the war on the side of the Allies. But our worst mistake of all was not making peace with the Russians at any price at the beginning of 1918, so that we could send every man we had to the western front. Instead, we left a million men in Russia who were badly needed in the great offensives on the West. We were guilty of a double psychological mistake: in the first place we thought that there was no national pride left in the enemy; and secondly, in our desire, intelligible enough in itself, to parade a brilliant success before the world, we failed to concentrate exclusively on the only enemy that really mattered. He who would emerge victorious from the hard-fought fight must not hanker after the outward show of success, but concentrate all his strength on the point where the real issue is to be decided.

If a man wants to knock his opponent out he must study his strong and weak points, exploiting the weak for his own benefit and beating down the strong. Once he has an accurate knowledge of his adversary's strength and weakness, the victory is really his already, provided he keeps his head and does not flag in the struggle.

Where a nation is divided into two parties, one of them will always epitomize a better and nobler side of it than the other, and therefore represent its true character. The other party, which accordingly embodies its darker aspects, can only raise its head for short periods, whether as a result of the complete exhaustion of its rival or with the support of hostile powers, and a determined attack on the part of its opponents will dislodge it comparatively easily. For the last twelve years we in Germany have watched it being demon-

strated in practice that the spiritual tussle with the enemy is the essential and decisive part of a war; for the German liberation-movement has grown out of a purely spiritual attitude and a spiritual change. Any coming material struggle will thus be merely the physical deduction from spiritual premisses; from which it may be concluded that all wars from first to last are fought out and lost and won in the domain of the spirit.

5. *The Psychology of the Neutrals.*—Whereas one knows what to expect from one's own people and in most cases from the enemy, the neutral remains an unknown quantity. There are honest neutrals and dishonest neutrals; that is to say, the difference is not a matter of free choice, but of temperament. The honest neutral keeps out of a dispute because he has nothing to do with the point at issue; he may be well disposed to one side, unsympathetic to the other—no matter, he keeps out of it on principle and observes the code of a man of honor in his dealings with both parties. Sweden and Spain in the Great War are examples. The dishonest neutral, on the other hand, keeps out of the fight because he is afraid of taking sides openly and then finding that he has put his money on the wrong horse, whose misfortunes he has no mind to share; at heart he is not neutral at all, but on the side of the prospective victor from the start. He is only neutral out of fear and greed. The best examples in the Great War are Italy and Rumania. Both had decided in favor of the Entente from the beginning, but they had so little faith in its military superiority that they only made up their minds quite late in the day, and as the result of particular events and inducements, to throw off their neutrality.

What is the proper attitude for the statesman or the commander to take up towards the neutrals? Towards an honorable neutral he can, of course, only behave honorably; but what of the dishonest neutral for whom neutrality is a means of feathering his own nest? There are several ways of dealing with him: you can either overcome his reluctance and

buy his aid; or wait anxiously till he definitely takes sides one way or the other; or again, compel him at the sword's point to come in with you or take the consequences. The military situation will always be a very difficult one, for it is when one is hard pressed already that this sort of neutral becomes dangerous. In the case of Italy, perhaps the right thing would have been to destroy her army while it was rapidly growing in Venetia during the spring of 1915 by an enveloping attack from the Isonzo and the Adige, without waiting for her to declare war; a still better way would, no doubt, have been to buy her neutrality by giving up the Italian-speaking Alpine districts at an early stage. The first was difficult to do because of the offensive against the Russians (which really might as well have been dropped, since it did not result in the destruction of the Tsar's empire), the second, because of the pride of the Austrians, who refused to surrender in good time what was subsequently taken from them by force.

Italy is the purest example of the calculating, self-interested neutral—how much so is shown by the term she has herself invented to describe her attitude, *sacro egoismo*, which is admirably calculated to appeal to all that is lowest in human nature. Italian neutrality arises not from any emotional antipathy towards a power of alien race, but from one of the fundamental features of the Italian character—the timidity of the Mediterranean race, which is there combined with the caution of the eastern and, with the materialistic outlook common to them both, tries to turn every situation, favorable or unfavorable, to its own advantage. That is just the character of this amiable people, and the clever statesman will base his attitude to Italy on it. The Italians, like everybody else, with the possible exception of certain Germans, know and think and scheme about nothing but themselves and their own aggrandizement; and they have a right, when all is said and done, to do so in their native manner, *i.e.* by cunning, deceit and hesitating action. Their natural timidity and caution do not cease with their neutrality, but are

carried over into their war policy; in their mobilization and opening maneuvers, and in their subsequent operations, too, they were every whit as timid and hesitating, always afraid that they might suffer more damage from the enemy than their allies—who, for their part, watched the discomfiture of their companion in arms, of whom they had none too golden opinions either, with a certain malicious pleasure.

As a general rule, which need not necessarily fit every single case, it is safe to say that in dealing with the dishonest neutral, the neutral who makes a business of it, a firm and even hectoring attitude is more appropriate than a hesitating and apologetic one. A man who is neutral by natural inclination can be intimidated; for that kind of neutrality is essentially timidity. Prompt action and the high hand can work wonders with him.

6. *The Psychology of Collapse*.—In any fight between two opponents, be they nations or parties or individuals, sooner or later there comes a moment when one of them begins to get the worst of it. The fundamental reason why this happens is not that he fights less well or that the great god Chance is against him, but that he was always the weaker in his psychological attitude to the contest. Everything else—the comparative inefficacy of his blows, adverse circumstances, the overwhelming superiority of the enemy—is at bottom but the expression and the result of this original weakness. That is not, of course, meant to imply that the eventual loser might not conceivably have carried the day—not at all; only too many things conspired against him, and he could not manage to keep his fighting spirit intact in spite of external losses.

To collapse is to throw up the sponge and finally give up all idea of defending oneself, when the real mental attitude which the collapsing party had temporarily abandoned during the struggle, returns with a rush. When a man collapses he parades his innermost soul, naked and unashamed, before the world, without preserving a shred of self-respect. He has but one overpowering desire—to be left in peace and not to

have to go on forcing himself to do agonizing things. The intensification of thought and activity which for a time was recognized as necessary and translated into effective action, gives place to its opposite, a depreciation of the past and therewith a repudiation of all his former essential values. The moment the slightest indication of the turn of the tide becomes visible—it may be even before the affected party feels it—everything turns against him, and the third parties, who have so far sat on the fence with a dignified air—I refer to our friends the neutrals—begin to incline to the other side and to take jabs at his undefended rear, as his strength begins to fail. And now things begin to go with a rush: the great god Chance ruthlessly joins in the fray and frustrates all his efforts; worse still, people from his own camp begin to desert to the enemy, strengthening their hands and tying those of his own men.

We will illustrate this by two examples, then draw the practical conclusion. The psychological attitude of the Reich to itself and the outside world had been so affected by twenty years of political mismanagement that when the war came it was already less robust than that of the Allies. Those slogans of "Encirclement" and "A hostile world of enemies," were merely a translation into words of the mental state of the Reich and the people. Both were still thinking in terms of the 'seventies—that is to say, purely continentally and purely strategically. Both had grown rich, but they had not yet grasped the changes that had come over the world in the meantime, the whole gigantic business of imperialism and world industry, naval war and blockade, industry and proletariat. The result was that we did manage to mobilize an efficient army but failed to provide for any means of mobilizing foodstuffs and material of war, or securing our communications with the outside world, or mobilizing the means of moral influence over our own or the enemy people, or combating Social Democracy and pacifism. All these omissions were the expression of the inner uncertainty of our

own attitude to the world—and the Allies were the world just as the world was the Allies.

Consequently, during the war itself we were fighting with inadequate weapons. We had a splendid army and won many victories with it, but that was not enough in a world that had changed completely since 1871; we kept on slashing at the enemy's right, his sword-arm, but never touched his left, his shield-arm, to say nothing of his body. Only once did we aim at the two latter, and that was when we at last proclaimed unrestricted U-boat warfare; but we did not put our whole backs into it and were soon terrified at our own daring. Perhaps the worst mistake of all was that we paid no attention to the enemy's head, his brain—that brain which filled itself ever fuller with lies and calumnies and hatched such terribly effective schemes against us.

Shattering as it is for us, we have to admit to ourselves that our conduct of the war proceeded on the wrong lines, and that we were not spiritually prepared for such a many-sided contest. The enemy, on the other hand, knew very well that the war could only be fought out and won by a combination of military and naval and economic and industrial and psychological weapons. When this truth finally began to dawn on us too, our position, encircled as we were, was already so precarious that the morale of the government and the people, which had only been kept up with difficulty owing to our misunderstanding of the methods of war, collapsed. The army, that one bright star in our firmament, could now no longer stand its ground either, and was sucked down into the maelstrom. The nation had already given up its army; the army itself was a long way the least to blame.

At the present moment we are witnessing the second collapse, but this time it is the welcome, longed-for consequence of the first. In 1918 it was the German element in our people that collapsed, while the un-German triumphed. The victor on that occasion—*i.e.* the overwhelmingly superior world outside us and the enemy gnawing at our vitals within, who

drew his strength from the outside world—the victor on that occasion, I say, has now gone so far that he has destroyed himself and completely broken down in his turn. Here too the cause is an inner moral weakness.

Who are the parties engaged in today's struggle, and of what spirit are they? The German is at war with the un-German in our people and in our breasts. The un-German, the alien, the dark, sub-human, self-emasculating and self-repudiating element is about to go under, after over-reaching itself in a manner that was inevitably leading to irreparable disaster. For the spirit of the nation has changed since the collapse of 1918. It has come to realize that we depend on ourselves, that no one is going to give us a helping hand, and that it is folly to want to help others when one is oneself without a friend in the world. Misery and need and humiliation and calumny have opened our eyes, and for a healthy nation it is but a short step from there to self-help.

Here we have the root of our present enemy's inner weakness. In 1918 his strength rested on our war-weariness. Today his weakness rests on the resolute determination of large sections of our people to regain their health. We are sick of parading our weak and pitiable condition, and intend to appear before the world once more as strong as nature made us.

In the struggle between the German and the un-German element we shall not repeat the mistakes we made in our struggle with the Allies, in which we fought with one arm tied behind our back and never went for the whole person of the enemy: this time we are taking the sword in both hands and smiting him hip and thigh till we split him in two from top to bottom. We are waging this war with military and economic and psychological weapons—particularly with the last, for all social questions are in the last analysis spiritual, not economic, questions. Even the poor man may be a passionate idealist provided he is not for ever being told that he is being cheated if his wages are not pushed up.

Much as our mental attitude in the great strife of nations

may have lacked firmness, it is firm as a rock in the great strife of parties in which we are now engaged. And that in itself is a complete guarantee that the struggle between the German and the un-German in our midst, which is now coming to a head, will end in that victory which is necessary to us if we are not to go under.

7. *National Psychology as a Weapon.*—The psychological study of everything connected with the War leads one to the conclusion that knowledge of national character is an important weapon. It was left to the English genius in the War to elaborate the brilliant notion of using psychology as a weapon of offense, as an arm under its own specially qualified commander, which inflicts grave wounds on the enemy and indeed gives him the *coup de grâce*. Such an achievement does not exactly suggest a heroic temperament, but it was an extraordinarily good stroke and shows, after all, uncommon superiority in intellectual grasp of the situation. A country which entered a war where armies numbered millions with a hopelessly inferior force was just the one to hit upon this new kind of warfare.

Applied national psychology as a weapon of war means propaganda directed towards influencing the mental attitude of the nations to a war. It has four functions: (1) to gain one's own nation's support for the idea of the war, fill it with hatred and bitterness against the enemy, inspire it with an unquenchable war-spirit—in short, to do everything possible to fill it with a passionate determination not to sheathe the sword till the enemy is laid low. (2) One's allies must be persuaded in the same attitude and induced to identify their interests with one's own. (3) The neutrals must be filled with aversion for the enemy and an interest in one's own cause, so that they may as far as possible be dissuaded from coquetting with the enemy and drawn to one's own side, and also get the idea that it is only from the latter that they stand to gain anything; in particular, they must be firmly convinced that one's own cause is the only just one in the eyes of God and man. (4) Perhaps the most important point

of all, it is essential to attack the enemy nation in its weak spot (and what nation has not its weak spots?), to undermine, crush, break down its resistance, and convince it that it is being deceived, misled and brought to destruction by its own government, in order that it may lose confidence in the justice of its cause and that thus the opposition at home (and what nation is without one?) may raise its head and make trouble more successfully than before. The originally well-knit, solid, powerful fabric of the enemy nation must be gradually disintegrated, broken down, rotted, so that it falls to pieces like a fungus when one treads on it in a wood.

In the Great War England handled this weapon with exemplary skill. Under the leadership of a Jewish newspaper owner of German extraction,¹ who was made a peer for his services, aided by a staff of well-informed assistants, all of them practiced writers and adepts in practical psychology (among whom a writer of world-wide reputation like Rudyard Kipling was not ashamed to be numbered) the English manipulated world opinion and prepared the psychological ground for the German revolution with such skill that they thereby contributed in no small measure to the winning of the war. Unfortunately the Central Powers provided more than enough material for the English "campaign of lies," as we are accustomed to call it. As regards item (1) in the above classification, the English used our invasion of the apparently innocent "little Belgium" to rouse their own people—who were by no means convinced straight away of the necessity of a war with Germany and still less with Austria-Hungary, about whom the average Englishman knew nothing—to such a pitch of indignation that they easily went on from there to the belief, to which English public opinion has been much addicted in the last two hundred years, in the necessity for a crusade against the barbarians. Starting from this typically canting sentimentality, it was easy to imbue the tenacious English character with an ever stronger deter-

¹ The German description of Lord Northcliffe, who was of Irish extraction. (Publisher's note.)

mination to hold on, although the cast was far greater than any Englishman had ever imagined. The English also set about inoculating their allies—in so far as they needed it, which France hardly did—and the neutrals with the justice of the Allied cause and the lust for power and infamous brutality of the “barbarians,” and they had soon succeeded so well that the whole world was convinced that the war was a struggle of liberty and democratic institutions everywhere against despotism and aristocratic oppression; in spite of the fact (and this is a real triumph for the campaign of lies) that Russia, of all countries, was on the Entente side. England was greatly helped by her control of world trade, which enabled her to keep the Allies well fed and only allow just enough merchandise to get through to the neutrals to secure their benevolence. At the enemy England struck numerous admirably-aimed blows, effectively backed up in this case by starvation: she did her best to convince the enemy peoples of the hopelessness of their struggle (by the end it was twelve hundred millions against one hundred and sixty millions, or six great and twenty-two small powers against two great and one small) and to alienate them from their governments by enlarging on their responsibility for the war, and she encouraged the revolutionarily inclined elements by every means in her power; she thus sowed the seeds of distrust in their own strength, together with the germ of disunion—a sowing which, as a result of hunger and scarcity, bore all-too-abundant fruit.

We are bound to admit that the English campaign of lies was one of the most effectual weapons that were used against us, and that it was conducted on thoroughly sound psychological lines. There were geniuses at work over there, even granted that our respective positions—and our own stupidity—made things easy for them. They had a most complete intelligence organization, made full use of their economic advantages and spent money like water on this side of the war. Our O.L.A.—that is to say, the foreign department at German G.H.Q.—was started too late and had too little

money at its disposal, besides being too military-minded, to achieve anything of decisive importance. The English propaganda was run entirely by civilians, the German by soldiers; the latter is the wrong way, because it is not the soldier's but the psychologist's opinion that counts here.

Actual methods need not be discussed in a book which is concerned with the main outlines rather than the details of the problems it discusses. Suffice it to say that good propaganda must be unobtrusive, that its object must not be apparent at all, if it is to be effectual and have a permanent and decisive influence on the mind of a nation. It needs to be planned a long way ahead and we must not expect it to bear fruit in a couple of months or even years. It must be such as to bring the whole mind of a nation on to a quite different plane, from which it can no longer get up a feeling of hostility or even unfriendliness. Hence good propaganda should begin in peace-time and operate in such a way that the country running it reaps its fruits as soon as war is declared. War-time propaganda ought to be merely the more concentrated and, of course, more vigorous continuation of peace-time propaganda. Our O.L.A., which was set up in the middle of the war, came on the scene far too late, besides having no peace-time activities to go on, to accomplish anything worth talking about. In detail the things to be done are: setting up centers in foreign capitals; literary propaganda, by influencing the press and also by producing books and pamphlets; getting up effective films and broadcasting-items; putting up public-utility buildings adapted to the character of the people, *e.g.* reading-rooms or drinking-fountains or industrial institutes, as the case may be; finally, mouth-to-mouth propaganda with the help of native agents.

II. THE WORLD WAR IN THE LIGHT OF GEOGRAPHY

I. THE GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION IN THE PRE-WAR PERIOD

WE do not propose under this head to tell the story of the War or even to describe the changes which it has made in the map, but to give a rough outline of the whole geographical situation in the pre-war and war periods.

In the decade which witnessed the founding of the Second Reich a decisive change took place in the whole configuration of the world. The united strength of Germany, now gathered up for the first time in centuries, found an outlet for its concentrated energies in modern mechanics (as a result of the practical application of scientific discoveries) and modern industry, fresh enterprise and new wealth, an awakening interest in colonies and a navy, and all this happened with a rush as the forces too long dammed-up burst forth. Consequently the German Empire very soon took such a leading position in the political and cultural structure that the configuration of the world, which had remained pretty uniform for long years, was seriously upset. The powers did not know what to make of it and took a long time to readjust themselves to the new power, the altered situation and each other. The "nation of thinkers and poets," as the world had called us with a mixture of affection and contempt (what the world meant was, unpractical and harmless dreamers) suddenly revealed itself as also a nation of engineers and commercial magnates, statesmen and soldiers, who, to the general surprise, had no further intention of working for other people's interests.

This meant a change for the world on all fronts. First of

all, for the European front: the center of the continent suddenly refused to go on being a duelling-ground to which people repaired in order to settle their differences; on the contrary, the new Germany unmistakably showed its intention of itself using the border states for such purposes: France in particular felt that she had been ousted from her long-established continental supremacy.

Then there was the second, the economic, front. Suddenly the German trader was to be seen everywhere, in every market, farm and harbor. Here too his presence was resented: he captured customers, cut prices, carried piece-goods at more moderate rates and flooded the bazaars with cheap goods of constantly improving quality, so that the old-established houses no longer had things their own way as before.

Thirdly, there was the political front. In all sorts of places the German residents deserted foreign consulates, having now one of their own to go to; German warships displayed the new flag in overseas ports, and it was quite unexpectedly hoisted in various places in Africa and the South Seas and finally even in the Far East, where a German general actually took command of foreign troops (Frenchmen under a German general!); German ambassadors and ministers pursued a policy of their own in foreign capitals which made hay of old webs and threads and caused great annoyance in many quarters.

Again, there was the fourth or cultural front. The rationalistic culture of France had long enough set the tone for everybody all over the world who came into contact with western culture. English materialism had been steadily gaining ground since the end of the previous century and was taking possession more and more automatically of all nations who came into touch with the west for the first time then. And now a third philosophy, which had no smoothly varnished surface to show but approached things with a profounder knowledge, appeared on the scene, and found no difficulty in raising doubt in the taught and annoyance in the teachers by its destructive criticism. With Kant behind one,

one naturally gets deeper into the heart of things and people than with Voltaire and Nelson. Thus the older arbiters and lawgivers found themselves in danger of having their water shut off at a higher level and the ground cut from under their whole intellectual position.

Last of all, there was the fifth front, that of national psychology. The Frenchman treated the colored races according to the principle of equality and fraternity but not liberty, and laughed at them in private; the Englishman insisted that all colored people, whether they were highly cultivated Indians or Australian aborigines, should conform to his ideas and remain in their places, *i.e.* a long way below himself; while the Russian by means of vodka and the knout reduced everybody to his own level, a very elementary level where white and brown and black men could all meet. The German, on the other hand, took the trouble to enter into the inner life of the native, tried to understand his ways and took the greatest interest in the intellectual culture of his foreign subjects—in a word, he took them seriously and thereby gave them a standing which they did not enjoy under any other western power. Thus arose a danger of a scientific and psychological conquest of the world by German idealism.

One may sum up by saying that as a result of all these various causes the world was in process of splitting, if it had not already split, into three great armies—the advancing one of the two old-established powers of France and England, on one side, and on the other the retreating one, which had gradually grown receptive, of all the colored races all over the world, the intended victims of exploitation; and now all of a sudden, thrusting itself more and more vigorously between them, came the German spirit with its deeper knowledge, which caused the colored people to prick up their ears, promising that it might one day become the third party who runs off with the prize.

Translating these facts and considerations into geographical terms, we see that the political partition of the earth

was suddenly and violently speeded up, for lo and behold, there was the German Empire, bursting with brains and energy and man-power, a new factor of first-rate importance and challenging character. A new competitor threatened to intrude upon the highway of the seas and to disturb the balance of colonial trade, which would thereupon cease to be quite such a convenient gold-mine to its two former owners.

II. THE FOURFOLD PROBLEM

From the above sketch of the geographical situation before the war, four groups of problems connected with the world war itself emerge. First of all there is the problem of territory. Three groups of countries—the Central Powers, the Allies and the neutrals—confronted one another. The Central Powers (apart from Turkey, who played only a secondary part) lacked room. They were hemmed in on all sides, their population was increasing, they had co-nationals living beyond their political frontiers, who really belonged to them and had been filched or alienated from them, and they were passionately eager to secure territory overseas which should absorb their surplus population and supply them with raw materials for their industries. The German Empire in particular was badly over-populated, with its 120 inhabitants to the square kilometer. Every year hundreds of thousands of her best man-power scattered itself all over the world in foreign service. It is not surprising that in such circumstances the internal pressure became higher and higher, so that the pent-up forces sought any kind of outlet and were ready to burst forth at any moment.

The Allies (England, Russia and France), on the other hand, had too much room. They had spread over the greater part of the globe, possessed every raw material that the stomach and machines of Man could require, and were unable to produce enough white people of their own to develop their vast territories economically, or even to keep military or civil control of them. But they had not sufficient

generosity to pass some of it on to the Central Powers (by sale, for instance); no, they kept a jealous watch over every acre of land, even when it was nothing but a dreary desert. England commanded the best raw-material-producing countries, the most effectively situated naval bases, and the sea itself; France had in her African possessions that recruiting-ground for her army which she felt was necessary in view of her stationary population; Russia extended from Europe right across North and Central Asia to the Pacific, and with all that was constantly trying to expand southwards in order to get access to the open sea. Even a little country like Belgium had vast colonial possessions. The Allies—whose later accessions, such as the United States, we will not discuss here, although the territory of the latter could support twice its present population—the Allies, I say, were the rich men, the lucky ones, who jealously guarded their property and had convinced themselves that the wicked Central Powers, who were really so small compared to them, might at any moment filch bits of it away from them.

Thus in these two antithetical groups imperious need for more room on one side confronted jealous anxiety to preserve its possessions on the other. It cannot in fairness be denied that moral right was on the side of the Central Powers, and particularly of the German Empire, which was threatening to burst under its human steam-pressure. The zig-zag career of its last Government is perhaps best regarded as the outcome of an inability, attributable to the conditions I have described, to solve the problem of what was to be done with all the surplus energy and surplus people.

Behind these two groups of powers stood the large, amorphous body of the neutrals. These were swayed by various emotions—some by fear of compromising their position through taking sides prematurely, others by that hope of pickings which other people's quarrels never fail to raise in the onlooker, others again by lack of interest. Yet many a neutral must have had an uncomfortable feeling (Holland,

for instance, with her large colonial empire which she is incapable of developing) that at the end of the war they might have to foot the bill. In several cases the territory of some small neutral state formed an effective bulwark for one of the two groups of great powers. Thus England benefited by the mere existence of Holland, which kept the German army and navy away from her shores, and France could not be too thankful for Switzerland, the mere existence of which made it impossible for the Germans to outflank her right. Both these countries have been torn from the body of the German people and in a sense owe their existence to the political and military goodwill of France and England. In other words, the two most important neutrals by their mere existence helped the Allies, while they seriously damaged the German Empire; for had they both still been parts of that Empire England would have been in the very gravest danger of invasion and France would have had a much longer and less advantageous front—that is to say, the initial prospects for both of them would have looked very much less rosy.

To the second group, to continue our classification, belong the problems of economic geography, which follow directly from those of territory. The Allies had everything necessary for modern life—vast food-producing areas, exceptionally rich mineral deposits, splendid plantation- and pasture-land for the production of textile materials, admirably organized industrial areas, ocean harbors and merchant fleets. If one country produced more raw materials, another more manufactured goods, what did that matter from the point of view of the Allies as a whole? They helped each other out, so that as a whole they were self-supporting, as they well might be with their command of the “free” seas and the world’s commerce.

The Central Powers, on the other hand, lacked most of the necessities of modern life. They had coal and a certain amount of iron, also fertilizers; but they were not quite adequately off for foodstuffs (especially as Hungary, which is

rich in them, supplied nothing even to Austria), and they lacked all colonial goods, textile materials, adequate supplies of oil, and most metals. The economic organization of the Central Powers was so bound up with world trade that their sudden exclusion from it was bound to strike a severe blow at the whole industrial structure.

The neutrals suffered a similar fate; they too were so closely tied up with world trade, which was controlled by England, that the mere threat of exclusion from it was enough to make them—with the single exception of Sweden—subservient to the English but cold to the Central Powers, who had nothing to offer them. Thus even when their territories abutted on the latter, they were not of much use but took their places, more or less willingly, in the cordon drawn round the Central Powers.

The third problem that demands our attention concerns the geography of communications. The Allies had two main lines of communication at their command. In the first place there was the ring-shaped trade-route which embraced the whole coast of Europe and at the same time bolted and barred the door of world trade on the Central Powers. Beyond that they also had under their control a traffic that spanned almost the entire surface of the globe—world trade, as it is called—which laid all routes both by land and sea open to them. Every conceivable means of transport, from aircraft and railways to motor and horse-drawn vehicles and even caravans of camels and armies of porters, was put at the Allies' disposal in unlimited quantities all over the world.

The Central Powers, on the other hand, possessed only one arterial trade route, namely the Berlin-Baghdad line (it ceased to be Hamburg-Basra with the war) and it had several grave defects. The countries it connected were not able to supply each other's needs; from this point of view the eastern half of the combination, that is to say, Turkey, was useless; Turkey was always the eager recipient in everything. This arterial route proved an untimely attempt to revive the

old, long-perished glories of Levantine trade, the difference being that it was entirely restricted to expensive land transport, with mostly single-track and entirely inadequate railways, and was besides very short in comparison with the enemy's trade-routes. To this must be added the fact that the Central Powers only had complete control of it after the mopping-up of Serbia and Rumania—that is to say, after the end of 1916, shortly after which it began to go to pieces badly at the Turkish end.

When one considers that the neutrals, commercially speaking, more or less voluntarily formed part of the enemy's net, it becomes fairly obvious that the Central Powers were at a disadvantage both industrially and commercially from the start. The one advantage that they had and kept was the possession of the inner line. The Allies' chain of communications in Europe was a pretty far-flung one; moreover, it was cut into two halves, which had few facilities for direct communication with each other (only the Murmansk and trans-Siberian railways), in the north by the unshakeable and (for once) friendly neutrality of Sweden and our command of the Baltic; and in the south by our possession of the Dardanelles. The Central Powers, on the other hand, could come and go among themselves pretty well undisturbed, at least within the borders of the two chief ones and Bulgaria, and were able to shift troops about on the grand scale. Without this advantage of the inner line of communications even the best German strategy could hardly have kept up a war on four fronts through four years. Already in the winter of 1914-15 the numerically superior Russians could only be kept out of German territory, and actually beaten, by the strategic aid of railways. As soon as the Central Powers got away from their good railway-system and began fighting in remote places, they rapidly lost the advantages of the inside position and became less nimble in their movements and operations.

Fourthly, and lastly, there is the problem of national psychology. It is an uncommonly complicated one and can only

be solved by means of a thorough understanding of the psychological attitudes and the philosophies of life which came into conflict in the Great War. Racially, and even nationally, the three groups of powers—the Central Empires, the Allies and the neutrals—were so thoroughly mixed up that no solution is possible on these lines alone. In all three camps there were representatives of the Phalian, the Nordic, the Eastern, East-Baltic, Dinaric, Mediterranean, Alarodian and Negro races; descendants of Lower-Saxon yeomen fought in the German, English and American armies; the royal families of all three groups were closely inter-related; and western civilization gave the principal nations a common spiritual basis in their common attitude to the great question of God, Man and the Universe.

The spiritual tension which led to war in 1914 was based on the antithesis between yesterday and tomorrow, which was roughly equivalent to that between culture and civilization, between a conservatism conscious of its responsibilities and irresponsible progress. The contest of which Valmy was the first round ("with this day and in this place a new epoch in the history of the world begins," said Goethe) was continued, if not quite fought to a finish, in the world war. At every stage in its development humanity is dominated by two main currents of thought: the one aims at organic evolution, or, if it cannot muster sufficient vital energy, becomes fixed—but its fixity may be a fine and noble thing; the other, in conscious opposition to it, desires inorganic, spasmodic and eclectic evolution, stimulated by alien ideas and setting to work without tradition. Organic progress respects the limits of its own spiritual capacity and will only create new forms that grow naturally out of the old; inorganic progress delights in taking leaps into entirely new spheres and combining things that are inwardly, and therefore invariably also outwardly, ill-assorted. If organic evolution is liable to stagnation, as all the Mongolian nations show, the danger of inorganic evolution is that it may decline into materialism and go to pieces in its style. With the organic mode of

thought go strictness of principle, a consciousness of responsibility towards the future, attachment to tradition, pure will, and in general a certain disinterestedness; with the inorganic, on the other hand, go laxity of principle, love of experiment, a desire to shake oneself free of the shackles of tradition, definite ambition, desire for improvement in a mechanical direction. The organic is synonymous with the inward, the profound, the inorganic with the external, the superficial; the former finds its highest expression in culture, the latter in civilization. The organic is thus more difficult to understand and get hold of, it is awkward, keeps itself to itself and is frequently unpopular; the inorganic is easier to grasp, insinuating, dazzling and much sought-after. One is reality, the other appearance.

The reality-attitude to the world belongs properly to the Nordic-Phallic mind, the appearance-attitude to the Mediterranean *cum* Dinaric *cum* Alarodian. Both conceptions of life, have, however, spread to other racial groups and mixed stocks, modifying and overlaying their original psychological constitutions. Thus in England the Nordic element has been psychologically so completely overgrown with Mediterranean accretions that the English have been living for the past 150 years—notwithstanding all the fruits of reality that they still bring forth—in a world of beautiful appearance. There were, of course, representatives of both modes of thought under every flag, yet there was a rough division into two categories, the organic principle being represented primarily by the German Empire, the inorganic by England. The German Empire was the incarnation of the organic, the conservative principle; England and France were the champions of the inorganic, of progress at any price—France as the mother of the Enlightenment and the Revolution, England as the sounding-board of the tinkling cymbal of industrialism.

Much has been talked about the racial and national hatred which broke loose in the world war; but there could really be no question of the former, since there were mem-

bers of every race fighting on both sides, and only very little of the latter. The bitterness and stubbornness of the struggle had their origin in something much deeper, namely, the above-mentioned antagonism between contradictory attitudes to life which here came to a sanguinary head. The organic attitude, being the more difficult and less comfortable one, was in the minority from the beginning; the inorganic one, being the more agreeable and less stern one, attracted almost the whole world to its side. Which just shows how the pleasant, tangible thing always has the pull over the astringent morally tonic one with the majority of mankind.

The tragedy of the world war lies in two things, first, that the inorganic triumphed over the organic, and second, that this was not the inevitable result of the superior strength of the inorganic principle, but happened because the organic principle was deserted and betrayed by a section of its own adherents—not merely among the Allies but in our camp also. Men whose temperament fitted them to fight on the organic side stood in the ranks of the other side, and men whose place was on the inorganic side had to fight on ours. That is to say that the dividing-line between the opposing forces was to some extent, morally speaking, wrongly drawn. It was a war that involved violence to men's souls to an extent probably unprecedented in history, the first war in which the great majority of the combatants, whether on the field or on the home front, had, at bottom, no idea what it was really all about. This may possibly be the fundamental reason why the conduct of the war was characterized by such terrible ruthlessness on both sides, but particularly on the inorganic side, whose hunger-blockade preceded, and caused, U-boat warfare, and whose campaign of lies deliberately elevated base calumny into a weapon of war.

III. THE EXTERNAL CAUSES

The posture of affairs in the pre-war period, as described above, led by a chain of easily recognizable causes to the outbreak of the world war.

First of all there was the old enmity between France and Germany. Ever since the Thirty Years' War France had been accustomed to regard herself as the military and cultural mistress of Europe, a belief only temporarily shaken in 1813-15 and not even wholly destroyed in 1870-71. As a matter of political geography, her supremacy was only made possible by her command, dating from the seventeenth century, of the plain of the Upper Rhine and the security afforded to her northern frontier by the neutral buffer-state of Belgium. The exclusion of France from the Upper Rhine in 1870 deprived her of the possibility of exerting a permanent pressure and influence on the small South-German states, and also of cutting Germany in half by a rapid invasion and making sure in advance that any war should be fought on German soil. It is extremely typical of the difference in character between the two nations that the French, instead of lying down under this exclusion, never rested from 1871 onwards, working, educating, arming, till they regained their old position on the Upper Rhine and once more rendered Germany powerless. The Germans have for several hundreds of years been allowing substantial sections of their people to be wrested from them on all their national frontiers and have almost ceased to be conscious of the fact, while the French raise Cain and refuse to be pacified till they have actually got back non-French Departments, as Alsace and Lorraine after all are. France does not need the Upper Rhine for imperative industrial reasons or to round off her national frontier, not a bit of it; she needs it wholly and solely for her hegemony in Europe, for she has realized clearly that she can only maintain her position by keeping down Germany, and can only do that by getting

her fingers on Germany's windpipe on the Upper Rhine. But this knowledge has never become part of the flesh and blood of the German people; they do not realize that the possession of Alsace-Lorraine is a life-and-death question for them; for they lack that faculty for thinking politically which comes naturally to the French. All the planning and scheming and burrowing and probing of the German goes into cultural and intellectual objects—and comes out again, whereas the Frenchman goes straight for power and sticks to it like grim death. Hence in the age-old struggle for the Rhine frontier France has been the more determined, clear-headed and successful of the two antagonists and, in spite of numerous reverses, has on the whole come off better. Since the French nation is not large enough, and not in itself sufficiently well-equipped, to resist successfully, far less to beat, a united Germany, the object of France's policy has always been either to reduce the size of the German state or to cripple it from the other side through her allies. She did the first by detaching Holland and Switzerland from the German Empire, and the second by alliances with Turkey or Poland, latterly with Russia, and subsequently with England, Belgium, Serbia, Italy and Rumania; to which we must now add the vassal-states of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which she has set up and keeps as her creatures. We may sum up by saying that France's uncontrollable will to power (disguised on this occasion as a desire for *revanche* for the "loss" of Alsace-Lorraine) and her efforts to make it effective by securing powerful allies, were one of the causes, if not the main cause, of the War. The fate of the whole western world, not only of the German Empire, hangs on Alsace-Lorraine.

In the next place there was the antagonism between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Since the wars of liberation Russia had got into the habit of regarding herself as a sort of protector of Austria and Prussia. But the union of the German states in the Second Reich and the strengthening of the anti-Russian Magyar element in the dual monarchy

weakened this bond, and after Russia's diplomatic defeat (which was Austria's victory) at the Congress of Berlin in 1879 and the light-hearted repudiation of Bismarck's Reinsurance treaty at the instance of Caprivi in 1890, relations with her reached the stage of political enmity. Russia now felt herself isolated and her security threatened by the two contiguous and closely allied empires. If one turns from these phenomena to consider the whole light in which Russia regarded Europe, one finds that in her case too an extremely strong will to power had been manifesting itself for the last two hundred years. From its cradle in Great Russia it had gone forth and conquered the great plains of eastern Europe and transformed them into a vast empire, which forthwith proceeded to demand direct contact with the Baltic, the Mediterranean, the Pacific, and, if possible, even the Persian Gulf, on the ground that free access to the ocean was necessary to it. But let there be no mistake: this "necessity" was only the product, not the cause, of the aggrandizement of the Muscovite Empire. It was not really a vital necessity at all, such as the world would have to recognize even if reluctantly, but merely a consequence of ambitious desires. Nevertheless Russia's whole policy was dictated by it—the annexation of Finland; the expulsion of Turkey down from the Balkans and the threat to her in Armenia, the object being to get hold of the Dardanelles; the invention of Pan-Slavism for the purpose of enlisting the sympathies of the western and southern Slavs (since the destruction of Tsarism there has been no more Pan-Slavism, a sure proof that it was a put-up job); the threat to England and Japan in Asia; the invasion of Manchuria. The powers who stood in Russia's way were treated as enemies—namely, Austria-Hungary and Germany, who tried to bolster up the existence of Turkey, the first because she had plans of her own in the Balkans and did not wish to be hemmed in by Russia, the second because from the building of the Baghdad railway onwards she had come to regard Turkey as a commercial sphere of influence. Russia endangered the very

existence of the dual monarchy by inciting its Slav minorities to rebellion, while the alliance she concluded in 1904 with France, its arch-enemy, was a direct threat to the German Empire. Russia's defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904-5 had caused her to withdraw from the Far East and devote more of her attention to the Near East and Europe, where she was bound to come under the strong influence of France, and French gold inoculated her with a bellicose spirit which she was originally far from entertaining towards Austria-Hungary and still less towards Germany. So we may say that Russia entered the world war primarily at the orders, and as the paid retainer, of France—a view which adds new emphasis to France's part as the arch-disturber of the peace of Europe.

Now we come to the antagonism between England and Germany. Ever since England became a naval and imperial power she had always maintained good relations with the German states, because they were tied to the mainland and provided a good market for English goods. Things went on like that until the ambitious German Empire began to manufacture goods in increasing quantities, to found colonies, and from about 1900 onwards, in order to protect its growing world-wide interests, to build a large fleet. One might have supposed that these were things that any country had a perfect right to do—but apparently not. The English merchant found himself undercut in every market, the English sailor crowded out of every sea, the English manufacturer began to feel nervous about his markets, and it was an unpleasant shock to English pride to come up against the rising tide of Germans everywhere. To do England justice, however, all these things would hardly have seemed to her a valid reason for going to war. But the pendant to this go-getting, namely the young German navy, was a valid reason for her to do so. That navy, as it rapidly increased, came to be regarded more and more as the symbol of German ambition. Unfortunately, as a result of too much tall talk, our growing fleet attracted more atten-

tion to itself than was good for peace, in which alone it could develop undisturbed till it became invincible. The German navy was regarded in England as a very grave menace to the security of the British Isles. England's security depends on her communications with her colonies, who supply her with raw materials and buy her manufactured goods, being maintained intact, otherwise the mother-country would be starving in a month and beggared not long after; hence if an enemy once succeeded in blockading her, she would have to surrender at discretion. The need to guard against this danger will continue to determine England's foreign policy until the day when she has lost her colonies and returned to a balanced economic system at home. Spain, France and Holland had all had to be laid low in the past, for the sake of this or a similar object, and now the same grim specter seemed to be rising again, after all those years, in the person of the young German Empire. England saw quite clearly what might happen and took energetic measures to forestall it, with such success that her islands are once more safe for many years to come. The history of the war on sea from 1914 to 1918, in spite of the paralysis of the high-seas fleet and the fatal delay in starting unrestricted submarine warfare, showed that Germany was in a position seriously to threaten the security of the British Isles. The great naval battles have always been won by the smaller fleet.

This state of tension, anxiety and mutual suspicion between the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, France, Russia and England finally crystallized out into two alliances—the Triple Alliance of 1882 and the Entente of 1904 and 1907—which soon after the turn of the century began to fill the horizon more and more, as the representatives of the two ideas, the two worlds I have described. The former included, beside Germany and Austria-Hungary, Italy and, on a looser basis, Rumania; of the latter, besides France and Russia, England was a secret but none the less trusty member, while Belgium and Serbia were in its pocket.

Italy and Rumania were extremely unreliable allies;

indeed, it is not too much to say that the untrustworthiness of the Italians, which was universally known to be in their blood and had given proof of itself on several occasions, was one of the principal causes of the War; for the Entente knew that Italy would certainly remain neutral and probably very soon come in on their side. Moreover her hunger for her Alpine *irredenta* and the command of the Adriatic could only be satisfied through the break-up of Austria-Hungary. The same sort of thing was true of Rumania, an equally cautious little soul, who was only prepared to come in on the prospective victor's side when everything was over bar the shouting, and also saw the greater part of her *irredenta* on the other side of the Hungarian border.

Belgium and Serbia, on the other hand, were entirely reliable satellites of the Entente, and of considerable military value too. Belgium knew that as a buffer-state she could place complete reliance on the protection of England especially; she was being increasingly dominated by French culture, and was afraid of violence from Germany. Serbia had for decades been the recognized outpost of Russia in the Balkans, and therefore knew that she was completely covered as regards her plans for aggrandizing herself by the absorption of the Croats, Slovenes and Bosnians her kinsmen. As she was also badly used by Hungary in economic matters, she became the sworn enemy of Austria-Hungary, and was very largely responsible for its national and military collapse.

IV. THE TWO SIDES

Two groups of powers thus confronted each other in the War. The one represented the organic principle and was seeking to establish a right which the course of history and the enemy had denied it; it was in the minority and the less advantageous position and thus had an uphill job of it from the start. The other represented the inorganic principle, was bursting with men and territory and in the majority, and thus from the beginning had the better prospects of victory,

which were bound to grow steadily rosier as time went on; whereas the Central Powers only possessed 6,100,000 square kilometers of territory with a population of 160,000,000, the Allies had 100,000,000 square kilometers of territory and 1,200,000,000 souls at their disposal by the end.

The German Empire had all the advantages and disadvantages of its central position, but it was neither self-supporting enough economically nor united and resolute enough morally, and in addition to that, burdened with weak allies who had to be bolstered up. Nevertheless it was the strongest and most efficient power engaged in the struggle, and it took the most strenuous efforts of almost the whole world to lay it low.

Austria-Hungary was a superannuated great power, whose medley of nations was unsuited to an age of growing nationalism, and was unable to stand against a simultaneous attack from all sides which used the device of tampering with her minorities. The Allies banked on her disintegration and also on the *blasé*, irresponsible character and highly cosmopolitan outlook of her ruling class, and hence did not rate the military capacity of the dual monarchy very high. There is no doubt that the thinly-veiled impotence of Austria-Hungary was a strong encouragement to the Allies to risk a war.

Bulgaria and Turkey were only of minor military importance. Bulgaria aided us against her enemies the Serbians and the Rumanians; she thereby helped to open up the direct line to Turkey which we had hitherto lacked. Turkey, as a German sphere of influence, had to be protected against the Allies who were bent on partitioning her, and therefore needed, instead of providing, help. Her importance in the War lay in the fact that she broke the circle of the Allies' European communications, by cutting Russia and Rumania off from Anglo-French support.

On the enemy side the decisive factors were at first Russia and France and subsequently England and America. France bore the brunt of the first onslaught of the German army

and, helped by the Germans' own serious tactical mistakes, held it and something more besides. Her military strength, which was always formidable, steadily increased with time, and her war-spirit was sustained not only by the tenacity and grim determination of the French character but also by her unconquerable lust for power, so that the Republic, in spite of all its sufferings, never seriously flagged; in fact the transition from war to peace found her with the largest and strongest army in the world, which haunts the mind of present-day Europe like an evil dream.

While France was the little man with taut muscles, Russia was the big man with slack ones. Like Austria-Hungary, Russia was a country of many peoples, but the ruling element was more determined to have its way and possessed effective means of getting it. The Russian army tried to win by sheer weight of numbers, but it was partially paralyzed by industrial deficiencies. Nevertheless it was able, by strategic use of its wide spaces, to maintain itself as an entity, in spite of many defeats. The collapse of Russia was only indirectly brought about by the general failure of her armies, inasmuch as the Marxian canker, which had long been there and had had the ground well prepared for it, knew how to draw sustenance from such failure.

But the old Russia in its own death-agonies dealt the old Germany its death-blow, because the latter had not the sense at the beginning of 1918 to discount Russia, then in the throes of collapse, altogether as a danger in its rear, which would have given us a definite superiority on the western front; instead of that we left an army of a million men in a Russia that was no longer capable of defending itself.

England brought to the Allies what Russia lacked, tenacity and staying-power. It was only the support of the mistress of the seas that ever nerved France and Russia to risk a war—without England they would never have done it. England only gradually created an army, but she let loose the full force of the war of starvation against us immediately by closing both the entrances to the North Sea, and brought

the opinion of the world over to her side by her low-down campaign of calumny. Her bull-dog way of getting her teeth into the enemy and hanging blindly on—unheroically, when one really comes to think of it, but still, looking neither to the right nor left—had much to do with deciding the issue of the war, and was a never-failing encouragement to the French in their occasional moments of weakness. Unfortunately the German mind, at least as represented by our leaders at that time, completely misunderstood the English character. Just as it dismissed the French as a nation of degenerates, so it dismissed the English as a nation of shopkeepers; but neither things are incompatible with courage and determination to conquer. Moreover, the Germans put too little trust in their own navy and did not know how to turn the sea to their own advantage; they ought to have used it to destroy England's maritime trade, wiping out as much as possible of her fleet, and invade the British Isles. They only attempted the first, and then too late and with inadequate resources.

The other members of the Entente, with the one exception of America, played only minor parts in the bloody drama. This is even true of Italy, with a population as large as that of France. Her defection from the Triple Alliance, for which German and Austrian clumsiness provided a good diplomatic pretext, strengthened the French army right at the beginning, in the decisive struggle at the Marne, by allowing it to leave its Alpine frontier unoccupied, whereas the German left in Alsace, which had been originally apportioned to the Italians, had to be taken over by German troops. Italy's active entry into the war subsequently weakened Austria's Russian front so seriously that it could only be held with difficulty and then entirely through a strong stiffening of German troops. But just as Italy, in accordance with her natural temper, had proved an untrustworthy ally, so she made a backward and lukewarm companion in arms.

The small states on the Entente side did their bit with varying degrees of efficiency, Serbia best of all, whom Aus-

tria-Hungary only succeeded in wiping out with the aid of German and Bulgarian troops. The western corner of Belgium constituted an unpleasant threat to our right flank to the very end; and the relic of Serbia's heroic struggle, that miscellaneous army of near-Easterners in southern Macedonia, remained a constant menace to Bulgaria and Turkey, the latter of whom struck the first deadly blow at the Central Powers in the autumn of 1918. Rumania, though pretty easily conquered, nevertheless lengthened the Russian front to a considerable extent and prevented us from rolling it up from the south side.

Of the rest of the Allies only America need detain us here. As a result of Anglo-Saxon influence the United States took up an unfriendly attitude towards us from the beginning; indeed it was they who first enabled the Allies, by supplying them with munitions etc., to hold their own against us in the war of material and gradually but steadily to get the better of us. America's declaration of war in the spring of 1917, which was dictated not by vital necessity but by a mixture of greed and sentimentality, of course made things infinitely worse for us, by backing-up English will to win with American self-assurance, which is closely akin to it, and compensating for the dropping-out of the vast Russian army. Against the huge masses of America's choicest manhood the weary people of the Central Powers—strictly speaking only Germany by then—could no longer make headway. It was the entrance of the Americans, whom we took for mere blustering braggarts without appreciating the capacity for swift and forceful action which they also have, that decided the war in the Allies' favor. Germany therefore made a grave mistake in not taking them seriously enough and not doing everything possible, even to the extent of inviting humiliation, in order to prevent their declaring war.

In conclusion it remains to mention one more mighty partisan of the Allies, who appears at first sight to have nothing to do with geography but is yet the resultant of certain geographical phenomena—Time. The resources of

the Central Powers—foodstuffs, raw materials, recruits and nervous energy—steadily declined through lack of reënforcements; those of the Allies steadily increased, for the whole world was at their disposal and fell more and more under the spell of their lying persuasions. As soon as the armies settled down to position warfare, numbers became the decisive factor, and time was on the enemy's side, not on ours.



PART TWO
THE CENTRAL POWERS



I. THE GERMAN EMPIRE

I. TERRITORY, INDUSTRY, COMMUNICATIONS

GERMANY, that is to say, the German-speaking portions of Central Europe, extends over three belts of country, increasing in altitude as one goes from the North Sea and the Baltic towards the south, and dove-tailed together by valleys and a uniform climate. Not one of the three belts—lowland, highland and alpine—is completely occupied by the German people; the linguistic frontier, both in the west and even more in the east and the south, runs along a very irregular, and in parts highly disadvantageous, line.

The German Empire, created in 1871 out of a part of German Central Europe and badly mutilated in 1918, is merely a section of Germany, and one with the most disadvantageous frontier too. The German peoples of Holland, Flanders and Brabant, Switzerland, Austria, Luxemburg and Lichtenstein were already missing from the Second Reich, and the present interregnum has further been deprived of the Germans of Lorraine, Alsace, Posen, West Prussia, the eastern part of Upper Silesia, the little district of Hultschin, the Eupen-Malmedy region and the northern marches of Schleswig. That is to say, Germany's line of defense, with the single exception of the short eastern and southern sides of East Prussia, lies entirely inside the borders of German language and culture—a most unfavorable position from the national point of view, since it means that any future war will automatically be fought over country belonging to outlying portions of the German nation. The military jumping-off line of the Second Reich was considerably better placed; for from Aix-la-Chapelle to Basel (except for Luxemburg) it abutted directly on French-speaking territory, from Memel

to Pless on Lithuanian or Polish, and in the northern marches on Danish.

The German country is not of uniform physical structure. The northern lowlands are a broad land of plains and low hills, with no natural obstacles apart from an occasional swamp or marshy river-valley. The numerous rivers, running as they do north or north-west, provide good defensive positions with an eastward or, better still, westward or south-westward frontage. The soil is mostly sand, loam or clay; in the first case it is dry and permeable; in the other two hardly permeable, or impermeable and wet; the level of the ground-water is often very high, which makes it unsuitable for deeply dug-out positions. The vegetation consists of arable, meadow-land and forest, with heath and juniper in the dry sandy districts of the west. The arable land produces abundant quantities of corn, potatoes and sugar-beet, also in certain places of vegetables and fruit. The pasture-land, particularly in the coastal and river marshes, supports large herds of black-and-white Frisian cattle as well as a good half-breed; and pig-farming also plays an essential part in the nation's food supply. The country is on the whole moderately and comfortably populated, in some of the numerous sandy regions even sparsely; the population becomes denser in the marshy districts of the North Sea coast and its rivers, in the regions of the Oder and the Vistula, and in the loess-covered fringe of hills at the southern edge of the lowland belt, where coal, iron and potash, in conjunction with extreme fertility and good means of communication, have created one of the most thickly populated areas in Germany, running from Flanders via the Ruhr, the foot of the Harz mountains and the Leipzig district to Upper Silesia. Regions like this, swarming with big villages and estates, factories, mines, towns, cities, stations and railway-lines, naturally stand out in strong contrast to the sandy wastes of the Lüneburger or the Tucher Heide—the former with its isolated farms and dwarf villages, moors and peat-bogs, pine-woods

and little fields of buckwheat, the latter with its sandy flats, scattered dwarf-pines and humble lumber-villages.

Though each section of the lowland belt has its own system of communications, and though the rivers with their shipping divide it into distinct sectors, nevertheless in the railway age, as the capital of the Reich, Berlin has become, as regards passenger traffic, the dominant center upon which the principal lines converge. The Greater Berlin area is better protected than any other part of the lowlands, by the remains of old moraines in the north and south and by the reaches of the Elbe and the Oder and their tributaries, together with innumerable swamps and lakes, on the western and eastern sides. It has the additional advantage of being a long way from the arch-enemy, who would have to fight his way through marshy river-valleys and mountain country before he could reach it; while the danger of the Slavs on the eastern side, near as it admittedly is, need not, perhaps, be taken too seriously.

The northern side of the lowland belt, the coast, also possesses strategic advantages, especially the North Sea coast, which is almost everywhere a flat country of shoals, sand-dunes, dykes and islands, with river-mouths demanding very careful navigation. The Baltic coast consists of sandy, clayey beaches and big bays, in which hostile troops could land more easily; on the other hand, the danger is rendered less by the ease with which the Danish straits can be closed, while the Kiel Canal enables us to transfer our fleet from the North Sea to the Baltic in safety. The southern side of the lowland belt, where it joins on to the highlands, would be less easy to defend; for the transition between the two belts is affected by a mass of hills and valleys which are particularly thickly populated. However, not being a political frontier, this line is never likely to have to function as a whole. The western frontier is well secured by the Buertanger Moor, still comparatively impassable on the German side, and the line of the Ems, with its bogs, moors and woods behind it. The eastern frontier lies open in East Prussia between Memel

and Pissa, and also round about the valley of the upper Alle, but is well protected elsewhere by moraine-hills in conjunction with rivers and lakes. Between the Vistula and the Oder there are several broad and in parts boggy prehistoric river-valleys which could serve as lines of defense—*i.e.* especially the Warthe-Netze sector, to protect Further Pomerania, and the line of the Oder itself for Silesia, which, of course, has the half-Czechoslovakian mountains towering close behind it.

The southern German highlands are decidedly more ambiguous in character. They consist of rolling plateaux intersected by glens and descending by steep, crenellated terraces to broad river-valleys. The whole region has been formed by the breaking-up of a former single hog's-back, so that the surface-form of the hog's-back still predominates in both its upper and lower regions. The individual mountain masses meanwhile exhibit the most various shapes—flat-topped blocks like the Harz, slabs like those of the Erzgebirge and the Swabian Alps, great ramparts like the Sudetes and the Tüvingerwald, broad flat blocks like the Rhenish slate-mountains. Between them stretch tracts of open country with a flat or undulating surface, which form little sheltered worlds of their own—*e.g.* the punch-bowl of Thuringia, the long depression of the Upper Rhine valley, the wide, terraced country of the Main and the Neckar, or the Alpine foreland, formed out of sand and scree brought down by the Alpine streams. Whereas in North Germany (and in the Alpine foreland) the rivers are the principal landmarks, in South Germany it is the mountain-ridges, the larger valleys, the passes and, in places, the plateaux that control communications and thus also show the way to strategy.

The geological structure in the mountains consists of old, hard formations like slate, graywacke, granite, porphyry, chalk and sandstone; on the flat, between slopes and cliffs of these one finds sand, scree, loam and loess. The vegetation is as follows: in the plains, fields sprinkled with copses, gardens and vineyards; in the mountains, beech- and pine-

woods, mountain-pastures and potato-fields, moors and beetling crags. The mountains are cool and moist in summer, in contrast to the hot plains, and cold in winter, as they retain their blanket of snow till a late date, and when it does melt in the spring, the rivers run high. Corn, potatoes, the sugar-beet, vegetables, hops and vines are all cultivated; the best crops are got in the plains, the hills encircling them, and the lower slopes of the mountain-valleys. On the high plateaux, owing to the shortness and coldness of the summers, they are poor and their place is often taken by the brown mountain cattle which graze on the mountain slopes. The food produced is not enough to support the population: the mountainous districts especially, but also the numerous very highly industrialized valleys depend on imports to feed their extremely dense populations. The lower levels are not, however, in all cases better populated than the higher; they are in South Germany, where the plain of the Upper Rhine and its satellite valleys have an average of more than 380 people to the square mile; on the other hand, in the eastern half of Central Germany the mountains are in some cases better populated than the far more fertile hills and plains leading up to them. The explanation is that in the Erzgebirge and the Sudetes the former mining population, instead of leaving when the mines were closed down, obstinately hung on and took to weaving, which enabled it to remain in its home. An army may have a chance of living off the country in North Germany, but not in South Germany, or in any case only in certain areas. The country on both sides of the Rhine along its whole length and Central Germany from the Harz Mountains and the Thüringerwald to Upper Silesia are so densely populated and heavily industrialized that they have to get large quantities of food from outside.

Even in South Germany most of the main highways lead to Berlin, though the fact is not so obvious as it might be, owing to the natural divisions of the country. From Cologne and Essen, from Treves and Coblenz, from Frankfurt and Mainz, from Stuttgart, Munich, Dresden and Beuthen, the

main railway lines converge on the Capital of the Reich. Nearly all of them have to pass through narrow openings in the mountains and bottle-necks where traffic can be shut off. And every line, every position that the Germans are ever compelled to take up inside the Reich will have to fall plumb on to one of these main-line railways. From this point of view the following are particularly important: on the Cologne section, the natural stronghold of the Teutoburgerwald and the Weser range, secured on the left flank by the Egge, on the right by marshes of the Hase, and doubly strengthened in the rear by the Weser and the Leine; on the Coblenz section, the line of the Rothaargebirge and the Vogelsberg; on the Frankfurt section, the Vogelsberg-Landrücken-Rhön line which joins on to its left side; on the Stuttgart section the Kocher-Jagst line, and the line of the Main behind it; on the Munich section the line of the Danube, also the Frankenwald-Fichtelgebirge line; on the Dresden (Prague) section, the Elbe-Elster line, surmounted by the frontier rampart of the Fläming and the Niederlausitzer; on the completely level Breslau-Beuthen section, a series of tributaries of the Oder lying one behind the other. The Southern German frontier of the Reich is admirably secure in several places. This is particularly true of the Erzgebirge, whose steep side is the Bohemian one; in the Böhmerwald, of course, the position is reversed, but here there is a succession of slopes one behind the other. The Sudetes, which are situated on the other side of the easily blocked Elbe gorge, are more easily passable, as they consist of separate ridges, and the ways through, *e.g.* from Zittau and several to the east—are not seldom threatened by Czechoslovakia. Elsewhere the Southern-German frontier is definitely insecure; this is especially true of the whole sector between the Saar basin and Basel, where it is formed by the Rhine and the rolling plateau of the Palatinate. The Rhine is, of course, not altogether easy to cross here, but it and its hinterland on the Baden side are completely exposed to French fire, and the rather narrow flat strip on its right bank

would not give a large army room to deploy. The Black Forest itself is somewhat easier to defend, as it slopes down sharply towards the Rhine, while its northern portion is intersected by valleys running north and south and is awkward to cross from west to east. The wooded, rolling tableland of the Palatinate presents no great obstacles to an invader from the south-west, especially as the line of its western marshes with the Kaiserstrasse which the French have so often trod, lies exactly on the Metz-Mainz route. The Second Reich's frontier along the Vosges was also a bad one from the military point of view, as the French sat tight on the ridges and at the heads of the valleys and made it impossible to climb up the steep Rhine side. While they could look down over miles of the open plain of the Rhine, we could get no direct view of the broad wooded plateau of Lorraine at their backs. The western frontier is, however, better protected in the region of the Rhenish slate-mountains. Apart from the narrow, winding valley of the Moselle, which is flanked by mountains and easily closed, the Eifel affords a series of river valleys, one behind the other, running north and south and separated by wooded and in places boggy strips of high ground. In particular the valleys of the Our and the Rur with those of the Meuse and the Nier next to them on their right, separated by a marsh, should provide good positions. Of the southern frontier of the Reich, the Swiss part must be distinguished from the Austrian. The latter consists of sandstone ridges of moderate height, high mountain chains and blocks of chalk and dolomite, and valley-heads, while the Salzach-Inn line joins on to its left flank in the open foreland of the Alps, with a series of further river valleys behind it. This frontier can certainly never acquire practical military value. It is otherwise with the Swiss frontier, which is divided into three parts—the broad and navigable Lake of Constance, the easily crossed section of the Rhine valley between the open spaces of the Hegau and the region of the lower Thur, and the narrow section where it cuts in between the plateau of the Jura and the slopes of the Black Forest.

The middle part is the danger spot, because it presents the fewest natural obstacles and lays open the way to the valley of the Danube, the rest of the Alpine foreland and the passes of the Swabian Alps for an enemy approaching from the west or south-west.

II. NATIONAL CHARACTER

This country, in which a flat or undulating landscape, a cool, moderately damp, cloudy climate and green vegetation are the rule, is the background against which the German people lives and works, the home of its culture and its political aspirations. As a result of its position in the center of Europe, the German people is a compound of several races, among which one, the Teutonic race of Phalian *cum* Nordic blood, has gained the upper hand and imposed the law of its inner compulsion, its will, its cultural ideal and its language on the others and on the mixture as a whole. Nevertheless, through the disruptive effect of a territory with many natural divisions, and the results of the influence of other races on the manner and degree of the mixture, various races and dialects have crystallized out and in many cases developed historically on widely divergent lines. History shows us two main divisions of our people. Up to the sixth century the western half of Germany was the scene of migrations from the north to the south, and from that time onwards we find the Frisians, Lower Saxons and Lower Franks in the north, the Franks, Hessians and Thuringians in the center, the Alemanni and Bavarians in the south. Between the tenth and the fourteenth centuries, however, portions of these races moved eastwards across the Slav frontier, which then ran from Kiel through Magdeburg, Saale, Nuremburg and Linz to Toblach, and colonized what is now the eastern half of Germany. In this newly-settled country the different races did not keep strictly to themselves as in their old homes but intermingled to a considerable extent; hence the consciousness of definite German nationality was on the whole more

strongly developed here: it is no accident that the two leading courts since the thirteenth century, Vienna and Berlin, were both situated in the east.

The total German-speaking population of Central Europe—from Cape Griz-Nez to Memel along the north, from the Neuenburgersee to the Raab along the south, and, looking north and south, from the Königsau to the Salurno pass—today numbers 92,000,000 souls, of whom only 62,500,000 live in Germany; there are 6,500,000 of them in Austria and 400,000 in Danzig, that is to say, in countries which desire to be German; the rest live in countries of non-German nationality, even though they may be purely German-speaking, such as Holland and Luxemburg, or as subjects of foreign countries like Switzerland, Belgium, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania and Denmark. It is a distinguishing mark of the German people that only a part of it is really determined to be German; the others are willing subjects of other countries or, if not that, turn their backs so completely on German cultural ideals that they cease to be creative. This opens up the oddest possibilities. Ever since 1648 the Dutch have detached themselves, politically, nationally and culturally, from the German parent stem so deliberately that both they and most other Germans have almost ceased to be conscious of this unnatural separation—a separation which meant the end of their creative achievement. On the other hand, the German element in quadrilingual Switzerland, in spite of its strict political detachment from the Reich, has kept up closest intellectual relations with the German motherland. But the German minorities which are stuck in foreign countries with strong cultural and national ideals of their own, like the Flemings in Belgium, the Alsatians and the Lorrainers in France, the Germans in Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland;—these *dissecta membra* are all marked out for spiritual death sooner or later, as has long been quite clear in the case of the Flemings, Alsatians and Lorrainers, people who were once of considerable cultural importance.

The German character is the character of the Teutonic race as modified by Eastern, Eastern-Baltic and Dinaric influences and formed by a particular common destiny. Its main characteristics fall into two categories. The first is positive; it comprises: (1) creative power, which instead of resting content with what there is seeks to embody and exhibit the old spirit in ever new forms; (2) work for the sake of the thing itself, not in order to palm off some sham, which leads the Germans to look for the real meaning of things even to the neglect of pleasing form, and makes it difficult for differently constituted nations to get close to the German mind; (3) individualism, which treats the individual as an independent entity, free to think for himself and conscious of his responsibilities. The other category is of a more negative order; it comprises: (1) the *invidia*, or suspicious jealousy, already noticed by Tacitus, which is the reverse of their individualism, allowing no one to have more than his fellows and anxious to pull its neighbor down to its own level of zero; (2) a defective political sense, which, like the old Teutonic farmers, usually thinks only of its own welfare and its own salvation, and finds it extremely difficult to think on communal lines. This leads to (3) a tendency to set up and stubbornly maintain separate political entities whose individual welfare, even today in some cases, is preferred to that of the whole; (4) insufficient power of being carried away by blind enthusiasm, because a profound insight into the nature of things and an individualistic temper make it difficult for a man to follow a leader blindly; (5) unpractical dreaming, which neglects the outside of things through preoccupation with their essential nature, and lives so completely in a world of unreality that it forgets all about facts and is often overreached, thrust aside, by realists like the French and the English. The name of "nation of poets and thinkers," which came in about 1800, was used by other nations in a definitely contemptuous sense.

Obviously, a character such as this fits a nation for both things, brilliant victory and miserable defeat, mastery and,

alas, also slavery. German history is rich enough in examples of both; one has but to think of Versailles in 1871 and then again in 1919. Owing to our mixed blood, our national temperament is so lacking in unity, so ambiguous, that anything may issue from it, anything be demanded of it, according as foreign influences are admitted or excluded. And that is the root of what is perhaps the most prominent feature of the German spirit, its tragic quality. It is not so much will and ability as desire and fulfillment, the beginning and the final achievement, which are so far apart in its case. It is often an alien hand that reaches over from outside and sets in motion the dark forces of the un-German blood in us, playing them off against the forces of the light, the creative values, so that, in spite of a brilliant start and astounding victories, we do not keep it up to the very last, do not fight our battles through to the end; the net result being that, instead of the victors everyone expected, we emerge battered and defeated, and relapse still indignant at our fate, which we have after all deserved, protestingly at first but in the end with resignation, into our old position as misunderstood nobodies. The Great War is the most terrible confirmation of this truth of which the whole world, with the solitary exception of ourselves, has long been fully aware.

How will a nation with such a psychological constitution behave in the hour of danger, in a war, in the final moments of a supreme struggle for existence? It was above all the creative power of the German nation that enabled it to carry on the War for four years and against the numbers, materials, energies and brains of the whole world. The training of the army, the supply of arms and equipment, transport and mobilization were technically well planned and well carried out. But our strategy went wrong from the very beginning, inasmuch as a sound plan for a war on two fronts was not carried out consistently, flexibly or vigorously enough, which immediately turned a war which could only be brought to a satisfactory conclusion against overwhelmingly superior forces by a series of rapid blows, into a war

of attrition, thus making the issue extremely dubious. Subsequent individual victories in and about East Prussia, Poland, Serbia, Rumania and Italy could not alter this, as they did not hit our chief antagonist in the west, and did not end either in the case of Russia or of Italy in the complete annihilation of the enemy. German creative power showed itself strangely helpless as regards the sea. It had created a splendid navy, but had little confidence in it, dared not take a chance with it, and entered upon unrestricted U-boat warfare, which had good prospects of success and was sometimes regarded as our only salvation, so half-heartedly, and abandoned it so soon, that nothing decisive was achieved on the sea. When one considers that the policy of Falkenhayn, which aimed at destroying the enemy by gradual attrition—a hopelessly wrong policy for a minority as economically inferior as we were—stood in the way of the more effective strategy of Hindenburg and Ludendorff right down to the summer of 1916; when one remembers further that a courtier like Admiral von Müller, in conjunction with a congenitally timid Chancellor like Bethmann-Hollweg, effectively opposed the vigorous naval policy of a Tirpitz and a Scheer;—one must admit that our creative energy suffered only too often from contradictory aims. Nor can it be denied that our big-wigs only too often decided against the one right thing, or if for it, then too late. In our dispositions on the west in August, 1914, the left, stationary wing, which had mostly to advance through difficult country, was made too strong, the right, mobile wing, which had to accomplish long marches, too weak: moreover it was not given the chance to force a way to the Channel coast, although England was one of our enemies, and on top of everything, it and not the left wing was further weakened by the withdrawal of two army corps to strengthen the eastern front, which, though hard-pressed, could never decide the issue. These were fatal mistakes of strategy, which ill became the creative energy of the German people and were in fact far removed from it, since they

are only to be laid to the account of an ill-informed government which did not know how to choose its generals.

The joy of work for its own and its object's sake undoubtedly helped many a soldier at the front and many of those at home to endure labors and horrors and losses, and braced them to do their duty without murmuring. If our armies, even in the retreat of Autumn 1918, when there was no longer any chance of victory, made the numerically vastly superior enemy pay dearly in blood for every step he advanced; if isolated machine-gun teams, with tanks, aeroplanes and bursting shells all round them, their retreat long since cut off and death staring them in the face, still fired off their ammunition to the last round;—this silent, indomitable heroism, which cares not if others be there to see or no, comes entirely from our German quality of devotion to one's duty and one's work. This quality shone perhaps even more brightly in the silent endurance of the last three starvation-years on the part of the whole population, civil and military; if this attitude broke down to a large extent later on, the blame for that lies exclusively with the insidious canker of Marxism, which well knew how to play upon our fatal national trait of *invidia*. The real heroes of the Great War are not the well-fed, warmly clad conquerors from Scotland and America, relieved every two or three days, but the harassed, haggard figure in field-gray, and his lonely wife with her starving children clinging to her skirts. These last two gave the war a deeper meaning than war had ever had before; the fact that they were both defeated in the end detracts nothing from their heroism.

The noble principle of work for its own sake has its disadvantage in war. A nation with its eyes so fixed on loyalty, truth and honesty easily falls into the enemy's traps. This is exemplified, firstly by the success of the English campaign of lies and Wilson's Fourteen Points, secondly by the way we clung to the letter of the law. A nation accustomed to loyal, straightforward work does not easily bring itself to

blacken its enemy in the eyes of the world, rob him of all sympathy and get him down by lies and persecution, because it believes that all good work is its own justification and its own reward. But this, alas! is often by no means the case, either in individual or national life; the bad press which Germany enjoys in the world, in spite of her splendid cultural achievements, is a proof of this. A straightforward nation imagines that it and its work do not need propaganda; at the same time is easily falls a victim to the lies of the enemy, because it is accustomed from its own practice to regard words only as a means of expressing the truth, not of garnishing a falsehood. It takes dross for good coin only too readily; it is unfitted for active propaganda, but passively a most profitable object for it. Our tendency to cling to the letter, to take the other trap into which we fell, showed itself, for instance, over the Congo Act, the scrupulous observance of which had rendered our colonies almost defenseless by forbidding the extension of a European war to African colonies, but for which neither England nor France nor Portugal cared a fig, only we Germans. A nation with such a character will find it hard to grasp that vital necessity always takes precedence of a mere agreement, especially as every agreement originally arises from a vital necessity. With the English action often comes before thought, with the Germans thought is generally ahead of action. The Englishman strikes first and then thinks out the best interpretation he can give to his blow, the German wonders how best to strike, and often thereby misses the chance of striking in the best place. Another quality, and defect, of this loyalty in work is the tendency to get absorbed in one line of thought—undoubtedly an admirable gift in itself, for great things are only produced by immersing oneself in the object. The Schlieffen plan, the enveloping victories in East Prussia, Rumania and northern Italy, the defense of the Dardanelles with incredibly small forces, are all examples of this. But what if the line of thought leads in the wrong direction? In that case nothing is more calculated to bring about de-

feat and disaster than this single-track sort of mind. As an example we may cite our higher command from 1914 to 1916, which imagined that the war was to be won by the gradual wearing down of the enemy (who had superior and ever-growing numbers and the resources of the whole world at his disposal), and planned the terrible battle of Verdun and fought it for six months, in order to bring the French to their knees by inflicting intolerable losses on them!

Our individualism enabled us from the beginning to face a world of enemies calmly—perhaps too calmly; for it is a feeling of complete self-confidence, which is accustomed to stand by itself and does not worry about a couple of enemies more or less. Though this self-confidence may go wrong, yet our people must never cease to cultivate it; it seems to us to be one of its best and strongest sides, for which, when combined with creative power, nothing in the world is too difficult to achieve. The ability not to lose one's head at the critical moment but to find a way out by one's own unaided efforts, is of an essentially individualistic order. The sure instinct which led the German and Austrian higher commands in May and June of 1915 to carry on with their operations against Russia in spite of Italy's declaration of war, and the clear-headed way in which, also at a very difficult time, the offensive against Rumania was planned and swiftly carried out;—such things are the fruits of individualistic efficiency. To be sure, this quality may do harm when it leads people to under-rate their enemies from a feeling of their own strength; that is what we did in the summer of 1914, when we doubted England's capacity to sustain a big war on land and to raise, train and transport to France an army of millions; and perhaps even worse (as we are bound to admit in the light of subsequent events) in the spring of 1917, when we failed to do everything possible, even to the swallowing of grievous humiliations, to prevent, or at any rate defer for as long as possible, America's entry into the war: for it was this that finally clinched the victory of the

Allies. But individualism means relying entirely on one's own efforts, and that also has two sides to it, a strong one and a weak one.

Unfortunately, the reverse of individualism, *invidia*, mutual jealousy and suspicion, has done the German nation grievous damage over and over again from the earliest times. Roman writers already speak of it, with evident satisfaction: for instance, in connection with the battle of Strasburg in 357, where the Alemannian infantry objected to their leaders being mounted and cried out, "Get off your horses, get off your horses," as a result of which the battle was lost, because the chieftains could no longer keep an eye on the general progress of the battle. In the war this *invidia* showed itself both at home and at the front. (About the worst case of all, the Emperor Charles the Last's betrayal of his ally, we will say nothing.) It undoubtedly played a part in keeping Hindenburg and Ludendorff out of the supreme command to the last possible moment and Tirpitz out of the command of the navy altogether, which things contributed very materially to the unsuccessful issue of the war. Worse still was the incitement of the masses through the poison of Marxism, which is based purely on *invidia*, since it is an attempt to get power and wealth on the part of those who lack one or both of these things and envy their neighbor his house or his better dinner. This evil trait will not be cured by dividing all property equally, which would only increase covetousness, but only by keeping the ideas of each class within the limits proper to its station, and thus getting rid of exaggerated ambitions. In time of war there ought, no doubt, to be equality in the physical things right through the army; that is to say, the principle of "same pay, same food" ought to be carried out, in order to obviate any cause for jealousy. This may be unpleasant for pampered young men and for many of their seniors, but the interests of the fatherland must take precedence of all other considerations. Never again must it be said in a German army:

*With equal grub and equal pay
The war'd be over this many a day.*

In the eyes of death all are equal, general and private; not only strategic ability but also sacrifice of his creature comforts is part of a commander's business. Indeed the principle of equal rations ought, in the event of Germany's being blockaded and starved out in another war, to be extended from the army to the whole civil population, in the first place to make supplies last as long as possible, and in the second, by removing all inequalities in the standard of living, straight-way to stamp on the head of the cross-eyed serpent, Envy.

Our lack of political sense has brought the most untoward results on our heads throughout our history, and our few great statesmen have had to battle with crass political ignorance in the nation as a whole and in many of their colleagues in office too. It may be that this deficiency is part of our dominant individualism, which at a low level thinks first and last of its own little self and prefers the welfare of that to the welfare of the nation and the state. The whole diplomatic prelude to the world war shows political stupidity, starting with the estrangement of the Russians, which drove them into the arms of France, completely isolated till then, and first started the atmosphere of antagonism which led up to the conflict right down to our declarations of war, by which, as in the case of the invasion of Belgium, we made ourselves the guilty party in the eyes of the world. It is also highly questionable whether Bismarck's choice of Austria-Hungary, the "ramshackle empire," and Italy, unreliable at the best of times and Austria's bitterest enemy, was a wise one. Even if there was no other possibility open in the 'eighties, a later date ought to have witnessed the inclusion of another great power in the alliance or the foundation of a new alliance of great powers, the only possible candidates being England and Russia. Bismarck's notion of diverting France's attention from Germany by letting her found an empire in Africa also proved a mistake, for it enabled France

to bring over 800,000 colored soldiers and laborers to the European theaters of war. During the war our lack of political insight showed itself in the peace offer of December 1916 and in the Reichstag's peace resolution of July 1917, both of which arose out of the unsatisfactory military situation and showed that it is precisely in misfortune that one must take the greatest care to repress all signs of faint-heartedness, because they confuse and weaken one's own people, but strengthen the enemy and fill him with joyous hope, and particularly when one is dealing with an enemy so vindictive and greedy as France or so tough and unyielding as England.

A still greater degree of political immaturity was evinced by the proclamation of a kingdom of Poland by Germany and Austria in November 1916. The anticipated gain—the formation of five volunteer divisions ready for the spring of 1917 and the enlistment of a million new recruits—entirely failed to materialize; instead, serious ill-effects soon manifested themselves: the Russians, who had been ready to make peace, were thrown once more into the arms of France and England, now that all hopes of recovering Russian Poland had been finally shattered, and the desire of the Poles for the restoration of Poland had risen to boiling point not merely in Russian but also in German and Austrian Poland. One sees the fatal combination of political stupidity and ignorance of psychology at work in this affair. Another thoroughly bad piece of political work on our part was the dragging of America into the war. America's neutrality may have been definitely unfriendly to us, and she may have done us great harm by supplying arms, munitions and material to the Allies; but even so her actual armed intervention—as the event clearly showed—was to be avoided at all costs. In the spring of 1917 we had to choose between unrestricted U-boat warfare and keeping America out of the war. If we preferred the former, it was essential to carry it out as soon, as ruthlessly and as energetically as possible—otherwise the possible success of our submarines was not worth the risk of the intervention of the American army and the American fleet.

The event showed that American man-power was more formidable than our submarines; that is to say, we had played our diplomatic cards badly.

Our conduct of the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in the spring of 1918 was equally injudicious. The desire, in itself perfectly natural, to show the world and our own people a brilliant success, led to our extorting the greatest possible advantages from our defeated and disintegrating enemy, which, however, we had to leave a million soldiers in Russia to follow up. But there was no longer any point in possessing ourselves of large quantities of territory and collecting phantom victories; the one thing needful was to put as many men as possible in the only place that really mattered, namely France. Brest-Litovsk interfered with this, with the result that our spring offensive did not reach the objectives which it might have reached and which would have decided the war—particularly Amiens, the key position on which communications between the French and the British fronts depended. But the worst political folly of all was the conclusion of the war, the falling of a great nation, which had given a magnificent account of itself, into the crude and obvious trap set by a single Yankee, and a private individual at that, by means of which America followed up her military knock-out by a political one. One gets the impression that the average German politician is often guided more by his heart than by his head. Moreover, he does not go deeply enough into the psychology of the enemy, but judges their thoughts and actions by his own standards, which is naturally bound to lead to mistakes when their mentality and the German are poles apart.

Insufficient capacity for blind enthusiasm, and an allied lack of resource in inventing inflammatory catch-words, are a feature of the German character which, while it has nothing to do with lack of ability, may yet do a nation harm. It undoubtedly goes with strong individualism and is its disadvantageous side. The self-reliance of the individual and his skeptical attitude towards his fellows make it impossible

for him to follow the crowd without reserve, and the German character, which shrinks from loud exhibitions of one's most private emotions, prevents a German from joining in an enthusiastic chorus to another man's song or indulging in frenzies of *esprit de corps* in front of the whole world. These are entirely admirable qualities considered in themselves, but politically they may be a barrier to success; militarily, they can doubtless be eradicated by the equalizing effects of training. Enthusiasm did burst forth at the beginning of the war and was skillfully fanned by reports of early victories; but the reverse at the Marne and the mysterious silence of G.H.Q. which followed soon caused it to change to a half-amazed, half-anxious expectancy, whose deepening gloom was only lighted once again by the patriotic outburst of the young student regiments at Langemarck. After that, no further word was found to fire the imaginations of the people; instead, the saying went round that enthusiasm was not like herrings—*i.e.* that it would not keep. True enough, but it must be possible to make it keep longer than a month or two—if a nation's character is made that way. In that respect we are inferior to the Latin nations, who can be wrought up by a good fiery slogan to deeds of which they would be incapable in cold blood. The essential function of enthusiasm being undoubtedly the swift overcoming of a sudden danger, the national interest demands that occasions should be found for constantly rekindling it, in order to overcome special difficulties by its aid. In the war the moment for doing this was at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 after the collapse of Russia, when it was generally expected that the hour of victory on the western front was at hand. Unfortunately, the government did not make use of it to repair the cracks in the body politic by appropriate measures and (what was then indeed less urgent) to give a fillip to the army.

Our unpractical dreaminess also came out in several ways during the war. It began with our chivalrous loyalty to Austria-Hungary, who had done very little to deserve it, for

her *blasé*, irresponsible aristocracy, with its extremely cosmopolitan outlook, always maintained a cold and skeptical attitude towards the German Empire, even after the latter had allowed itself to be dragged into the most dangerous of all wars for their sakes. It continued with the insane idea that a war which was not merely a military struggle but a war of economics, material and propaganda, involving the whole world, could be won by cold steel alone; with the child-like hope that we, from our besieged and beleaguered fortress, could gradually wear down our giant enemy who had the whole world behind him; in the fantastic notion of keeping America out of the war by irritating her, and so on and so on. Verily the German people plunged like a young, green hero into the adventure of this world-conflagration, driven by an inner urge to break the endless monotony of everyday life by some epic experience. For two decades it had seen the world as it wanted to see it, not as it was, and it acted according to this figment of its imagination, not as the realities of the situation demanded. The German soldier crossed the French frontier in the same spirit as his father had left it in 1871, taking his victory as a matter of course, and his people at home waited daily for the pæan that should celebrate it and grew uneasy when it did not come. Even so, this opening move would not have been such a hopelessly wrong one if G.H.Q., instead of failing from the very start, had carried out the great Schlieffen plan resolutely. For as the war went on the German soldier proved his superiority in action to a degree which the world had not expected. But dreamers remained dreamers; they lacked that little touch of realism which even the most beautiful dream needs if it is to be more than mere froth. It follows, both from their many-sided nature with all its tense, vibrating chords and from the difficulty of the task with which they were faced, that the experience of the German people in the world war was profoundly tragic. They saw themselves, comparatively unprepared and without a moment's warning, face to face with the three strongest powers in the world, and their first

commander-in-chief was a man, to quote the Crown Prince, "crushed by the weight of responsibility, whose condition was a source of grave concern to me and everybody else." The German people did not enter the lists for the final test as a complete unit; only two-thirds of the Germans of Central Europe stuck together, while the rest looked on or actually fought against us on the Belgian, Russian or American side. Germany built the second strongest navy in the world and thought only in terms of the land, not of the sea; she knew the enemy as little as she understood herself; she plunged into the struggle with a bravery that was based in equal quantities on superb courage and ignorance of the greatness of the danger. She soon got entangled in a curious duality which infected her whole war-experience: though her armies were deep in the enemy's country, she never quite managed to look like the winner, for the richer resources were in the other camp, from which rose the threatening shade of Time, a mighty helper and hard to overcome. While Germany won the battles, the enemy waited for victory. The Germans went on far too long confusing territorial gain with military success; in this war the former meant nothing, the latter everything. There is no doubt that victory stood on a razor's edge on many occasions; more than once it only wanted five minutes more to turn a German success into a decisive victory for Germany (the Marne in 1914, Russia in 1915, Rumania and Verdun in 1916, Amiens in 1918), and more than once Fate, in the guise of some failure by no means serious in itself but entailing incalculable consequences, took a hand against us. Anyone who has accustomed himself to look upon phenomena as the expression of invisible powers will ask himself the agonizing question, Were certain defects of our inner constitution responsible for the loss of the war, or did we attempt the impossible and so inevitably come to grief? Perhaps it was our fault that we marched straight out of a long-past, superseded age of romance into the adventure of the war, that we wanted to make history in the manner of the epic heroes, when history

herself had chosen the method of an economic war. The warrior-hero in these days has also to be a coldly calculating statesman with an understanding of economics; he must know as much about manufacturing guns as loosing them off. It has been Germany's fate to realize this too late. We wanted to act the Great Power before we were one. Let us take care next time to be a Great Power first and demonstrate the fact afterwards.

III. GERMANY IN THE WORLD WAR

1. *The War on Two Fronts.*—The great problem of the war on two fronts was, Shall we strike our main blow on the west or the east? From the military point of view everything was undoubtedly in favor of choosing the west, but unfortunately the higher command was induced prematurely to weaken the western front in the interests of the eastern, by which it spoilt the chance of a swift decision in the west without achieving one in the east.

Why was our western opponent much more dangerous than our eastern? In the west there were three powers arrayed against us, France, England and Belgium. Of these, France, which bore the brunt of the struggle for the first year, was out for a rapid victory, while England, which had still to raise a large army but possessed in its fleet a weapon of war that could rank with the French army, worked for a slow victory. The French army had but one object, to hold and repulse the German army, which had staked everything on the attack and a victory in double-quick time. The function of the original very small English army was to keep the French up to the mark; the English fleet was simply there to cut the Central Powers off from world-trade and throw them back entirely on their own very slender resources—*i.e.* to starve them of food and raw materials. Such were the objects which our enemy set himself in the first year of the war and, with his clear grasp of the situation, pursued with relentless logic. The fear that a German victory would mean

the end of British sea-power and world-dominion and the stifling of France's greedy ambitions so wrought upon the passions of the French and the obstinacy of the English that both nations were possessed by the conviction that a war to the knife was necessary. Owing to lack of education in the science of defense we did not grasp this fact clearly, or else Moltke would not have watered down the Schlieffen plan for an offensive in the west and Falkenhayn would not have conceived the idea of bringing the enemy in the west to their knees by gradual exhaustion. The mightiest force on their side was Time, their growing stocks of war-material, their world-wide campaign of lies; and the countries waiting to come in—Italy, Rumania, America and the rest—were already lurking in the background. It is incredible that anyone should have remained doubtful in the face of these facts. What reasons could there be for regarding the enemy in the east as the more dangerous?

To begin with, there was only one of him (little Serbia being on the defensive), to wit, Russia—a gigantic country, to be sure, with a large territory and millions of men, but through its geographical position as completely shut off from world-trade as ourselves; an agricultural country, moreover, so little industrialized that it was quite incapable of keeping its army properly equipped, which seriously reduced the military value of its huge population. In addition to this, there was the fact that the Russians are by nature slow without being sure and that their mentality is not purely western but has an Asiatic streak in it, not agile but, on the contrary, inert, hesitating, inclined to wait upon events, fonder of thinking than doing. In short, it should have been obvious to us from the beginning that the Russians, without wishing to under-estimate them, were no match for us and far less dangerous than the enemy in the west. The strategic objection to concentrating our efforts on the east was that the Russian country made it necessary to cover huge distances and in doing so to use large quantities of troops, while the enemy suffered comparatively little damage by such territorial losses

as we could inflict on him. Thus in the east too Time was on the side of the enemy; not economically but in a purely military way, by eating up men.

Every argument of pure military geography was thus in favor of our concentrating on the western front, but what should have clinched the matter was the consideration that the defeat of France would certainly finish Russia, whereas the defeat of Russia would not finish England and France.

2. *The Western Front.*—The German plan of campaign (see map 2) contemplated an advance on the line Crefeld-Metz-Strasburg-Colmar and in its original form laid down that the left should remain stationary as far as Metz, while the right carried out a lightning advance pivoting on Metz, with its right flank bearing down on Lille. Since an attack on the strong fortifications of the line of the Moselle and the Meuse was considered to have no chance of success, our left was to keep the French army busy in Alsace and Lorraine and, if possible, even tempt it to advance over the open plateau of the latter; meantime the right was to hurry through neutral Belgium, drive the French left and the little English army before it and force them eastwards in the direction of the Moselle fortresses and the Jura.

This plan, excellent and obvious in itself, had two defects: in the first place, it really only reckoned with France and neglected England, close by and extremely powerful; and in the second, it presupposed a commander of first-rate judgment, iron nerves and flexible intellect. The first mistake caused us at the very beginning to miss our chance of extending our right to the Channel, which would have enabled us straightaway to seize the line of the Somme (the best natural line for our purposes in France) and hold it when we subsequently withdrew; the great arsenal and railway-center of Paris would then have been disqualified for the office which it soon afterwards performed on our right at the Marne with such decisive and baleful effect, when the French Sixth army attacked us in the flank from Paris and the railway organization and personnel of the capital enabled the French to shift

troops faster in the race for the Channel than the Germans, with their momentary shortage of railways, were able to do. The second mistake, the choice of our commander-in-chief, led to the Schlieffen plan's being watered down still worse, inasmuch as (a) our left was strengthened at the expense of our right, which was useless to the former and fatal to the latter, and (b) the German troops in Lorraine, instead of biding their time, allowed themselves to be tempted into attacking and pursuing the enemy, with the result that the French front was thrust much further back at this point than was desirable for the intended envelopment of the whole French army in the east. Thus the German plan assumed an entirely different aspect in the course of being carried out; instead of first outflanking the enemy and then crushing him, it developed into a series of frontal attacks delivered against a skillful and resolute foe, strong fortifications and the handicap of steep slopes and broad rivers which had to be negotiated; this enabled the enemy to make use of his superior and extremely close network of railways, and gave him the strong arsenal of Paris as cover for his left flank. On the top of this came the failure of G.H.Q., which remained too far back to keep its grip on the situation, which was changing at every moment, and allowing itself to be rushed by sudden rumors of disasters into believing that a gap which had formed between the First and the Second armies was threatened by the English; but the English acted with the hesitation that a higher command with proper psychological training could have foreseen. It was indeed a fine victory for German discipline when a highly competent general against his better judgment obeyed the instructions of an excited and misinformed lieutenant-colonel, simply because he came from G.H.Q., and gave the order for a wholly unexpected and quite inexplicable retreat. This decision finally disposed of the original admirable plan for the war on two fronts, which had aimed at a rapid decision in the west to be followed by strangulation of the enemy in the east,

and time, material resources, starvation, calumny and moral disintegration usurped the place of heroism.

When one examines the German plan of campaign from the point of view of military geography—it was all settled as early as 1898 and not altered in the manner here to be indicated—one feels that it took no, or too little, account of England. It reckoned with the French army and even with England's little expeditionary force, but not with England as the mainstay of a protracted war, the organizer of the blockade which starved us out, the fountain-head of supplies. This was hardly expected of Schlieffen himself considering the situation in his time, but his successor ought to have been awake to these things. Our right flank ought not only to have besieged Antwerp—we had plenty of men in Alsace-Lorraine, where they were falling over each other, in fact—but also have made straight for the coast and occupied the Belgian and still more the French Channel ports, the bases of the British expeditionary force, as far as Boulogne or better still Abbeville, which would have been quite easy to do.

Nobody thought of this, because the purely land-minded Germans took no account of the sea and sea-power. Indeed, it is a question whether it was not a bad mistake in military geography to content ourselves with marching through Belgium instead of occupying Holland also, equally a neutral and our kinsman to boot. The disadvantage of this proceeding, namely, the fact that it involved a second violation of neutrality, was as nothing compared with the first violation; but the advantage was incalculable, for it would have put the whole opposite coast of England within our range; given our fleet a much longer and stronger base, which would certainly have preserved it from inactivity; and finally, made the possibility of an invasion of the south-eastern coast of England so immediate that the English, with practically no army, would probably have concluded a reasonable peace with all speed rather than have the country over-run by German soldiers. The military occupation of Holland, the home of a race of German traders and peasants thinking entirely

in terms of commercial advantage not military honor, would have presented no difficulties.

It is not too much to say that the world war became an economic war, a war of starvation, and lost the heroic character of earlier wars, because the Germans failed to grasp the strategic significance of the coast of Holland, Belgium and northern France, and made a mess of the Schlieffen plan. We can only hope that more comprehensive thought will some day lead to wiser decisions.

The further course of events in the west led to the retirement of the German right, which, however, soon turned face-forward again and dug itself in. The transition to position warfare was a declaration of strategic bankruptcy on the part of the German higher command, which had staked everything on the war of movement with the lightning destruction of the enemy in the west as its objective. Position warfare implies either complete inferiority on one side or inability on the part of the commander to make effective use of his troops and organize his transport out in the open. With Hindenburg and Ludendorff at the head of affairs, position warfare would never have started. The establishment of the western front meant the probability of a slow and lingering defeat for us, while it dangled visions of a gradually approaching victory before the eyes of the enemy.

The entrenched front which came into being in the autumn of 1914 in France, Flanders and the Vosges (see map 3) grew out of the chance position reached on a certain day by our military forces. It was not selected on tactical grounds, and contained both advantageous and disadvantageous sections, the latter of which were obstinately held, often at an immense sacrifice of lives, in accordance with the view, then still dominant, that territorial gain meant victory. One of the most obviously impracticable sections, for instance, was the salient from, roughly, St. Mihiel to the Meuse, which actually remained till the Americans pushed it in in the autumn of 1918; other bad ones were the trenches in the Flanders plain which were constantly flooded by the ground-

water, and those near Rheims, under the scarp of the tertiary bed, which was protected by projecting spurs. Attempts were made to overcome these disadvantages by attacks costing oceans of blood, but the gains were insecure and were often very quickly lost once more.

Trench warfare meant the abandonment or renunciation of the war of motion, and therewith of the hope of a rapid, fighting finish; and the decision became a matter of gradual attrition. Trench warfare has a very different effect from open warfare on the mind of the soldier; it gives him time to collect his thoughts and reflect, makes him wonder about all sorts of things and raises doubts in his mind which would never have time to grow up in open warfare with its constant rush of new events. Moreover trench warfare destroys an army's mobility, it turns the soldier into a householder, who ends by being unwilling to leave a neighborhood to which he has grown accustomed, and even developed a certain attachment for, for fear of exchanging it for a worse. The warrior becomes bourgeois-ized, the active spirit becomes passive, the conqueror turns property-owner. An immobilized army is forced into lines of thought which have no connection with its real function; it begins to think of peace rather than war, and finally of insubordination rather than obedience; for it feels the incompetence of its commanders from the fact that operations have come to a standstill.

The heroic virtues give place to technical acquirements. The machine, above all things, comes into prominence, in the form of entrenching-tools and machine-guns, hand-grenades and rifle-grenades, trench mortars and flame-throwers, barbed-wire entanglements and rock-drills, deep dug-outs and tanks, observation balloons and bombing-planes, etc., etc. It is the technician, not the warrior, whom trench warfare really requires, whether it be the pioneer or the miner, the geologist or the well-sinker, the telephonist or the listener-in, the flash-ranger or the sound-ranger, and the work of many hours is constantly being destroyed by the activities of the artillery.

For us the worst thing about the entrenched war was that a well-fortified and well-defended front like the French and the English was practically impregnable with the offensive weapons then available. From this point of view it made no difference whether it consisted of strong trenches hastily constructed for each occasion or, as we discovered to our great surprise at Arras, merely a deep network of craters and machine-gun posts. A small number of highly trained, resolute and strong-nerved men, machine-guns and gun-emplacements, well hidden from the observation of balloons and aeroplanes, could hold up whole armies; massed tanks were the only things for which this form of defense seemed inadequate, as the English break-through near Cambrai in November 1917 showed. The oldest and most elementary procedure for dislodging the enemy was prolonged artillery bombardment; this did destroy the enemy's position, but it gave him warning and enabled him to bring up sufficient reserves with which to meet the onset and to counter-attack himself; the most obvious examples are the Somme in 1915 and Flanders in 1917. Another method was a surprise attack by infantry after short artillery preparation; but this does not wipe out the position, which may therefore oppose a stout resistance, witness our break-through at Gorlice in 1915. The third method consists of a short bombardment, a gas-attack to cripple the enemy artillery, and then a sudden rush by infantry, the method we used successfully in the spring of 1918, though even then without getting the initiative completely into our hands, which we no doubt could have done with the aid of tanks.

It was the results of position warfare—lengthening of time, moral disintegration, inferiority in material resources, hunger, decrease of man-power, the growth of revolutionary sentiment—combined with the lack of enterprise which caused us to sit tight from the autumn of 1914 to the spring of 1918 without attempting an offensive in the west, that finally lost us the war on the western front.

3. *The Eastern Front.*—During the 'eighties the German plan of campaign, in case of a war on two fronts, envisaged the destruction of the Russian army as the first and most important objective. The reasons for this view were (a) the fact that the Russians proposed to take up their position in Poland, where their army could easily be surrounded from East Prussia and Galicia and completely destroyed, and (b) the building, which was then beginning, of the strong chain of fortresses on the north-eastern frontier of France, which it would be a very costly business to try to rush. But once the Russians, under French influence, had altered their plan of campaign as well as speeding up mobilization—so that their army was now to deploy east of the Polish mouse-trap, and once the idea of circumventing the French fortifications via Belgium had occurred to us, the German higher command opted for the western plan, which aimed at a rapid decision in the west, after which the east could be dealt with. Had we tried it the other way round, as many critics have insisted that we ought to have done, the Russian army drawn up along the Kovno-Grodno-Brest line, with its left resting on the Rokitno marshes, would no doubt have been defeated, but it would have retired further and further into the center of Russia, *i.e.* out of reach, very soon compelled us to fight a series of bloody frontal battles in the severest winter weather in open country with boggy river valleys in front of us, and never exposed its flank to us at all. Meanwhile, however, the French would have forced their way into Lorraine, occupied the key industrial area of the Saar basin, and no doubt also seized the Upper Rhine as far as Mainz, all of which would have made our position pretty well impossible.

The German idea of just holding the enemy in the east was absolutely right, especially as the enemy on the west was a far more dangerous and tenacious one. But the way in which it was carried out in practice was not above criticism. It depended, of course, on coöperation between the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians; indeed, the most im-

portant task fell to the latter. The Austrian higher command actually planned an offensive in Galicia between the Vistula and the Bug, which was to be supported by German troops advancing from East Prussia across the Narev. Unfortunately the Austrians made the mistake of launching only half instead of almost the whole of their army against Russia, in the interests of their really quite unimportant campaign against Serbia, and on top of that the big drafts of Germans which were expected to arrive after some four weeks of successful fighting against France, failed to materialize after the reverse at the Marne. The result was that the Russians, who had mobilized and taken up their position with unexpected promptness, invaded East Prussia and Galicia and thereby not only won rapid laurels for themselves but also contributed to the issue of the whole war, inasmuch as the German higher command allowed itself to be misled into withdrawing two army corps from the western front, and from its all-important right flank too. Admittedly this resulted in Hindenburg's and Ludendorff's first double victory, at Tannenberg on August 26-31, 1914, and at the Masurian lakes on September 9-15, which finally drove the Russians from German soil; but this was far outweighed by the other side of the picture, our defeat at the Marne, which made hay of our two-front plan and determined the course of the war. The splendid strategic achievement of our double victory may have saved East Prussia, but it in no way removed the danger of the "Russian steam-roller," as the expression was in those days; for the establishment of the western front had led to the terrible danger, the very one which was to have been avoided by a rapid victory in the west, of a simultaneous struggle with the entire armies of France, England and Russia. The danger of Eastern Germany's being overrun was not removed till the breach made in the Russian front from Tarnov to Gorlice on May 1-3, 1915, and the subsequent withdrawal of the Russians to the line of Riga-Dvinsk-Pinsk-Kovno-Kamenetz. The principal reason why the highly desirable object of enveloping the Russian army was not

achieved was that Falkenhayn and his staff did not regard the eastern theater of war as of decisive importance. So it certainly was not, but it might have eased our position, and a complete success would have been possible if we had used only a few extra troops, and if the German left had been ordered to advance in a south-easterly instead of a north-easterly direction.

The Germans used too many men on the eastern front not to hamper themselves in the west and too few to annihilate the Russians. From August 1915 onwards they were involved in position warfare on the eastern front, which proved an increasing strain, as this front was about twice as long as the western, and the progressive demoralization of the Austro-Hungarian army made it necessary to bring up more and more German troops. Certainly this campaign, which cost the Russians immense losses and in which two promising offensives launched against disloyal Austro-Hungarian troops in 1916 and 1917 were promptly scotched by German troops, did at least have an important psychological result; for in the spring of 1917 revolution broke out in Russia and in the course of that year wrought such havoc in the Russian army that it asked for an armistice on November 26th. This was an uncommonly good stroke of luck for us. The February revolution is indeed said to have been engineered by England because the Tsar was supposed to be on the point of making a separate peace; nevertheless, the armistice was a piece of luck for us. But we made a poor use of our luck. We might have transferred our eastern army, or very much the greater part of it, to the west, and tried for a decision there with every prospect of success; nay more, with a better understanding of the Russian national character and more accurate knowledge of the state of affairs in and behind the Russian lines, we might have transferred troops to the Italian front as early as August 1917, where they were badly needed in the struggle for the Piave and for the purpose of bringing Italy to her knees. Unfortunately, we took up a stiff-necked attitude over the negotiations for the treaty

of Brest-Litovsk, which dragged on from December 22, 1917, till March 3, 1918, and insisted on the acceptance of our harsh terms, to enforce which we had to leave a million men in Russia. The Allies had thereby in reality scored a major victory, for we were now some seven or eight thousand men short on the western front (allowing for two or three thousand as a necessary frontier guard and army of occupation in the east). That means that in our offensive of March 1918 we might have reached Amiens, thus driving a wedge between the English and the French; shortened and improved our front very considerably along the line of the Somme, which is admirable for military purposes; and captured a part of the English army besides. It may be understandable from the human point of view that we went out for laurels at Brest-Litovsk which should impress the world and raise the spirits of our own people, but it would have been more to the point to release a maximum number of men with all possible speed for the decisive struggle in the west. The Russia which we treated with such contempt at Brest has long since become a free country again, whereas we lie humiliated in the dust. And in that way the terrible fall from the heights of Brest-Litovsk to the depths of Versailles might have been avoided.

4. *The Maritime Front.*—The German maritime front is divided into two sections—the North Sea coast and the Baltic coast, which are separated by Jutland but conveniently connected by the Kiel Canal, which permits of the safe passage of shipping from one to the other. Their respective values as bases of operations for the high-seas fleet differ very widely. In the Baltic the naval incompetence of Russia made it easy for us with quite a small force to maintain a kind of command of the sea, which preserved us from a Russian landing on our shores (which was doubtless never projected) and secured our exceedingly important supplies of iron and timber from Sweden. But the Baltic, owing to its isolation, which was made even more complete by German, and subsequently

by British, mine-laying in the Belts, was of no great importance.

The North Sea was quite another matter (see map 9). Here our geographical position was in any case most unfavorable, and by a serious mistake in naval policy no attempt was made to overcome it. The North Sea is a wide but nevertheless enclosed area, and the German coast is its innermost corner and therefore a regular trap for our high-seas fleet, which can always be cut off from its base by the British, if it ventures outside it. On the other hand, the island of Great Britain occupies the whole western side of the North Sea, which gives the English three advantages: it enables them (1) to block up both exits from the North Sea to the Channel, thus hermetically blockading Germany; (2) to withdraw to a great variety of points along this long base; and (3) to attack the Bay of Heligoland by a variety of routes. It was therefore a grave mistake that we ourselves immediately ruined a safe position in the Cattegat, from which we could have threatened the left flank of the English battle-fleet, by strewing mines all over the Belts. The advantageousness of the English coast extends to the smallest details: thus its straightness makes it much easier to determine the whereabouts of a wirelessly German ship by listening-in from several points on it than it is to listen-in to English ships from the reëntrant German coast. The English Admiralty was thus always excellently informed regarding the position and direction of our warships, quite apart from the fact that the great god Chance, in the guise of a dead signaller from the sunk *Magdeburg* washed up on the Baltic coast of Russia in September 1914, put the secret code and signaling-manuals of the German navy in the way of the English, who henceforth deciphered every wireless message from German naval headquarters and were able to take steps accordingly—a terrible blow which showed that fate was definitely against us; wherever the German fleet showed itself it was immediately confronted with superior British forces.

Unfortunately Germany took the same sort of line on sea

as on land, or even a worse one. The reasons were: (1) the desire of the Chancellor not to annoy England, which showed his ignorance of national psychology; for nothing makes any impression on the English except the mailed fist; (2) lack of confidence in our navy in certain responsible naval circles, where it was considered no match for the British: it was the battle of Jutland on May 31, 1916, which first showed that Tirpitz and his supporters, who considered it at least equal to the British, were right; (3) the intrigues which led to the cold-shouldering of the creator and only proper commander of the fleet, High Admiral von Tirpitz; (4) the idea of emerging from the war with the fleet intact. In consequence of these things the high-seas fleet was kept in its harbors and every avenue of approach to us from the North Sea was closed by mines. But mine warfare on the sea means exactly the same as trench warfare on land, namely, the bankruptcy of all strategy and the end of all mobility. The fact that U-boats from the beginning showed good results in certain cases does not come into the account; it was an unexpectedly agreeable extra; and even so, its vast possibilities were not understood, or at any rate not exploited.

In judging these appalling proceedings it is not permissible to point to the similar behavior of the English naval authorities as an excuse. England also kept her high-seas fleet back; but in the first place, as her entire political and economic existence depended on her navy, there was no point in her risking it on the always doubtful issue of a big naval battle; and secondly, the security of her trade did not demand that she should use her fleet but merely that the German fleet should be shut up. Our backwardness thus suited England's book and was really playing her game. The English principle of the "fleet in being" was as completely sound for England as it was wrong for us. Our Admiralty failed to realize this till at least the spring of 1916, and thus deprived us of the service of one of our most effective arms. When it was finally gingered up, it was too late to try to beat the British navy, for by then the English had strewn the

whole North Sea with mines, increased and improved their fleet and, in short, overhauled their whole naval defenses.

The crippling of the German fleet was responsible for: (1) the British blockade, which so curtailed our supplies of food and raw materials that we were unable to meet the increased demands of the war; (2) in contrast to that, the undisturbed continuation of British trade, which supplied England and France with everything they needed; (3) England's undisturbed communications with her army in France; (4) the almost complete submission of the neutrals to English dictation; (5) America's increasingly open support of the Allies, first by economic, then by diplomatic and finally by military support; and (6) the infection of the personnel of our navy with the Red bacillus as a result of their enforced inactivity.

The great god Chance gave us yet another chance in the U-boats which had proved their usefulness, to the great surprise of everyone, at the very beginning of the war. But even of this opportunity full advantage was not taken by our Admiralty. We ought at once to have built U-boat after U-boat, not battleships. And then the Admiralty's forecast for the unrestricted submarine warfare which was finally resolved upon in February 1917, under pressure from Hindenburg and Ludendorff at G.H.Q., was farcical. This forecast, drawn up on December 22, 1916, reckoned that England would give in after a mere five months of unrestricted U-boat warfare, sinking 600,000 tons per month, directed against her merchant shipping, and that two-fifths of neutral shipping would be frightened off coming to England. Considered from the point of view of military science it was a gross miscalculation (in spite of the fact that the sinkings greatly exceeded the estimate), for it completely overlooked national psychology. England saw that she was on the brink of the abyss and at once acted in the most energetic manner; she ruthlessly requisitioned neutral shipping, and even German shipping in neutral harbors, developed an increasingly effective system of defense against the U-boats and had the unique pleasure,

which was at the same time a long-deferred victory for her diplomacy, of seeing America abandon her reserve and declare war on the German Empire, which at once put many tons of German shipping at the disposal of the Allies. Even though U-boat warfare considered in itself was in no sense a failure, the building of new tonnage, together with the requisitioned neutral and German ships, kept pace with the losses, which in 1917 amounted to 9,000,000 tons by mines and submarines.

The theaters of unrestricted U-boat warfare were the Irish Sea, the western end of the Channel, and the west coast of France, *i.e.* the areas through which merchant shipping going to and fro between England or France and the rest of the world had to pass. Unfortunately, direct cross-Channel communication between England and the English forces fighting in France could hardly be interfered with at all, owing to the effectual closing of the Channel. The German U-boat bases were Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, Kiel, with Ostende and Bruges for the smaller boats in the Channel, and Pola and Cattaro for the Mediterranean.

Our whole conduct of the war on sea once more, alas, proves the truth of Tirpitz's old contention that the German people had not understood the sea—if it is really permissible to attribute the defects of a small minority in power to the whole nation. A more resolute and better-considered use of the fleet against the British—if possible hand in hand with the occupation of Holland and the landing of troops in the south-east of England—before they had learnt the lessons of the war and overhauled their naval policy, was calculated, if not to bring England to her knees, at any rate to make the question of supplies an acute one for her and to render the blockade impossible. In those circumstances the whole war would have taken a different turn, in which heroism would have counted for more than economics.

5. *War in the Colonies.*—Our colonial possessions were too scattered even in Africa to be brought under a single

plan of defense; there was also the impossibility, for which our navy was partly to blame, of sending military aid and providing for their needs from home. Indeed, our far too blind confidence in the Congo Act, which was a product of our ignorance of national psychology, resulted in our never even considering the question of the defense of our African colonies against a European attack. England and France, on the other hand, entirely disregarded the provisions of the Congo Act of 1885, which neutralized the African colonies in the case of a European war, and overran the German colonies in order to destroy our prestige in the eyes of the natives and lay the ax to the roots of our economic system. The garrisons in the three chief African colonies, the Cameroons, German South West and German East, were merely intended to keep the peace in case of a native rising. Nevertheless, with the aid of planters and traders, they succeeded in putting up a resistance which kept the enemy busy and compelled him to send out strong reinforcements. Thus England had to use 300,000 men in East Africa to keep our force of 16,000 at bay and even then failed to score a smashing victory.

The great idea of our commanders in the colonies was to preserve as much territory as possible in German hands, in order to put us in a stronger position later on when it came to making terms of peace. Sound as this notion may be, it is a political not a military one, and is therefore not the right basis for a military commander to work on. The proper thing would have been to march our troops in the Cameroons and South West across the forests and savannahs to East Africa (Lettow-Vorbeck's far-flung operations prove that this was possible) and put a respectable force of some 20,000 men or more into the field there. But not only that. Even the retention of this, our most important colony, was not a crucial object, for German East lay quite off the main track of events. That army might, however, have brought its weight to bear directly on one of the vital spots, if it had been led down the Nile and through the Sudan to Egypt.

The Suez Canal was one of the focal points of Allied shipping during the war, and one of the two points of vantage from which England threatened Turkey's flank. The mere news that a German army inured to the climate was approaching the southern border of Egypt, in conjunction with a stronger Turko-German attack on the Suez Canal, would inevitably have scared the English into sending a large army to Egypt, which they simply had not got to send in the spring and summer of 1915. England would have been faced with the disagreeable choice between a disastrous weakening of her front in France, the abandonment of the Dardanelles enterprise then in progress, and the evacuation of Egypt. In any case she would have been placed in a very awkward position and our colonial forces would have employed themselves more usefully than by heroically defending each separate colony.

6. *Critique of the War from the Standpoint of the Science of Defense.*—The story of Germany in the world war is an epic of heroism, self-sacrifice and Herculean effort. The fact that it was all in vain and achieved no direct success must not blind us to the fact that this war and its loss were the fiery furnace appointed for the purging of the German people. Our millions of dead have not fallen in vain, but live again in the new ideas that are raising their heads towards the light today. But this should not prevent us from applying the probe to our conduct of the war and ruthlessly using the knife on ourselves whenever we find anything amiss; only so shall we be able to avoid mistakes in a future war.

Our principal political mistakes were: (1) Alienating Russia and pushing her into the arms of France, and in the face of that repulsing the English offer of alliance and sitting down to build a large fleet which England regarded as a menace to herself; in this way we put the three greatest powers against us, while we looked for support to one rickety and one untrustworthy power. (2) Our foolishly Quixotic fidelity to Austria-Hungary, whose ruling clique plunged

into the war in a completely irresponsible manner and dragged us into it. (3) Our stupidity in not stopping Italy, Rumania and America from declaring war on us—the first by putting strong pressure on Austria to cede the Italian Alps in good time, the second by threats of an immediate invasion, and the third by renouncing unrestricted submarine warfare. Perhaps also (4), not securing the neutrality of England at the price of abstaining from marching through Belgium. The last two points, relating to America and England, are admittedly controversial; but it is certain that absolutely everything even remotely thinkable ought to have been done to avoid having the two Anglo-Saxon powers against us, since their overwhelming superiority in numbers, economic resources and strength of will was simply not to be coped with even by us. Finally (5), at the end of the war, being taken in by Wilson's bluff over the Fourteen Points—this, of course, when we were hard-pressed by Marxian troubles at home.

Our chief military mistakes were: (1) Failure to develop our potentialities fully before the war, and even during it, with the result that we could not make good our heavy initial losses quickly enough, and were from the beginning unequal to the enormous demands of a war on two fronts. (2) The baneful influence of the Cabinet on the choice of the commander-in-chief of the army and of the navy, resulting in the loss of the battle of the Marne (von Moltke) and subsequently in the scheme, fatal to us in our isolation, of a slow war of attrition, which culminated in the blood-bath of Verdun, was persisted in for two years (von Falkenhayn) and finally paralyzed the fleet (von Müller). In consequence of Falkenhayn's ideas the year 1915 especially was very largely wasted; having lost the initiative in the west, we ought at least to have undertaken a big offensive in the east which would crush Russia's war-spirit, so that we might have both hands free in 1916 for the struggle with England and France. (3) Our failure to occupy Holland and invade the south-east coast of England, at the same time making

an aggressive use of the high-seas fleet and building up our U-boat fleet. (4) The fact that no attempt was made to raise the English blockade and so shorten the war. (5) Allowing Allied troops to remain at Salonika, when they ought to have been driven out of the Balkans in 1915-16; they were responsible for the defection of Bulgaria in Autumn 1918 and, to some extent, of Austria-Hungary, which left Germany's rear uncovered. (6) Starting unrestricted U-boat warfare too late and on a basis of totally inadequate estimates. (7) Leaving too many German troops (a million) in Russia during the 1918 offensive in France and not using them, and Austro-Hungarian ones too, on the western front (the latter if possible only as labor-battalions). (8) Underestimation of tanks, although they had proved their value at Cambrai in 1917. (9) In the latter part of the war—let us admit this frankly—the fear in the minds of many of our soldiers that they would be killed at the last moment and not live to see the longed-for dawn of peace; this, however, meant the beginning of the break up of the army, which was completed by the poison of Marxism. Finally (10) the absence of a single supreme command, vested in German G.H.Q., over the German, Austro-Hungarian, Turkish and Bulgarian armies, which made it impossible to bring the whole forces of the Central Powers into simultaneous action, thus reducing their striking-power. The obstacle here was the Austrian commander-in-chief, Conrad, and Austro-Hungarian jealousy generally. (The Allies finally achieved the ideal of a united command over all operations against Germany on April 3, 1918; this, by materially increasing the enemy's striking-power, was a turning point in the war.)

Other important mistakes from the point of view of the science of defense were: (1) Lack of comprehensive thinking, *i.e.* thinking in terms of continents and oceans. (2) Ignorance of economics and of national psychology plus inadequate preparations for the war, both as regards food-supply and raw materials and as regards psychological equipment. (3) Disproportion between heroic temper and knowledge of

the world. (4) Inadequate psychological preparation of our own and other nations. (5) The moral collapse of our people at home in consequence of the English hunger-blockade, the enemy's campaign of lies, the ferment of Marxism, and the frequently stupid behavior of our own government; this failure made possible the stab in the army's back by which our fate was sealed.

II. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

I. TERRITORY, GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY, COMMUNICATIONS

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY was a state compounded of numerous territories and peoples which had no real kinship and no relation to each other. The dual monarchy was a dynastic relic of earlier times, when the idea of the national state was still unknown and the notion of the commonwealth was adequately embodied in the sole person of the monarch. In an age of growing nationalism it was an anachronism whose continued existence was bound to be gravely imperiled the moment foreign powers stretched out a hand to help the individual nations inside it to burst its frame. When Austrian geographers tried, as some of them still try, to demonstrate the geographical necessity of the dual monarchy as a Danubian state, they were acting in the interests of the House of Habsburg. They tried to demonstrate it, but they did not succeed, and it is a fine advertisement for Viennese *esprit* that they should have got as far as the paradox, "If Austria-Hungary had not existed it would have been necessary to create it."

The territory of the dual monarchy did indeed lie along the Danube and it belonged for the most part to the Danubian basin, but the Danube and its tributaries do not form a definite and coherent system of inland waterways, so that the "Danubian territory" is a fact on the map rather than an effective reality. Apart from that, the country as a whole falls apart into such sharply contrasted regions as the high Alps and the wooded Carpathians, the Bohemian block and its border ranges, the depressions of the Vienna basin and of upper and lower Hungary, the hilly country of Croatia and Slavonia, the deeply faulted plateau of Galicia, the

rough Karst Hills and the Dinaric Alps, the high plateau of Transylvania dotted with mountains and the pathless Transylvanian Alps—all of them regions without the smallest geographical relation to one another and often holding absolutely no intercourse with each other. No lofty idea, beyond the domestic policy of the House of Habsburg, inspired this medley of lands and peoples, parts of which were longing to become independent or pass under the rule of another nation related to them in blood; while not one of the remaining sections of the population was convinced of the necessity for the continued existence of the state and the monarchy, apart from certain privileged cliques who were mixed up with them personally or through their families, and certain sections of the German population who still nursed the illusion that the dual monarchy was essentially German-minded, which it had, however, progressively ceased to be since 1848 and 1866.

The chief danger-spots were Bohemia, Galicia and the Italian Tyrol, whose Czech, Polish, Ruthenian and Italian inhabitants desired political independence or incorporation in neighboring countries as the case might be; such ambitions were less strongly developed among the Moravians, Slovaks, Rumanians, Croats, Slovenes and Bosnians. The Magyars had fully realized their national aspirations long ago and were the entirely independent equals of the German Austrians: they were far from loving them, but they were reliable allies in the War, because there was no other way of maintaining the integrity of the Kingdom of Hungary in face of Slav and Rumanian ambitions.

Economic life and communications were in a very elementary state in many parts, and in any case very unevenly developed; agricultural and industrial districts, technically advanced and primitive regions stood cheek by jowl. The chief contrast was between comparatively industrialized Austria and agricultural Hungary. Unfortunately, in the War, instead of each helping the other, Austria was severely handicapped by Hungary, which refused to supply it with

food; hence the fantastic state of affairs in which Austria was starving and had to be helped by Germany, herself hungry enough, while Hungary was rolling in grain, fats and meat. The Alpine regions have their timber and their grazing industry, but depend on imports of cereals and vegetables. Galicia, Croatia and the Hungarian plain are agricultural areas, as yet undeveloped industrially. Bohemia alone boasts a many-sided economic life; it has agriculture, cattle-raising, a timber industry, mines and manufactures, all of them equally highly developed. The manufacture of arms and munitions for the world war was carried on chiefly at Pilsen and Steier in Upper Austria. In any case, the total economic resources of Austria-Hungary were nowhere nearly adequate, either as regards food-supply or industry, for a war which lasted so long and used up such vast quantities of material.

The great arterial highway was the double line of river and railway connecting the two capitals, Vienna and Budapest, from which a somewhat scanty railway-system radiated in the direction of Bohemia and Moravia, the most thickly populated part of the empire, of the Alpine foreland, the Adriatic port of Trieste, Belgrade, Transylvania and Galicia; but there was no real inner coherence about this system, one railway did not support or complete another as they do in Germany. Thereby the military usefulness of the whole system for the defense of the dual monarchy was considerably impaired.

II. NATIONAL CHARACTERS

Such a mixed population living in such a diverse country naturally can have no uniform national character. Each of the ten peoples had its own psychological structure. Originally the mental outlook of the dual monarchy had been determined by the German element in it, and German remained the official language and the language of the court to the end. But as a result of the influx of Slav, Magyar and

Latin blood, the German upper class had gradually become supra-national, and finally found itself in a kind of opposition to all the separate nationalities. This led to the development of an Austrian race in the narrower sense of the word, a cultured ruling class, whose interests were bound up with the existence of the monarchy and which held up before its own eyes and those of its inferiors a patriotic ideal which had ceased to have any foundation in fact. As a class it was characterized by a charming but quite impersonal amiability, a tired and skeptical attitude to life which had ceased to take anything seriously, an uncreative irony which did not stop short of itself, an irresponsibility which plunged with hardly a moment's reflection into anything that promised to add to its pleasure and waived everything that needed hard and conscientious work aside with a *blasé* air, an esthetic sense which confined all inspiration within the prison of an exquisite grace and invariably preferred charm of form to seriousness of content. These people were elegant cavaliers, who knew how to move with an easy grace and talk amusingly about nothing, but they lacked a sense of responsibility towards the nation as a whole. And as they ended by ceasing to take even themselves seriously, they ceased to be taken seriously by other people too.

Over against this shallow, agreeable, but ultimately drone-like caste, whose roots were deeply embedded in the cultured bourgeoisie, stood a number of peoples, all possessed with a burning desire for national independence and well aware of the hollowness of the ruling class. First of all there were the fierce and treacherous Czechs, who hated everything to do with the Germans and Magyars and looked on both as their ancestral enemies, although they could never have reached their present numbers and civilization without the influx of German blood and German culture. Wherever Czech troops went, there one found half-heartedness and bad discipline, mutiny and desertion; mobilization was not over before Czech regiments began to mutiny, and they were already going over to the Russians by whole battalions

and regiments, often in the middle of a battle, in the first winter of the war. Like the Czechs, the ambitious and restless Poles desired to set up a state of their own at the expense of the dual monarchy, a project they could only hope to realize in conjunction with their brethren under the Russian and the German flags and, of course, with the support of the Allies. Then there were the Italians of the southern Tyrol and Trieste, who made up in noisiness what they lacked in numbers and had the backing of Italy, Austria's supposed ally; and the Ruthenians of Galicia, who spoke the same language as the Ruthenians of the Russian Ukraine and whose peasantry was intimately connected, through its Orthodox priests and teachers (the only upper class), with Russian dreams of expansion. The German and the Hungarian peoples were the only ones who stood staunchly by the throne in this war. As for the former, the only reward its loyalty had brought it for the past half-century was to have its interests constantly subordinated to those of the other peoples; the Hungarians were to be won over, the Germans were safe and could therefore be treated anyhow.

Thus the truth about Austria-Hungary (which had a serious bearing on its part in the world war, but was almost totally unknown to us) was that it was (1) just an obsolete political, or rather purely dynastic, concept, resting on no foundation of a self-contained territory or a homogeneous nationality; (2) a witches' caldron of eleven nationalities, torn by conflicting passions and contradictory national ambitions; (3) a power which could no longer be exposed to any serious strain, if the danger of complete disintegration was to be avoided; (4) a government whose only idea of statesmanship was to put off the evil day, paper over the cracks in its fabric, and play the different peoples off against each other. The House of Habsburg had had time enough in which to Germanize these peoples, especially the Czechs, but its object was always extensive, never intensive power: the number of square miles always meant more to it than the souls of the people in them. That Austria-Hungary was

incapable of sustaining and surviving a war of such magnitude was as plain as a pikestaff to everybody—except us Germans; rather was it a miracle that she was able to enter it with an outward appearance of integrity. What destroyed her was not the war, but two ideas, the national and the democratic, of which the first rebelled against German and Magyar supremacy, the second against monarchical tutelage and aristocratic pretensions.

III. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY IN THE WORLD WAR

Austria-Hungary also had its war on two fronts and must have been prepared for it for years, Serbia being Russia's outpost in all that concerned the Balkans. In spite of that she had done very much less than the German Empire to develop and perfect her defenses. The peace-time establishment was far too weak, the once-famous artillery far too small, there were not enough reserve formations when mobilization came, and stocks of arms, ammunition, cloth, leather, etc., were insufficient and could never be adequately replenished during the war. Apart from that, notions of life in general and military service in particular were laxer than among us; there was none of the seriousness and reliability of the Germans, none of the bracing, if not particularly pleasant, Prussian discipline. Up to the very last moment we greatly over-rated the military capacity of our ally; it was only her succession of reverses right at the beginning of the war, and in particular her shattering defeat at the hands of a tiny country like Serbia, which made it obvious in a moment to the whole world that Austria-Hungary had ceased to be a great power. Her internal dissensions, shortage of money, the unreliable character of whole divisions, the irresolution of the government, which plunged from violent bellicosity (it must never be forgotten that Austria started the conflagration by her stubborn attitude to Serbia, which was on its knees before her) into whimpering pacifism, the strategy of the Chief of the General Staff, Conrad, which

was admirable in theory but frequently unprofitable in practice because it did not take conditions on his own side sufficiently into account;—all these things took us by surprise and depressed us as much as they cheered the enemy. At any rate, by the end of 1914 it had become clear to our higher command that no good could be expected of Austrian troops except in close conjunction with Germans. And as early as the beginning of 1916 the value of our ally's army had sunk so low that our higher command pronounced it to be out of the question that detachments of it should be used on the western front, since they had neither the training nor the strength of nerve nor the devotion to duty to enable them to face the severe conditions obtaining there. They were not even invariably equal to the Russians, none too stiff a proposition when all is said and done; for the Italians, on the other hand, particularly with the protection of a mountain country, they were regarded as at least a match.

The verdict thus delivered on the Austro-Hungarian soldier is one-sided and needs to be corrected in the light of the national psychology. The Germans of the Alpine districts, the Czechs, the Magyars and the Croats, are definitely good fighters in themselves; they all have the qualities which enable a man to stand fire; particularly in the case of the Alpine Germans is that beyond all doubt. But the Austro-Hungarian army as a whole, being what it was, the warlike virtues of these people were entirely or partially hidden under a bushel, because (*a*) the whole spirit of the army was slacker than with us, (*b*) the individual soldier had less confidence in his leaders, and (*c*) some of them simply did not choose to be brave; on the contrary, they knew that they were furthering their secret national ends by failing in battle; this is absolutely true of the Czechs and the Italians, and very largely true of the Rumanians, Ruthenians and Poles. The Czech soldier, for instance, in any future struggle for the existence of his country, will show up considerably better than he did in the world war; let us hope that the

very large alien element in his army will serve him then as the Czechs served the Habsburg monarchy in the War.

The Austro-Hungarian plan of campaign for the war on two fronts, against Russia and Serbia, was as follows. Originally the dual monarchy hoped to have only little Serbia to cope with and mobilized over-hastily against her, with the result that when five days later it became necessary to mobilize against the far stronger power of Russia also, the whole plan got into a hopeless muddle, as some of the troops on their way to Serbia or already there had to be recalled and rushed across the Carpathians, which presented great obstacles to transportation owing to their few railways, to Galicia. At this point the Austrians made a second mistake in concentrating too many troops on the Serbian frontier and too few in Galicia; they were banking on strong support from the Germans which was expected to materialize after a rapid victory in France. The right thing would have been to send only just enough troops to the Serbian front to defend the easily-held line of the Danube, Save and Drina, and to pit their main strength against Russia; instead of which they sent too many men to Serbia for defensive purposes and yet not enough for the unfortunate offensive which they launched and which ended in disastrous defeat, and meantime failed to muster a sufficient force to attack the Russians or even to hold them. The Austrian higher command made the fatal mistake of trying to be strong on two sides at the same time, and specially strong on the less important one; in this way it sacrificed its best troops, and especially officers, at the very beginning, thereby depriving the new levies in advance of the stiffening they would badly need. It is perhaps legitimate to conjecture that the preference of the Serbian over the Galician front was a symptom of that preponderance of Hungary over Austria which had been steadily increasing in the past few decades; for Serbia was Hungary's arch-enemy, politically and economically, and this antagonism was largely responsible for the whole war. Once more politics took the reins out of the military authorities'

hands and messed-up all their efforts. The plan of campaign against Russia herself (see map 6) envisaged an offensive somewhere west of Lemberg between the Vistula and the Bug, and hoped for support from the Germans, who were expected to come down from East Prussia across the Narev three or four weeks after the outbreak of hostilities, *i.e.* immediately after the destruction of the French army. That is to say, the Austrian plan of campaign depended entirely on the success of the Schlieffen plan, and with the failure of the latter it was bound to collapse also, especially as it had far inferior human material to work with.

What, from the point of view of the science of defense, ought to have happened instead of all this? The main thing was to hold up the numerically formidable Russian army, which had been unexpectedly quick off the mark, at a natural frontier between open and closed country and to push it back into the open. For this purpose Austria-Hungary had the thickly wooded rampart of the Carpathians, which could only be crossed with considerable difficulty, and next door to them, linked by the fortress of Cracow, Germany had the marshy reaches of the Warthe and the Prosna, the upper Netze, the Drewenz, and the East Prussian lakes, with the fortress of Lötzen and, for cover on the flank, the fortress of Königsberg plus the river Pregel. Everything to the east of this natural frontier, especially Galicia and the north of East Prussia, should have been abandoned at once; territorial losses were of no importance in this war. Not weakened by unnecessary drafts to the Serbian front, the Austro-Hungarian army would have had no great difficulty in holding the line of the Carpathians and could even have taken over the Polish Warthe-Prosna sector, where German troops would have had to make a junction with them on the upper Netze. No attempt should have been made at an offensive until the Germans had been substantially reënforced from the western front. Lack of cordial coöperation and a united command, the jealousy of Conrad, the Austrian Chief of Staff, who was out for laurels for himself and won victories

on paper which he never had sufficient forces to carry out in fact, excessive confidence in the success of the Schlieffen plan and, lastly, the far from contemptible quality of Russian generalship;—all these things combined to give the war on the eastern front a most inauspicious opening. Unfortunately these reverses reacted particularly unhappily on the dual monarchy, as they opened the eyes both of the Allies and of the still hesitating neutrals of the Italian and Rumanian type and, finally, of its own rebellious subjects like the Czechs, etc., to its weakness and brought the prospect of its disruption within reasonable reach.

The Serbian Front.—On this front the Austrians launched two offensives on their own account in Autumn 1914, both across the Drina, advancing eastwards towards the hinterland of Belgrade. In itself that was no bad scheme, but they neglected to advance simultaneously from the north into the open and more accessible valley of the Morava, the heart of Serbia; and this, combined with the morale of the attacking troops, which was no match for the warlike spirit of the Serbs, wrecked it. Both offensives thus failed, even the second, in the course of which the Austrians temporarily occupied Belgrade and suffered much from the inclement December weather in impassable mountain country.

After Austria had remained on the defensive for a whole year, the necessity for the release of the Austrian troops detained down here and for the opening-up of a through route to Turkey, together with the accession of Bulgaria, Serbia's arch-enemy, to the Central Powers which had taken place in the meantime, made it desirable that Serbia should be finally polished off. As things were (see map 10), this could only be done by the coöperation of German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian troops. It was necessary to advance simultaneously from the north-west, the north and the east, in order to push the Serbian army out of the line of the Morava and the Vardar—the one section of an otherwise mountainous and sparsely populated country which has a relatively dense population and is comparatively accessible,

being traversed by a railway—and drive them up into the desolate rocky mountains of the south-west, where human beings and supplies are equally scarce and the snow falls early. The scheme succeeded, as will be described in greater detail on p. 273 *et seq.*; not merely was the Serbian army hunted down, but the Serbian state ceased to exist for the last three years of the war. The strategic planning of this campaign was entirely the work of the German commander-in-chief Falkenhayn.

The territory of Serbia once more became an acute danger-spot towards the end of the war, when the Allied army of the east advancing through Macedonia threatened the line of the Danube and the Save, which the Germans once more prepared to defend, while most of the Austrians ran home and the Hungarians were recalled by their newly-constituted republican government. But the enemy made but slow progress in October weather through the trackless mountain country whose one railway we had completely destroyed. The Austro-Hungarian armistice and the German revolution which followed close upon it rendered a defense of the line of the Danube and the Save superfluous, whereupon the enemy was able on November 10, 1918, to cross the Danube.

The Russian Front.—Here the Austro-Hungarian army was also thrust more and more into the background owing to the unreliability of the men, especially after the entry of Italy into the war, upon which its best divisions, the German ones, had been sent to the Alpine front.

In August 1914 the Austrians took up their position behind the line of the Dniester and the San, which would have been quite right for an attack on Russia hand in hand with a German offensive from East Prussia, but for mere purposes of defense (which was more to the point) was definitely a mistake, since Galicia, being surrounded on three sides by Russian territory and cut off on the fourth by the steep slopes of the Carpathians, was the worst possible spot for the Austrians to concentrate their forces in. With no natural

distinction, not even in its population, between it and its neighbor Russia, Galicia provided a good field of fire for them but no maneuvering-ground as long as it was a matter of holding the enemy.

Two Austro-Hungarian armies moved across the San into the area enclosed by the Vistula and the Bug, a third advanced on Floczow, while a fourth was stationed south of the Dniester with its front to the east. The offensive was thus directed simultaneously towards the north, the north-east and the east, radiating from the center like a fan, so that the distance between each division automatically increased as they went on—a most dubious proceeding in the face of a very much larger army. In any case, only the attack on the Bug—the one towards the north, that is—succeeded; the others soon collapsed, so that the northward one had to be given up too and the troops withdrawn behind the San. The Austrian army never recovered from its defeat at Lemberg and Rawaruska on September 11, 1914, where the flower of its regular officers, so essential to such an *omnium gatherum* of nationalities, was left dead on the field.

After the failure of the Austrian plan of campaign—due, so the Austrian higher command maintained, to their having been left in the lurch by the Germans, who were to have backed them up from East Prussia—the Russians overran Galicia and even penetrated into the snow-clad Carpathians, from which they were only dislodged when Mackensen's break-through between Tarnow and Gorlice on May 3, 1915, pushed the Russian front in Galicia eastwards, which made it impossible for them to remain in the Carpathians. Even combined attacks by Austrians and Germans in February 1915 had failed to expel the Russians from their woody ridges, which, though snow-clad, had nothing of the character of high mountains. Owing to snow, cold and difficulty in bringing up supplies and reënforcements, these attacks lasted four months instead of the expected fortnight. The pushing back of the Russian front to the Riga-Pinsk-Kamenetz line in the summer of 1915, chiefly through German attacks, took so

great a weight off the Austrians' shoulders that they could thenceforth send their best troops to fight the Italians.

On the eastern front the Austro-Hungarian line was stiffened with continually increasing drafts of German troops, in some cases units already exhausted from the western front. Even so, serious Russian attacks proved too much for it on two occasions—the first was Brussilov's offensive in July 1916, the second the Kerenski offensive in July 1917. Brussilov's offensive, the object of which was to relieve the pressure on the Italians in the Tyrol, pushed the Austrians back a considerable distance between the Pinsk marshes and the foot of the Carpathians, until the onset was stayed by the exhaustion of the Russians and their growing shortage of munitions and, above all, by the arrival of German reserves on the scene. The loss of territory may not have meant much; but Rumania now plucked up her courage sufficiently to declare war on us. The Kerenski offensive which followed a year later broke the Austrian line in eastern Galicia but failed to reach its objective, Lemberg, again owing to the timely intervention of the Germans, who very soon afterwards counter-attacked and broke through the Russian line at Zborow, driving the enemy across the river Zbrudj, which forms the frontier of Galicia, and thus cleared both Galicia and Bukovina of the enemy. This German victory led to the final crushing of Russian resistance and the rise of Bolshevism, with which Russia's fate was sealed—just in time for Austria's eastern army, which was only keeping up even an outward show of resistance with difficulty.

The Italian Front.—With Italy's declaration of war on May 23, 1915, the dual monarchy acquired a third front, the holding of which engaged its attention to a much greater extent than the Russian or even the Serbian front. Austria had, unfortunately, not exerted herself enough diplomatically after Italy's secession from the Triple Alliance to purchase her future coöperation or at least her unconditional neutrality by a timely surrender of the Italian-speaking southern Tyrol. Italy's actually taking up arms against us

was also due to Austria; for it was the Austrian failures in Serbia and Galicia that first gave her the necessary courage. Italy's desire for the surrender of the above-named district, which she expressed for the first time in December 1914, was admittedly rank blackmail, but in this severest and most complex of all wars it was essential to face the facts of the situation or any others that might suddenly present themselves, and in this case the relevant facts were: (1) the disadvantageous military situation of the dual monarchy; (2) the extensive promises made to Italy by the Allies at its expense; and (3) the greedy eye cast by a land-hungry nation on Austrian territory. At all events, it was a lucky thing that the Italians had waited till after the worst moment for the Austrians, and also the Germans, on the eastern front, *i.e.* the critical winter of 1914-15, to declare war, and that even by May 1915 their preparations were not sufficiently advanced for them to disturb our great summer offensive against the Russians. Even though the Austrian higher command was anxious to attack its country's old enemies the Italians, whom the Slavs and the Germans in the Austrian Empire detested equally and despised as turncoats, immediately, the German higher command insisted on carrying through the offensive against the Russians and in fact brought it to a close in August. From May to August the Austrians held the Alpine front with a very small force, which they were only enabled to do by the impassable nature of the country, by the warlike spirit and excellent musketry of the Alpine Germans, the incompleteness of Italian preparations and the timid generalship of the Italian commander-in-chief, Cadorna. Had the Italian character permitted of an immediate and energetic offensive—which, of course, it did not—the Italian army could easily have broken through the Austrian line, which numbered only six divisions strong, spread over some 375 miles, and appeared in western Hungary; this would have brought the dual monarchy to the verge of destruction and might have put an end to the war straight away. Once more the great god Chance, this time in

the disguise of a nation's psychology, rescued the Austrian Empire from the abyss.

The Austrians had to reckon with two principal points of Italian attack (see map 11), namely the two openings in the great mountain wall which runs from the Swiss frontier to Trieste, namely, the Etschtal and the Isonzo. The whole line of the Alps and the Karst Hills was far better suited to defense than to attack on account of the impassable nature of the country, which compresses all large-scale evolutions into a few narrow valleys and passes. One difference there was: the Italian line, as long as it did not press further into the mountains, had at its disposal the dense network of railways in the Venetian plain, which was extremely convenient for shifting troops, with the rich industrial and food-producing area of northern Italy in the immediate vicinity; the Austrians, on the other hand, had nothing behind them except impassable mountains, with only one railway (the Drave-Rienzthal line) and that not a particularly efficient one. It and the Brenner railway were the only decent communications between the Etschtal opening and the country behind it; the Isonzo region was, of course, more easily accessible from the direction of Vienna and Budapest. An Italian attack up the Etschtal could count on Austrian difficulties in bringing up supplies; on the other hand it would get into difficult Alpine country, could nowhere strike at the heart of the enemy, and would be certain to get tied up somewhere in the thinly-inhabited mountains. An Italian attack on the Isonzo, on the other hand, could reckon on the open Karst country, and by pushing its way into the Hungarian plain might have hoped to isolate the southern portions of the Austrian Empire (Dalmatia, together with the Austrian fleet, Bosnia and Croatia), join hands with the Serbs, then still unconquered, and even threaten the two capitals, Vienna and Budapest. The Isonzo position had, of course, one great disadvantage for the Italians, namely, the constant threat to its rear from the Tyrol, which was liable to turn Venetia into a vast prison-camp for the Italian army

—a possibility which may help to explain the timid strategy of the Italians.

Italy's fundamental errors were: (1) a timid and hesitating war-policy, which left the enemy too much time and failed to profit by his preoccupation elsewhere to deliver a rapid thrust which, at that juncture, would undoubtedly have been successful. (2) Halving their strength by holding their positions in the Etschtal and on the Isonzo about equally strongly (the same mistake that Austria made with regard to Russia and Serbia in August 1914) instead of just holding the enemy on the Etsch (Adige) with a small force and attacking with all their might on the Isonzo. Thus Italy, to the great benefit of the dual monarchy, missed her opportunity of penetrating to its interior. Meanwhile the Austrians had but two alternatives—either to remain permanently on the defensive in country where the enemy was at a disadvantage, or to pin the enemy to the Isonzo by fierce attacks and then, when he had concentrated the greater part of his army there, march down from the southern Tyrol in the direction of Padua, thus cutting off his communications in his rear and bottling him up in Venetia. The Austrians took the offensive twice, the second time with exceedingly strong support from German troops, but on neither occasion, unfortunately, did they attack in both the above-mentioned places at once; on the first they only attempted a thrust in the Tyrol without simultaneously attacking on the Isonzo, on the second they attacked on the Isonzo but not in the Tyrol. The result was that the first offensive petered out in the difficult mountain country round about Asiago and Arsiero, as the enemy was able to bring up his reserves quickly while the Austrians had no reinforcements available. The second offensive, in October 1917, proved a victorious break-through and developed into a brilliant pursuit of the enemy, who fled from the Isonzo headlong; but it came to a standstill before the line of the Piave, which had been strengthened in the meantime with French and English troops, for lack of a complementary thrust from the

southern Tyrol, which might have made it a real Cannae for the Italians. It is asserted that we had not sufficient troops at that time to carry out the required double offensive; but that is not altogether convincing at first sight, in view of the fact that we just then had more troops on Russian soil than were strictly necessary.

In any case, the fact remains that the Austrians gave a good account of themselves against the Italians, repelling no less than eleven vigorous attacks on the Isonzo, with great loss of life to the enemy; and further, that by pushing forward as far as the Piave they were able to shorten their front, now resting on an extremely advantageous natural line, by almost a third, thus effecting a saving of troops, which, however, did not make itself felt in any other theater of war. In October and November 1917 the Italians lost at least 800,000 men (of whom 300,000 were taken prisoner and more than 400,000 were cut off and deserted), besides 3,000 guns and a large quantity of munitions and equipment. This brilliant victory, which was, of course, only rendered possible by the work and coöperation of the Germans and the military and moral inferiority of the enemy, unfortunately failed to produce any very great effect; in spite of the severe humiliation they had suffered, the Italians continued to keep the largest and best part of the Austrian army occupied here and for their part showed no desire to make peace, so that no relief came in France, the decisive theater of war. A third Austro-Hungarian offensive, which was undertaken in June 1918 in order to relieve the situation in France, having been asked for by the German higher command for March, was launched along the whole front from Asiago to the sea against an enemy about equally strong; hence it was unable to concentrate extra strength at any one point and rapidly collapsed. After that the Austrian army remained on the defensive, waiting for the end of the war and its own collapse, which took the form of a dispersion of the various peoples, whereupon our Italian enemy just walked over and took what he liked. Four days before the

last Italian offensive, which began on October 24, 1918, thirty divisions refused to go on fighting, and the negotiations for an armistice which followed immediately ended in the complete capitulation of the army and the monarchy together with the breakdown of all order.

Austria-Hungary, whose *blasé*, irresponsible, ambitious and arrogant upper class had light-heartedly let loose the dogs of war, paid for this crime by the complete disintegration of its superannuated and unnatural political structure. The moral worthlessness of that class and its royal head had already revealed itself in March 1917, when Charles the Last attempted to betray the German Empire behind its back to the Allies. By so doing he had given the Entente the most convincing proof of the fragility of the bond between the Central Empires; but by that time the military incapacity of Austria-Hungary was too obvious for France to renounce her plan for setting up succession-states as her puppets in the Near East. The final collapse of the dual monarchy was a secret victory for the German idea in Central Europe, though the fact was hardly noticed in the confusion of the moment; for the Austria of the Habsburgs was the most serious obstacle on the road to the Third Reich, which now, with the liberation of the German Austrians from Slav and Magyar shackles, lies clear. Indeed it is not too much to say that one of Germany's worst enemies was her ally Austria-Hungary, whose disappearance has been a concealed victory for us.

III. TURKEY

I. GOVERNMENT, TERRITORY, INDUSTRY, COMMUNICATIONS

THE Turkish Empire was not the product of a national idea; it was built up by conquests on the part of the Sultans of the Turks or Ottomans, originally a race of nomad horsemen who had pushed their way into Asia Minor from Central Asia, at the expense of the Arabian Caliphate and the Byzantine Empire. In the sixteenth century the Turkish Empire extended far beyond Asia Minor over large sections of south-eastern Europe, western Asia and even northern Africa. But as far back as the eighteenth century its territory in Europe had begun to shrink, through the agency of Austria and Russia, and the same happened in Africa in the nineteenth, a process which came to a temporary end in 1911 with the total expulsion of the Turks from North Africa and their almost complete expulsion from Europe. The Turkish Empire had, moreover, been disintegrating ever since the eighteenth century, and owed its survival not to its own vitality but solely to the disagreements of the European powers. Among these Turkey's principal enemies were: (1) Russia, who coveted the Bosphorus and with it Constantinople, and jostled her from the Armenian side especially; (2) England, who wanted the Arabian vilayet as far as Palestine and Mosul, in order to protect her sea-route through the Suez Canal, get the overland route to India, which goes through Mesopotamia, into her hands, and keep a better eye on Russia; (3) France, who had posed as the protector of the Christians in the East ever since the Crusades and laid claim to Central Syria; and (4) Italy, who had robbed the Turks of Tripoli and the islands off the south-western extremity of Asia Minor in the middle

of peace as short a time ago as 1911 and laid claim to the whole south-west of Asia Minor. On the other hand, Austria-Hungary, who had in 1908 annexed the former Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina after having occupied them since 1879, had renounced her anti-Turkish policy since Turkey had been pushed out of the Balkans; and ever since the 'nineties Germany had taken Turkey more and more under her protection: she had built the railway which formed the only overland link between Constantinople and Baghdad, and was determined to bolster up the Ottoman Empire whatever happened, in the hopes of economically exploiting the potentialities contained in its large territory, potentialities which we greatly over-rated.

With the outbreak of war in 1914, the Young Turks, who had only been in power since 1908 and consisted of young men more remarkable for vaulting ambition and greed for power than ability and sense of responsibility—Enver Pasha especially, the vain dilettante and utterly incompetent soldier who was promoted from the rank of major to that of commander-in-chief of the army, did a lot of harm, though it should be added that he remained faithful to us—these Young Turks found themselves diplomatically in the following dilemma. The powers bent on the partitioning of Turkey were in the Allies' camp, the people who wanted to preserve her were the Central Empires. But the dominions of the Sultan were almost completely surrounded by the former and by the sea which England commanded, while the Central Powers were far away and could not even establish direct military communication with them. If Turkey joined the Allies, she could hardly expect anything but the severe curtailment, if not the complete partition, of her dominions; if she took up with the Central Powers she would have to face the enemy alone, with the prospect of but little support from Germany, because both railway routes, the one via Belgrade and the one via Constanza, were in hostile or unfriendly hands, so that help could only reach her in the form of single individuals, money and concealed stores.

The Young Turks realized the difficult position of the Central Empires clearly enough, but they probably said to themselves that they had absolutely nothing to expect from the Allies, and therefore declared their adherence to the former on October 29, 1914.

Apart from the little Thracian triangle, this side of Constantinople, the Turkish Empire of 1914 consisted of three principal regions: Asia Minor with Armenia, Syria and Mesopotamia, and Arabia (see map 7).

Asia Minor with Armenia is a mountainous country, with high arid plateaux in its interior enclosed between mountain ranges which fall down in promontories and valleys to the *Ægean* Sea. Hence this region is more easily gained from the west than from the north or south. Apart from that it could only be comfortably approached from the eastern side, as the Russo-Turkish frontier there ran right across rough highland country without any regard to natural lines of demarcation. Asia Minor is blessed with a higher rainfall than its southern neighbors, and hence possesses more cultivable ground, which is most extensive in its comparatively open west, but reaches considerable proportions in the valleys in other parts also. For this reason, and because the population was chiefly Turkish, though it also included Greeks, Armenians and Kurds, it was regarded as the heart of the Empire, since the Turks alone could be looked upon as reliable subjects. The country could go some way towards feeding itself and had been tolerably well opened up by railways and roads. But the railways did not center on the capital sufficiently; the western Anatolian system, radiating from Smyrna, was an independent unit and was of little use in the world war; the inner Anatolian system did indeed have Constantinople as its starting-point, but its one arm only reached as far as Angora instead of Erzerum, the center of the fighting with Russia, and the other stopped at the foot of the Taurus mountains of Cilicia, only continuing on the far side, with another break at the Amanus mountains (both breaks were due to difficulties over

the construction of tunnels which were only completed towards the end of the war) via Aleppo to Ras-el-Ain in northern Mesopotamia.

The region of Syria and Mesopotamia is of quite a different character. Here lowland plains or rolling tablelands are the rule, with occasional mountain masses rising out of them, mostly to a moderate height only. Hence it is drier as well as hotter, and the cultivable land, in most cases only made so by irrigation, is far more scattered; indeed much of it has the character of an oasis—that is to say, it is surrounded for miles and isolated by arid steppe. Its productive capacity is therefore limited even as regards food and it cannot get on without imports, although the western foreland of the Hauran and the delta of Shatt el Arab produce large quantities of wheat and dates respectively. The population is mostly Arabic-speaking, and hated the Turk as a foreign ruler who sucked the people dry without doing anything for them. Syria and Mesopotamia are separated from Asia Minor and Armenia by the high, trackless and generally bare Taurus and Amanus mountains; and except for one point near Aleppo, no attempt was made to connect the railway-systems on either side of them. That on the southern side consisted merely of two lines, one running through Syria to Palestine and the other through northern Mesopotamia to Ras-el-Ain and continued, after a long break, by a solitary line from Tekrit to Baghdad.

Arabia also consists of tableland, but of an even more monotonous kind and with a still hotter and, above all, drier climate, so that it contains nothing but steppe and desert with very occasional oases of palms. The only exception is the district of El Yemen at its extreme southern corner, then a Turkish possession though in a chronic state of revolt, the western slopes of which were more fertile and better settled owing to their comparatively damp tropical climate. Apart from El Yemen the whole population is dependent on imported food. It is entirely Arab and consists of peasants and Bedouins, among whom the Turkish gov-

ernment only enjoyed recognition in a few places, principally in the Hedjaz, into which a pilgrim's way from Damascus penetrated as far as Medina; in the vast regions of the interior as well as on the south and east coasts, the Turkish flag was practically nowhere to be seen. England, on the other hand, had for years been getting at the Arabs, who were exceedingly susceptible to the influence of money, everywhere; she possessed a strong naval base in Aden and a year before the world war she had occupied the Turkish vilayet of El Hasa together with the harbor of Koweit on the Persian Gulf, in order to forestall the future economic and political effects of the German Baghdad Railway which was making for the same point.

II. NATIONAL CHARACTER

A state of such geographical and national monstrosity, which put even Austria-Hungary in the shade, could by nature only tend towards disintegration, not inner consolidation, especially as the ruling people, the Turks of the north-west, made not the smallest effort to gain the goodwill of the other peoples and turn them into loyal citizens of the Turkish state. On the contrary, the Turkish officer or official wherever he went made no concealment of his contempt for the Arab, the Kurd, the Greek, the Armenian, the Fellahin or the Bedouin, and treated him more or less openly as an inferior being. The non-Turkish population was consequently always ready to break away, though the cowardice of the Greeks and Armenians and the indifference of the Arabs and Kurds prevented an open revolt.

The characters of the principal nations which made up the old Turkish Empire differ of course very greatly in many respects; on the other hand, certain fundamental racial traits run through all or most of them and on occasions lead to similar stirrings beneath different exteriors. In the north the original stock is Alarodian and Norman, in the south Arab and Negro: hence we find a higher stand-

ard of seriousness, industry and effective living in the north, while the south is more imaginative, less inward and more taken up with dreaming than doing. The Turks proper had a certain ethical conception of the meaning of life, especially the officer and official caste, in so far as they were conscious of their position as the embodiment of the power of the state and felt themselves a governing race, a feeling which found its sole expression, as far as the other races were concerned, in oppression and extortion.

As regards the Turkish army, the only troops who showed up at all well were, of course, the actual Turkish ones; the rest, just as in Austria-Hungary, were not to be trusted, especially not the Arabs. The Christian Greeks and Armenians were out of it in any case, while the Kurds and Bedouin Arabs refused to be conscripted. The Turkish soldier often went calmly and steadily into battle, the Arab was always nervously looking out for a way of escape; the only bonds that held them together were their common religion and Ottoman coercion. The Turk was able to adjust himself to the job of soldiering and lay aside all his bourgeois or peasant ideas; the Arab remained completely commercial in his outlook and viewed everything from the standpoint of personal profit. The moment the risks of the soldier's life outweighed the possible gains, his only idea was to save his bacon, whereas the Turk entered more readily into the spirit of the bloody game. Arab troops could never have defended the obsolete forts of the Dardanelles against the overwhelming power of the English and French fleets with the inadequate weapons with which the Turks managed to do it in 1915—only, of course, under German leadership and with the support of U-boats.

Unfortunately, with all their better morale, the Turks showed little aptitude for constructive organization or prudent forethought. The oriental and his civilization, as we see them today, are the played-out, fossilized remains of earlier times, when the race was more vigorous and therefore culturally more creative. It is not to be expected that

such people should be able to meet the onset of a type so much superior to them in activity as western man with adequate weapons of defense. Only, they must accept the fact; they can only go under with calm dignity or try to adapt themselves to foreign ways. The Turks have been attempting to do the latter these hundred years past, but so far with small success. They may have adopted western institutions, but they have not succeeded in mastering them completely; and the economic attitude peculiar to the oriental, which invariably puts his personal profit first, has always frustrated or at least hampered almost every attempt at improvement. Whoever has attained to power in the East has always thought first about lining his own pocket and providing for his relations. But beyond that the oriental finds it difficult to adapt his mind to the severely practical way of thinking characteristic of the northern part of the western world and to direct all his actions consistently to one end, even when it promises no economic gain. As a result of this lack of an objective outlook, the Turkish officer nearly always fails in the higher branches of his business; he is unable to think in large terms, to select the essential thing from a mass of detail and compress a diverse multiplicity into a concentrated unity; he usually leaves out of account a number of things which seem to him of no importance but subsequently by their absence or presence produce fatal results.

This contrast between the German and the Turkish character was bound to lead to unpleasant, nay serious differences, not merely in great questions of politics and strategy but also in small ones of military life and personal intercourse. The German officer, accustomed to absolute obedience and honest work, was asking impossibilities in expecting the same from his Turkish brother-in-arms; the result was frayed tempers, contempt, and high-handed behavior. The Turkish officer, with his slacker nature and less strenuous ways, keener on tomorrow than today, was repelled by the unfamiliar "regimentalness" of the German, and soon

began to make a point of annoying him and even of countermanding his orders behind his back. The extremely touchy and mostly quite unjustified self-confidence of the Turkish officer and the justified but most injudicious impatience of the German between them did much harm in Turkey during the war.

III. TURKEY IN THE WORLD WAR

The Turkish Empire, surrounded as it was by the open sea and by Russian and British territory, naturally presented numerous points for attack to the enemy. Apart from the fact that he could have effected a landing at any number of places on the coast with very little hindrance, and indeed without being seen at all in many cases—an advantage of which his secret service certainly made the fullest use—there remained certain points from which an advance into the interior would be bound to have especially great effect. It was up to the Turks not to police the whole coast and all their frontiers, which they were quite incapable of doing, but to concentrate on the really critical places. Of these there were half a dozen to be considered (see map 7).

First and most important of all, there were the straits, in danger from the English and French at the Dardanelles end and from the Russians at the Bosphorus end, who might attempt to force them or effect a landing at any moment; the straits which guarded the capital, Constantinople, with the government and the chief military depots of the empire, and also formed the junction between the European railway-system and the Turkish, which made them the link between the Sultan's realm and the Central Powers.

Then there was the neck of land between the Gulf of Iskenderun and the frontier fortress of Erzerum. This "neck" is, as a matter of fact, some three hundred miles across as the crow flies and comprises high mountains, plateaux and gorges; but it was the important place where the sea which England commanded came nearest to the Russian frontier

and the Russian army, so that an Anglo-French landing-force and a Russian army might have joined hands in northern Mesopotamia. This operation, had it been successfully carried out, would have cut off the Arabian and Kurdish portions of the Sultan's empire, together with the troops stationed there, from its vital center, and immediately reduced the Turks, in territory and in strength, to the condition of a small nation. The Gulf of Iskenderun was also the fulcrum of the one big through route. Cyprus close by and Egypt in the offing were possible bases of operations for the English, while the Russians were able to bring their troops up to the Turkish frontier in the heights of Armenia by an efficient railway.

Lastly, the two danger-spots of the Sinai peninsula and southern Mesopotamia, which, though widely separated from each other by the impassable Syrian desert, are nevertheless connected in the north by the line of the Jordan and the Orontes and the line of the Euphrates, thus inevitably bringing about the desired junction between two originally quite separate operations. Neither position was such that a blow could be struck from it straight at the heart of the Ottoman Empire (as it could from the two earlier pairs), but they had this advantage for the enemy, that they were nearer to his bases, Egypt and India, and involved the Turk in a much longer and more difficult journey from his; they also cut Arabia at least off from the rest of Turkey, though this was of comparatively little importance.

The occupation of Turkey was worth any amount of effort to the Allies, for the sake of rescuing Russia from her isolation and getting her war machine into better order by sending arms, ammunition and equipment. The ten months' obstinate struggle to force the passage of the Dardanelles and the Russian advance deep into the heart of Armenia show that Allied strategy in Turkey during the year 1915 was in fact dominated by this idea. The failure of the attack on the Dardanelles in December 1915; the increasing extent to which German officers, troops and material of war ap-

peared on the scenes after the defeat of Serbia in Autumn 1915 (which had established free communication between Germany and Turkey); and finally, the dead-end to which the Russians came in the desolate Kurdish mountains, and their increasing defection since the revolution of March 1917;—it was the combination of all these circumstances that finally induced the Entente (*i.e.* by this time, simply England) from the end of 1916 onwards to concentrate on the third line of attack, the Sinai-Iraq line and thrust the Turks back towards the north that way by a frontal attack, necessarily a slow and costly business.

What the Allies ought to have done—if we are to criticize their strategy—was (*a*) to try to force the Dardanelles from both sides, not only from the west; (*b*) to effect a simultaneous landing in the Gulf of Iskenderun and, by advancing from there and also from the sources of the Euphrates along the line Aleppo-Diarbekr, to cut Turkey in half; and (*c*) also simultaneously, to keep the Turks busy in the south by attacking from the Suez Canal and Jaffa and from Basra and Kermanshah. These latter enterprises could have been looked upon as side-shows; the main attack would have been launched between Iskenderun and Erzerum, and stood a far better chance of success than the Dardanelles adventure. The Turkish army, dispersed and ill-equipped as it was anyhow, would not have been equal to all these simultaneous attacks. After the loss of the Arabian and Kurdish territories and the troops in them, its main body would have found itself confined to Asia Minor, where it would have been gradually forced backwards towards the north-west and finally crushed.

The fact that none of this happened appears to be due to two causes. In the first place, in 1914-15 the Allies, and especially England, no doubt lacked sufficient men to carry out such operations; and in the second, the English, of all people, probably distrusted their strategic ability to conduct an advance with a force landed in the Gulf of Iskenderun under conditions of open, mobile warfare and exposed to

attack from the right, front and left. In our opinion this consideration, which is a matter of national character, is likely to have been the decisive one. England's conduct of her colonial wars has been marked for many years past by just this cautious deliberation, and it was characteristic of her that the campaigns in Sinai and Palestine and in Iraq were made to keep pace with the gradual construction of a railway and, in the former case, of a water-supply.

Military Operations.—The Turkish army had been weakened by the bloody and disastrous Balkan Wars and put under the command of amateurs, and it was only German money (8,000,000,000 marks in gold), German equipment and German direction which got it into a fit state to meet Anglo-Indian and Russian troops. The terribly long distance separating it from its base (except in the case of the Dardanelles) and the loss of time that involved put great difficulties in the way of all operations, particularly the movement of heavy artillery and munitions, so that the enemy was very much better equipped for the struggle on all fronts. In addition to this, undisturbed communication with Germany only became possible at the beginning of 1916. All the necessities of war—rifles, cartridges, uniforms, entrenching-tools, steel helmets, *chevaux de frise*, coal, even grain—absolutely everything had to come all the way from Berlin to Constantinople, and from there to the various theaters of war, before it finally reached the front after an endless series of unloadings from rail to ship and back to rail, and from there to ox-wagons and back to rail again, and thence to motor wagons and from them to mule-back, and so on *ad infinitum*. Nothing like all of it reached its destination, large quantities disappearing on the way, while the reënforcements, who often spent months on the journey, deserted in hundreds and thousands. The rifles, for instance, our good mark 98, were frequently sold by the soldiers to Bedouin Arabs or other robber-bands at high prices. What indeed was there to attract the soldier who was not exactly burning with patriotic feeling for Turkey, to the front,

where he was left to starve, not looked-after, not paid, ill-treated, and expected to allow himself to be shot dead by people who had done him no harm? He therefore seized every opportunity of making off, and in various parts of the enormous Turkish Empire vast hordes of armed deserters roamed the country, a menace even to regular troops; there are supposed to have been over 300,000 of them in December 1917.

The first considerable operations were undertaken by the Turks and were directed against the Suez Canal and Russian Armenia. In the first case, the forces employed were quite inadequate, and in the second, the idiots in command chose the depths of a snowy winter to advance through rough Alpine country. Both attempts were thus doomed to failure, which cheered up the enemy and drew his attention to weak spots (see map 7).

The attempt on the Suez Canal was carried out in January 1915 under the command of a German, Lieutenant-Colonel von Kress, with 16,000 Turks and Arabs, who sprung a complete surprise by their appearance at the Canal after a seven days' march through waterless desert, but were repulsed with heavy loss and had to retire two days later. Nothing was thereby achieved except that the English now realized that they could no longer regard the Canal, which was of such capital importance to their trade, as a trench to protect Egypt, but must move their line of defense further east, which finally led to the scheme of attacking the Turks in Palestine itself. This did not happen till the summer of 1916 and depended on the construction of a railway and a water-supply, so that the real offensive against Turkey only began in the spring of 1917 with the battles near Gaza. It led to the capture of Jerusalem in December 1917 and from Spring 1918 onwards pushed the Turco-German front slowly northwards, until the Turks were beaten in September 1918, after which their retreat became headlong. How very little heroism there was about the English performance is shown by a comparison of the numbers engaged on each side. In

September 1918 there were 124,000 English against 14,000 Turks; the English prudently directed their onslaught against the Turks and Arabs, not against the one or two battalions of German rifle-men scattered through them.

The campaign against Russian Armenia was the star-performance of the Turkish generalissimo, the thirty-four-year-old amateur strategist Enver Pasha. Enver's idea was that the Turkish forces which had taken up their position east of Erzerum, at that time the best of the Turkish army, should strike leftwards across the mountains and attack the Russian troops stationed in the neighborhood of Kars in the rear. Enver and his friends must have devised this stroke on a map without contours, or not have known what contours meant. The result was that out of 90,000 inadequately equipped Turks who found themselves some 9,000 feet up in the trackless Armenian mountains in the depths of an icy winter, only 12,000 got—not to the enemy's rear, but home; the rest were frozen or starved to death, lost, killed, or taken prisoner. It is a splendid example of the way in which a piece of country may get the better of Man. By this piece of arm-chair strategy Turkey lost her best Anatolian troops and her commander-in-chief made an immortal ass of himself. What subsequently happened on this front was that the Russians advanced slowly westwards through Armenia, occupying Erzerum and Trebizond and reaching Lake Van in February 1916; there was, however, a distinct falling-off in their aggressive spirit after the revolution of March 1917. And in the spring of 1918 the Turks at last braced themselves to an advance on their side, in the hope of snatching northern Armenia and Caucasia, with their rich oil-fields, from the disintegrating Russian Empire. The fact that this involved weakening the far more important Palestine front did not weigh with them in the slightest.

The chief point selected for attack by the English and the French was naturally the Dardanelles, since their opening would have rescued Russia from her economic isolation and greatly consolidated the strength of the Allies. And so

in February 1915 a fleet appeared off them which might well hope, knowing as it did exactly how obsolete and ill-equipped the fortifications were, to force the passage. But the slowness of the enemy's preparations left the Turks enough time, with German aid, to get everything as nearly as possible in order. Purely naval attacks having failed, the enemy proceeded to land troops north and south of the straits, for which purpose the islands of Lemnos and Imbros formed convenient bases. Though the actual landings were successfully accomplished, the British and French troops did not succeed, despite their superiority in numbers and equipment, in extending their little strip of occupied territory inland and pushing the Turks out eastwards. So that nothing remained for them but to withdraw under cover of darkness in December 1915 and January 1916. Sound German strategy, which, unlike the Turkish, always had a sharp eye for essentials; the tenacity of the troops, whose confidence became grim determination with the first unexpected successes against an immensely stronger enemy; the natural superiority of a mainland fortress when attacked by a landing-force, even with backing from a fleet;—all these things together triumphed over a vast expenditure of the most modern material of war. The aim of the attack, the opening of the straits and the establishment of communications with Russia, had been frustrated—a success which contributed very materially to the economic exhaustion of Russia, to the ever-increasing heaviness of her losses, and thereby to her moral disintegration, which culminated in the revolution. The successful defense of the Dardanelles is the one great feather in the cap of Turkey as bolstered-up by the Germans, an achievement comparable, for its efficacy in prolonging the war, to Austria-Hungary's holding the line of the Alps against the Italians.

The fourth theater of war in Turkey was Iraq, as the southern part of Mesopotamia is called. This flat desert plain with its occasional river-oases was much more easily overrun by the British, as they could bring up troops and

heavy war-stores by steamer far more quickly and easily than the Turks, whose military railway did not reach beyond Ras-el-Ain, and was only continued after a long break by the short, isolated line from Tekrit to Baghdad, where it connected with the Tigris steamers; the Euphrates, owing to its constant changes of level and its sandbanks, was only of secondary importance as a means of transport. In addition, the English had occupied the port of Basra as soon as war broke out, and thus possessed an admirable base for further operations inland. As usual, they took their time and laid their plans carefully, and waited till the summer of 1915 before beginning their advance up the Tigris. Just in front of Baghdad they suffered a defeat which forced them to retire on Kut-el-Amara, where they were besieged by their Turkish pursuers and finally taken prisoner to the number of 13,000, mostly Indian troops. This, coming so soon after the abandonment of the attempt on the Dardanelles, gave a nasty knock to British prestige in the East; unfortunately, however, it had no wider effects of a beneficial kind for the Turks, as they did not make use of the opportunity to drive the English out of Iraq, which was their obvious next objective, but preferred to engage in hopelessly unprofitable struggles with the Russians in Persia. The threat to the Turkish left flank from a possible Russian attack from Persia in the direction of Chanikin could have been amply countered by occupying the very difficult Zagros passes. The result was that the English were left in peace to recover breath in southern Iraq, so that at the end of 1916 they were able to return to the attack, drive back the Turks, whose numbers had been reduced in the interval to 16,000, and in March 1917 occupy Baghdad, the key to southern and central Mesopotamia, also to western Persia. This was a serious blow to Turkish, and also German, prestige in the East. The English continued to press forwards in the direction of Tekrit till the end of 1917, when the war in Mesopotamia to all intents and purposes came to an end.

The offensive strength of Turkey was small, but she

nevertheless fulfilled two functions: in the first place she shut Russia off from England and thereby from reënforcements of material, and in the second she kept a considerable number of English soldiers away from the western and eastern fronts; she may thus be said in a sense to have done what was required of her, albeit by a narrow shave and only with the aid of our moral and practical support.

IV. BULGARIA

I. TERRITORY AND GOVERNMENT

BULGARIA is one of those small Balkan states which emerged from the ruins of Turkey in Europe through the ambition of South Slav Boyars; under the rule of a German prince it cleverly exploited Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans to gain for itself a position of considerable importance. The ambition of the Young Bulgarian kingdom was to unite all Bulgarian-speaking peoples under its flag and to get possession of the straits, with Constantinople, and therewith a hegemony in south-eastern Europe. The first of these objects could only be realized in defiance of Rumania, Serbia and Greece, the second, of Turkey and the third, of Russia, who posed as the protector of the stormy petrel Serbia especially.

The main territory of Bulgaria is divided by the easily-crossed, wood-and-pasture-clad range of the Balkan Mountains into two broad depressions, the Danubian plain and the valley of the Maritza, Bulgaria's most important agricultural districts and the seat of most of her population. South of these lies the gneissic block of the wild Rhodope Mountains, which are snow-covered in winter and only inhabited by a few scattered herdsmen. To the south-west Bulgaria is well protected by impassable mountains, while the deeply incised, marshy valley of the Danube, with only a few bridges crossing it, forms a useful northern frontier; it is only on the north-east and south-east, *i.e.* on the Rumanian and Turkish sides, that it lies open and easy of access. The Balkan Mountains are for most of their length disqualified from acting as a natural defense, as they are situated in the middle of the country between the two most thickly populated areas and not on the frontier. Although numerous easy

passes render them quite passable enough for commercial purposes, they do nevertheless put difficulties in the way of coördinating the defense of the plains on either side of them, and in the event of a simultaneous attack from the north and south would make concerted action on the part of the Bulgarian army impossible.

Bulgaria is a purely agricultural country, producing grain, rice, vegetables, fruit and tobacco, some of which it even exports, so that the population can feed itself. Against that we must set the absence of industry, which means that Bulgaria cannot carry on war under modern conditions without importing war-material from abroad. The process of opening up the country by railways is far from complete, large sections of it being still untouched. Special importance attaches to the main line from Belgrade to Constantinople, which runs over Bulgarian territory in the valley of the Maritza via Sofia and Adrianople. The two little Black Sea ports of Varna and Burgas also have railways to them. Lastly, the Danube has its importance as an inland water-way.

II. THE PEOPLE

The Bulgarians are a race of peasants and market-gardeners, industrious workers on a small scale and strongly materialistic in outlook. The national character is mainly of the Dinaric and Eastern type: they are before all things else matter-of-fact, calculating, sly and rebellious; they have in addition a strong feeling of equality, which only tolerates a government as long as it remains strong and successful and does nothing injurious to the economic well-being of the population. The Bulgarian peasant has but little land and can only just keep his head above water by hard work; hence a bad harvest may easily plunge him into the direst distress. This makes him inclined to the vices of proletarianism and an easy mark for Bolshevik propaganda. In general we may say that the Bulgarians are an untrustworthy race of small peasants, who will readily follow a leader who handles them

firmly as long as they stand to gain by it, but in a tight place will not scruple to sacrifice the national interest to their own personal advantage. In the world war the Bulgarian soldier showed up pretty well as regards endurance of hardships and the defense of difficult mountain positions, when standing shoulder to shoulder with German troops or under German officers; left to himself, on the other hand, he was not entirely reliable, particularly under continuous heavy fire. The Bulgarian army was deficient in technical equipment and in artillery, and hence not equal to the Anglo-French troops of the army of the east with which it was confronted from 1916 onwards.

III. BULGARIA IN THE WORLD WAR

Bulgaria found herself in a certain degree opposed to the Allies from the very beginning, because her arch-enemy, Serbia, was one of them and her two other enemies, Greece and Rumania, were also in sympathy with them. In 1912 these three countries had by shameless perfidy deprived her of the fruits of Turkey's almost complete expulsion from the Balkan Peninsula which had been chiefly her work. Her hatred for these three countries was reënforced by her desire to set up a greater Bulgarian state, *i.e.* to unite all Bulgarian-speaking people under one flag, which could only be done in the teeth of their opposition. There were many Bulgarians settled on Serbian and Greek soil, in Macedonia particularly, and also on Rumanian soil in the Dobrudja. Hence the Central Powers could promise the Bulgarians more than the Allies could, and when the campaign against Russia in the summer of 1915 made brilliant progress, the government decided to throw in its lot with Germany (September 6, 1915), which in any case promised a quicker return and caused Turkey to give up a bit of the Maritza valley on the spot.

As a reward for her help in the overthrow of Serbia which followed immediately (see p. 273 *et seq.*), Bulgaria was given civil control of Macedonia, her chief war-aim and the object

of her dearest ambitions, as early as the summer of 1915, and the southern Dobrudja was added a year later for her share in the campaign against Rumania. The Bulgarian army formed a part of the line which kept the Anglo-French army of the east at bay in Macedonia; but from the end of 1916 onwards its efficiency rapidly decreased, (a) because the men, under the influence of vigorous enemy propaganda, grew tired of fighting; (b) because Bulgaria's war aims were in fact already realized; and (c) because Bulgaria was refused possession of the Rumanian north of the Dobrudja, to which they had of course no claim under the agreement; but a timely concession would no doubt have lent wings to their martial spirit. We certainly made a mistake there, which was not remedied by our agreeing to the annexation of the disputed territory at the end of September 1918. The German set-back on the western front in the summer of 1918 had a particularly depressing effect on Bulgarian spirits, which sank to nil when on top of that most of the German troops were withdrawn from the Macedonian front and the Bulgarian soldier found himself abandoned almost alone to the tender mercies of an enemy whose technical equipment was vastly superior to his own. The spirit of mutiny spread rapidly through the army, which was inclined to suspicion and insubordination at the best of times, and the word went round that all soldiers should go home on September 15, 1918—and so indeed they did. A timely stiffening of the line at the beginning of September with German troops, of which there were plenty available in Russia, might have stayed the collapse, the effects of which were unhappily not confined to the Balkans, but developed into a threat to Austria-Hungary's rear across the line of the Danube and thus contributed to the far-off German higher command's decision to propose an armistice on September 29.

The campaign in Macedonia itself will be discussed in connection with Serbia, as it is immediately bound up with the conquest of the latter (see p. 276 *et seq.*).



PART THREE

THE ALLIES



I. FRANCE

I. TERRITORY, INDUSTRY, COMMUNICATIONS

1. *Territory*.—Geographically France is made up, like Germany, of three land-forms, lowlands, highlands, and high mountains, but their proportions are quite different, and so, consequently, is their effect on the inhabitants. The three land-forms do not exist separately side by side as with us; the lowland penetrates so deeply into the other two that it is the dominant form. Now lowland, in a temperate climate, spells prosperous agriculture, an even distribution of settlement, and the possibility of a strong central power controlling and directing the whole.

Flat, rolling lowlands—fairly frequently crimped into rounded hills or traversed by low ridges—occupy the whole north and west of France and, skirting the rolling highland plateau of the center, reach round to the broad depression of the Rhone in the south, which runs northwards like a deep trench between the highlands and the Alps and forms a convenient highway and strategic route, through the aperture of Belfort, to the region of the Upper Rhine. The central plateau, which tapers towards the north, lies like an island in the sea of the plain. It is a wild mountainous pasture-land, cold in winter, with much bare rock and scanty woods, and hence sparsely populated except where the presence of coal has given rise to heavy industry and the manufacture of armaments, *i.e.* at St. Etienne and Le Creuzot. The lowlands fall into three main divisions—the Paris basin, the Garonne basin, and the depression of the Rhone and the Saone. From the defense point of view we are chiefly concerned with the first.

The Paris basin (see map 5) is a broad, rolling depression of stratiform character. This means that there are several

geological strata lying one inside the other like a nest of saucers—the youngest inside and exposed at the top, the oldest underneath and cropping out at the extremities—and forming a deep escarpment round the inside of the basin by their steeply shelving tiers. The tertiary layer is in the middle, round it runs the cretaceous, outside that the various jurassic layers, below them the three triassic layers, and finally, still further down, the paleozoic and the primitive rocks. And by a strange geological whim Nature has willed it that precisely in the direction of Germany these strata and their eastward scarps should be formed with a beautiful but baleful precision. On the way from the Upper Rhine to Paris there are about eight steep scarps to be negotiated; coming from Flanders and Brabant they are somewhat fewer and, owing to the absence of the primitive and jurassic rocks, considerably less high. Northern France is thus a natural stronghold which has few equals on this earth, in spite of its lack of actual mountains. And the military authorities have made the fullest use of this quite exceptional natural advantage, in former days by building forts on the tops of the scarps and their outriggers, today by groups of fortifications of a new type, which have now been pushed out a long way towards the east. The margin of the tertiary bed to the north-east of Paris, in the neighborhood of Rheims, with its projecting dwarf mountains, was particularly strongly fortified, but it was surpassed in this respect by the margin of the extremely hard white jurassic belt to the left of the upper Meuse, where the impregnable fortresses of Verdun and Toul tower above the plain of wet, clayey lower jura stretching away in front of them towards the east. In such country the French army always has the following advantages: (1) It commands the high ground and a covered position to the rear at the same time. (2) It has a clear view of all the movements of an enemy advancing over the plain below. (3) It has in many cases extensive woods behind it, where it can concentrate and deploy without danger from aircraft. (4) It can leave the wetter plains to the enemy. (5) It always has the ad-

vantage, as regards communications, of the inner line and a close network of railways, all leading to the vast depot and junction of Paris, from which reënforcements and supplies can easily be despatched in any direction. The Paris basin has the advantages of a fortress without its disadvantages; for it is easy to defend and yet (being equivalent to the north of France) so extensive that it cannot be bombarded and destroyed like a fixed fortress, but allows freedom of movement to the largest army and, as a definitely wheat-growing and market-gardening country, provides it with food as well.

Since 1918 France has pushed her north-western frontier a long way out to the east, as far as the Upper Rhine and almost to the margin of the triassic belt of the Palatinate (see map 4); apropos of which it must not be forgotten that the military frontier really lies some 30 miles east of the whole length of the Rhine, thus securing as undefended a foreland as could be desired, which the French army could overrun in two days. We will readily admit that the present boundary-line is an uncommonly advantageous one for France, but no one must take it amiss if we modestly indicate our aspirations for the future. From our point of view the best frontier (see map 1) would run from the Jura along the ridge to the west of the upper Moselle and the upper Meuse and then, bending westwards and keeping south of the chalk and tertiary regions, to the valley of the Somme and so to the sea—or at the very least along the chalk ridge of Artois. This frontier has, of course, the disadvantage that it takes in a French population, but that could be got over by handing over these sons and daughters of France to their already under-populated motherland. On the other hand, it possesses great advantages. It would destroy the fortress-like character of the Paris basin, deprive the French army of the strategically most important scarps, and ensure that the opening engagements in the war after next shall take place in a region which has fewer natural defenses and from which Paris can be reached more quickly. Besides that, the Channel ports of Boulogne and Calais, which are essential for holding

the pistol to England's head, as well as most of the coal and iron (Lille, Briey), will be in our hands. Incidentally, a considerable portion of the country involved was formerly German-speaking, and the rest of it is full of old German (Frankish) place-names.

The western Alps form an entirely distinct section of France. They consist of high ranges and rock-masses, with zigzag valleys running up from the western side and providing a convenient approach, which only becomes difficult after crossing the main watershed and the political frontier, and comes to an end before the passes, which are few and high. From the Italian side the way up to the passes is short and steep, and, on top of that, they are nearly all in French hands, so that the Italians have very small prospect of forcing a passage towards the west. There is only one low place, where the Maritime Alp slope down near Nice, and even that does not really afford room to maneuver freely; also it is protected by a modern group of fortifications.

The whole northern and eastern frontier of France has been enormously strengthened since the War; in particular a new defensive scheme, started in 1929, is to make it impregnable by 1934. The main feature of the scheme is the establishment of permanent fortified areas, each occupied by two divisions. Such areas are (1) in the region of the western Alps: from Nice to the upper valleys of the Durance and the Arc, which commands the approaches from the Italian river Dora Riparia; and the head of the valley of the Isère, which secures those from the Dora Baltea; (2) obviously, the opening between the Jura and the Vosges at Belfort; (3) two in Lorraine: one to the north-west of Hagenau and Wörth, the other in front of Metz, both connected by an area all prepared for flooding in the Saar basin to the south of Saarge-münd. Besides these permanent fortified areas, which are located at the natural weak points in the frontier, numerous deeply dug-out positions have been planned, if not already constructed—one at the fort of the Vosges; a couple in front of Saarburg and south-east of Metz, which are also echel-

onned behind two fortified areas; a couple west of Metz and south of Longwy; and a completely detached one in the region of the upper Schelde, which has the plain of French Flanders directly on its left; this plain can be flooded by arrangement from somewhere west of Douai to the sea near Calais. There is yet a third means of defense which the French are already getting ready in peace-time, road-barri-
cades. The biggest are situated: in the Jura; behind the ridge of the Vosges; in front of the middle Meuse from Verdun to somewhere north of Mezières. It must not be forgotten that a well-planned group of similar defenses in the east of Belgium forms a useful extension of the French line towards the north. When one also considers that the railway system of north-eastern France and Belgium has been developed to such a pitch that it can rush an army of millions into defenseless German territory along thirteen strategic main-line railways, working in conjunction with motor-roads, in a few days, one is bound to admit that the French military authorities have made a splendid, an admirable use of their opportunities to establish their country's much-discussed "security."

2. *Industry and Communications.*—Owing to her proximity to the Atlantic and her somewhat more southerly position, France has a damper and milder climate than Germany, so that cold, wet weather is a factor to be considered in the low-lying parts of the north, causing great discomfort to the soldier. A high rainfall and the wide distribution of a rich layer of mold provide the foundation for an exceedingly well-developed and productive agriculture, yielding enough wheat, maize, vegetables, sugar-beet, wine and oil to feed the population—a tremendous score over Germany. Arable-farming is supplemented by stock-breeding in the extra-damp north-west, which supplies pasture for cattle, horses and sheep. Industry is also so well developed, in consequence of the keen intelligence of the race and the presence of coal (Lille, the Central Plateau) and iron (Briey, Normandy, the eastern Pyrenees), that it must be capable of meeting all the economic demands of war; and its capacities are increased

by the use for electrical purposes of the water-power available in the Alps and Pyrenees, as well as by the plundering of the Saar coal-mines.

The economic life of France is much less highly industrialized than ours. French factories may turn out good work, but France is a land of peasants and small *rentiers*, a fact which throws a vivid light on the view so popular among us before the War, that the French were decadent: we mistook Paris and a few other great cities for France. The high percentage of soil under cultivation—60 per cent. arable and gardens, 10 per cent. pasture land, and only 15 per cent. forest—gives rise to a fairly even distribution of population at a density of about 190 persons to the square mile, with villages which, in the north-east, which particularly concerns us, are mostly compact, stone-built miniature towns of Frankish origin. Scattered in between them are numerous small market towns with a strong agricultural flavor about them, and only rarely does one see the towers of a big town rising up out of the rolling green of the landscape, which almost everywhere has a peculiar, intimate charm of its own. Our soldiers were nearly always struck by a certain slackness and dirtiness about towns and villages alike, also by the neglect of sanitation, which tolerated the rat as an inmate and had not yet come to regard a W.C. as an essential adjunct to the house.

Communications, on the other hand, are everywhere excellent; and the natural tendency towards centralization, which is rooted in the national character and encouraged by the physical structure of the country, shows up particularly clearly here. The fact that Paris is the traffic-center of the Paris basin and thus of northern France is not in itself remarkable, but that it should have become the center of the whole country is matter for more surprise. From every side and every corner of France, the canals, the excellent poplar-lined roads and the railway lines all converge on Paris. The canals were built in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for the sole purpose of establishing cheap and secure transit for merchandise from all river-basins to Paris in a pre-railway

age. Paris thus sits like a spider in the middle of an admirably planned and spun web of steel. In the world war it gave brilliant proof of its efficiency, especially in handling traffic behind the main curve of the front and between the British and French sections of the line. Without Paris, with all its troops and railway stations, on its left flank, the French army could hardly have won the race to the sea in September 1914.

II. NATIONAL CHARACTER

France's geographical position has had a most distinct effect on the racial, and thus also psychological, structure of the population, and also on the growth of its strong sense of nationality. Owing to its westerly position, the East-Baltic race does not figure in it at all, and the Dinaric only appears in the western Alps, and on a small scale at that; the Phalian race is also to seek, or in any case not strongly represented. The racial structure of France is thus determined by three races only, the Eastern, the (western) Mediterranean, and the Nordic. The basis of the French people as a whole is probably Eastern, which accounts for the typical small *rentier*, who pegs away at his little job and hopes to retire at forty, looks up with awe to the *ville lumière*, Paris, and is carried away by the idea of *gloire*, but is at the same time a skeptic and a mocker. The Mediterranean is the basic race in the west and south, but has filtered into the rest of the country too: it is responsible for the enthusiasm, the quick response and the sudden flaring-up which characterize the French *élan* and thirst for glory. When one observes these two races in the places where they have kept themselves comparatively pure, the Eastern in the Central Plateau, the Mediterranean in the Garonne basin, one is driven to conclude that they neither severally nor jointly possess either the Gallic *esprit* or the Gallic *élan*, nor even contribute to them in any important degree; and that it was only the accession of the Nordic race that awakened these highly characteristic traits to life. There has been Nordic blood in the

country from the earliest times; later on it was constantly reënforced by Celtic and Teutonic immigrants and last of all by the Franks, who came in from the north in the fifth century and rapidly established themselves as a ruling race everywhere, in the north also blending largely with the earlier Nordic *cum* Eastern inhabitants. In later times also there has been a constant influx of Nordic blood into northern France—*e.g.* through the planting of Saxon colonists and the settlement of the Normans along the north-west coast—so that its population may be regarded as one-third Teutonic.

This Nordic element, which has kept its hold of power without a break since Merovingian times, though shaken for a moment in 1789-92 by the Revolution, has succeeded, with the support of the fertile lowlands which extend all over France, in making the other elements in the population completely submissive to its cultural and political ideas; a process which was made easier for it by a situation that was for the most part well protected on all sides and by the small number of races involved. In consequence of cross-breeding, Northern France has naturally not remained what it was; and its line of development has been just the opposite of its German cousins'. These French Teutons have retained more of the character of the Viking, the conqueror of the age of migrations, and have been able consciously to preserve their essentially military spirit undimmed, in contact with a definitely inferior and alien race; whereas the instinct of the German Teuton is often rather to stick quietly to the ancestral soil. This accounts for the aggressive, turbulent strain in the French character with its sudden flashes of energy. Both in material and immaterial things, the French are always out for conquest, equally studious of formal beauty (without falling into the hollow poses of the southerner) and practical efficiency. There is something uncommonly attractive, because specious, about everything French; no nation so perfectly combines Northern and Southern characteristics, wherefore admirers flock blindly to the shrine from Scandinavia and the Mediterranean alike.

What sort of strategy and what type of soldier has a national character like this produced? Although the French are much more of a single homogeneous nation than ours, a distinction has nevertheless to be drawn between the northerner and the southerner. The former, having so much more Celtic and Teutonic blood in him, is very much the better soldier. For the northern Frenchman, the glory of France and its defense, when all is said and done, come first; the southerner, when put to the acid test, may prefer a quiet life. The mutinies of 1917, which went as far as the establishment of soldiers' soviets, mostly happened in southern units. This national ambition and the proud consciousness of having, since the Baroque, Rococco, Revolutionary and Napoleonic ages, led the civilization of the world, together constitute that firm backbone which no amount of bitter doubt, failure or disappointment can permanently affect, and carry away even many a southerner in the swirl of their impetus. This Germanic element is France's main generator of vital energy; it alone is responsible for that current of unrest which has constantly disturbed the peace of Europe from the middle of the seventeenth century onwards and is determined to establish the hegemony of France on the continent. One of the most important tasks for the establishment of peace on earth is the weakening, nay the extermination, as far as that is possible, of this Germanic element. Ruthlessly conducted wars, which will reduce the numbers of this French warrior-cast; transportation of detachments of them to an eastern Germany of the future, where they would soon become Germanized; cross-breeding of those that remain with southerners and negroes, in which matter the French military authorities have themselves shown the way; progressive limitation of population;—all these are possible means to the decline and fall of France. Hence we approach the problem of our future relations with France not merely from a political and military but also from an ethnological point of view. All the wrongs that the old France did to the western German in her wars of extermination and rapine must be paid back in kind.

The bloody de-northernizing of France must be one of the main items of Germany's defense program, for only in this way can our eternally restless, bloodthirsty neighbors be shorn of some of their spiritual and physical powers. A frontier such as the one described on p. 187, within which the French language might be extirpated in half a century, would, of course, be a great help in this task.

In the War the French soldier—I refer primarily to the northern Frenchman—proved himself a skillful fighter with plenty of endurance, even if not quite the Englishman's stubbornness in defense. He knew how to conduct himself in the open, and quickly seized any little advantage that came his way. And the rapidity with which he pulled himself together after the numerous defeats of the first month of the war and resolutely turned round in full retreat to face us at the decisive battle of the Marne on September 6, 1914, came as a surprise to us. The artillery on the whole impressed us less than the infantry. In general, it was not so much the individual soldier as the spirit pervading the whole army that maintained the honor of France in the world war. That spirit was entirely northern in character, and emanated from that dominant upper class of generals and deputies—embodied in names like Joffre, Nivelle, Pétain, Foch and, above all, Clemenceau—who with a ruthless and admirable energy never took their eyes off their great dual object, to maintain France's greatness and their own preponderance, cost what it might. Nothing in the world could divert these men from their aim; they were prepared to stake absolutely anything, if only that was achieved. This ruling class of republican France compels one's admiration, it has no equal in the world for sheer energy; all the more reason, then, why it must be destroyed. Never in the past, not even under Napoleon, have the destinies of France been guided by such resolute, such brutally ruthless hands as they are today.

III. FRANCE IN THE WORLD WAR

1. *The Opening Operations and the Marne.*—France would have had her war on two fronts also, had not Italy left us in the lurch. This removed hostile pressure from the French Alps, and enabled her to use the troops assigned to their defense on the decisive northern front, where their numbers, in conjunction with the sudden weakening of the German line by the withdrawal of two army corps, tipped the scale at the battle of the Marne. France was thus able to put her whole strength into the north-eastern front, in addition to which the British expeditionary force took over the left flank.

The French plan of campaign (map 2) wore two different aspects, one for the consumption of the world, the other for reality. The First, Second, Third and Fifth armies took up their position between Belfort and Mezières, under cover of the chain of fortresses running in the same direction, with the object of keeping as many German troops as possible busy down there by thrusts at southern Alsace and Lorraine, and also of showing the world that the French were determined to respect Belgian neutrality. The chances of beating the German army on these lines were, of course, exceedingly remote. Hence an extension of the plan was provided for. A Fourth army was drawn up near Châlons-sur-Marne, between the Third and the Fifth, with instructions to advance northwards in concert with them towards the south of Belgium. The main strength of the French army was thus concentrated on the left wing to the west of Metz, which could only mean that the German right wing, which it was hoped would be as weak as possible, was to be fallen upon and destroyed in the region of the Ardennes. By way of providing cover on the flank the little English army took up a position near Maubeuge, the equally little Belgian one near Louvain.

If one compares the French and the German plans, one can hardly deny that the German was the brighter and more comprehensive of the two; in its assumption that the German

right wing would not extend northwards across the Meuse, which our First army did do, the French plan showed short-sightedness. The main body of the French (the Third, Fourth and Fifth armies) was bound in the Ardennes to run straight into the enveloping arms of the Germans. Unfortunately it escaped this fate, because the Germans were too strong and advanced too impetuously in Lorraine, but were too weak and too closely massed together in Belgium, so that they were not able to outflank the French and the British, but only to push them back in a series of frontal actions.

The premature belief of the German higher command that this retirement of the enemy was equivalent to complete victory was the saving of France, for it misled the former into withdrawing two army corps from the already too weak German right wing and meant the abandonment of the Schlieffen plan, since the pursuit was a frontal struggle, not a genuine out-flanking movement. While the French managed to keep their end up in front of their strong line of fortifications between the Vosges and Verdun and the parallel scarp between the Moselle and the Meuse with relatively small forces against greatly superior German numbers, they also succeeded with large forces, even though they were giving ground all the time (but what did loss of territory ever matter in this war?), in making an end of the German enveloping movement as such in southern Belgium. Their retirement to the Paris-Verdun line was by no means fatal to them; for in this way the German right wing found itself in a shelving tertiary and chalk region traversed by parallel rivers and partially wooded, face to face with the new French Sixth army stationed to the north-east of Paris, which resolutely advanced upon it in an easterly direction, whereupon the main body of the French halted, turned about, and prepared to attack. In spite of the fact that the right half of the German army between Paris and Verdun was now exposed to both a frontal and a flank attack, our right struck a very skillful blow at the French Sixth army and forced it back on Paris. But on the

afternoon of September 9, the fatal order to retreat arrived from G.H.Q. This order, which decided the War, was prompted by the fear that the little English army would attack vigorously in the direction of Château-Thierry through the gap which had formed between our First and Second armies. The blame for this order, so disastrous alike in its remoter consequences and in its immediate effects, lies, apart from pure mistakes of strategy already mentioned, with the fact that German G.H.Q., which had remained too far back, lost their grip on the situation, were taken in by a false report, and were totally untrained in national psychology; they assumed that the English would adopt the same tactics as the Germans would have done, whereas, on the contrary, the English general, true to type, acted with such hesitation that we could easily have closed up the gap. It was also typically German, or rather Prussian, that an excellent general, against his better judgment, obeyed the orders of a lieutenant-colonel who had lost his head, simply because he represented himself as having the full authority of G.H.Q.

The luck which the French higher command had at the Marne was more than it deserved; for its plan of campaign was a notably poorer one than the German, and its execution left so much to be desired that it degenerated into a headlong retreat. The execution of the German plan was not first-rate either, but it only came to grief through one of the maddest, purely personal mistakes in the whole of military history. This mistake, and this alone, rescued France from destruction and presented the French army with its "victory" of the Marne, a victory in which it had so little belief itself that it only followed it up tardily and did not get the feeling of a victory till September 12. Even the most essential thing—namely, to outflank the exposed right wing of the Germans, who had retired on the Verdun-Rheims-Noyon line, anew—was not done; all they managed was to push back the German line northwards from Noyon. To be sure, even this turned out well for the French, for it gave the German line, which became permanently established here, an extremely un-

healthy salient and kept it from the Channel ports, which were of capital importance for the landing of English troops. In the race to the coast neither the French, in spite of the better railway system behind them, nor the Germans succeeded in outflanking the enemy; both lengthened their lines in a series of frontal encounters as far as Flanders, where our advance failed, owing to the use of imperfectly trained, if gallant, new levies and the flooding of the country by the Belgians. By October 18th, 1914, the whole western front was established.

All in all, the Franco-Anglo-Belgian army came off better in the race to the sea than the German. After the battle of the Marne, *i.e.* on September 12-13, the essential thing was, for the Germans, to extend their line along the valley of the Somme as far as the Channel; for the enemy, to bend the German line as far back from the sea as possible at Noyon. In this the enemy were so far successful that they saved the Channel ports, secured a safe maneuvering-ground for the coming British army between Dunkirk and Amiens, at the same time retaining a very numerous population, the richest in Germanic blood, for France, and giving the German line of trenches the most disadvantageous line imaginable by the salient at Noyons. All that the Germans could set against that was, the occupation of the coal-mining and industrial area of northern France; the rich mines of Briey; and the mere fact of possessing a scrap of French territory, a triumph which was not sufficient, as the course of the war proved, either to intimidate the enemy or attract the neutrals.

2. *The Entrenched War.* The entrenched war on the western front (see map 3) was in any case fought almost entirely on French soil, and therefore in a measure at the French expense, so that it was of the utmost importance to France that the Germans should be driven back across the frontier. Moreover, our enemies had to strive for military successes here in order to upset our operations in Russia and induce the still-hesitating neutrals, Italy and Rumania, and Bulgaria too, if possible, to throw in their lot with them.

During 1915, therefore, the French, who were at that time still responsible for the greater part of the western front (until England should have raised and trained a respectable army), launched a whole series of offensives against the German lines. They usually selected Champagne or Artois for the purpose, finally even both together, with the obvious object of cutting off the Noyon salient and rolling up the side-pieces. In the meantime they also made attempts in the Argonne, in Lorraine and even in the Vosges, and simultaneously too, but here they had even less luck.

In 1916 the French were on the defensive for a long time, while Falkenhayn tried to bleed the French army to death at Verdun by six months of continuous attacks. The French succeeded—with the greatest difficulty, but still succeeded—in holding the fortress of Verdun, which was not so very favorably situated from their point of view either, being set on an isolated height and only accessible by means of an inadequate narrow-gauge railway and a motor-road (the latter carrying most of the traffic) from Bar-le-Duc. After their unfortunate experiences at Liège, Verdun no longer mattered to them in the least *quâ* fortress, but only as a strong sector of their line; however, as the struggle went on it became a symbol of France's resistance and of her ultimate victory. By the end of the first five days of the battle they had already increased their forces from 150,000 to 800,000. They fought with desperate courage, and the marshy ground of the Meuse valley of which they commanded a good view helped them, inasmuch as it made things appallingly difficult for us. Had we attacked along both banks of the Meuse Verdun would probably have fallen; as it was, this German plan failed like the rest. In any case it was most unintelligently conceived; for it set out, abandoning all strategic finesse, to wear down the enemy, whose numerical superiority was increasing every day with the growth of the English army, by sheer butchery—it aimed at the mere arithmetical reduction of the enemy. It may be that this idea of Falkenhayn's showed a grasp of the new truth, that it is only losses in men, not in

territory, that can get the enemy down in these days; but even so it was completely out of place in dealing with an enemy vastly superior in numbers, for heavy losses to him implied terrible, even if smaller, losses to ourselves. Hence Verdun may be called a second victory of the Marne for the French, again not won by their own generalship but thrown into their lap through our mistakes. No matter whether Falkenhayn was anxious to capture Verdun itself or not, Nivelle held it and thereby emerged from the shambles as the victor in the eyes of France and of the world. How far France was from bleeding to death in spite of her enormous losses (up to June 460,000 French, as against an estimated, but not officially admitted, 278,000 Germans) was shown by the fact that at the end of June the French were themselves attacking in conjunction with the British on the Somme, and were able to fight the first great battle of material. The success of this offensive in terms of damage to the German line may have been small, but it was sufficient to cause the Germans to execute a voluntary retreat to the Siegfried line, as it would hardly be possible to protect the Noyon salient from being cut off from both sides in the big attacks which were expected to follow. Sound as this step on the part of German G.H.Q. was (it effected a saving of 25 miles of front and ten divisions and spoilt some of the enemy's offensive plans), yet on balance it was a success for the Franco-British forces and regarded as such by the world, for it was a striking proof of the inferiority of the Germans and the first step in their retirement from France. Two offensives which followed soon afterwards, in April, at Arras and on the Aisne were of little profit to the enemy. Indeed, France's loss of blood in these battles and the continued delay in the expulsion of the Germans produced a crisis in the French army which could only be got rid of by savage activity. So the French army was induced to return to the attack in August at Verdun and in October on the Aisne, attacks which led to the capture of the Chemin des Dames and inspired the Poilu with new confidence in himself.

3. *Defeat and Victory, 1918.* The Franco-British plan of campaign for 1918 was just to hold the German attacks which were expected to follow the collapse of Russia, until enough American troops had arrived to make the numerical superiority of the Allies overwhelming. This was a thoroughly sound plan, especially now that, with the election of Clemenceau as French Premier on November 13, 1917, the strongest, most determined and most implacable will then in existence had become the life and soul of the resistance. Thus prepared, the enemy held up the attacks delivered in brilliant style by the Germans on the Somme and near Armentières in March and April 1918 and between Noyon and Rheims in May and June, after the failure of which the Germans found themselves with a line which was far too long, thus suddenly requiring many more troops, and not ultimately tenable for them, but all that the enemy, with their American reënforcements on the way, could desire. The front was now some 87 miles longer than before and required at least twenty-five more divisions. In addition to this, the enemy had obtained, at Rheims, Noyon and Albert, three positions from which it was possible for them to stave in the two German triangles of newly-gained ground, and isolate and capture the troops fighting in them. If the German higher command hoped by a rapid succession of powerful blows so to weaken the enemy that he was ready to make peace, it miscalculated; for our losses were bound to be hardly less than the enemy's (and could not like theirs be made up by new reënforcements), and in the case of our advances being held up we should find ourselves with a less advantageous line. The German successes from March to June were brilliant tactical victories, but they did not alter the situation as a whole and their successfulness ultimately proved illusory.

Moreover, they had one most untoward result. The French higher command had learnt by the success of the new offensive tactics of the Germans, and when the next German attack came in July on both sides of Rheims, they adopted a

new method of defense which proved so effective that the German onset went to pieces right at the beginning. They simply evacuated their front line secretly, let our artillery waste all its ammunition on it and then greeted our infantry with a devastating hail of rapid fire. Thus the responsibility for the failure of the offensive rests not with the soldier but with the higher command, which was so ignorant of national psychology that it expected our most intelligent enemy, the French, to fall a fourth time into a trap which had already succeeded three times. One is almost inclined to suspect that our higher command had grown too much accustomed to the mentality of the Russians, whom it had so often brilliantly defeated. But the French are in every way a match, and in some ways more than a match, for us: to shut one's eyes to this would be a mistake for which our nation would some day have to pay heavily.

The repulse of the German attack at Rheims on July 15, 1918, proved to be the final turning-point of the war; for it had been Germany's last gamble, after which there was nothing left, whereas the Americans were just beginning to make their presence felt on the western front. Anyone who saw with his own eyes the tiny companies marching up to our front line could only think with tears in his eyes of the fate that was now advancing towards the Reich with giant strides. Within three days of the failure of our attack at Rheims the French made an eastward thrust at Soissons in order to cut off the Marne salient; they were held with great difficulty, but the Marne salient, having become untenable, had to be evacuated at the beginning of August, which was naturally celebrated as a great victory on the other side. Therewith the initiative finally passed to the enemy, who henceforth had the situation in his hands. As early as July 27 Foch, now the supreme commander of the Allied forces, developed his plan for a general offensive to clear us out of French and Belgian soil. It began with an attack from Amiens in the direction of St. Quentin on August 8, which was intended

to stave in the other German salient and did in fact flatten it to a considerable extent. The enemy made the highly valuable discovery that the German soldier was no longer quite what he had been in the spring, and German G.H.Q. also now came to the conclusion "that the war must be ended"—a matter which was in reality no longer in their hands.

Numerous enemy attacks on our positions between Arras and Soissons, launched with the object of breaking through towards the east and cutting off our troops between Soissons and Verdun, caused our G.H.Q. to retire on the Siegfried-Wotan position on September 4. At the same time, *i.e.* September 12, the German triangle at St. Mihiel was successfully pushed in, on which occasion the Americans received their baptism of fire; as a result of this the French got the important Toul-Verdun railway once more into their hands.

For the end of September the French prepared a big offensive on the whole front, with especial emphasis on the two wings in Flanders and on the Meuse, the object being to dislodge the Germans from the great curve of their line and drive them into the Ardennes. They knew that they still had a stiff job in front of them, and did not hope for the final victory before 1919. They would have been well satisfied if they could have got the important Brussels-Mons-Maubeuge-Sedan-Metz railway line into their hands and thus interfere with the Germans' lateral communications behind their line. The German higher command, on the other hand, thought that we could no longer face the expected general offensive, and made up its mind on September 28 to wind up the whole business as quickly as possible. The Allied offensive began on September 26. By the middle of October we had been pushed back to the well-constructed Hunding-Brunhild line, and before the end of the month to the half-finished Hermann line. We were in process of retreating, under orders received on November 4 to the purely rudimentary Antwerp-Meuse line, when the armistice came.

IV. FRANCE AND GERMANY

Passing over France's share in the confiscation of the German colonies (the Cameroons and Togoland) also her disgraceful and bloodthirsty behavior towards German civilians in her colonies, and having already discussed elsewhere her military activities in the Dardanelles (see p. 175), Macedonia (see p. 276 *et seq.*), and northern Italy (see p. 159), we will proceed to a few final observations on the fundamental nature of Franco-German relations.

Since her political consolidation in the middle of the sixteenth century France has been the arch-enemy of our people and our existence as a nation. All this time she has been the continual aggressor, her object being the Rhine frontier. For the fact that there has since existed no state which included all Germans we have primarily to thank France and her deeply ingrained passion for supremacy, at least on the continent. All the thoughts and all the actions of the French nation are subordinated to that one great end, and its whole intellectual achievement is but a means to the attainment of the Rhine and the dismemberment of the German people. Both nations are of equal intellectual rank, both are highly gifted with creative genius; but in all matters of politics the French are superior to the Germans, owing to their national solidarity, their more pronounced corporate sense, their greater devotion to the national ambitions, and their superior willingness to go along with the ruling class in this direction. Hence France is a much more dangerous, because more resolute and aggressive, enemy to Germany than Germany is to France. And the extraordinary thing is that the whole world sees nothing amiss here. Hardly a single nation would worry its head if France tomorrow declared the whole Rhine to be her eastern frontier (did a single nation do so when the Black pestilence was raging on the Rhine?), but there are plenty of them to get on their hind legs the moment

Germany wants to fetch her German brethren in Alsace and Lorraine back into the Reich!

With such a restless, ambitious, resolute and brutal nation as the French, obviously there can be no question of peaceful, neighborly relations—so much should be clear from the history of the last four hundred years. It is a question of one of us or the other. But for the peace of the world it is undoubtedly far better that the final victory should rest with a peace-loving nation like the German, not with a restless and perpetually covetous one like the French. All French talk about the necessity for "security" is cunningly disguised aggression plus, perhaps, the fear that springs from a bad conscience, seeing how long France has been allowed to work her wicked will on our border-lands with almost complete impunity. As short a while ago as 1919 the French military authorities, prompted by the ambitions I have described, demanded the annexation of the whole left bank of the Rhine, which was only prevented with great difficulty by the English and Americans. What France would really like to see is a small Germany wedged in between the Rhine and the Oder and split up into numerous independent small states. All movements calculated to disintegrate Germany, whether inside or outside its borders, are sure of French support. France invented separatism on the Rhine and lends every sort of aid, financial and otherwise, to the German Marxists of whatever shade of opinion; she has planted Poland and Czechoslovakia on our eastern frontier and armed them, and it is she who prevents the union between us and Austria, for the intimidation of whom she also supports the southern Slavs. Wherever we turn in Europe France stands in the way, ready to humiliate and damage us.

But these dragon's teeth which France has sown will one day surely produce their terrible crop. . . .

II. BELGIUM

I. TERRITORY, INDUSTRY, COMMUNICATIONS

BELGIUM is one of those wretched states which have been created on the outer hem of German national territory, in defiance of all the facts of nationality, under French, and in this case perhaps also English, influence, with the object of making the numbers of the German race less formidable by splitting them up politically and thus weakening them as a whole. The territory of Belgium was detached from Holland in 1830 by emissaries of the July revolution; in 1839 it was declared an independent entity by the powers and given "perpetual" neutrality, which—having performed its anti-German function—was abolished at Versailles in 1919, Belgium having in the meantime been openly incorporated as an important member of the league of Germany's enemies.

The country and the population both fall into two quite separate halves. The north is flat or rolling plain, most of it sandy and loamy soil, with some marsh-land, on which both arable and stock-farming are practiced. The whole region is densely populated, in some places too densely, especially in Flanders, where the small peasantry, which forms the majority of the population, carries on a domestic industry of linen- and wool-weaving and also lace-making. The south of Belgium slopes up through loess-covered, well-cultivated hill-country to the rolling *massif* of the Ardennes, which rises towards the south to forest- and meadow-covered highland country with many bogs and deeply incised river-valleys, and owing to its poor soil and snowy winters only supports a small population in widely scattered villages. The northern part, *i.e.* the lower Ardennes, traversed by the channel of the Meuse, which is an important waterway, has, of course,

been densely populated for a century, for it contains the western continuation of the Ruhr coal-field as well as iron, lead and zinc, with the result that one of the most vigorous centers of heavy industry in the world has grown up between Liège and Mons, right on the Paris-Berlin railway-line. This is the region whose mining and manufacturing population, incited by Catholic priests and Latin nationalists, inflicted so much damage by their guerilla methods on our troops marching through; the atrocities of the sharp-shooters of Dinant and Liège are notorious enough.

Belgium is primarily an industrial country and quite incapable of feeding itself; it has to import foodstuffs in exchange for manufactured goods and coal. In its commerce and communications it is equally dependent on others. Its principal port, Antwerp, is not situated on the open sea, being shut off from it by Dutch territory. Moreover, a great proportion of its foreign trade consists in the carriage of goods to and from Germany. Hence, in spite of its territory being closely criss-crossed with railways, canals and motor-roads, it has no self-contained system of communications of its own, but is merely a half-way house on the way between France and Germany, and between the Rhine valley and the Channel.

II. POPULATION

Racially Belgium is equally far from self-contained. It has no people, only a population. The north is inhabited by Germans, the south by Walloons; the former, as Flemings of Lower Frankish blood, belong to the great German nation; the latter speak a very degenerate form of French containing many German words. Although they are very much in the minority—only 38 per cent. of the total population—they have managed to acquire a predominating influence in all political affairs. This they have been able to do not merely through their more energetic and forceful character but also through the strong support they have received ever since 1830 from the great political and cultural power of France,

whereas the Flemings received no encouragement from the German Empire and, being ignorant of the written language of Germany (they spoke Low German), have completely lost touch with German culture. Hence the dominant language of public affairs, the higher grades of society and big business is French—a fantastic state of affairs, which is only intelligible if we regard Belgium as part of the great French plan for destroying Germany. The symbol of this Gallicized Belgium is the city of Brussels, which is situated in the German-speaking part of the country but is only German in the quaint Old Town and the common people; the showy, new Upper Town and the upper bourgeoisie do their best to ape Paris.

The Walloon character is accounted for by the infusion of much Germano-Celtic and a little Mediterranean blood into an original Eastern stock, and has developed itself in a country formerly poor and rather sparsely populated but much of it hopelessly proletarianized today. The Walloons are a violent, fickle lot, given to brutal excesses when their hot tempers get the better of them. This leads, in the upper classes, to an immense masterfulness, which often seeks commercial advantage rather than glory; in the lower to a latent spirit of unrest, which cunningly looks for chances to express itself in action.

III. BELGIUM IN THE WORLD WAR

Obviously a population of this sort, with a Francophile ruling class and indifferent masses, saw the outbreak of war between France and Germany chiefly with French eyes; and the moment their neutrality was violated by Germany, they took the French side, some with passionate ardor, others through sheer stupidity.

As we have seen above, Belgium had no independent strategic significance, it was simply a factor in both the German and the French plans of campaign; the Germans looked upon it as the way through for their right wing, the French

regarded it, or at least its southern portion, as the place where the German right wing was to be annihilated. Apart from that Belgium played an important part in the politics of the war, inasmuch as the English Government knew of the intended German violation of Belgian neutrality in case of a war at least as far back as 1911, and welcomed it, because it was the only thing that would reconcile English public opinion to a war with Germany and rouse the feelings of the world.

To the passage of the Germans (who incidentally offered to restore Belgian neutrality after the war) Belgium was able to oppose the fortresses of Liège and Antwerp, which were admirably constructed and protected by a ring of forts, as well as her army, which took up its position near Louvain. The best route from Germany to Brussels and Paris, which slips in between the south-eastern tip of Holland and the Venn Mountains, was blocked by Liège. The assault delivered on this exceedingly strong and unexpectedly well defended fortress from the directions of Aix-la-Chapelle, Eupen and Malmedy was not entirely successful, the last fort only falling ten days later; still, the advance of our right flank had really only just begun, and Belgium, in so far as we needed it to get to France, now lay open before us.

The overrunning of Belgium by our troops (the First, Second, Third and Fourth armies—see map 2) had the following results: (1) the advance of the Third, Fourth and Fifth French armies across the southern frontier of Belgium; and (2) the withdrawal of the Belgian army from Liège to the fortress of Antwerp, which thus became a center of hostile activity in the rear of our right wing as it hurried south-westwards. Antwerp therefore had to be invested by a small force specially detailed for the purpose and was captured, though also a very strong fortress, in only twelve days; unfortunately the Anglo-Belgian army was able to get away towards the west and establish itself behind the Yser and the dykes of Nieupoort which the Belgians pierced, thus form-

ing the exceedingly important left wing of the future permanent front.

In the further course of the war the Flanders front was so obstinately defended by Belgian and English troops that we never succeeded in pushing it in. From Nieuport on the sea *via* Ypres and Armentières to Lens and the foot of the chalk hills of Artois the line ran through the Flanders plain, where the high level of the ground-water made the construction of trenches exceptionally difficult and that of dug-outs practically impossible, and in rainy weather produced a great sea of slime where every man, beast and vehicle sank in and mud-choked rifles only too often failed to function. Quite apart from bullets, Flanders was the soldier's hell.

Today Belgium has become purely a French dependency; indeed, from the military point of view it is simply a part of France. Therewith Liège has become a jumping-off ground into Germany instead of a barricade against her, and the function of Antwerp is no longer to threaten our right flank but perhaps to provide a take-off into Holland. The only arrangement that would satisfy us is that we should either have Flemish, *i.e.* German, Belgium, which is obviously the right thing on grounds of nationality; or alternatively, the whole of Belgium, considered as the hinterland of north-eastern France, the possession of which is also necessary to our security: The latter alternative is preferable, because the linguistic frontier which runs from Calais eastwards *via* St. Omer and Roubaix to Liège, gives a bad line for military purposes. Our army can only hold Flanders along the line of its natural southern frontier, the hills of Artois, or better still in the valley of the Somme at their foot; from which the natural extension to the Argonne and the upper Meuse follows as a matter of course (see map 1).

III. ENGLAND

I. INSULAR POSITION, INDUSTRY, COMMUNICATIONS

Geographical Position.—England is the larger half of the island of Great Britain, whose Scotch half was primarily settled from it and has been completely incorporated politically; relations between England and Ireland are less close, which is accounted for by the mutual dislike of the Irish, with their partly Mediterranean blood, and the Nordic English, and is reflected in the official designation "Great Britain and Ireland." England's position just off the middle of the west coast of Europe makes her the natural gate-keeper and watcher of the French, Belgian, Dutch, German, Danish, and Norwegian coasts and of the seas which wash them, the Channel and the North Sea. This explains the changing face of British history. As long as the Atlantic coast was Europe's rear, England was doomed to comparative insignificance; it was, in fact, an unpretentious land of peasants and shepherds, which exported wool and imported manufactured goods, and not in its own ships either. But once the crossing of the Atlantic and the discovery and settlement of its further, American shore had made Europe's west coast her main front, it depended entirely on the capacity of the British people whether the sudden change in their position, which was now extraordinarily advantageous from the commercial point of view, would result in the development of overseas trade and in political expansion or not. The British proved equal to their opportunities; they are an ambitious race and carry out their projects with unfailing success and great energy. Since the end of the sixteenth century they have reached out across the ocean and built up a colonial empire, which has opened up immense resources to them in the way of raw materials for their industry and foodstuffs for

their population. And in 1846 they took the step, so fraught with consequences for their security, of ruining their own agriculture by the introduction of free trade, which placed the nation's food supply in dependence on imports from overseas and, on the other hand, gave a great impetus to industry. England can scarcely survive for a month on her home production; in the event of war, therefore, she is faced with starvation unless she can import foodstuffs or has hoarded immense stocks.

Even from this short survey certain important facts emerge regarding England's position from the point of view of defense. Her situation as an island just off the Atlantic coast of Europe enables her to keep an eye on it and in particular to watch over the Channel and the North Sea; it gives her, in addition, a military security enjoyed by no other country of Europe. Her economic dependence on her own, but distant, empire, which proceeds from this sense of security, is only made feasible by her possession of a big merchant fleet and a navy superior to all others. This fact alone makes England the sworn foe of any power which aims at possessing an equally large fleet. In her case, therefore, the security of the state is bound up with undisturbed maritime trade and a strong navy; none of these things is possible without the others; if but one drops out, the whole structure falls to pieces. Its two main pillars are the navy and, of course, the unswerving determination of the English people. The military upshot of this is, that for England the navy is much more important than the army. If the worst comes to the worst, the navy has (as happened in the world war) to procure for the English, secure behind their sea walls, the time necessary to raise an army.

Territory.—From the point of view of defense England's field of action lies outside her coast-line as long as no enemy has crossed the latter. This means that for England the European theater of war lies on the sea or even on one of its further coasts, from Jutland to the Gironde, to begin with—and perhaps later on the neighboring island of Ireland.

The north and west of the interior of Great Britain consist of rough, humpy mountain country of middling height, poor in soil and woods, rich in rain and moor-land, and fairly easily passable owing to its many valleys; these two areas, in Scotland and in Wales, are the most thinly populated in the country. The east and south, on the other hand, also the deep-set central depression of Scotland, consist of low-lying country, partly flat and partly undulating, and only intersected by a few modest ranges of hills. This country is the scene of a still-surviving agricultural and grazing industry, whose products, both animal and vegetable, are few but choice; but it is interspersed with many useless parks and game-preserves: indeed large portions of Great Britain which were once productive have been artificially turned back for the pleasure of its aristocracy into unproductive, if marvelously beautiful, country, whole villages often disappearing from the face of the earth in the process.

Great Britain is easily approached from the sea owing to its many bays and short but deep rivers (see map 8), nor does its interior, apart from Scotland and Wales, present many obstacles to communication. Even the Pennine Chain in the north of England forms no barrier, being merely a sort of raised plateau covered with sheep-runs. In general there are three main densely-populated industrial (and shipping) areas: (1) the main axle-tree running right across the south of England from London to Cardiff, with its center of gravity in the vast London area; (2) the Midlands, an area bounded roughly by a line joining Liverpool, Birmingham, Hull, and Leeds and containing rich deposits of coal and iron; the Midlands are the seat of the principal heavy, smelting and textile industries of the country, contain a considerable proportion of its population and are responsible for most of its foreign trade; (3) the small lowland area in the center of Scotland, with its coal and iron deposits, its ship-building and other industries, which contains Glasgow and Edinburgh and almost the whole population of Scotland. The remainder of the island is considerably more sparsely

populated and is of no great importance for the economic life of the country, which in this case is the country. It follows that any hostile threat or actual invasion must be aimed at one of these three areas, and if possible against the most important one, the Midlands, which are also the principal center for the manufacture of arms.

The south-east of England (see map 8) also deserves special attention, as it is most easily reached from the Continent and, as the seat of the capital, is of paramount importance politically. South-eastern England forms the northern extremity of the Paris basin, though, of course, now separated from it by the curving-in of the Channel. Consequently, its outer edge from Portsmouth to the neighborhood of the Wash is composed of jurassic rock which forms either gently undulating depressions or grass-clad downs, towards the west with steep slopes, and is traversed by numerous rivers running lengthwise through it. It is easy to see that this jurassic belt possesses certain physical features of which an invading army might make good use—with its front facing north-west, that is. The area behind the jurassic belt is chalk, hard writing-chalk in the higher parts, soft upper green sandstone in the depressions; in the middle of the chalk, however, there is superimposed—just as in the actual Paris basin—a flat tertiary layer, into which the Thames has cut its channel and in the center of which stands London. The chalk country is thus divided into two branches which fork north-east and south-east somewhere between Oxford and Salisbury; their narrow lines of hills, running in these same directions, form a second rampart facing north-west, of practical military importance and further strengthened by various rivers. In addition to the Thames valley, south-eastern England contains one other low-lying area, namely, the broad blunt peninsula formed by Norfolk and Suffolk, a relatively sparsely populated agricultural district. This region is so noticeably cut off from the rest of England, including even the south-east, by the Wash and its inland extension, the Fens (once a swamp, now converted into marshland), by the

lower Thames, and by various other rivers, that it is necessarily of the greatest interest to any invading army. In fact, the Great Ouse which flows into the Wash and a number of streams flowing into the Blackwater estuary which are only separated from its source by a few miles, make the peninsula into a regular island, which provides an invading army with safe and roomy quarters from which it can threaten London, which is quite close and without natural defenses on that side, and also the industrial Midlands not far away.

England's outer region consists of the sea and its further coasts. The latter are in themselves not difficult of approach owing to their river-mouths and numerous harbors; nevertheless, English troops could only land with the consent of the country concerned, unless that happened to be one of the two small states of Holland and Denmark—not Belgium, in view of its powerful partner, France. Such landing moreover presupposes the English navy's having the command of the sea. That is most likely to be the case in the Channel, which, as the War proved, can be completely closed against bigger ships and to some extent against U-boats by means of steel nets, mines and look-out ships, so that busy traffic can go on between the Channel ports of south-eastern England and those of northern France and Belgium behind two walls. Similar traffic with the ports of Holland and north-western France, though more difficult, would be possible with a superior English navy in spite of the longer sea-passage. On the other hand, any attempt at such maritime intercourse right across the North Sea with Danish ports, or across the Bay of Biscay with those of western France, would be exceedingly hazardous, should the enemy possess a fleet of any strength and, still more, any skill in submarine warfare. It will always be easier for an English fleet to close the North Sea at the Channel end and along the line from the Orkneys and Shetlands to the south of Norway than to establish safe and permanent communications across the North Sea. The world war proved this to be so, in spite of the fact

that the whole western coast of the North Sea bristles with English harbors which would have made excellent points of departure.

II. THE ENGLISH CHARACTER

The English nation—and the same applies in general to the Scotch, the Mediterranean, Gaelic-speaking element being very small and uninfluential—was originally a compound of Lower Saxon and Norwegian emigrants; later on it came under a Norman upper class, which introduced the French language as well as Norwegian blood, with the result that modern English is a sort of old Low German with Latin additions. The small differences between the English and the Scotch are chiefly to be explained by the absence of the Norman element, which never penetrated so far north, and left the Scotch in a sense more German. Racially the British Isles belong to the Nordic-Phalian group, but in England especially some of the Mediterranean blood of the earlier inhabitants still persists; it manifests itself in the comparative, and in recent years increasing, frequency of dark hair. Wales and Ireland are its homes.

The English thus grew up as a nation of peasants on a soil that is mostly none too fertile, and for more than a thousand years they grew corn and tended sheep whose wool was the main foundation of the Flemish weaving-industry in the Middle Ages. It was not till the end of the sixteenth century that certain Englishmen took, hesitatingly at first, to commerce and shipping, and subsequently to colonial enterprise and industry, which led to extensive overseas emigration.

The Anglo-Scottish national character is thus in all essentials that of the Lower Saxon peasant, only impoverished by less favorable agrarian conditions and further limited by its insular situation. Hence we find great capacity for work and great circumspection, a very materialistic attitude to the things of this life, which looks clearly ahead, and an ego-

tistical lust for power which seeks to grab everything for itself, be it a piece of land at home or sea-power and colonies abroad. This is accompanied by a certain slowness, which clings to the old as long as it can be made to work somehow and is very unwilling to alter its ways or develop, preferring to surround itself with an extraordinary hotch-potch of the most modern devices and the most ancient traditions. But the most marked feature of all is the incredible tenacity with which the English, once they have adopted an objective, never let it out of sight for a moment, and use absolutely any means of getting to it without the slightest compunction. The main object of an English boy's education is not, as it is of a German boy's, to stuff a maximum amount of knowledge into him, but (a) to harden him, to give him a resolute, self-confident character, and (b) to incorporate the individual in the great British nation, which God has chosen to rule the world. This produces an admirable type of humanity in so far as it combines free manhood with complete incorporation in the state and society, so that the government can rely on popular support at any rate in all questions of foreign policy. The old German individualism, which among the Germans penetrates and (from the public point of view) vitiates everything, has been overlaid and transformed in Great Britain by the strict Norman discipline, till it has come to form a politically reliable quantity. In matters of culture this is, of course, a limitation, so much so indeed that a wearisome, if in itself beautiful, sameness descends on everything, in life as in thought. It should be noted that in the Scotchman the individual element is more strongly, *esprit de corps* less strongly, developed than in the Englishman, whereas his outlook is even more materialistic by a long way; hence Scotch meanness has become the subject of innumerable jokes and stories in England. There is one other highly significant trait which springs from the bedrock of this character, namely, hypocrisy. Behind a cold and self-controlled exterior the Englishman conceals a pretty ardent temperament, which tries to conceal its true nature

and has gradually learnt how to let an inner reality, which but too often has good reason to shun the light of day, run riot beneath a well-preserved exterior. Fontane, thinking of the innumerable brutal colonial wars of the English, summed it up perfectly in his epigram: "They say Christ and mean cotton."

Let us now attempt to evaluate the character we have sketched above from the point of view of military psychology. The English probably surpass even the French in national solidarity, particularly as they are free from the latter's skepticism; with them a rational grasp of the fact that the existence of Britain is at stake fulfills the same function as the Frenchman's faculty of quick enthusiasm. The English nation pursues its vital aims with bulldog pertinacity and will never let its enemy go till it has laid him low; this it has usually succeeded in doing, from the Spanish Armada to Napoleon and on to Versailles. The English individual soldier also shows the same steady, if slow, determination; in the hundred days' battle in Flanders in the summer of 1917 he was the mainstay of the Allies, who were beginning to weaken under the combined strain of the Russian collapse, the mutiny in the French army, the failure of Italy, and the fury of our unrestricted U-boat warfare. The Englishman's type of heroism is passive rather than active; he remains calm in the face of danger, but he does not leap wildly into the fray; he prefers to get hold of the enemy's weak side carefully and then strike a smashing blow at it. On the other hand, it is not the English way to pursue an enemy to his last breath—by all means let him live on, provided he is no longer dangerous. The English are very ready to shake hands with him, perhaps even to feel pity for him; but before that stage is reached, they will stick at nothing, from slander to starvation and from bare fists to tanks, and they spare nothing and nobody belonging to the enemy, neither combatants nor women nor even children. The English nation always thinks in wholes; what it sees as the enemy is not the individual soldier but the nation plus its entire

environment, from the physical aspect of the country to its economic life and even its good name. The English were the first people to adopt this new attitude, which they have put into practice in countless colonial campaigns as well as in the Great War, and they have thereby created a new conception of war and one that has come to stay. Henceforward war is no longer a crossing of swords with the enemy, as it used to be, but the military, economic, psychological and moral destruction and extermination of the enemy nation. It was England who instituted the war of starvation, the war of economic annihilation and the war of lies alongside of the war of armies—and scored a thumping success with them. One does not know whether to be horrified at the vileness, or to admire the clear-headed logic and unshakeable iron determination, which this reveals; the latter attitude will probably carry a nation with its eye on its future further.

The aggressive spirit is not highly developed in the English, nor have they ever shown much talent for military operations on a large scale. Their slowness at the Marne, where the English army might have landed the German right in queer street by a rapid and resolute thrust between the First and Second German armies, says enough. On the other hand we may instance as typical British performances: (1) their exhibition of endurance in Flanders in 1917, already referred to above; and (2) their extremely methodical advance across the Sinai Peninsula, which was judiciously but not boldly planned and carried out; like Kitchener's march against the Mahdi in Nubia, it was made to depend on the construction of a railway, and in this case of a water-supply too, which in both cases brought the British slowly and unheroically but surely to their goal.

In the free use of mobile masses in open country, and in the rapid following-up of an initial tactical success till it assumes strategic proportions, English generals have usually failed. The individual soldier in the field is not expected to overwork himself either; he is treated like a gentleman, who cannot get on without comfort and well-

being; the small extent to which the unexpectedly successful tank-attack at Cambrai in November 1917 was followed up is proof enough. The British soldier, of whatever rank, always does just as much as he thinks necessary to preserve the Empire, and no more—"the Empire" meaning comfort and security for the English at home; martial glory means nothing to him. Whatever the Englishman is doing, he never loses sight of his objective once he is convinced that it is the right one, never (as the German sometimes does) confuses the means with the end. England's naval strategy in the North Sea, which kept the battle fleet in the northern harbors, was as right as it was unheroic: why risk the precious fleet, the bulwark of England's world power and of her domestic security, if the object of the war, the destruction of Germany, could be achieved in an easier and less dangerous fashion? It was the clear realization of the object of the war, namely, the destruction of Germany in the interests of England's future security—especially after unrestricted submarine warfare had shown how very real the danger was—which was the source of the material and moral strength with which the English people endured the unexpected hardships of the long war, among which compulsory military service, with its inroads on the liberty of the individual, was no doubt much more keenly felt than the (by no means severe) rationing. The unrestricted submarine warfare which stiffened England's back broke ours, in saying which we must not forget that the latter had previously been subjected to very much the greater strain.

It is very important to form some idea of how the English character may be expected to react to a hostile invasion. The nation will certainly rush to arms as one man and with heroic obstinacy let itself be mown down in front of the line of the Ouse or the chalk and jurassic hills, before it is forced back step by step. But it is questionable whether the English could face starvation. Physically they have been extremely pampered for centuries and would find it very hard to adjust themselves to real privation (such as they never

experienced during the War in spite of food-cards). Some of them would no doubt patriotically endure even that, but others might throw up the game, which would have ceased to be one for them, sooner. We confess that it gives us pleasure to meditate on the destruction that must sooner or later overtake this proud and seemingly invincible nation, and to think that this country, which was last conquered in 1066, will once more obey a foreign master or at any rate have to resign its rich colonial empire. The above sentences would appear monstrous, nay rank blasphemy, to every Englishman and Englishwoman in the world—if they ever saw them.

III. IRELAND

Of special concern to England are her relations with the neighboring island of Ireland. Ireland lies to the west of Great Britain, and, like it, just off the coast of the continent of Europe; but its importance is more circumscribed, for its people are lacking in creative force and in the English strength of purpose, and the country itself is without those two mighty resources, coal and iron. Ireland is a thinly populated peasant country, largely through the fault of England herself, who has systematically and mercilessly oppressed her dangerous neighbor ever since the fifteenth century in order to draw her claws.

Ireland consists of a lowland plain shut in between two highland districts, which, with its loamy soil and its many rivers and lakes, is the chief corn- and potato-growing, as well as cattle-grazing, area. Owing to the extremely damp, mild climate, due to the gulf-stream, the whole country is covered, apart from cultivated fields, with a carpet of grass and meadow-land of a remarkably luscious green. It is a heaven-sent agricultural country and might be a valuable source of food supply to its neighbor Great Britain, but the English, conscious of the Irish danger, would rather forego this advantage than take their feet off the necks of the Irish.

The people of Ireland belong principally to the Mediter-

raneean race, whose northernmost offshoot they are. A good deal of Nordic blood has, however, filtered in from the east in the shape of Celts and Teutons, so that side by side with the short, dark type we find a tall, blue-eyed type and also a red-haired one, the result of crossing. At the beginning of the seventeenth century there was also an influx of Anglo-Scottish Protestant immigrants into Ulster, as the north-east of Ireland is called, from which the Irish, who had remained Catholics, were expelled. Even today Ulster is sharply divided racially from Ireland proper and is also outside the young Free State; what follows does not apply to it. The English conquered Ireland in the fifteenth century and immediately set about the regular extermination of the Irish nation, which at that time was almost as numerous as the English. They turned the free peasantry into serfs and day-laborers, and at the end of the seventeenth century ruined Irish shipping and captured the country's foreign trade; shortly afterwards they destroyed the old woolen industry, and even now raise the cost of living by high freights. The Irish abandoned their old Gaelic tongue to a great extent and adopted a corrupt form of English which sounds comic to English ears. Their worst time was in 1846-7, when Irish agriculture broke down as a result of bad harvests, the fall in agricultural prices (due to England's adoption of free trade) and famine, and 1,200,000 persons emigrated, to be followed by 4,000,000 between then and 1900, so that even today the Irish landscape is marred by hideous blots in the form of derelict houses and villages. The population has decreased from 8,100,000 in 1841 to 4,400,000 today.

In the destruction of the mere possibility of an Irish peril, the English, with their ruthless, unswerving determination to compass their economic and political ends, brought off a master-stroke of applied national psychology. They have got rid of all real danger from Ireland, as the test of the War proved, and have managed to use the most brutal methods without rousing the anger of the world at large—nobody has got indignant about England anywhere. These brilliant suc-

cesses were, of course, rendered easier for them by certain features in the Irish character.

That character, being built on a Mediterranean foundation, possesses various traits which incapacitate its owners from competing with the Teuton, at least in political and economic matters—*e.g.* their capacity for rapid reaction and their violent but short-lived bursts of passion, which lead to quick impressions and inspirations but do not by any means necessarily issue in action, and particularly not in lucidly planned and conducted action. Such a mentality is only too often content merely to have conceived the idea of something, without going on to translate it into action. Day-dreaming about the best way of doing a thing, plus, if possible, the loud admiration of an enthusiastic audience, are enough for the Irishman. Hence he makes the fundamental mistake which the Englishman, as I have said above, never makes: he confuses the means to the end with the end itself, that is to say, he cannot carry through a job which needs patient application.

Ardent imagination and burning sensuality, passionate artistry and impetuous but easily extinguished enthusiasm, superficiality and the gift of the gab—what place have such things in politics, which demand a cool brain and a steady hand? All the Irish have is excitability and love for a scrap, which make them good soldiers—England has won most of her colonial wars with the help of her poor Irish mercenaries. All their burning hatred of their English oppressors has been of little use to this nation of small cattle-breeders and soldiers, agricultural laborers and factory-hands. Nevertheless, with the financial aid of its expatriated sons, who have become a considerable power in America, it has succeeded in securing the recognition of Ireland (apart from Ulster) as a free state and a Dominion within the British Empire.

In the world war the Irish desire for independence was, alas, of no use to us, probably because we did not exploit it cleverly enough or give it sufficient encouragement and practical support. A German steamship which landed arms

and ammunition on the Irish coast in April 1916 was destroyed and the Irish nationalist leader, Sir Roger Casement, who had been brought across in a U-boat, was arrested immediately on landing and shortly afterwards executed; the probable reason for the rapid frustration of both these attempts is that since the autumn of 1914 the English were in possession of the German navy's secret code and listened-in to all German wireless messages. Ireland's establishment of a kind of state of war with England in 1920 came too late to be of any use to us, and brought even the Irish themselves nothing but an illusion of freedom. But it just shows how unreliable and incalculable the Irish are that they never seriously bestirred themselves during the War, when there was a chance of shaking off the English yoke with German aid, but waited for their attempt till the very moment when England's whole power was ready to be used against them.

What, then, is Ireland's military significance for a foreign enemy of England? Ireland lies to the rear of Great Britain, which diminishes its importance for a continental enemy of England, as long as secure communications are not established by sea—but that can only happen if the English fleet is destroyed. Hence Ireland cannot play more than a secondary part in a war against England; it can only act as an outpost, not as a base of operations for an invasion. It is also incapable of supporting a large army off its own bat; it might feed one for quite a time, but owing to lack of industry would not be able to equip it or keep it supplied. A landing-force despatched to Ireland would need to remain in constant communication with its home on the continent, that is to say, it must have behind it a navy which commands the sea. Here we see the point of England's long and systematic destruction of Irish economic life. Ireland can only acquire greater importance if there is a hostile army in occupation of south-eastern England and it becomes essential to back it up by invading the western Midlands, *i.e.* the industrial Liverpool-Manchester area, from Ireland. If this, the most densely populated and highly industrialized part of

England, were once gripped as with a forceps from the west and the south-east, England would be pretty well finished (see map 8).

Thus Ireland's function is merely to back up the main operations which would take place in the east of England. Only in the last-named case as described above would she acquire importance—indeed, great and decisive importance. The English commander is likely to find difficulty in manipulating a considerable army on two fronts in the over-populated rabbit-warren of the industrial Midlands. Moreover, English war industry, which has its chief centers in this particular area, would not be able to support an army of millions concentrated in this narrow space and keep it supplied with munitions. Inside Ireland itself special attention needs to be paid to Ulster, which would have to be conquered or hermetically sealed up at the same time as the invasion of the northern Midlands took place; if conquered, it might be used as a starting-point for an attack on the densely populated Glasgow district of Scotland, which is quite close and of great importance from the point of view of war industry; even if such attack were only carried out by a small force, it would have the effect of keeping considerable portions of the English army busy up in the north, until a decision was reached further south.

IV. THE BRITISH EMPIRE

It will always remain one of the wonders of history that a small Teutonic island like Great Britain should have succeeded in building up such a vast empire and keeping hold of it through such long years. As against the mother country with its area of only 88,000 square miles and 43,000,000 inhabitants, the colonial empire extends over some 13,000,000 square miles of territory with a population of 393,000,000—that is to say, for every Briton there are nine colored subjects. These nine colored men have had a double function assigned to them by the one white man: in the

first place they are to cultivate corn and rice, plant cotton and jute, grow tea, coffee, cocoa and tobacco, breed sheep and cattle, mine gold and diamonds, iron and tin for him; in the second, to buy back from him the goods manufactured out of these and other raw materials. The one white man is enabled to live comfortably and often even luxuriously by this arrangement.

The British Empire may have been built up by force and fraud, justly or unjustly, by cruelty and hypocrisy or by manliness and intelligent hard work—that does not matter to us now. The truth is, no doubt, that a foreign nation, be its skin light or dark, can only be held down by the mailed fist and only kept steadily at work by compulsion. What matters to us is the relation of the mother-country to the various portions of the empire. And there we find important differences, the white countries contrasting strongly with the colored ones.

The white part of the empire consists of Canada, Australia, and South Africa, and is inhabited by English, Scotch, Irish, Germans (including Boers), Scandinavians and Frenchmen. These people naturally consider themselves the complete equals of the English at home; and some of them show not the smallest concern for the honor of Britain, the desire to break away from the empire gradually gathering force in proportion to the increase in their economic strength. This tendency is probably strongest in South Africa, which contains only 37 per cent. white Britons; in Australia the tie with the mother-country has been loosened through the universal prevalence of Marxism, and in Canada again only 57 per cent. of the population is British. Nevertheless the idea of an open revolt against the English Crown in these countries is hardly to be thought of, particularly as the sort of blunder that the government committed in dealing with the North American colonists in the eighteenth century is in no likelihood of being repeated by a cabinet today. In any case, all three countries did their full share in the world war, particularly Canada, which sent some first-

rate storm-divisions to the front, while South Africa preferred to collect cheap laurels in German South West and East Africa against minute German forces.

The colored part of the empire consists of tropical colonies, where the Briton does not settle *en masse*, but lives among the colored population as an official, soldier, planter or trader, in most cases for a few years or decades only, after which he goes back to England to enjoy a well-earned if dyspeptic repose in the evening of his life. The most important of these colonies are India and Ceylon, and certain possessions in Further India and the South Seas, also in Africa from the Suez Canal to the Cape—so that almost the whole coast of the Indian Ocean is in British hands. Among these countries—I omit various small scattered possessions—the only one inclined to rebellion is India, among whose population of 300,000,000 certain intellectual classes are attempting to sow the seeds of revolt. But the military strength of the English is so vastly superior to that of the Indians and, in the East, of the Mahomedans, the character of most Indians is so averse from the business of war, and finally, the disarming of the people has been so thoroughly carried out, that there can be no question of the English being expelled. That could only happen if the mother-country got into such difficulties that the invading enemy in her midst would no longer have any need for the defection of the colonies. In view of the strong and determined will of the English, which always neglects everything else and concentrates exclusively on the essentials, all ideas of striking a blow at England through her colonies had better be abandoned. England's power consists solely of the island of Great Britain and her navy, nothing else.

The fact that there are naval stations and coaling-ports, cable-stations and oil depots flying the British flag on islands and peninsulas, bays and river-mouths in every corner of the globe, intended to secure communications between the mother country and the colonies, should not lead us to conclude that it is only necessary to attack and destroy them in

order to disrupt the empire. They are so numerous and so widely scattered that no navy in the world, even if it were as big as the British, could dispose of them all more or less simultaneously, as would be necessary. Even the occupation of the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar, no doubt the most sensitive spots in the network of British communications, would not destroy the empire's trade; to do that it would be necessary to have at least the Cape of Good Hope also, and perhaps the Falkland Islands too, in which case England would, of course, be cut off from the Indian Ocean and her principal colonies which lie along its shores. But a hostile fleet that was strong enough to seize these four points and hold them against English ships, would be more usefully employed in taking on the English battle-fleet in its home waters and in an invasion of England itself.

V. ENGLAND IN THE WORLD WAR

1. *The War Deliberately Prolonged.*—Whereas it was in Germany's interest to carry the war through as rapidly as possible and finish it before the end of 1914—indeed her whole conception of the war and her hopes of victory were founded on this—England set out from the beginning to prolong it, for three reasons: (i) in order to gain time, through the military efforts of her allies, to raise a large army; (ii) to let the Central Powers gradually waste away from lack of food and raw materials; (iii) to draw ever new allies to her side by coercion and systematic lying. Even France and Russia, as the parties most immediately involved, were bound to aim at making the struggle as short as possible; but the fulfillment of England's hopes lay beyond the years, her arms were engaged primarily on the battlefields of Time. This is not to say that she did not also do her bit in France, Africa, Turkey, Macedonia, North Italy—far from it; for England achieved the astonishing miracle, for which we were quite unprepared, of bringing up the number of her soldiers from 248,000 (plus 280,000 ill-trained Territorials who could

not be used straight away in a modern war) at the outbreak of war, to 9,500,000 before its end (as compared with France's 7,900,000), two-thirds of whom were recruited from home. On October 1914 there were 200,000 British soldiers in France, in May 1915 only 300,000, but by February 1916 the number had risen to 900,000, by September 1916 to 1,400,000 and by March 1918 to 1,800,000. During the last year of the war there were a further 1,380,000 men in other theaters. As regards the Dominions, the lion's share, both in numbers and fighting-quality, fell to Canada, with 420,000 men. Australia mustered 324,000, New Zealand 100,000, South Africa only 74,000. It is a great pity that our higher command, which from Autumn 1914 to Spring 1918 attempted no offensive in the west, only in the east, left the English the time and the peace necessary to raise such an army. During that time England developed from a purely naval power into a naval and military power, which enormously increased her importance as an enemy; so that, while she played a very minor part on the western front in 1914 and 1915, from 1916 onwards she was able now and again to take the chief burden on herself.

The creation of this mighty army was the work of Lord Kitchener, who thereby did his country an incalculable service which was really more important in 1914 and 1915 than laurels of victory without permanent success. In addition to increasing the regular army and the Territorials, Kitchener created an entirely new army, the so-called Kitchener's Army, the first divisions of which were ready for use in Autumn 1915. Large-scale recruiting, which produced 4,500,000 attestations (though hardly 2,000,000 were accepted as fit), was followed in 1916 by the introduction of conscription, to which this liberty-loving nation after a long resistance finally reconciled itself, when it recognized that it was necessary.

England's presence as a belligerent meant: (i) The extension of the war from Central Europe to the whole world, also from the mainland to the sea. (ii) The mobilization of

the strongest world and colonial power against us. (iii) The exclusion of the Central Powers from world trade and their reduction to starvation by the blockade. (iv) The intimidation of the neutrals, with the result that some took up an unfriendly, some a pitying, attitude towards us, while some even declared war on us. (v) The loss of the German colonies and of the German merchant fleet in so far as it was laid up in foreign ports. (vi) A skillful campaign of lies against us all over the world. (vii) The direction against us of an inflexible will to destruction, which kept a firm hold of the Allies and continually added to their number, with the one great aim of destroying our navy.

2. *The Western Front.*—After the German Empire, England was engaged on the largest number of fronts in this war. Her principal ones were the western front and the sea. It was characteristic of the dilatoriness of English war-policy that on their real element, the sea, they chiefly sat and waited, while on the land, to which they were strangers, they were considerably more active. For the Englishman has long been an expert in naval strategy, whereas in military matters he has always had the touch of the dilettante, and such he proved himself once more in the world war. His best military successes were gained through the tanks, those admirable miniature warships on dry land—which is typical of the way some analogy with or bearing on the sea invariably determines the form of everything the English think or do.

Apart from that the English did nothing outstanding on the western front, nothing that falls outside the general scheme of Franco-Anglo-Belgian operations. Their job was at first to form the left flank, and later, extending to the right, the left wing, of the Allied line, and as such to prevent the Germans from out-flanking the French left and to keep them away from the Channel ports, *i.e.* from threatening their communications with England. This task the English army performed by stubborn defense and spirited but, till the late summer of 1918, unsuccessful attacks. To descend

to details, it figured most prominently in the following operations.

The extremely prompt arrival, while the French were still mobilizing, of the British expeditionary force of only five divisions, which took up its position at Maubeuge (see map 2), was an early proof to all the world of British determination. The intervention of the English at the battle of the Marne just at the gap which had formed between the First and Second German armies contributed materially to the German retirement; however, the hesitating attitude of the English generals prevented their making full strategic use of the advantage that luck had thrust into their hands. Next came their extremely stubborn defense of the line in Flanders—against regiments of raw, if gallant, German recruits, be it said—which, in conjunction with the Belgians' piercing of the dykes, prevented the Germans from reaching Calais.

During the entrenched war (see map 3), the British army, which had extended its line to the Somme (though this still accounted for a very small fraction of the whole western front) and now numbered 1,400,000 men, first figured prominently in the battle of the Somme—significantly enough, the first great "battle of munitions"—which was prepared for, begun, and carried out with a methodical slowness in harmony with the English national character. It began with seven days' artillery preparation, and with a new destructive bombardment every other day. The whole battle, which lasted from July to November of 1916, brought the English little territorial gain and 410,000 killed and wounded; to us it brought the surprising experience that an elastic defense in a deeply dug and intricate position, using shell-holes instead of trenches, was a less costly way of keeping one's end up than rigidly sticking to the front line at any price.

Following on the further failure of the British offensives at Armentières in April and Wytschaete in July 1917, after the usual initial success and with heavy losses (196,000 at Armentières), the British army played an important part in

the hundred days' battle in Flanders in the late summer and autumn of 1917, inasmuch as it diverted the attention of the German army from the French, who were pretty badly shaken at that time, and stiffened their resistance. The objective, which was to bundle us out of Flanders and deprive us of our U-boat base there, of great importance in the submarine warfare then at its height, was not achieved on this occasion either. Incidentally, we were expecting a British landing in the south-west corner of neutral Holland and took precautionary measures to prevent our right wing from being out-flanked in that way. The great surprise success gained in November 1917 in the flat uncratered Cambrai country by massed tanks, which burst out of the morning mist upon a quiet sector of our line, also failed to have any strategic effects, because the Germans, who had given ground in the first shock of surprise, soon recovered themselves and before long even forced the English back by a flank attack on the right.

In the German offensive on the Somme in March 1918, and at Armentières in April, the British retired fighting gallantly; at the Somme they lost touch with the French, but this time it was we who failed to make strategic use of an unexpected piece of good fortune, through lack, so it is said, of troops, especially cavalry and tanks. At Armentières our success was small, owing to the marshy character of the valley of the Lys and the exhaustion of our men, who had been brought over from the Somme without any interval for rest; it culminated in the capture of Mount Kemmel instead of the more important heights of Cassel. It is a pity that a third offensive was not launched in May against the British, who were so exhausted that they might not have been any longer able to defend the Channel ports. By attacking in Champagne instead, we gave the English time to recover breath.

They did not return to the attack till August 8, when, in conjunction with the French, they advanced eastwards along the Somme and pushed us out of the ground we had gained

there in March; here again the tanks bursting out of the mist figured prominently in the action. Their part in the general advance of the Allies against our broken army which began at the end of September, first to the Wotan line, then to the Hunding line, and finally to the Antwerp line, gained the English no further special laurels.

3. *The War on Sea.*—The grim shadow which without doing anything in particular loomed in the background of the war was the British fleet, a gray vision of efficient steel-work and coolly calculating energy. The British doctrine of the sufficiency of a "fleet in being" was demonstrated with admirable restraint—only, of course, in home waters, where the battle-fleet was not to be risked and Germany merely to be blockaded; in foreign waters, on the contrary, English cruisers hunted down all German and Austro-Hungarian war vessels and merchantmen. Owing to lack of safe bases and coaling-stations of their own, these could naturally only hold out for a short time: thus even Count Spee's cruiser-squadron, which had won a splendid victory at Coronel, was destroyed by vastly superior forces at the Falkland Islands in December 1914. The occasional excursions of German privateers which managed to run the North-Sea blockade never inflicted more than temporary damage on English merchant shipping. In the Mediterranean English ships, partly in conjunction with French, held the Austrian and Turkish (really German) fleets in check, guarded the Straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal (the latter against Turkish land-forces) and attempted in vain to force an entrance into the Black Sea through the Dardanelles. While English ships won cheap laurels for themselves all over the seven seas by hunting down German ships invariably weaker than themselves, they failed completely in the more difficult and highly important business of establishing communications with Russia.

We have already discussed the war in the North Sea (see p. 134 *et seq.*) and will only consider it shortly here from the English point of view. The functions of the British Grand Fleet were: (1) To protect the English coast against a Ger-

man invasion; (2) to secure the rearward communications of the British army in France with the home country, for the purpose of supplies and reënforcements; (3) to cut off the German Empire from world trade (a) by blockading the Channel and the north of the North Sea, (b) by intimidating neutral shipping. It must be admitted that the Grand Fleet performed these functions to perfection: aggressive action was not required of it, and—with the exception of Jutland, out of which it came off less well in many respects than the German high-seas fleet—it most carefully refrained from anything of the sort.

Coast Defense. The coast-line of Great Britain and Ireland extends over about 6,875 miles, but as long as the Grand Fleet is functioning, there are only two places worth considering for a hostile landing—the broad East Anglian peninsula, protected on the flanks by the Wash and the estuary of the Thames, which lends itself well to defense (see page 214); and the peninsula of Kent and Sussex, lying between the Thames estuary and the Channel, the occupation of which by an enemy would be a still more direct threat to the capital (see map 8). Both schemes of invasion of course presuppose the would-be conqueror's having the Belgian and Dutch coast at his disposal as a base of operations. In case of doubt, the occupation of East Anglia is the preferable plan; for it enables one to threaten both London and the industrial Midlands, which are of crucial importance for England's resistance, and in addition has most to gain from an Irish invasion of the latter. When we consider the wonders we did achieve and the trouble we spent on less essential objectives, we are forced to the conclusion that our failure to occupy Holland and attempt a landing on the other side of the Channel was a grave error. Till the beginning of 1916 the English, as we know now, assumed that we should be able to land 160,000 men, as the Grand Fleet could not get into action within less than twenty-four hours of the transports' being sighted. They were here thinking of a force coming from Germany. So that we may assume that

we could have got 250,000 men across from the Belgian and Dutch coast before the Grand Fleet could interfere. The line of the Great Ouse to the west of Norfolk and Suffolk is some 80 miles long; it would not have been very strongly held with 250,000 men, but sufficiently strongly to cope with English home-defense troops. To get an army across the Channel to the Kent coast should prove a relatively simple business, particularly if the attacker is in possession of the French Channel ports of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, from which he can clear the Channel of English ships with artillery, the shortest sea-passage between the ten miles or so of coast from Cape Griz-Nez to Sangatte and Dover being only 21 miles. During the world war there were two opportune moments for a German landing: the first in 1914 or the beginning of 1915, when the English army at home was still small and untrained; and the second in the spring of 1917, when unrestricted submarine warfare started. At that time the British higher command believed that if U-boat warfare failed, Germany would be bound either to attempt an invasion of England—at the cost of her fleet, if need be—or sue for peace. "At the cost of her fleet." Is that not eloquent of an inexhaustible energy, an iron determination to reach the goal, which we lacked? The cautious behavior of our high-seas fleet did at least one good thing for us: it compelled England to keep a strong army at home, which in 1917 reached a total of about 400,000 men, half of them unfit for active service, of course. But what a difference an invasion would have made! In the first place, the Grand Fleet would have been lured from its funk-hole; then the English army in France (all of it in 1914, most of it in 1917) would have been recalled, whereupon the French would have been unable to go on holding the western front by themselves; moreover colonial troops would have been called in, thus removing the pressure on our colonies, on the Turks and in Macedonia. Instead of delivering this blow, which had every chance of success and would have struck at the very heart of the Allies, as well as delivering France into

our hands, we involved ourselves in piecemeal operations all over the place, which could not bring the war to an end.

Hunger Blockade. On the outbreak of war the Channel was closed at both ends to protect English transport to and from France from being interfered with by the German fleet and at the same time to prevent goods from slipping through this opening to Germany. The task was easily accomplished with the aid of nets, mines, small look-out ships, old ships of the line, and cruisers. To establish the blockade between Scotland and Norway and keep a watch on the east coast of England, the only one in danger from an invader, the Grand Fleet was stationed at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys. This distant blockade was much easier to maintain than a blockade of Heligoland Bay, because in the latter case far more ships would have been required and they would have been in greater danger of being attacked or mined. Curiously enough, it was precisely on this near blockade, which was, of course, the kind that considerations of international law would have led one to expect, that the German Admiralty counted, and it had hoped to reduce the English fleet by guerilla warfare to the same strength as the German. Once more it was clearly proved that England invariably puts might before right—or rather, in accordance with its ideas, deduces right from might—in defense of its existence and its future. It is childish to put on paper, that is to say, arbitrarily fix, right before vital necessity, as the German is only too apt to do (*cf.* page 114). The stationing of the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow had two advantages: the blockade-line and the English coast-line meet there and the fleet is as far removed as possible from the German coast. The Grand Fleet was thus able to keep an eye on both strategic lines at once and move if necessary, and was also in the best position for cutting off a fleet advancing northwards or westwards from its base. Scapa Flow, has of course, the disadvantage that it is a good long way from the southern end of the English coast and thus not handy for beating off an invasion. For this reason the cruiser-squadron was subse-

quently moved down from Scapa to the Firth of Forth, from which it can get to the Wash in half the time (see map 9). Had there been a really aggressive German fleet to deal with (which there was not, owing to our Admiralty), this division of the Grand Fleet into two parts would have had the disadvantage that each could be destroyed separately. But we never so much as attempted that; while the English hoped, on the strength of their excellent intelligence and listening-in services, that they would get sufficiently early information of any such intention—in which they would, alas! not have been disappointed.

We have already discussed in several places the effects of the action of the Grand Fleet in the main blockade and in the almost perfect preservation of Great Britain's military and commercial intercourse with the world, and need not return to the subject here. We have also described on page 137 how the unrestricted U-boat warfare of 1917-18 was dealt with by well-designed counter-measures, and by the ruthless requisitioning of German and neutral shipping laid up in foreign ports wherever it could be got hold of. U-boat warfare, in conjunction with Russia's collapse, gave us an astonishingly good chance of winning the war after all, but we started it at least a year too late and left the English too much time to adjust themselves to it. The great god Chance, who had once more wished us well and made America's declaration of war, which coincided with the outbreak of U-boat warfare, remain practically inoperative for another year, then turned away from us and covered his head.

4. *Other Fronts.* Besides the western front and the North Sea, considerable English military, and in some cases naval, forces were engaged in the following places: the Dardanelles and Macedonia, the Sinai peninsula and Iraq, the German colonies, and in Autumn 1917 even in northern Italy, to stiffen the Piave front. For these theaters of war the reader is referred to the separate sections devoted to them.

IV. RUSSIA

I. TERRITORY, INDUSTRY, COMMUNICATIONS

Geographical Position.—Russia is in many respects the antithesis of England. It may not be an island lying off the European coast, but neither its country nor its people nor its civilization really belongs to Europe; in spite of two centuries of ardent endeavor it remains a part of Asia, with which its spaciousness, land-bound character, Mongoloid blood and stagnant immobility link it. Russia lies along almost the whole eastern frontier of the western world and its vast spaces have proved a more serious barrier to the expansion of the Nordic and Phalian peoples than the sea in the west. Russia entered the circle of European powers not much later than England, but as a land-, not a sea-power. Both of them press heavily on others, England by her fleet, her command of the sea, her commerce and her threats of blockade, Russia by her enormous army which comes along like a steam-roller and can never be finally pinned down and beaten in its own country. Both are world powers, England in virtue of her overseas colonies held together by a finely spun web of sea routes, Russia by her vast Asiatic colony, merging imperceptibly into the "mother country." When one looks closer, the Russian Empire turns out to consist largely of mere desert, in whose tundras, marshy forests and steppes only few people can live—or would care to; while the British Empire is seen to be a domain full of riches well and systematically managed in the interests of the master country. There is another important difference between them; in the British Empire distances mean nothing, as they are almost all traversed by sea, *i.e.* cheaply and easily, whereas in the Russian distances are a severe obstacle to trade owing to the high cost of trans-

port they involve. From the point of view of defense, the situation is partially reversed, inasmuch as England must always have the strongest navy in the world to protect her trade, while Russia only needs relatively small forces to protect her internal trade which is what chiefly matters to her.

Territory.—The territory of Russia is nearly all plain, with low chains of hills, formed by the sand of old overgrown moraines, rising from it in the north and center only; in the south numerous belts are distinguishable with low scarps all facing eastwards. Since, therefore, the surface formation presents no obstacle whatever to movement, a proportionately greater importance attaches to certain other phenomena, especially the rivers, most of them with marshy valleys which can only be crossed with tolerable ease during the long winter when they are frozen over; vegetation, which consists of arable and pine-woods in the north, arable and steppe in the south; and finally the climate—a long, bitterly cold winter, in which everything is covered with snow and the rivers are frozen over, even quite far south, and a long, blazing hot summer, separated by two short intermediate seasons when the roads are a sea of mud. Most of the population is located in two areas. One is the triangle made by Petrograd, Kiev and the great elbow of the Volga, consisting of mixed forest and moderately fertile clay soil on which a good deal of agriculture is carried on; this is the home of the East Baltic race of the Great Russians and as such the kernel of the Russian Empire. The other is the adjacent south, whose drier climate, extremely hot in summer, naturally produces nothing but steppe plants; but since the end of the eighteenth century most of its extremely fertile loess and black earth has been plowed up and turned into flourishing cornfields; it is the home of the Little Russians, who have more eastern and Dinaric blood in them and are giving place—in the east, not elsewhere—to Great Russian immigrants from the north.

Apart from these there are two less important inhabited

areas. The first is the pure pine-woods country of the north, where owing to the very long, semi-Arctic winter one only finds a few settlements of peasants, fishermen and traders, almost all restricted to the rivers, which form the chief means of communication; the population consists of Great Russians who have migrated northwards and a few primitive Mongol tribes. The second is the desolate region, half steppe half desert, in the south east towards the Caspian Sea, which is chiefly inhabited by Mongolian nomads and their herds of camels.

The rest of the Russian Empire is made up of Siberia, Turania, and Caucasia. In Siberia, which is marshy lowland west of the Yenisei and rough mountain country east of it, the vegetation, going from north to south, passes through the same gradations from pine-woods to steppe, except that pine-woods recur in the mountains of the extreme south, while in the extreme north, close to the Arctic coast, tundra, *i.e.* frozen steppe, makes its appearance. Siberia is even more primitive, sparsely populated and economically undeveloped than Russia and suffers even worse from the bitterly cold winter, which is matched by a surprisingly hot summer. Turania is desert, with a long hot summer; there are occasional cultivated oases, but the rest of it is inhabited by Nomads. Caucasia, on the other hand, is a mountainous country in which forest-clad, snow-crowned alps alternate with blazing hot, steppe-like plains, and where the most variegated hotch-potch of peoples in the world is crowded into the narrowest of spaces.

Two other features of this extremely monotonous country—at least in those parts which immediately concern us—remain to be considered, the coast and the western frontier. Russia has a long coast-line and long land-frontiers, both bordering either on strong powers or regions with little commerce, so that the Russian Empire is the remotest in the world. That does not matter as long as it is inhabited by numerous independent peoples and small states, since these have no external ambitions and there is then no pos-

sible question of a wall of steel right round the empire. But the moment it comes under one authority, the economic and military defects of its mainland and maritime frontiers at once make themselves felt. The north coast is only accessible to ships for a few months of the year, owing to the long period during which its harbors are frozen over; even so during the war Archangel, at the mouth of the Dvina, did give the Russians some chance during the summer of getting things from England, but it had to be supplemented by the ice-free port of Alexandrovsk in Lapland and the Murmansk railway which was only built to it in 1915-16. The east coast lies between waste land and waste sea and possesses only one good ice-free harbor, Vladivostok, the terminus of the Siberian railway to Moscow, which was the only safe means of communication between Russia and her allies but owing to its enormous length and its single track proved cumbersome in practice; also the only arm by which the Russian power can be brought to bear on the Far East, an arm whose capacity for handling traffic had broken down once already in the war against Japan. The land frontier of southern Siberia abutts almost throughout its length on thinly populated, if not uninhabited, deserts, steppes or high mountains, nearly all of them a long way from the sea too. Only on the Black Sea and the Baltic does, or did, Russia possess a coast and even some harbors of practical use. The Black Sea ports are never ice-bound, but owing to the presence of the Turks at the straits they have no free access to the ocean; and the same thing applies to the Baltic ports, of which, besides, only Libau was free from ice. The moment, therefore, that Russia developed ambitions beyond her own borders, she was bound to be seized with a desire for less encumbered coasts and frontiers. The chief obstacles here were Turkey, England, Japan, and perhaps Austria-Hungary; Germany had only drifted into a certain antagonism to Russia in the past few years owing to her patronage of Turkey.

The western portion of Tsarist Russia consisted of the

Baltic Provinces in the north, Russian Poland together with its hinterland of the Pinsk marshes in the center, and Bessarabia and Podolia in the south. This region, the whole of which has ceased to be Russian since 1918 with the exception of Podolia, is distinguished from Russia proper by slightly less vast spaces, a climate somewhat damper and also not quite so severe in winter, a stronger Aryan strain in the population, and the culture of the latter, which owes much more to western Europe. In this region Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians, White Russians, Poles, Little Russians, Jews, and Germans, as well as the most various creeds (the Lutheran, the Catholic, the Orthodox and the Hebrew) are all found side by side, so that one gets an impression of a certain crowding and restriction of space such as one finds nowhere in Russia proper. There was nothing attaching these people to Tsarist Russia, to which they had only been subjected by force, and among them the Poles were filled with a passionate hatred of the oppressor. The peasant population of the Baltic Provinces was politically pretty indifferent; the German ruling class may have inclined spiritually and intellectually towards Germany, but in virtue of its superior gifts of leadership it found plenty of opportunities for honorable employment in Russia. The Poles, both the masses and the upper classes, were definitely hostile to Russia and constituted the most dangerous element. Only the White and Little Russians could be classed as loyal subjects of Russia; indeed Russian propaganda even angled for the Little Russian population of Austrian Galicia.

From the point of view of military geography the position was as follows. The western frontier of Russia rested with its right on the Baltic and its left, in Bessarabia and Podolia, on the Black Sea. Between them, in Russian Poland, it stuck out a long way to the west, forming a salient with East Prussia on its right flank, Galicia on its left. The Baltic Provinces are a flat region of pine and birch woods, meadow and arable land, bogs and lakes, stony and sandy tracts, sprinkled with villages, farms and numerous market-towns

of a German type. The coast, which is deeply indented by the Gulf of Riga, is easily approachable and allows of the landing of enemy troops in the rear of a Russian front facing southwards. On the other hand, the Dvina, which runs into the Gulf of Riga, provides a good line of defense which cuts the Baltic Provinces roughly in half and makes it possible to take up a position directly facing Germany.

Bessarabia and Podolia, like Galicia, form a table-land intersected by rivers, whose loess and black earth provide ideal soil for wheat and maize and consequently support a flourishing agriculture together with many villages. The broad rivers of the Sereth, the Pruth, the Danube at its delta, the Dniester and the Bug provide admirable lines of defense against an attack from the south-west.

But the crucial area here in the west, owing to its central position and its (in 1914) westward salient, was Russian Poland. Here too flat country is the rule, hills are few and far between and mostly in the south-west. The north is entirely plain; it consists here of loam-covered relics of moraines and marshy prehistoric river-beds, and is covered with birch woods where it is sand, and fields of corn, potato and sugar-beet where it is loam. The population is mostly agricultural and lives in thatched log-huts, and towns of any size are rare. From the military point of view the most important feature of Poland is its network of rivers. This consists mainly of only one river, the Vistula, which, however, branches out towards the north from the environs of the capital, Warsaw, in the shape of a star, so that a defending force has useful rivers on every side of it. The northern frontier runs parallel to the Bug-Narev line, with its mostly impassable marshes. Towards the west, there are in succession the Prosna, the Warthe, the Piliza, the Vistula, the Wieprz and the Bug; towards the south the upper Vistula, the San, the Wieprz and the Bug. And should it be necessary to retire eastwards, abandoning this whole region, there are two new lines of defense waiting further east, first of all the Niemen-upper Narev-Bug line, and behind that the Dvina-

Pinsk Marshes-Goryn-Dniester line. Unfortunately, we used the latter and not the former when we settled down to position warfare in the late summer of '15; the former would have given us a shorter and better front, which would have cost us less men to hold and have fulfilled the same function as the somewhat further forward one (see map 6).

The battles in Masuria, Poland and the Carpathians during the winter of 1914-15 are of general importance for military science in so far as they throw a light on the methods of fighting in snow. In deep snow a marching column soon comes to a standstill; the men get tired, and tumble about, guns and vehicles get stuck; it is only possible to get single guns forward with teams of 12 to 18 horses each. In short, extensive movements soon come to grief through the exhaustion of man and horse. Snow-storms also form a temporary obstacle by confusing people's sense of direction. And when the wind has blown the snow off the roads, they are left like hard, glistening ice-runs, on which horses fall and men stumble. When it thaws, on the other hand, all solid ground disappears, the roads break up, the flat valleys are flooded; the roads are worse in the towns or villages, so much so that all vehicles often have to drive round a place instead of through it.

Industry and Communications.—Up to 1918 the total Russo-Siberian Empire was practically able to feed itself. Agriculture, stock-breeding, river and coastal fisheries were so productive that large quantities of South Russian grain were actually exported. The principal agricultural products were rye, barley, wheat, hops, linseed, sugar-beet, and also Turanian cotton. Of the yearly grain-harvest, which amounted to 68 million tons till 1914, 20 millions were exported. Stock-breeding included horses, cattle, and sheep. As regards raw materials for industry, Russia possessed and exported first of all vast quantities of timber, and, in Trans-Caucasia, of oil. In addition she possesses coal and iron in the Ukraine, besides copper, gold and platinum. The coal is not up to much, but it is rather the slow unprogressive

Russian character that has prevented the growth of a considerable industry. Such industry as there is manufactures the raw materials of the country, particularly timber, textile materials, sugar, naphtha and some metals. A certain heavy industry has grown up in the district south of the upper Volga, chiefly round about Moscow and Tula; the Putilov armament works themselves are in Petrograd.

Russian industry was and is totally inadequate for equipping a large army or keeping it supplied through a long war. During the world war the Russian armament industry only succeeded during 1914 and 1915 in producing one million new or reconditioned rifles, which even with the three-quarters of a million imported from abroad was not nearly enough to cover the demand for that period, which amounted to three or four millions. It was not till 1916 that home production and imports between them filled the bill; even then there were not enough guns or shells for the field artillery, and this deficiency was not remedied till the end of 1917, when the Russians began to withdraw their army from the front. The heavy artillery was in even worse case; during the retreat of 1915 it constantly had to be withdrawn from the scene of action through lack of shells. Had the Germans succeeded in keeping Japan away from the Allies and, if possible, as a benevolent neutral (we will not even suggest the notion of an alliance), the Russians would have been able to make considerably less use of the Siberian railway for meeting the needs of their army, or perhaps none at all—in which case Russia could hardly have gone on with a war which put such an undreamed-of strain on industry, beyond the spring of 1915. This may serve as a lesson in case of future wars or alliances with Russia. Russia, which is still an immensely populous country, is powerless except in alliance with a highly industrialized power. Among her neighbors the only one that fits this description is Germany; all the other industrial countries (England, France, America, perhaps Japan) can only maintain communication with her western regions, which will decide

the military issue, by the most difficult and devious channels.

Communications across the vast and mostly undeveloped or but slightly developed regions of Russo-Siberia are the other weak point of Russia, whether Tsarist or Soviet. Russia-in-Asia has only three important railways, the Siberian and two in Turania, of which only the first links Russia-in-Europe with the ocean, à propos of which it must be remembered that its terminal port, Vladivostok, is not situated on the open sea but on the Sea of Japan, which is cut off from the ocean by Japan, so that traffic on it is dependent on Japanese goodwill. Any war between Russia and Japan deprives the Siberian railway of all commercial significance and turns it into a military railway and, owing to its single track, not a particularly adequate one at that. The railway-system of Russia-in-Europe centers on Moscow and Petrograd, both of which are termini with long lines radiating from them. Before the war the western railways generally avoided the German and Austrian frontier, either stopping long before it or running parallel to it a little distance away; only a few lines crossed the frontier in the direction of Berlin or Vienna. Thus the Russian railways—which, incidentally, have a wider gauge than the European ones, for whose carriages one of the lines has to be shifted—are of little use to an invading army but extremely advantageous for a retreating Russian army. This poverty of railways; the uselessness of the roads (mostly unmade tracks only fit for light peasants' carts) for guns and motor-vehicles; the numerous broad rivers with their marshy valleys, and the long, hard winters, which make it impossible to remain out of doors except in a sheepskin coat; the frequent absence of any sort of shelter for miles; the enormous distances which can only be got over by wearisome marches—all these things together, by making any campaign in Russia extremely difficult, are an enormous help to the Russian soldier (*cf.* also page 15 for a consideration of wide spaces in general).

II. NATIONAL CHARACTER

Russia, both old and new, is a country of many nationalities, so that we cannot very well speak of *a* Russian character covering the whole of Russia. It will not even do to speak of a Slav character; for the word "Slav" conceals a mixture of races united in nothing but language. And even the narrower term "Russia" stands for no sharply defined unit, as the Russians are divided into the entirely dissimilar Great Russians and Little Russians, not to mention the White Russians and the Russians who have migrated to Siberia, the so called *Sibiriaki*. Leaving out of account the various Mongolian and Mongoloid peoples of eastern Russia and Siberia, also the Finns, Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians and Poles, who were subjects of the Russian Empire till 1918, and the ubiquitous Germans, as forming no essential part of the Russian nation and the Russian state, we will confine ourselves here to the Great Russians and the Little Russians, and especially the former, out of whose mass—under Nordic leadership, of course—the empire of the Czars was gradually built up and extended.

The Great Russians are primarily of East Baltic race, the Little Russians fundamentally Eastern. The former are thus a mixture of Nordic and Mongolian, the latter a dilute Mongoloid stock. Neither was therefore naturally inclined to expansion and conquest, but the Great Russians at least have been induced to develop in that direction. This has been accomplished by their Nordic ruling class which they called in from Sweden in the Middle Ages and which has maintained its position right down to the most recent times, recruiting itself chiefly from German stock. In the case of the Little Russians the influx has been of Dinaric and Alarodian rather than Nordic blood, with the result that the commercial instinct is more strongly developed in them than the expansive.

In the Great Russians we must therefore distinguish two

classes, the vast, formless mass of the common people and the very small, highly complex and predominantly Nordically-minded ruling class. The masses are a race of small peasants and wood-cutters which grew up in the mixed forest area between Lake Ladoga and Kiev. They are a short-legged and squatly-built breed with bony, flat-nosed faces, and light hair and eyes, though there is a considerable sprinkling of the tall, fair Nordic type. With this mixture of Nordic and Mongolian blood goes a very divided character, in which one quality too often contradicts and neutralizes another. Hence there is something resigned and brooding about them, and they will often follow up one action with a completely contradictory one which takes us, with our ways of thinking, completely by surprise. Blank indifference may suddenly burst forth into violent action, apparently hopeless stupidity into boundless imagination, and a vague feeling of inferiority has its counterpart in fits of absurd arrogance. They will knuckle under to brute force ruthlessly applied, but every now and again their suppressed murmuring breaks out into an ungovernable fury in which they do things that they often bitterly regret afterwards. The Russian masses are incapable of any progressive development or enterprise on their own, but the weight of their numbers and their blind obedience enable them to be used, under resolute leadership, as a means to the accomplishment of great tasks. With a strong hand over them they can be relied upon, not otherwise; without it the unstable side of their character comes to the front, and instead of the mighty Russian Empire the foreigner finds a vast collection of isolated villages. The Great Russian nation never knows what it wants; it oscillates helplessly between action and dream; it kisses its ikons with penitential devotion and then goes straight off and gets blind drunk on vodka.

The Great Russians have no conception of the self, of personality; its place is taken by the idea of the mass, especially in the form of the village community, the *mir*, which owns the land—the individual peasant does not. They are

a mass and in themselves easy to lead, but long-continued injury to the village community by a government has its effects and sows the seeds of a sullen discontent which sooner or later issues in open rebellion and bloody deeds of violence. This predominance of the mass is the key to a proper understanding of Russia's military and political policy. The nation as a whole always stands behind its leaders, even when the latter are suddenly changed, as in 1917. The government can always count on two instincts—complete and unquestioning acceptance of its decrees, and a lack of critical sense which always shouts hurrah for the man who has the power and uses it ruthlessly. The first-named instinct accounts for the dumb obedience of the soldiers, who allowed themselves to be driven into battle in solid masses like sheep and mown down by the superior technical equipment and strategy of the enemy; the second for the prompt seizure of power by the Soviets, inasmuch as the peasants, who were supposed to be so devoted to the Tsar, in most cases cheerfully accepted the change of government without in the least realizing what it meant.

The class which rules these masses has hardly any roots in them. Under the Tsar it was mostly Germanic, with an international streak, and Russian-nationalist in complexion; to-day it is wholly international, with the eastern-Jewish *cum* Tartar *cum* Caucasian note predominating. Whatever its composition, it has always known that force is the only thing which can set the Russian masses, with their half dumbly submissive, half rebellious character, moving along the line which a far-sighted government absolutely must adopt if it wants to keep its own and its country's end up against foreign powers. The ruling class is united to the people by no bonds of mutual sympathy (though it was in the old days by a common religion); it is not drawn from them and does not recruit itself from them. It soars above them, sits on the top of them, like a film of oil on water—the two can be separated without causing pain. The knout has always been the principal nexus between the people and their rulers.

There is no link between the classes, as there is in other countries. The Russian masses are peasants, the ruling class is a caste of officers and officials. Outside these two there are two other very small classes, the bourgeois intelligentsia and the industrial proletariat. The former, composed of men of property engaged in academic or commercial pursuits and given to an esthetic philosophism, helped to make up the ruling class in Tsarist times; the latter, which only exists in a few towns, is the source from which the rulers have been drawn since the Revolution.

The Little Russian character is less easy to describe in definite terms than the Great Russian. The Little Russians are of very much more mixed blood, South Russia having been the home of no less than two fair and five dark-haired races. They are more approachable and receptive of new ideas than the Great Russians and less hostile to strangers. They are, in fact, altogether softer and more pliable, and, as the descendants of nomad horsemen, who only began to turn the steppes into cultivated land at the end of the eighteenth century under foreign guidance, they cling less closely to the ancestral soil. Even the village is not a closely interlocked community; the individual is more prominent, and the land mostly belongs to the peasant, not to it. The Little Russians are thus not such a reliable and easily led lot as the Great Russians, and owing to the absence of an aristocratic or bourgeois upper class they have no definite national feeling. They have submitted without a struggle to the encroachments of the Great Russians; even with the German support which was available in 1918, when the Germans occupied the Ukraine and held it against the Great Russian Soviets, this leaderless people did not succeed in asserting its nationhood. Our hope of being able to use the Little Russians as a card to play against the Great Russians in 1918 was doomed to disappointment because it was based on ignorance of national psychology.

The Russian soldier, accustomed to being order about for generations, submitted willingly, if in most cases ignorantly,

to military discipline. Contemptuous of death, he went bravely and clumsily into battle in dense waves, dumbly resigned to his fate. He knew that he was fighting against superior generalship, training and technical equipment. His stoical determination was as powerless as the ruthless but not sufficiently circumspect and intelligent tactics of his leaders against the German superiority of fire. Otherwise we could never have repulsed and in places even routed the immense forces of the Russians in 1914 with such few troops, some of which were past the age for active service. In retreat, however, though not in attack, the Russian higher command showed its skill and prevented us from ever enveloping the whole Russian army. To have brought that army back to the Riga-Dvinsk-Pinsk-Kamenetz line as a going concern was really as much as could be expected of it, and by doing so it gave its country a temporary reprieve. Everything connected with supplies and the welfare of the soldier was, of course, thoroughly mismanaged. Peculation, carelessness, ignorance of hygiene, inability to look ahead—everything, in short, that one means by organization—was hopelessly inadequate, and this had a lot to do with the Russian defeats. Bearing in mind all this and also the shortage of arms and munitions in a country so little industrialized and almost cut off from its allies, we must not conceal from ourselves that we owe our victories, which were all achieved with inferior numbers, in no small degree to the deficiencies of the Russians.

III. RUSSIA IN THE WORLD WAR

Russian notions of defenses are conditioned by the great size of the country, the severity of the winters, the passive character and vast numbers of the people, and—in modern war—the absence of industry. It follows from this that Russian strategy is more successful when it retires from the western frontier and thus sets the distances, the winter, and the self-defensive instinct to work for it in place of the active

qualities which are lacking. Whenever the Russian army risks itself on foreign soil and in a restricted space, thus surrendering the advantage of its own country, its bad qualities come into play and lead to its defeat. The Russians are only formidable when they retire into their own geographical and psychological interior; they are more likely to be victorious before or in Moscow than in Masuria or the Carpathians.

Prompted by the consideration that Germany's attention was chiefly occupied in France, Austria-Hungary's in Serbia, the Russian army proceeded to take the offensive in August 1914 against small enemy forces—thus losing its psychological base of operations. An earlier plan, by which the army was to have been drawn up in Poland, had been abandoned, as it would have exposed it to envelopment from East Prussia and Galicia. In its place a newer plan (whose business-like character betrayed the influence of France, as did also the increase in the speed of mobilization, the building of strategic railways and the general gingering-up of the army) envisaged deployment along the Kovno-Brest-Lutsk-Mohilev line, which was well protected by rivers and marshes (see map 6). In case of a united attack by their enemies the Russians would have retired eastwards from this line; as it was, considering that the greater part of the German army was tied up in France and half of the Austrian in Serbia, they took the offensive, as indeed they were bound to; otherwise the Allies in the west could expect no relief through Russia. The Russians concentrated their main strength, consisting of five armies, between Ivangorod and Mohilev against the Austro-Hungarian position in Galicia; two armies were to advance into East Prussia, hoping to envelop the lakes and rivers guarding its eastern frontier from the north and south; they also posted one army at Warsaw, one at Petrograd and one at Odessa ready for special emergencies.

For Germany to be overrun by the "Russian steam-roller," of which there was much talk up to Spring 1915, two things were necessary—(1) the conquest of East Prussia, and (2) the overrunning of Galicia, without which an army advanc-

ing westwards through Poland would not have had a clear field behind it. The line of the lower Vistula and the main ridge of the Carpathians were bound to be the Russians' first objectives: these once gained, the plains of eastern Germany and Hungary lay open to them. Of the two the latter was only partially gained, the former not at all, so that the Russians never managed to overrun Germany. We will not go over the campaigns already described in the chapters on the German Empire (see p. 131 *et seq.*) and Austria-Hungary (see p. 154 *et seq.*) again but limit ourselves to a few points of interest to the science of national defense.

In Galicia the centripetal offensive launched by the Russians with greatly superior numbers in reply to the centrifugal Austrian offensive, was successful, culminating in the battle of Lemberg and Rawaruska on September 11, 1914, in which the Austrian army was badly mauled, losing a particularly large number of officers. As a result, the Russian line was pushed forward almost to Cracow and deep into the Carpathians, the fortress of Przemyśl being invested and subsequently captured.

The two Russian armies which invaded East Prussia across the Niemen in the north and in the direction of the Ortelsburg gap in the south, were successively defeated by the Germans through skillful maneuvering by railway and superior generalship; unfortunately, however, the victories of Tannenberg and the Masurian lakes, owing to the withdrawal of two army-corps from our already too weak right wing in France, cost us the battle of the Marne—a much higher price than they were worth.

The Russians also made an attempt as early as September '14 to advance westwards in Poland, but after an initial success in the south they were held up by a German attack along the Vistula and came to a temporary halt in marshy valleys and prepared positions on the Bsura-Rawka-Piliza line. This at any rate achieved two things for the Central Powers: in the first place German soil was secured from being overrun by Russians, and in the second, the war could not now be

decided in the Allies' favor by a Russian attack. But is this last really true? Admittedly the Russians had not overrun Germany, but they had given the government and the higher command such a fright that the latter, by withdrawing two army corps from France, weakened German striking-power there sufficiently to wreck the whole Schlieffen plan. Russia's part in deciding the issue of the war therefore needs to be rated higher than it usually is, even though she may not have covered herself with any special glory in the field.

If Russia still nourished any hopes of invading Germany and Hungary—they were finally shattered at Tarnov and Gorlice on May 2, 1915. The point to the south of the upper Vistula, selected by Falkenhayn and Conrad independently of each other, was in fact the weakest spot in the Russian line. In the Carpathians the Russians' position was so strong that the Austrian attempt to dislodge them in January and February 1915 failed, in spite of German support; in Poland it was protected on its right by the fortress of Warsaw, and consisted of numerous rivers which were difficult to negotiate, the last of them being the Vistula itself. In western Galicia, on the other hand, between the upper Vistula and the foot of the Carpathians, the country presented no obstacles, and a successful break-through there, immediately followed by an advance eastwards, would automatically force the Russians to withdraw from their impregnable position in the Carpathians and southern Poland. Nowhere could a break-through have such extensive effects to right and left as here. Terrified by the tardy discovery that there were German troops engaged and demoralized by intensive artillery fire, the Russians withdrew along the 28 mile sector under attack; whereupon their whole line was pushed eastwards, its northern end being subsequently subjected to special pressure through the intervention of German auxiliaries on the Narev. They succeeded, however, in maintaining their line as a whole and preventing it from being enveloped from Galicia and the Narev. For this they had to thank (1) the size of the country, with its many rivers, which took the

pursuer further and further from his base and themselves nearer and nearer to theirs; and (2) Falkenhayn's view, in itself quite sound, that the war could not be decided on the Russian front, for which reason our commanders in the east were not given sufficient troops. Falkenhayn turned down Conrad's proposal that they should close in upon the Russians from Galicia and East Prussia like a pair of pincers, because he thought it too ambitious and had also become skeptical of the capabilities of the Austrian army. He therefore resolved on the break-through at Gorlice, where, by means of a north-eastward advance towards Brest supported by a move across the Narev on the left, he formed a smaller pair of pincers of his own which severely nipped the enemy but did not quite meet in the middle, so that he got away. After the success of the break-through the proper thing would have been for our troops to cross the San and carry on to the right, not the left, of the Bug towards Pinsk, not Brest, while our left wing advanced from East Prussia across the Niemen to the enemy's rear, instead of across the Narev to his front. But this could not be done because Falkenhayn was not prepared to use the necessary troops on the eastern front. The Russian retirement was successfully carried out and the front was established on September 15, too far east from the German and Austrian point of view; the line ran from Riga through Dvinsk and Pinsk to Kamenetz, whereas a line from Riga through Kovno, Grodno, Bielostok, Brest to somewhere east of Lemberg would have suited us much better, as it would have been shorter and thus required fewer troops.

The great difference between the German advance into Russia in 1915 and Napoleon's in 1812 is that in 1812 there were no railways, so that the French advanced in long lines with a narrow front, which meant that their rearward communications were in great danger; in other words, they were handicapped in every possible way by the size of the country. The Germans a hundred years later took the railways with them, which made their communications safe, espe-

cially as they advanced on a broad front; hence the size of the country only militated against them in so far as they were out to attack the enemy; afterwards, and as soon as the railway was functioning, it shrank and lost much of its perilousness. With modern pioneering technique, destruction of railways, bridges and roads only causes a momentary delay, hence it only affects troops in pursuit, not communications.

The tragedy of the German offensive in Russia in 1915 is that when the Lord had delivered the Russian army into our hands we threw away our chance of annihilating it because that was no part of our (*i.e.* Falkenhayn's) plan, having been dismissed in advance as hopeless. After the loss of the battle of the Marne, almost the only thing left for us—apart from an invasion of England (*cf.* p. 234 *et seq.*)—was to dispose of the Russian army completely and then concentrate our whole strength on the western front. We might have done this during the spring of 1916, when there was as yet no threat to our eastern front from Rumania, when England still had relatively few men in the field, and there was no question of American help for the Allies. Falkenhayn, who thought offensives in the west and the east equally hopeless and conceived the frightful idea of bleeding the French army to death at Verdun—Falkenhayn, in his way a good general, stands convicted of a grave crime against the German people, the crime of having misunderstood the military situation both in the west and the east.

The Russian army was, however, so seriously weakened, nay, demoralized, by its enormous losses in its rearguard action, and the nation so deeply disheartened, that the soldier lost confidence in his leaders, and the notion of throwing off the yoke of the Tsar, after remaining in abeyance for decades, began to raise its head once more. Russia did indeed make two more attempts to break the enemy's line. The first was Brussilov's offensive in July '16, which easily drove back the Austro-Hungarian divisions between Pinsk and the foot of the Carpathians and was only stopped some thirty miles further west by the hurried arrival of German re-

serves. The second was the Kerenski offensive of July 17 in eastern Galicia, by which the Revolution, which had broken out in March of that year, hoped to recommend itself to the Russian people (and England), but as a result of the German counter-attack which soon followed it turned into a Russian evacuation of Galicia. This—together with the expulsion of the Russians from the Baltic Islands and Riga in September and October '17—marks the end of the Russian army's active participation in the world war, but not, alas, of its passive participation.

From the end of '17 onwards right through '18 the revolutionary Russian army and Russia generally played an extremely important, though purely passive, part, both in relation to us and the Allies in determining the further course of the war and its final issue. The Russian army fought against us no more, but it continued to exist and thereby caused us to leave a million men in Russia, as a result of which we were too weak for the decisive struggle of 1918 on the western front. The Russian army thus did the same thing in the east as the British navy did in the west; both pressed heavily upon us by merely being there, that and nothing else. And we must not conceal from ourselves the fact that the harsh manner in which we conducted the negotiations for the peace of Brest-Litovsk between December '17 and March '18 was partly responsible for this condition of affairs, with all the fatal consequences to us which it entailed.

The Russian front began to go to pieces in many places very soon after the revolution of March '17, so that Russian and Austrian soldiers were already to be seen fraternizing between the lines in eastern Galicia before the end of that spring. Out of its total strength of 14,500,000 men the Russian army had lost by the beginning of '17 something like 4,500,000 in killed, wounded or prisoners, while about 2,000,000 deserters and men on leave were scattered about the country. From January 1917 onwards cases of troops refusing to go over the top and strikes among workmen

began to occur, for which the blame was thrown on the government—not without justification, although the real cause was, of course, the old Russian national character; for in the end every nation has the government which it desires, or will put up with. The formation of soldiers' soviets in March '17 undermined, and in most cases entirely destroyed, discipline in the ranks. The Tsar was forced to abdicate on March 15, probably because England suspected him of leanings towards a separate peace; anyhow, the Allied press made no secret of its rejoicing over the success of the Social Democratic revolution. Unfortunately, the German government failed to make the most of the lucky or unlucky chance of the Russian revolution. We ought either to have destroyed and dispersed the Russian army with one mighty blow or, better, to have made a separate peace with Russia at any price (including even the restoration of the pre-war frontier if need be), in order to make the whole eastern army available for use against France and Italy, whom at that date, the summer of 1917, we could without any doubt whatever have beaten. We have here an instance of the failure of our government and our higher command to grasp the situation, especially where it touched on the domain of national psychology. If one has penetrated deeply into the character of the enemy nations, one is not so easily deceived when it comes to estimating one's chances against them and their capabilities and probable actions. It is not only by military but also by psychological weapons that wars are waged, won—and lost.

The collapse of Russia became quite open and irretrievable when the Bolsheviks came into power under the leadership of Lenin in the Autumn of '17. When our higher command sent Lenin in a sealed coach from Switzerland through Germany to Russia, it little knew that it was signing Germany's death warrant. Even the intensification of the revolution on Bolshevik lines which followed very soon afterwards and deliberately destroyed all existing institutions, was not made proper use of by us. If we had been good

enough psychologists to form a proper judgment of the break-up of the Russian army, which had already become perfectly obvious in the autumn of '17, and removed troops from the eastern front and sent them to fight against Italy anyhow, where the offensive was just starting, the latter, instead of coming to a standstill at the Piave, might, in conjunction with a simultaneous vigorous attack from the southern Tyrol, have destroyed the Italian army and made Italy sue for peace.

The occupation of large portions of South Russia especially, by German and Austro-Hungarian troops (they got as far as a line drawn from Lake Peipus through Polotsk, Mohilev, and Bielgorod to Rostov-on-the-Don, besides seizing Trans-Caucasia) left the Russian army untouched. And the fact that under the peace of Brest-Litovsk which Russia was eventually compelled to sign she "permanently" lost Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and Finland, and temporarily lost Lithuania and Esthonia, which meant that she was almost completely excluded from the Baltic; and that the Ukraine, her chief granary, was taken away from her, was all of no real value as long as Germany and Austria had not won the war. The position was such that the fate of the east could only be decided in the west; from which it is easy enough to see that the eastern theater of war was never more than a secondary one.

V. RUMANIA

I. TERRITORY, INDUSTRY, COMMUNICATIONS

THE old Rumania was the country of the Lower Danube littoral, and as such commanded the very open passage from Russia to the Balkan Peninsula; at the same time it was thoroughly separated from Austria-Hungary by high mountains. Hence it was naturally overshadowed by Russia, a fact which in itself ought to have made the Central Powers beware of Rumania who, though secretly allied, was not in reality attached to them.

The country as it then was consisted chiefly of plain and was made up of three naturally distinct regions, Wallachia, Moldavia, and the Dobrudja. Wallachia, which contains most of the population, has been formed out of the detritus washed down from the Carpathians and deposited over a wide depression. At its western end and at the foot of the mountains it is broken and hilly, in the east flat plain, intersected everywhere by the valleys of broad rivers, studded with villages set against a background of fruit trees. Moldavia is a late-tertiary slab rising from lowland in the south to hills in the north. The Dobrudja, on the other hand, descends from highlands in the north to a flat cretaceous slab in the south. Owing to the general flatness of the country, the valleys, most of them deeply incised, are an important factor, both because the population gravitates towards them—the towns and villages are threaded on them like pearls on a string—and also as aids or obstacles to communication. In Wallachia they form a serious obstacle to all movements from west to east; only an enemy attacking from the Carpathians would be rather less handicapped. In the south the extremely deeply incised valley of the Danube, with its steep Bulgarian side, its branches, old arms, lakes,

marshes and bush-covered gravel islands and its very few bridges, forms a thoroughly effective barrier.

In spite of its severe winter and dry, dusty summer Rumania is a farmer's paradise. The whole of the south was once steppe, the oak forests being confined to the northern parts of Moldavia and a few isolated bits of high ground elsewhere. Today the forests have to a great extent been cleared, while the steppe has disappeared, except for the Baragan district and a few isolated areas; its place has been taken by broad fields of wheat and maize where the soil is loess or black earth, and each village has its girdle of dark green orchards. The country also produces rice and wine and has an extensive sheep-farming industry; timber is cut in the mountains and oil and rock-salt are extracted. The oil-fields are situated in the miocene foothills of the Transylvanian Alps, especially in the region north and west of Ploesti, and yield about 3,500,000 tons a year; the oil is conveyed in pipes to Constanza, Bucharest and Djurdju, and forms the chief export of the country, along with corn, cattle and timber. The economic life of Rumania is thus built on sound foundations; it is an agricultural country, able to feed itself and furnished with valuable commercial assets in its surplus foodstuffs and oil; and in this last it possesses one of the prime necessities of modern war. This is counterbalanced by the thick-headedness of a small peasantry which does not take kindly to civilization, and the reckless ambition of the ruling class; also by the fact that the country is tucked away in a corner in a practically inland position, with the result that its access to world trade depends on the good pleasure of a foreign power, the power which holds the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The upshot of all this is that Rumania cannot steer an independent course but must always attach herself to one of her bigger neighbors, and this, in conjunction with her dishonest character, which is ever on the lookout for the main chance, results in a sneaking, unstable, unreliable political character—as appeared only too clearly in her tardy and totally unexpected inter-

vention in the Balkan war against exhausted Bulgaria and her entry into the world war on the side of our enemies when we appeared to be in a bad way.

II. NATIONAL CHARACTER

The people of the Rumanian lowlands are principally of Dinaric and Mediterranean stock, though they have some Eastern and Alarodian blood also. Under the Roman Empire they adopted a corrupt form of Latin which was subsequently still further modified by the introduction of Slavonic and Greek words, so that the present-day Rumanians have no right to rank themselves with the Italians as a Latin people. The nation is divided into two classes, the small ruling caste of the Boyars and the great amorphous mass of the peasants and wandering herdsmen. The Boyars are a set of denationalized Levantines with no roots in the country and no close contact with the common people; the money and the big estates, and therewith the government, are in their hands, and French civilization is to them the highest goal of humanity. The masses, on the other hand, live modest lives, with their noses close to the grindstone and no sense of a national heritage or national cohesion. Most of them are the debt-slaves of the aristocracy and follow them blindly in so far as they take any interest in affairs at all. Down-trodden for centuries and eternally in debt, they are absolutely worthless from the national point of view. There is a violent contrast between the showy houses of the extravagant Boyars and the mud huts of the Panjes, between the noble in his tail-coat and glittering orders and the peasant in his *opanki* which will probably never give place to a healthy equilibrium.

Clearly, a country like Rumania, where all disinterested patriotic activity is stifled by Levantine corruption, is not equal to the demands of modern war. In the world war the Rumanian generals showed themselves nervous and irresolute, always hesitating, never carrying through anything

energetically. In September 1916, after Rumania had finally made up her mind to come in, the army advanced far too slowly and timidly into almost undefended Transylvania, thus giving the Germans time to bring up enough troops and give the Rumanians a thorough beating and, in fact, to drive them out of the country. Although the war had been raging under their noses for two years, their soldiers were inadequately equipped and trained, so that when in 1917, after the defeat of their country, they were drafted into the Russian front, they had first to be further trained and initiated into modern methods of warfare by French officers. What discipline and training can do for a soldier was once more proved here; for from that time onwards the Rumanian soldier proved a much more formidable opponent.

III. RUMANIA IN THE WORLD WAR

Rumania was bound to the Triple Alliance by an agreement that obliged her to come to its aid if Austria-Hungary should be attacked in any portion of her territory bordering on Rumania—which could only mean by Russia or Serbia. Rumania wriggled out of this obligation just like Italy and maintained a watchful neutrality. Since, however, she could in the long run hope for no increase of territory from such a policy, and finding herself eagerly courted both by the Allies and the Central Powers, she decided, after the war had lasted two years, to abandon her neutrality. Rumania had her eyes on Transylvania and Bessarabia, which contained a Rumanian population along with other minorities. We could only offer her parts of Bukovina, which Austria was prepared to cede, and a prospect of Russian Bessarabia, Hungary having flatly refused to give up a single inch of Transylvania. The Allies, on the other hand, offered her the whole of Transylvania, which was more than Bessarabia, and when things looked black for the Central Powers in the autumn of 1916, after their losses at Verdun, the battle of the Somme, their defeat in the southern Tyrol

and Brussilov's offensive, especially after Austria's weakness had been revealed to all the world, the Rumanians finally opted for the Allies, joined them on August 17, 1916, and on the 27th declared war on the Central Powers. If, however, they imagined that they could throw their sword with great and decisive effect into Bellona's trembling scale, they made a great mistake. One mighty blow was enough to knock them out and clear their army out of the greater part of their own country. To be sure, the collapse, then still unforeseen, of both Russia and the Central Powers has enabled this unsuccessful speculator among states subsequently to realize both its war-aims, so that Rumania today has got Transylvania and Bessarabia, with a portion of the Hungarian plain, Bukovina, and the Bulgarian southern Dobrudja as well. Along with Serbia, it has been one of the chief gainers by the world war.

The Rumanian declaration of war, which both the German and the Austrian higher commands expected after the maize-harvest at the earliest, was a severe blow to both of them, as it found them unprepared. Transylvania had practically no troops in it and was powerless in the face of a Rumanian invasion. Had the Rumanians set about their business energetically they could have overrun Transylvania in a couple of weeks and turned up in the rear of the Austrian right wing; it was four weeks before we could get enough troops into Transylvania. That this never happened is entirely due to the timid and irresolute Rumanian character. The situation reminds one exactly of Italy's entry into the war and the weakness of the Austrian Alpine front at the time.

Looking back today one cannot help feeling that it would have been better for the Central Powers if they had crushed Rumania, about whose hostility they could be in no doubt, earlier and at a more advantageous moment, when the Rumanian army was less prepared. We could easily have closed in upon Rumania from Bukovina, Transylvania, the Batchka and Bulgaria, and turned her oil and her surplus

grain to our use. Her army, without time even to deploy, could have offered no opposition worth talking about, and certainly not a determined one; it could not have joined forces with the Russian army and lengthened the latter's line as it subsequently did, and we should presumably have been able to advance across Bessarabia from Moldavia, occupy Odessa, and roll up the Russian left wing from this side. In that case Russia would probably have asked for peace, or, alternatively, her army would have been annihilated, and the eastern front would have troubled us no more, so that we should have been free in good time to collect our strength for the west.

The three principal frontiers separating the Central Powers from Rumania (see map 10) were, on the north the line of high mountains formed by the Transylvanian Alps and the Carpathians, on the south the valley of the Danube, and on the east the southern frontier of the Dobrudja. The last named runs through open country, but the other two are strong natural frontiers. In the mountains, the two ranges of which meet in a right angle, there is a succession of wooded ridges rising one behind the other up to a height of well over 6,000 feet, the whole traversed by good, but in places very steep roads, exhausting to man and beast, and numerous railways, not to mention minor mule-tracks. The nature of the country is such that large bodies of troops find it difficult to get along and a weaker force can, by skillful maneuvering, get a stronger one into a very dangerous position—as the Rumanians very soon found to their cost (*cf.* pp. 21 *et seq.*). One of the conditions of success was that all operations should be completed by the end of November, as from then onwards the passes are blocked by deep snow. The Germans could not begin operations before the end of September: that left two months at the most in which to push the Rumanian invaders back over the mountain-range into the plain; otherwise they might dig themselves in among the snow-covered mountains, and they would not be so easy to dislodge in the following summer. To use the line of the

Danube for an invasion of Rumania from the Bulgarian side was not such a simple matter, (a) because the marshiness of the Danube valley makes it uncommonly difficult to get large bodies of troops across it under hostile fire, and (b) because our right flank would be in danger from the Dobrudja. The conquest of the Dobrudja was therefore a necessary preliminary to the crossing of the river.

The Rumanians immediately crossed the Hungarian frontier, easily driving the inadequate Austrian and Hungarian outposts before them, whereat the greater part of the German and Magyar population of Transylvania also hastily decamped. After that, however, they were seized with indecision and, although their army was all ready to move on, hardly made any further progress beyond the foothills on the far side of the passes, not daring to trust themselves in the open plain of Transylvania. Seldom can an army have played its cards so badly, when it had all the trumps in its hands and four weeks in which to do it! The Rumanian higher command certainly revealed a quite astonishing incompetence in action (*cf.* map 10).

The German campaign against Rumania, of which Falkenhayn, the ex-Chief of the General Staff, was the guiding spirit, had three difficult tasks to perform:—(1) to prevent the Rumanians who had invaded Transylvania from advancing any further; (2) to thrust them back southwards and eastwards over the mountains; and (3) to close in upon them in Wallachia by a simultaneous advance from the north and the south and pin them down. The first two tasks were accomplished by brilliant generalship and unprecedented boldness, the last only partially, as the narrowness of the mountain paths, some of which were snowed up very early, delayed the progress of the pursuers so that they had to go a long way round, *i.e.* over the Szarduk Pass which lies far to the west, and negotiate several rivers which were defended and necessitated frontal attacks. The high mountains also helped us at first, as they made it difficult for the hopelessly incompetent Rumanians to move about in the coun-

try; later on, however, they slowed down our pursuit and enabled the pursued to put up an effective resistance in the narrow valleys belonging to the principal passes, so that the country was now the saving of them. Consequently the last decisive battle was only fought on the Ardjis just in front of Bucharest; but this was so far east that there could be no more question of an envelopment, and the Rumanian army, in spite of being beaten, was able to withdraw to the Russian front and merge itself in it.

The German campaign consists of three brilliantly victorious battles. The first was when we attacked the Rumanian left wing, formed by the First Army, at Hermannstadt and outflanked it in the direction of the Rotenturm Pass with our magnificent Alpine corps, for which the Rumanians did not begin to be a match; unfortunately we did not succeed in permanently closing the pass in their rear. In the second battle, which followed immediately on the first, the same German Ninth army swung round like lightning and attacked the Rumanian Second army (which had in the meantime been reënforced by cavalry), pushing back its left wing by advancing between the valley of the upper Alt and the northern foot of the Transylvanian Alps, as a result of which the Rumanians' rearward communications were seriously threatened.

The Rumanians retired on the Geisterwald, north-west of Kronstadt, and even their extremely long right wing, which extended northwards as far as Bukovina, slowly moved back, although the Austro-Hungarian troops opposite it had once more broken down. After their defeat at Kronstadt the Rumanians retreated southwards without stopping. By his ruthless determination and brilliant generalship Falkenhayn had cleared Transylvania of the enemy in eighteen days. The third great battle was preceded by (a) the crossing of the Czurduk Pass and an advance from the west of Moldavia, and (b) Mackensen's crossing of the Danube at Sistova and his march on Bucharest. The battle itself opened discouragingly; for the Rumanian Second army, which had been de-

feated at Kronstadt and was supposed to have no more fight in it, detached itself from the Rumanian line, which was drawn up along the Ardjis with the object of defending Bucharest, got between Mackensen and Falkenhayn, and started counter-attacking, which put Mackensen, with his unprotected left wing, into a nasty fix. But Falkenhayn did not retire, like the German general in a similar situation at the Marne two years previously, but kept his head, attacked both Rumanian armies, and beat them.

The pursuit of the Rumanians which had begun so energetically gradually, however, died down, owing to the exhaustion of our troops, the growing resistance of the enemy, and the rainy weather which turned the roads into morasses. In spite of having also mopped up a covering force of Russians, the Germans realized that they would not be able to capture the well-defended line of the Sereth in the face of an attack by fresh Russian troops, and contented themselves with bringing the campaign to a close by the capture of Fokchany.

There are two special lessons to be learned from the Rumanian campaign. For our part, this victory left our military position as a whole worse than it had been before the campaign began, as we now had some 280 miles of additional front in the east to man and hold (having missed our chance of conquering Rumania earlier, more easily and more completely); which shows that territorial gains may actually weaken the side to which they accrue. From the Allies' side the inference is that Rumania would perhaps have done better to invade the south-west of Bulgaria instead of Transylvania, try to effect a junction with the army of the east and cut off Bulgaria and Turkey from Germany and Austria-Hungary. But the greed of the Rumanian politicians must have triumphed over the better judgment of the soldiers—assuming that the soldiers had one.

Subsequently Rumania concluded an armistice with us at the same time as Russia (December 12, 1917). She succeeded, however, in ingeniously prolonging the peace nego-

tations, which started in February '18, until the collapse of the Central Empires canceled their successes and turned the abjectly defeated Rumania into a "victorious country." Even after the armistice at the end of '17 we had, unfortunately, to leave four German divisions in the country to secure the delivery of certain supplies to us. Of these the most important for the conduct of the war were the deliveries of oil, which began in 1917; indeed, when all is said and done, they were our only tangible gain from the whole campaign.

VI. SERBIA

I. TERRITORY, INDUSTRY, COMMUNICATIONS

SERBIA, including the territory gained in the Balkan wars, consisted in 1914 of Old Serbia and New Serbia—the former being the region of the Morava, the latter of the Vardar. It thus possessed a natural corridor running right through it, with a watershed not much more than 1,200 feet high; but to the side of it there was nothing but wild highland country, some of it impassable high mountains. Just the two valleys and some of their lateral branches, where wheat, maize, plum trees and tobacco are cultivated, are somewhat more densely populated; among the mountains inhabitants are extremely few and far between. Hence it is essential for any invader to roll up the great longitudinal corridor, if possible from the north and south together; for only here can he get at the greater part of the population, with the towns of Belgrade, Kragushevatz, Nish and Uskub, and strike at the heart of its economic life; only here can he take possession of the main railway line which runs through the country like a backbone from Belgrade to Salonika, and enables him to get his troops to the remotest corners of the country on both sides of it. The last-named task is made easier by the fact that the valleys of the Serbian Morava and the Ibar, together with the upper reaches of the Morava and the Vardar which are linked to them by the wide depression of the Plain of the Blackbirds, give access to the western mountains. Once the Serbian army is pushed out of the corridor, the only thing it can do is to retire into the western mountains (on the eastern side the Bulgarian frontier is too near); there, however, the wildness of the country makes it impossible to manipulate any considerable number of troops, and its lack of resources to

feed them, while the very long and snowy winter (considering how far south it is) also sets a time-limit to operations.

Old Serbia is a well-watered mountain country and consequently rich in oak-forests and pasture-land; in New Serbia and Macedonia, on the other hand, one already finds southern sky with a tropical summer, malarious in swampy regions, and dusty scrub instead of real forest. Wheat, maize, fruit, the vine, tobacco and the opium-poppy are the principal crops, with rye and oats in the mountains, to which must be added sheep and pig-farming and a little silk-worm culture. The country is inhabited entirely by a frugal peasantry and can feed itself at an absolute pinch, but the demand for coffee and sugar and the complete absence of industry make it extensively dependent on imports. Before the war its economic and commercial progress was badly hampered by the lack of a port and access to the sea, and its consequent complete enclosure by tariff walls. In those days Serbia's natural markets lay to the north, but Hungary, itself a purely agricultural country, put obstacles in the way of Serbian exports, which was one of the main causes of Serbia's political opposition to Austria-Hungary.

As a theater of war, Serbia is a hard nut to crack, even for its own army. At first its inaccessible mountains were a protection and an advantage against the invaders, who had to storm every pass and capture or go round every commanding height, only to find themselves faced by a repetition of the same task as soon as they got to the other side. But once the Serbian army was relegated to the mountains itself, it had to taste all the disadvantages of the country, till it was finally cut to pieces in the mountains in the middle of winter. Even in the Morava valley, open though it was, the roads, which had been soaked, nay, turned into rivers of mud, by rain and floods, presented the most serious obstacle, so much so that one gun needed up to 50 men to pull it. And in the mountains the sticky clay made things equally difficult. The traditional ox-teams, whose pace is

not more than one or two miles an hour, were the only things capable of dealing with the roads.

II. THE NATIONAL CHARACTER

The Serbian people proved as hard a nut as their country, and the Austro-Hungarian army, to everyone's surprise, failed to crack it, indeed thoroughly broke several of its teeth on it. This proves the necessity for adequate reconnaissance in the sphere of national psychology in peace time, so that a country may avoid such disagreeable surprises.

The Serbian people inhabit not only Old Serbia but also Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro; in New Serbia on the other hand they are a minority among Albanians and Bulgarians. They are primarily of Dinaric race, but there is a strong Nordic strain in them, so that tall bony figures of a somewhat uncouth type and rough manners and mostly of swarthy complexion are not uncommon. The Serbians are a race of wild mountaineers, strangely compounded of simplicity and passion, unassuming as a rule but exceedingly ruthless and violent in prosecuting any aim on which they have once set their hearts. They are a people who only need a resolute leader and an intelligible patriotic ideal put before them, to make them burst out into furious action or defend themselves with grim pertinacity. The world war did not prove that the Serbian troops who showed such courage and tenacity in the defense of their impassable mountains were capable of equal achievements on foreign soil; but wherever he was engaged, the Serbian soldier proved himself a hardy, resourceful, cunning, and extraordinarily agile fighter; well led and inflamed with passionate hatred of the invaders, he was looked upon by the Austrians as their most dangerous enemy. Before the war they, and the whole world with them, despised the Serbians as barbarous sheep-stealers or at the best as comic-opera figures; they soon received a bloody lesson which caused them to revise their opinion.

III. SERBIA IN THE WORLD WAR

Serbia is often considered to have started the world war. The Austrian government shoved the blame on her on the strength of the Sarajevo murder, although the murderers were Austrian subjects, even if Serbians by race. Moreover, Serbia acceded to all the essential requirements of the Austrian ultimatum, which contained stipulations which a country could hardly accept without compromising its dignity. In any case Serbia on that occasion suffered a distinct diplomatic reverse.

It has already been explained on page 151 that the Austrians made the mistake of mobilizing more troops against Serbia than were needed for defensive purposes and not enough for an invasion of the country. The Serbian front being of secondary importance compared with the Russian, the only proper thing would have been to defend the line of the Danube, the Save and the Drin, broad rivers which could not easily be crossed; but the vanity of the dual monarchy demanded that an example should be made of impudent Serbia. The Austrians, however, soon found that they had caught a Tartar. After the miserable failure of their first two offensives in August and Autumn 1914 (*cf.* page 153), due to their attempting to reach the valley of the Morava from the north-west across impassable mountains instead of pushing their way straight in from the north, a long period of inactivity set in; but Serbia continued to block our way to Turkey and Bulgaria (a fact which made itself felt most unpleasantly during the struggle at the Dardanelles in '15) and remained a constant menace to Austria-Hungary. Falkenhayn and the German General Staff therefore resolved on her destruction, for which purpose German and Bulgarian troops had to coöperate with the Austrians, the latter being incapable in 1915 of doing the job alone. The aid of Bulgaria was particularly important, as the Serbians had to be enveloped from the north and the south-east lest, if they

were attacked from the north only, they should once more entrench themselves in a strong position in their mountains. Unfortunately we neglected to advance from a third direction, *i.e.* the west (from Sarajevo towards the Plain of the Blackbirds), because the way through those rocky mountains was considered to present too many difficulties. To this must be attributed:—(1) the fact that the main body of the Serbians dodged our intended envelopment at Kragushevatz by retiring to the trackless wilds of the Kopaonik Planina in the direction of Pristina, and (2) the fact that the remains of the army later succeeded in getting away to Albania and Greece (see map 10).

The Serbian forces, 250,000 strong, were divided into four armies, which, in spite of being secured on the northern and eastern sides, had by no means the full advantage of the inner line, owing to the absence of efficient railways, the one line proving inadequate. Each army had consequently to fight on its own, instead of all of them being quickly concentrated at one point to strike at one enemy and immediately swinging round to catch the other one somewhere else. It was supremely important for the Serbians to keep the way to Salonika open in the south, that being the only direction from which help could reach them from the Allies. This also shows the importance to us of Bulgarian coöperation in the New-Serbian south. The Serbians concentrated their best forces in the north, in order to defend the fairest and most densely populated part of their country, in which the capital was situated. This is understandable enough, but it may none the less have been wrong from the military point of view, for there they had to deal with German troops and German strategy, which was uphill work for them. Had they concentrated their main strength in the south and gone for the Bulgarian Second army which was advancing up the Vardar, they would probably have scored a fine victory, and might have waited for Anglo-French troops to come to their aid from Salonika, with whose support they would probably have succeeded in

holding southern Serbia and would have been a more serious permanent menace to our southern front than they were afterwards able to be.

The German and Austrian troops under the supreme command of Mackensen crossed the Drave, the Save, the Danube and the Drin under hostile fire (which the Serbians had thought impossible) and advanced southwards in several lines. Meanwhile two Bulgarian armies burst in from the east, the First over the Nishava, the Second up the Varadar; they had great difficulty in negotiating the frontier ranges, which rise to a height of anything from 4,500 to 6,000 feet, in the midst of rain, snow and mist, their ox-teams, which pulled up to 800 lbs. or so, accomplishing only six or seven miles in two days. During the pursuit of the Serbians through the mountains around Pristina, fugitives and pursuers got jammed up in the narrow precipitous valleys, and when the winter burst upon them with snow storms, the fugitive army became completely disorganized, abandoned arms and equipment, surrendered in shoals, starved, and froze to death—in short, provided an admirable text-book example of the efficacy of (a) a ruthless pursuit, (b) mountains in winter. Only 50,000 Serbs eventually assembled on the Albanian coast, whence they were taken across to Corfu to be reorganized as the core of a future Serbian army.

The whole campaign only lasted through October and the first half of November. By opening up the Danube to our shipping and putting the Balkan railway to Constantinople into our hands, it enabled us to send supplies, men and arms to Bulgaria and Turkey. That was its most important achievement, but it also secured Bulgaria's position in the Balkans, against Rumania especially, and tightened the bond between Bulgaria and ourselves. At the same time, it landed us with yet another front, the Macedonian.

IV. THE MACEDONIAN FRONT

About the same time that Mackensen crossed the Danube and the Save, 20,000 French and English troops from the Dardanelles landed—in flagrant violation of Greek neutrality—at Salonika. This was the so-called Army of the East, which, in spite of its rapid growth to 75,000 men in the course of four weeks, failed to effect anything for the rescue of Serbia, as it was not strong enough and also advanced much too cautiously up the Vardar, coming to a full-stop in front of the mountain barrier which crosses Macedonia from east to west. With the Belashitsa Planina as its main *massif* this barrier, with its rivers and lakes, forms a good defensive line with its left resting on the upper Tchernia and its right on Lake Doiran. The Army of the East was, however, dislodged from this line by a Bulgarian attack and retired to Greek territory, where it could recuperate and refit in safety, the German government having forbidden the Bulgarians to continue their pursuit into Greek territory, for fear that this would drive the Greeks into the arms of the Allies. So the Bulgarians were compelled, much against their will, to take up a defensive position along the Greek frontier and wait to see whether the Army of the East would obtain further reënforcements and return to the attack, or go away. In the end it did the former—see map 10.

The action of the German government and higher command in missing its chance of destroying the Allied forces and clearing them out of the Balkan Peninsula for good and all out of consideration for Greece and its royal family was undoubtedly a wretched conclusion to our victorious Serbian campaign, and apart from that a grave error. The expulsion of the Army of the East, which had by now retreated almost to Salonika would have been easy enough at the start, especially with the aid of a few German detachments, but it grew more difficult every week, because the enemy fortified their position and brought up heavy guns.

As it turned out, the greater part of the Bulgarian army was pinned to this dead but always dangerous front for the whole duration of the war, instead of being used to exert pressure on Rumania and later, perhaps, to do its bit on the Russian front. How dangerous this front really was became clear in the autumn of 1918, when the victorious advance of the Allies started from here. Had the Army of the East been driven out, as the Bulgarians quite rightly desired, Greece would hardly have plucked up the courage to take the field against us, as her defeat would have been certain. As it was, the presence of the ever-growing Army of the East, which by autumn '16 numbered no less than 400,000 men, prevented Greece from joining us, and besides that encouraged the Rumanians to come in against us.

In August '16 the Army of the East attempted an offensive against the Bulgarian right wing to support Rumania, who was at that moment shooting her bolt. It succeeded in capturing Monastir, the chief town of Macedonia, but with that its strength was spent. After this the Bulgarians might have pulled themselves together but for the disruptive effects of enemy propaganda, in consequence of which their line collapsed on September 15, 1918, as the Army of the East advanced between the Tchernia and the Vardar. The Bulgarians went completely to pieces and fled in the direction of home, whereupon an armistice was concluded in September on the most crushing terms. The few German troops in the Bulgarian line were unable to save the situation, and effected their retirement with the greatest difficulty, fighting gallantly as they went. The way to Hungary now lay open to the enemy.

VII. ITALY

I. TERRITORY, INDUSTRY, COMMUNICATIONS

IF IT were true that territory, of itself and alone, could determine, could shape the destiny of nations, then Italy would for ever be the leading state in the Mediterranean basin—a part, however, which she played for a few centuries only in classical times. Italy is a peninsula projecting far into the sea, and for that reason, and owing to her encirclement by the Alps in the north, is altogether dependent upon the basin of the Mediterranean. Her hot summers and mild winters extend some little way into the valleys of the southern Alps, but everything that makes life worth living to the Southerner—warmth, sunshine, blue sky with a pink glow on far off peaks—disappears in the Alps and turns to wind and cloud, mist and green forests, cold and rain. Within the Mediterranean, however, Italy occupies the same sort of position as Germany in the North: given a hardy people under strong leadership, her central position allows her to dominate in all directions from the Pillars of Hercules to the Euphrates. But if her people are weak and divided among themselves, Italy will be the sport of foreigners, who can land at any point on her long coast-line and bestride the peninsula in a few days.

That has always been Italy's weak point—an enemy may not only land where he pleases (the coast abounds in natural harbors) but can approach from two different directions and cut off part of the country. She cannot prevent this, for she dare not render her army powerless by dispersing it in all directions, or no part will be strong enough at the decisive point.

Regarded more closely, Italy consists of a main trunk—*i.e.* Northern Italy, a long peninsula and the islands of Sar-

dinia and Sicily. The three last consist of mountains with a few small plateaux and plains. Their chief centers of population are certain low-lying parts of Sicily, Apulia, the Campagna and Tuscany, noted for the production of olives, wine and legumes. The territory of greatest importance, however, is Northern Italy, a wide plain watered by the Po, surrounded on three sides by high mountains and falling eastwards to the Adriatic. It is land through which mountain streams flow down to what was formerly a gulf, and it slopes down from moraine hills and terraces at the foot of the mountains to level plains, where the only landmarks are the lines of the rivers and irrigating trenches, the tops of fruit trees and hedges, the roofs of innumerable villages, and factory chimneys. Irrigation has made the clay and loam soil so fertile that it has become the most important center of Italian agriculture. Rice and wheat fields, mulberry and other fruit orchards, irrigated meadows with grazing cattle, village after village, together with numerous factories for the manufacture of straw, cotton, silk and iron—all these comprise two-fifths of Italy's population and her largest towns. Northern Italy is of military importance for five reasons. (1) The line of the Po and the parallel-running lower streams of its tributaries form strong positions against north and south, though they often expose the plain to floods, since some of them flow in elevated beds, the embankments of which can be pierced. (2) Northern Italy is the center of Italian industry, food production and national effort, so that its loss would probably break the country's defensive will and power of resistance. (3) The Alpine foothills are very difficult to hold against an enemy offensive from the Alps, while very unsuitable for an advance by Italian troops against the mountain valleys; that is why Italy has been so keen to get possession of the watersheds, which in the Tyrol are situated very far north. (4) The plain of Lombardy projects into Venetia in a dangerously north-eastward direction, which means that an Italian army on the Isonzo or the Carinthian front may be cut off and taken prisoner by an enemy

attacking from Southern Tyrol in the direction of Padua. This was a cherished plan of Conrad's, but unfortunately could not be carried out in the world war for lack of the necessary troops. (5) The weakness of the western side of the Alps, which present Italy with an almost impregnable precipice and leave the important passes in French hands. An Italian offensive against France on this front would offer no hope of success, and even in the Nice gap, which, though strongly fortified, constitutes a natural opening, success could only be gained at the cost of heavy losses. To sum up, the line of the Isonzo, the gap created by the Etschtal and the Doberdo Plateau in the Karst mountains, which adjoins it on the east, the valleys of the western Alps and the Nice gateway are the weak spots in the military geography of Northern Italy. In case of a simultaneous attack from several of these points Italy would, it is true, have the advantage of a very dense railway system, but this asset would be everywhere imperiled by the narrowness of the plain from north to south (which could be traversed in a two days' or even in one big day's march); moreover the Italian national character could not be relied upon for the sangfroid necessary at such a juncture. If a knowledge of psychology is useful against any people, it is useful against the Italians.

From the point of view of war-time economics, it should be noted that Italy exports a surplus of certain agricultural products (especially silk, vegetables, fruit, hemp, cheese, rice, oil, wine), but has to import large quantities of wheat, meat and fish. Her industries, too, are mainly dependent upon foreign imports, for there is very little coal or iron, and only recently has the water-power of the Alpine valleys been made available for the factories of Northern Italy. The country depends upon foreign imports of wool, cotton, coal, hides and skins, timber, iron, copper, petrol and heavy oil.

Accordingly, Italy is not in an economic position to carry on a modern war without importing and, further, the length of her coast-line places her at all times at the mercy of

the strongest sea-power. These two factors greatly diminish her military capacity, and a third cause lies in the unreliable character of her people.

II. NATIONAL CHARACTER

Racially, the Italian people is divided into two groups by a line crossing the peninsula roughly in the latitude of Rome. The northern group, which is most clearly differentiated in Northern Italy and shades off into the second group in the Apennines, is a mixture of Nordic and Eastern elements, containing a strong Mediterranean and, in the Alps, a Dinaric strain. The southern group, which predominates in Sicily and Sardinia, belongs almost exclusively to the Mediterranean (or western) race. Formerly this latter race peopled the whole country, but was later thrust southwards by waves of Nordic, Eastern and to a lesser degree Dinaric immigration from the north. The most recent of the Nordic immigrants were the Celts (400 B.C.) and the Teutons (Goths, Herulians and Langobards), who arrived during the age of migrations. It is a noticeable fact that the Northern and Southern Italians, despite their common tongue and common national consciousness, are two different peoples in disposition and largely, too, in appearance.

The Southern Italian is a reflection of the Mediterranean scenery with its glowing colors. Short of stature and dark of hue, he is entirely the slave of his emotions; his mood will suddenly change from indolent ease to violent nervous tension and excitement. The tension, however, does not signify an unremitting pursuit of any goal, for he has no such fixity of purpose, and, his excitement dying down as quickly as it flared up, he returns to his previous state of dull apathy. Indolence and passion are always striving for the mastery in him; he is all compact of unreliability and specious appearance, and everywhere a vast and in most cases unbridgeable gulf yawns between intention and achievement. He is very fond of maturing plans in his head, but has neither the wish

nor the perseverance to carry them out; the thought is to him as good as the deed. All his geese are swans, and certainly his schemes often look well enough, but all usually turns out to be just a pretty pose. Appearance conceals reality, the agile mind cloaks the infirm purpose.

The military value of a nation with these moral qualities is more than questionable. The Italian is essentially unmilitary, and when he is dressed in uniform he struts about flashing his eyes and rattling his saber, hoping that everyone will look at him. He is play-acting, this time in the part of soldier. Faced, however, with the serious prospect of real soldiering or warfare, the common Italian complains loudly and shrinks at the thought of exertion, wounds and death, while his officers fail to grasp the necessary measures and lose time over inessentials. Is it to be wondered at that Italian strategy exhibits the hesitation, timidity, indecision and doubt characteristic of the Mediterranean race, that the Italian constantly imagines himself surrounded by enemy traps, and that his undeveloped sense of responsibility leads to inefficiency in the organization of supplies and reinforcements? And when the Italians find themselves in a really tight corner, as on the Isonzo front at the end of October 1917, there is no holding them. Universal panic sets in and each man thinks only to save his own skin.

The character of the Northern Italian is not of such uniform caliber. He is of more mixed blood, while hardened by a more rigorous climate than the Southerner. For the most part, the Northerners are taller and stronger, and fairer, sometimes quite fair, in complexion. They do not to the same extent sacrifice thought to feeling, although, compared with Germans, they too are an emotional race. Their thought is not, of course, so collected as in the pure Teuton, but it distinguishes them from their Southern compatriots. In addition to their Mediterranean traits, the Northern Italians possess something of the creative energy and enterprise of the Nordic races, the industry and canniness of the Eastern, the savagery of the Dinaric; and, in the best of them,

these qualities, though comparatively diluted, find expression in remarkable achievements. While the Southerner seldom passes from the will to the deed, the Northerner sets a clearer purpose before him and not infrequently reaches his goal. This difference is most clearly seen in the economic field, where Northern Italy is the dominant partner in the state, accounting for the bulk of the national revenue and nearly the whole of its manufacturing industries. Only in the north do we escape from that carelessness and disorderliness which characterize the picturesque south and which are the reasons why the Southerner does not feel really at home in Lombardy. To him these North Italians are almost like Germans. They gesticulate less than he does and do not lie about in the sun like beggars. They are as stay-at-home as good middle-class South Germans and have developed a family life inconceivable to the Southern Italian, whose life is spent in full exposure to the public gaze.

From the military point of view, the North Italian makes a tougher soldier less concerned for his own safety, and a most resolute and circumspect officer. Among the Alpine peasantry are soldiers of whose spirit any army might be proud, and the better-class youth in the big cities of Northern Italy is filled with an enthusiasm and patriotic fire that will carry it through much. But these qualities which shine so brightly in comparison with the Southern Italian character, quickly fade before those of Germans and Frenchmen. Public-spiritedness and the sense of duty are not so strong among the mass of North Italians as to cause the individual to put the community's needs before his own and to make him the latter's willing instrument. A long course of very stern discipline may possibly extract from the Northern Italians more than has yet appeared, but contact with the Southerners will always, it may be presumed, have a demoralizing and weakening effect, with the result that the total Italian effort will always be less than a Northern Italian effort alone would be.

The character of the Italian people as a whole may, from the point of view of national defense, be shortly described as follows. Its main feature is a passionate and quickly-spent impetuosity. It cannot endure a long nervous strain, which produces headlong panic. The Italian is eager for the fruits of victory and the victor's laurels, but at a minimum risk. He is very clever at snatching the chestnuts which he has allowed others to pull out of the fire for him. On this account he always takes the side of the stronger and is unreliable both as an ally and as companion-in-arms. He finds it very difficult to get through the arduous and inconspicuous spade-work which the business of war demands, for he wants to play a prominent part and to hear his exploits praised. The unreliability, excessive caution and timidity of the Italian character were on the whole correctly estimated by our higher command in the war and, when Italy declared war on May 23rd, 1915, it did not allow itself to be diverted from the offensive against Russia which had begun at Gorlice on May 1st, but followed it up vigorously until August. It was actually four weeks after their declaration of war that the Italians ventured upon their first offensive on the Isonzo.

III. ITALY IN THE WORLD WAR

The German government can never at any time have expected much help against France from Italy's adherence to the Triple Alliance in 1882, although both Bismarck and Moltke reckoned that it would keep a certain number of French forces busy in the western Alps. In 1888, however, it was agreed that an Italian force of five army-corps and two cavalry divisions (about 200,000 men in all) should reinforce our left wing in Alsace. Schlieffen, it is true, was convinced that this support could not be safely reckoned upon, as public opinion, which counted for more in Italy than in the Germany of that day, would oppose the employment of Italian troops abroad. He considered, too, that owing to delays in mobilization and the shortcomings of

the Italian and Tyrolese railways, the Italian forces would arrive too late to affect the rapid decision relied upon in the west. Schlieffen went so far as to think that the Italian alliance would not even detain French troops in the western Alps! Unfortunately the younger Moltke did not share his predecessor's view of the Italian character but trusted the assurances of the Italian staff, not realizing that the Southerner always promises whatever is expected of him, without any definite idea of keeping his word. In 1913 Italy definitely undertook to despatch an army of 3 corps and 2 cavalry divisions—a smaller force than originally contemplated—but the promise was rendered nugatory at the outset by the statement that the advance detachments would not arrive on the other side of the Alps until nineteen days after mobilization, from which it could be deduced that the main force of this small army would not be ready for battle until at least five weeks after mobilization—approximately the date fixed for the first decisive engagements. This was altogether too late to be of any real assistance to the Germans, though it gave Italy plenty of time to play her favorite game of waiting to see which way the cat would jump.

The military lesson to be learned from this Italian attitude is that northern powers will do best to dispense with the services of Italian troops north of the Alps, as the delays are too great, and should rather employ them against France within Italy itself. If, however, it is desired to use an auxiliary Italian army in the north (in order perhaps, to make better use of Italy's strength than may be possible on the difficult western Alpine front), Italian help should not be counted upon in the first decisive battles, but be held in reserve. It might, however, be better worth considering whether the strong Italian navy, which is superior to the French Mediterranean fleet, should not land an army on the south coast of France. The appearance of such a force in Provence or Languedoc (even if it made comparatively little progress) would make a far greater impression upon France and have much more serious effects upon her Ger-

man front than the intervention of Italian troops along the Upper Rhine. Another matter worth considering would be an Italian march through the valleys of the Rhône and Aare towards the Jura and the Bellegarde gap (see p. 311).

Whatever decision the future may hold, the absence of Italy from the Vosges and the western Alps at the outset of the war did us great disservice, for while our left wing was not relieved and our right flank thus could not be reënforced, the French—trusting to Italy's intention to remain neutral—which had been confidentially communicated on July 3rd, 1914—were able to throw in their Alpine regiments (more than two army corps) on the Marne and extend their left flank rapidly towards the sea. It may therefore be said that Italy had really made her main contribution towards the victory of the Allies before she openly embraced their cause or put a single man into the field. Without Italy's declaration of neutrality France would not have been able to take her stand upon the Marne, establish her front and return to the attack.

That Italy should at first remain neutral (though she had in reality already taken sides against us) and not enter the war on the Allied side till ten months later, might almost have been expected. It was wholly in keeping with her psychology, which prompts her to watch carefully for a chance of easy success, but to stake nothing. To this must be added the quite natural wish to win back Italian nationals living on foreign soil, although these could be just as well claimed from France or even from neutral Switzerland as from Austria. France has Italian subjects in Savoy, Nice, Corsica, Tunis and Eastern Algeria; in Switzerland they fill the whole canton of Ticino; the Italian subjects of Austria in the southern Tyrol, western Istria and parts of Dalmatia were well outnumbered by the Italians in France. Hence Italy could have satisfied her irredentist ambitions much more easily at France's expense. But the Italian Government thought that the Central Powers would be beaten, and the entry of Great Britain into the war was a deciding factor,

for Italy's supplies of food and raw materials were at the mercy of the all-powerful British navy. The flag, in fact, that flies over Gibraltar and the Suez Canal will always determine Italian policy in preference to the strongest military power in the north.

The hostilities themselves were dealt with in the section on Austria-Hungary, to which we need only refer the reader (p. 156 *et seq.*).

Although at no point victorious, Italy received from the Allies the full price of her treachery—in particular, the whole of the southern Tyrol with its flourishing German culture, Istria with the Alpine foreland to the north, and parts of Dalmatia. But she has at the same time found herself saddled with certain things from which she was free before; firstly, a far more marked antagonism to France and a much greater disparity between her own power and the enormously increased power of France, no longer held in check by the German Empire; secondly, the creation of a new enemy to the north-east, France's ally against Italy, Yugoslavia, who challenges Italian supremacy in the Adriatic and stretches out hands towards Istria and the territory of the Isonzo. Thirdly, Austria still cherishes the hope of regaining at any rate the German parts of the southern Tyrol, as far, that is to say, as the Salurno Pass.

VIII. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I. TERRITORY, INDUSTRIES, COMMUNICATIONS

THIS Commonwealth, the nature, importance and future of which cannot be understood without reference to the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic character of its ruling class and to the abundance of its natural resources, comprises the part of North America that enjoys the best climate, and it is thus the only great power with interests on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. This gives it a threefold importance: (1) within the New World; (2) in the South Seas, where it is in possession of the Philippines, Honolulu and Samoa; and (3) in the Atlantic, where it owns the most important steamship lines, has acquired islands in the West Indies and established, through the Negro free state of Liberia, what may be called a colonial outpost in Africa.

The long distance that separates its coasts from the territories of the great powers of Europe and Eastern Asia gives the United States a large measure of security against foreign invasion, and the size of its territory and its large and steadily increasing population exclude any possibility of a successful landing on its shores by weak forces. Since the States with their 125 million inhabitants could raise an army of at least twenty millions, an invading force of a million men would not be enough to gain decisive results, while the more or less simultaneous oversea transport of so large a force, together with military material and the indispensable supplies of munitions, would prove an almost insuperable problem. Accordingly, the United States are practically safe from hostile invasion; even an attack by Mexico or Canada could not be more than an episode, given the small population of these countries. We need not therefore deal with the question of territory, but for our present purpose may confine

our attention to those resources of the country which are of political and military importance beyond the frontiers—namely, its economic life and national character.

Economics have determined the whole moral and political outlook of the nation, for economic considerations are responsible for much the largest part of American immigration, while the amassing of wealth is the aim and object of every American, so much so indeed that its pursuit—by unceasing and unscrupulous hustling—has often become more important than the wealth itself. Until the sixties of last century, America produced only raw materials, which she sent to Europe to be manufactured. But since then she has built up an increasingly powerful industry of her own, with the result that she is now to some extent independent of imported European goods and herself exports manufactured products. At the same time, with her enormous quantities of cereals, fruit and vegetables, and animal products, her rich mineral deposits, timber and water power, she is very largely self-supporting and independent of imports. The whole of her production takes place within her territory (not, as in Britain's case, in distant colonies with insecure communications with the mother-country), which gives her a degree of economic and therefore political independence exceeding that of any other country. Herein lies the main source of America's strength.

In the north-east, particularly in the valley of the Lower Mississippi, and recently in the artificially irrigated parts of the south-west, the United States possess vast areas of wheat, maize, oats, barley, rye, rice, vegetables, fruit, cotton and tobacco. There is also unlimited pasture-land for the grazing of horses, cattle, pigs and sheep. Thus the food-supply is fully secured against the possibility of a coastal blockade. There are further enormous deposits of coal (40% of the world's output), iron (50%), petroleum (65%), copper (68%), silver (33%), gold (only 15%) and phosphates. All this wealth furnishes the essential raw materials for a powerful industry, which now employs some 14 millions of work-

men. American industry is noted for its elaborate division of labor and mechanization, mass-production and standardization, bold enterprise and the tendency towards the formation of trusts, which, by killing competition, determine prices. Foremost among these industries are the heavy industries, with their 500 blast furnaces, machine-building and automobile works. These latter produce 5 million cars each year and there are now more than twenty million cars on the roads of the United States. Next in importance comes the food-producing industry, with its exports of meat and its milling operations, tinned foods and farm products; the cotton-weaving industry (36,000,000 spindles), wool- and silk-weaving, and the manufacture of clothing, boots and shoes. Ship-building too has recently grown in importance and the United States, which from 1860 until 1914 had no merchant fleet worth mentioning, has now acquired, by the theft of German vessels and new building, the second largest merchant navy in the world.

It is obvious that so economically powerful a state, against which no other can compete in this respect, was destined, whether as neutral or as participant, to play a special and in the end decisive part in the world war, the economic aspects of which were of such paramount importance. A further necessary condition, however, was the determined and resolute character of this Americanized Anglo-Saxon people.

II. POPULATION AND CHARACTER

The inhabitants of the United States, who now number about 125 millions, are not a single people, but a mixture of immigrants of every European race and country, to which must be added the 300,000 survivors of the original Red Indian population, the descendants and half-breed offspring of immigrant African Negroes, and a large number of Jews from the East. Among the immigrants, those from Great Britain, Ireland, Germany and Scandinavia take first place, while those from France and southern Europe are declining

in importance. The population has therefore a Germanic, more particularly Anglo-Saxon, *i.e.* English and Scottish, stamp. The ideals and aspirations of this social stratum, the Yankee type, which is most strongly pronounced in the New England states, outweigh those of all the other Germanic races, whether Germans or Scandinavians, and even those of the Irish. Whereas the eastern third of the country is inhabited both north and south by a population of predominantly English or Scottish blood, the strongest elements in the Middle West, especially between the Ohio and the Great Lakes are German and Scandinavian. One day, perhaps, these elements may break away politically from the Anglo-Saxons, but for the time being they pursue the same ideals. The West appears to develop yet another type, whose actions and mental processes are more strongly influenced by passion and imagination. On this point, however, it is too early to form any conclusion, for whereas in the East the conditions of national life have been established for at least two hundred years, those in the Middle West have obtained for scarcely a century and in the West for only seventy years.

From the point of view of national psychology, five important facts must be borne in mind:—(1) The prevalent type in America is Germanic, more particularly Anglo-Saxon. (2) Their forefathers or they themselves immigrated for economic reasons, coming over as poor people in the hope of becoming rich. (3) Owing to the abundant resources of the country these hopes have largely been realized, and the many examples of quickly acquired wealth cause everyone to anticipate getting rich in the future. (4) By reason of the competition between so many like-minded men, only a furious rate of work and utter unscrupulousness can ensure success. (5) Alongside of these numerically predominant fortune-hunters, and standing apart from them, there are two other-minded classes of immigrants, the Puritans with their strict belief in the Bible, who emigrated from England in 1620 for religious reasons, and the German intellectuals, who came over in 1848. These two classes have strongly affected

the national mentality, partly in the direction of moral purity, and also of a bigoted and arrogant love of power, partly in the direction of intellectual creative energy.

The character of a people of such diverse race, which may develop new and original features of its own, obviously possesses endless possibilities. All the virtues and vices of Europe, particularly of its Germanic part, are here united. From the point of view of military psychology this is important, for, according as the army is led by a commander of German or English blood or according as German or English blood predominates among the soldiery, we may expect to find the military qualities and defects especially associated with German and English military leadership.

On the whole, however, the deciding element is the Anglo-Scottish character transmitted from the Lower Saxon peasant and Norse Viking, changed only insofar as its economic side, the materialist factor, at present controls all thought and action and makes the character intellectually of one piece. Anything which contributes towards the technical improvement of industry and labor is the subject of clear and wise thinking and efficient execution, but ideals go to the wall or at most serve to maintain the exalted position of woman in American life in a sentimentalized and debased form. This level-headed and materially-minded American has very little culture; but he makes up for it in self-confidence. From ignorance of everything outside America and from sheer enthusiasm he refuses to recognize the existence of difficulties and confidently takes upon himself anything that is calculated to increase his wealth and his power. This unshakable self-confidence, which to foreigners often appears childish, is systematically inculcated in American schools and is nourished on the ideal of "liberty" and a chance of wealth for every man. However empty this dream may be, it exercises a strong influence and welds these men of different race into one people in the face of non-Americans. In the war, when countless men of German blood fought in American uniform against the hard-pressed country of their fathers,

this ideology proved its worth. Through the welding of many nationalities into a single new people—a people consciously concerned to determine its own destiny—the America of to-day can put forth enormous strength, as we learnt to our cost.

The American soldier came into the war very late in the day and had against him an enemy worn out by hard fighting and privation. Well-fed, well-clothed and carefully looked after, he went into battle trained as for an athletic contest and confident of easy victory, for his lack of culture and his American self-conceit gave him a poor opinion of "Fritz" and "Heinie," and also, of course, of his French and British allies, who had not been able to deal with "Fritz" on their own. The war had been awaiting these children of "God's own country," waiting for them to deal the knockout blow. Not by dint of military prowess—their commanders proved themselves extremely unskillful in the command of large units, *e.g.* in the strategic exploitation of the breach made in the St. Mihiel salient—but solely by dint of numbers did they bring gains to the Allied cause. It is hardly correct to speak of their victory, which was rather the falling-back of the starved, weakened and despairing German armies.

What concerns us from the point of view of national defense is the military efficiency of the Anglo-Saxons generally, both Britons and Americans. While both have plenty of manly courage, their proceedings in war are often open to strong criticism. Both are economically well organized and subordinate much else in life to this end. They give the impression of embarking on war in a commercial spirit and of looking upon it merely as an occasionally unavoidable means of doing business. War as an end, heroism as a moral quality, they do not understand. They have degraded war and therewith military service to a mere means or instrument. But both of these things demand to be rated higher than that if they are to be successful. To a German or a Frenchman war and military service occupy a central place in his life

and thought, and the great leaders and born soldiers can therefore only come from these two nations. In single combat, to be sure, the individuals of all four peoples, whether from Ohio, Yorkshire, Artois or Lower Saxony, are of equal worth, but the first two will regard the fight as a means only of bettering their position, whereas the other two will look upon it as a thing good in itself. The Anglo-Saxons will demand from all effort, privation and wounds some advantage for themselves; they fight for the material welfare of their country. The German or Frenchman in similar circumstances hopes only that he is making a contribution to the victory; he fights to maintain his national existence. The Anglo-Saxon conduct of war also gives the impression of a business enterprise. It is well thought out, carefully, even elaborately prepared, systematically adopted and carried through quietly and coolly. Such methods, which may be conveniently and successfully employed against inoffensive colored troops, have an unprofessional look and are bound to fail against the more purposeful and rapid strategy of German and French commanders. Accordingly, Anglo-Saxon troops are probably best used under German or French command; under their own leadership and in a big war of movement they are likely to be found wanting.

III. THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD WAR

The importance of America in the world war was fourfold. (1) As a neutral she assisted the Allies with supplies of war-material, especially munitions, upon which they largely depended to carry on the war at all. (2) Her declaration of war on April 6th, 1917, encouraged the flagging spirits of the Allied Powers, who from that time onwards felt certain of victory. (3) America's fresh armies, which were not effectively thrown into the western front until the summer of 1918, definitely turned the tide of victory against the exhausted German army. (4) The resistance of the German people was finally destroyed by the artful cunning of Wil-

son's Fourteen Points, which the simple German soldier accepted in solemn earnest. Thus America fought the Great War like a clever business man and was glad to leave the ungrateful rôle of hero to others. A war which makes equal demands upon a country's economic and technical resources—and all future wars will be of this kind—can only be won by a combination of heroes, business men and engineers.

The danger of America's entry into the war on the side of the Allies was unfortunately very much under-estimated by Germany, who thereby revealed her ignorance of national psychology. The United States demanded of us the abandonment of unrestricted submarine warfare, which our higher command (not even correctly, as shown on page 138) looked upon as our last chance, and based the request on the danger to American citizens which it involved. They even threatened to declare war. The German government, however, thought that this was American bluff and further calculated that America could only play a small part in the war. We did not believe that the United States could raise a large army or, through shortage of ships, transport it across the Atlantic. Our naval authorities, in particular, thought that American troopships would provide excellent targets for our submarines, to which it may be replied that not one was sunk, every ship landing safely in France.

The psychological error lay in our conception of the American as a self-important boaster, a shoddy manufacturer of shoddy goods and an unscrupulous over-reacher in business, whose word could not be trusted. Such Americans there certainly were, but there is the other type of American, who is conspicuously efficient in all industrial and technical undertakings, the American who builds the highest houses, produces most motor-cars, attains record economic output, who built the Panama Canal and whose spirit of enterprise knows no bounds. It is heart-breaking to have to record that our government, our navy, our diplomats, were obviously unaware of the existence of this type of American and did not conclude from the racial kinship between most Ameri-

cans and ourselves that they too must possess similar qualities and a similar determination. Moreover, they should have learnt from the example of England, who had started only two years previously with almost no army and had raised a million men since then, that the same thing could be done in America. No one in Germany realized that in 1917 America was the world's biggest reservoir of unused Germanic manhood, a race of men who knew that they possessed the largest share of the earth's riches, who were brimful of enterprise and only awaited the anvil's stroke to be welded for the first time into a nation. This stroke was given by the declaration of war against Germany.

The first visible services of America to the Allies—apart from supplying them with munitions from the very beginning of the war—were, the provision of a fleet of small armed convoys against the German submarines; the requisitioning and use of the many German merchantmen who had sought refuge in United States ports in 1914; and lastly, the rapid building of new wooden ships for European service (the latter is held by some to have been largely a deliberate bluff to alarm the Germans). 2,200,000 tons of shipping were requisitioned, and in 1918 the big German liners brought over half the American army. The skill with which this transport of troops was effected is shown by the fact that, in order to make the utmost use of tonnage, the men slept in shifts, thus enabling the available space to be used two or three times over. The submarines were a complete failure and did not sink a single one of these convoyed troopships.

The American army, which in peace-time had hardly existed, was built up rapidly and efficiently, and the first consignments of troops left for France in June 1917. Until February 1918 only 20-50,000 men were embarked each month; by March 1918 the monthly number had reached 75,000, in April 105,000 and from May to October, 2-300,000. In March 1918, therefore, there were only 300,000 Americans in France, by June 900,000, by July well over a million and by November more than two millions. It was intended to

increase the number to 4 millions in 1919. Whereas at the time of our big offensive in March 1918 only one American division was engaged in an active part of the line and three in quiet sectors, there were by November 23 divisions in the front line, each 28,000 strong, or two to three times the strength of a German division. No one had anticipated this mighty increase of fighting strength from May 1918 onwards; even the hard-pressed Allies had not expected relief from America until 1919, and great was their joy and surprise. Every German who went through those grim times will understand how this reënforcement of the enemy's western front, combined with growing demoralization at home, broke our resistance. The American intervention resembled some mighty elemental force which crushed or threatened to crush everything that stood in its path.

American troops went into action for the first time in the French counter-attack of July 18th, 1918, which, directed towards Soissons, pushed in the German salient at Vesle. By the end of August the Americans held a sector of their own on the Meuse and here, on September 12th, these well-fed Yankees celebrated their first victory by penetrating the German front at St. Mihiel, although they failed to exploit this small tactical success strategically. When the whole enemy front began its advance against our brave defenders, the Americans occupied the narrow sector between the Meuse and the Argonne, marching on Sedan.

There is no doubt that, after the failure of the German offensive in July, the American army in France decided the issue on the western front, for Germany had no reply to this overwhelmingly rapid reënforcement of enemy strength. Or could she have done something? There were at that time something like a million men in Russia, and a few hundred thousand could have been combed out in Germany. It is, however, to be feared that the morale of the German people in the summer of 1918 was no longer good enough for troops thus recruited to stand up against the fresh, hard-trained

millions of America with their full rations and frequent reliefs.

The real triumph of republican America, however, came in October 1918, when the proud and much-feared German Empire begged a gentleman named Wilson to use his influence to obtain for it the most favorable terms possible from the Allies. Imperial Germany placed its fate in the hands of republican America, or rather of a vain and double-faced fool of a President. We were no doubt in a desperate situation, but this self-abandonment was unworthy and, moreover, an error in psychology.

Without American troops the Allies would not have won the war in France; and, except for America, we should not have made so miserable a surrender.

IX. JAPAN

JAPAN is an island empire lying off the middle of the east coast of Asia and her geographical position is therefore similar to Great Britain's. Politically and economically Japan's hour only came when, with the arrival on the scene of western maritime and commercial powers, the center of gravity in Eastern Asia shifted from the mainland to the coasts and adjacent sea, and when the Pacific, too, suddenly became of importance to Eastern Asia. More quickly, perhaps, even than England in the seventeenth century, Japan at the close of the nineteenth realized the nature of the change, adapted herself to the new situation and sought to take a place among the great powers. Since the territory of the Japanese motherland—the three islands of Hondo, Shikoku and Kiushiu, to which may be added the bleak northern island of Jesso—is small and mountainous, Japanese families prolific, and economic life at home restricted, it was necessary for Japan, if she was to become a great power, to extend her territories to the adjacent mainland, whence she could aim at dominating the whole of Eastern Asia and the Pacific.

The obstacles in her path were, first, the occupants of East Asia itself—Korea and China; and, secondly, the claims of the European Powers, among which Russia's and Great Britain's were the largest, those of the United States, France and Germany being smaller. First China was humbled; then Russia was shortly afterwards beaten; and, with the acquisition of Korea and the southern part of Sakhalin and the establishment of a foothold in Southern Manchuria, the extension of Japanese territory to the mainland was achieved.

But Japan's claims were not taken altogether seriously until the World War gave her the chance of approaching much nearer to her goal of predominance in Eastern Asia

and supremacy over China. This explains her declaration of war against Germany on August 23rd, 1914, preceded, on August 15th, by an ultimatum couched in most impudent terms, the product of accumulated irritation and self-importance. Next followed the conquest of our Chinese concession of Kiaochau, whose capital Tsingtao surrendered on November 7th, 1914, for lack of munitions, after an absurdly elaborate two months' siege, considering that it was nothing more than a fortified watering-place. The first move towards the Pacific was also made at this time, the Japanese chasing German ships in the company of British cruisers and occupying some of our small and unprotected South Sea islands, where they came into competition with the British from Australia.

However, this did not complete Japan's part in the war and she now passed from victory to profit-making. She began supplying Russia with arms and ammunition over the Siberian Railway, for which Russia paid in gold and by granting Japan a sort of protectorate over Eastern Asia, and especially China. The influx of gold enabled Japan to build up an efficient industry and to raise the national standard of living—this last an urgent necessity, for her ambitious foreign policy had strained her finances to breaking-point.

When at the end of 1917 the United States on their entry into the war conceded to the Japanese special privileges in China, in order that their rear might be secure, Japan reached the height of her power and began openly to preach a kind of Monroe doctrine for the Far East. Moreover, by 1917-18, when every British and American ship was needed for service in Europe, Japan had established her commercial supremacy in the Pacific and was able to build a large merchant fleet.

This state of war-time prosperity did not last long, for the advent of Bolshevism arrested the flow of gold from Russia and in 1919 Anglo-Saxon merchantmen returned to the Far East and the Pacific. The erstwhile allies then showed their true colors as commercial rivals and political foes. The artificially inflated war industries collapsed and the terrible

earthquake of 1923 dealt the finishing stroke to this economic prosperity.

The permanent results of the war years for Japan were—(1) the removal of the German (incidentally the smallest) obstacle, and the further thrusting back of Russia in Manchuria; (2) the rank of a respected great power with a population of 90 millions, which overshadows the Far East and without whose consent nothing can be undertaken in that quarter; as against that (3) a new political estrangement from Great Britain and the United States, who are concerned at all costs to prevent Japan from shutting the door against them in China.

Since Japan cannot concern us as a theater of war within any measurable future, we need not deal with her territory and may content ourselves with a few words about the Japanese character.

Its chief features are imitativeness and ambition, patriotism and chivalry, energy and a pedantic perseverance. This explains the amazing rapidity with which Japan has since the sixties of last century emerged from darkest medievalism into the light of modern civilization, having recognized that, if she is to preserve her national existence and her political independence, she must resort to the use of European weapons. Here she stands in marked contrast to the far greater Chinese nation, which does not possess this stern determination. The Japanese devotes all his mental and moral energies and all his labor to the promotion of his country's interests, and his reward is that in scarcely half a century Japan has become a great power with a voice in world affairs.



PART FOUR
THE NEUTRALS



I. HOLLAND

I. TERRITORY, INDUSTRY, POPULATION

THE Kingdom of the Netherlands is part of German soil and of the German people, but has been politically separated from both since 1648. Its territory forms the natural north-western boundary of Germany. Its soil is partly the flat delta of the Rhine, partly the débris of northern inland glaciers and partly muddy sea-bottom wrested from the ocean by means of dykes. The population is a mixture of Lower Frankish, Frisian and even Lower Saxon races, which have retained the old low German as their written language instead of the official Saxon and Lutheran German. There is absolutely nothing un-German about the country, and yet French, and later English, intrigues have succeeded in creating a political gulf between this fundamentally German population and its German parent and cause it to live in dread of losing the scanty measure of political independence which it enjoys through the favor of France and England.

The Netherlands are flat plains, except for a number of small moraine deposits extending north-eastwards from Utrecht with their heather-clad sand-dunes running from north to south. The western part of the plain, from Helder to Zeeland, is low-lying marshland, situated below sea-level and it can thus be turned into water by inundation. The natural lines of defense towards the east are the moraine hills south of the Zuyder Zee, which is now in course of being drained, and the rivers Issel and Vecht, tributaries of the Lower Rhine, which run parallel to the hills. The Vecht is part of the inundation area and is protected by a number of fortresses grouped around Utrecht. To the south the rivers Lech, Waal and Meuse form natural sectors of some

strength. In any case, however, the Netherland army is compelled to sacrifice considerable territory in order to hold the main area, which contains the bulk of the population, nearly all the large towns and the centers of economic life. The national character being easy-going and unwarlike, a strong hostile attack should not encounter any very stubborn resistance, and the government would probably be content to register a formal protest, unless it received immediate and powerful reinforcements from some foreign country. The Dutch coast appears most open to danger in the province of Zeeland, a group of islands carved out of the marshes by storm-tides, which can easily be approached from the sea, while it is threatened from the shore side by the proximity of the Belgian frontier and the fortress of Antwerp. The coasts of northern and southern Holland—the main part of the country—are well protected by an unbroken wall of dune, while the shores of the Zuyder Zee and of the waters behind the islands of West Frisia are comparatively inaccessible by reason of shallows.

The character of the Netherlanders is not uniform, for there is no Netherland people and no Netherland race. The north is inhabited by Frisians, the middle east by Lower Saxons, the south by Lower Franks, and the west by Hollanders, who are a mixture of Lower Franks and Frisians. The principal element is made up of these Hollanders and, from the military point of view, it is their character which is primarily important. The Hollanders have grown fat on their trade and fearful of losing their easy profits. They are traders first and last, whether in marshland cattle, bulbs, colonial imports or the products of the Java plantations. They pursue these activities with a view to securing the maximum profit and a comfortable existence. Riches and ease are their goal; they are therefore timid and hate anyone who threatens to rob them of their prize. They are afraid of losing their splendid colonial possessions in the East, which are much too large for them and quite beyond their powers to develop fully. They are not likely to be the

heroes they were in 1600, until their peace and comfort are at stake and a foreign enemy is threatening to take from them what they hold dearest. In the meanwhile they are traders and pacifists.

Dutch economic life is founded upon three things: cultivation of the soil, the products of the colonial empire in the Indies, and transit-trade with Germany, the Netherlands being the natural doorway to the wealth and industry of western Germany. Holland's native products are both agricultural and industrial; they consist of butter and cheese, bulbs and seeds, wheat, sugar-beet, potatoes and sheep. Except dairy produce, industry is almost entirely dependent upon foreign raw materials and even has to import its coal supplies. Among Dutch industries are ship-building and cocoa-manufacture. The country is quite unable to provide its own wheat and could not create a munitions industry; on the other hand, it produces a surplus of butter and milk. For technical reasons, it could hardly support even a short war.

II. HOLLAND IN THE WORLD WAR

In the world war the Netherlands were at great pains to preserve their neutrality, and that they were successful is due in some measure to the restraint exercised by Germany and Great Britain. On the outbreak of war a particularly vulnerable spot was the point of the Meuse projecting towards Liège and Aix-la-Chapelle, which squeezed the German right flank between the Dutch frontier and the Venn Hills and necessitated the attack upon the Belgian fortress of Liège. This Meuse projection therewith gave proof of its essential importance in effectively protecting Belgium and even France against German forces.

While the Germans were desirous of respecting Dutch neutrality in all circumstances, it was in danger of violation by Great Britain. In the summer of 1917, when England was hard pressed by unrestricted submarine warfare, it looked for a long time as if the British intended to land

troops on the island of Walcheren or on the neighboring coast of Dutch Flanders and thence to destroy the base of our submarines operating in the Channel and, if possible, in concert with the fierce Western offensive of that time, to outflank the right wing of the German army in Belgium. The British could have landed 15,000 men in twelve hours and, from Walcheren or from the mainland, could have destroyed our submarine base at Zeebrugge with long-range guns. In case the Netherlands should remain passive in face of this breach of their neutrality by Great Britain, we had provided two infantry divisions and one cavalry division, known as "the Ghent Group," to deal with this danger. If, on the other hand, Holland joined the Allies, in order perhaps to save her colonial empire, which depends on English goodwill, the Ghent Group was to be reënforced by two army groups from the East, which were to invade the Netherlands from both banks of the Meuse. The Dutch, however, sent troops to strengthen the threatened territory and took obvious measures to resist a British invasion. The latter did not materialize, possibly because the heavy British losses in Flanders made it impossible to spare troops for use elsewhere. It is evident that Germany would have been bound to do everything she could to prevent the British from setting foot in the south-west corner of Holland, since this would have compelled the early withdrawal of our right flank. The English must have regretted that they were not strong enough for this enterprise, the more so when they remembered their occupation of the islands of Walcheren and South Beveland in 1809, undertaken in an attempt, which incidentally failed, to threaten Antwerp, at that time in French hands.

Referring back to the question of a landing in England (see pp. 215 and 234 *et seq.*), mention may be made of the coast of Holland as an important base for such an attack. This coast (see map 8) threatens the English seaboard from Hull to the Thames, and troops can be carried across in a very short time. The crossing from Flushing to Margate takes five

hours, from the Hook to Harwich seven hours, from Helder to Great Yarmouth the same time. Troops can therefore be quartered on board without any special considerations of comfort.

Why was this not done? What did we gain by respecting Dutch neutrality? It would appear that we committed a psychological error. We felt that the march into Belgium had brought enough blame upon our heads and for that reason hesitated to violate Holland's neutrality. But the indignation of the world would have been no greater, while Germany would have reaped substantial advantages. Among these would have been the avoidance of the losses in front of Liège, a more rapid advance of the right flank, the immediate occupation of the central part of Holland between Utrecht, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Antwerp would have fallen sooner; the invasion of Belgium would have proved far more overwhelming; the Belgian army would probably have been captured. The Yser dykes might never have been opened and our right wing could have forced its way through to the Channel ports. Lastly, Britain would have been in serious danger of invasion from both Holland and Belgium and would have had to keep far more troops at home, instead of sending them, as she did, to the western front.

We are forced to the conclusion that the military problem of the Netherlands was obviously not thoroughly thought out either before or during the war. The argument that we were short of men and ships will not hold, for large forces were expended on less essential undertakings, while thousands of ships lay idle in our ports.

II. SWITZERLAND

THE WESTERN BOUNDARY OF GERMAN TERRITORY
FROM THE NETHERLANDS TO SWITZERLAND

SWITZERLAND forms the southern, the Netherlands the northern, portion of Germany's western frontier. Two-thirds of Switzerland are German in blood and German-speaking, and the country is thus one of those small States which France favors as a restraint upon German power and which owe their political independence entirely to the goodwill of the great powers and to their hostility towards the German people. While the Netherlands comprise the mouths of the largest German river, Switzerland contains the territory in which it has its sources—evidence, this, of the cunning with which our people has been territorially confined and its military situation prejudiced as compared with France.

A Germany bounded, as in the Middle Ages, by the heights of Artois and the line of the Jura holds the eastern part of Northern France in a pair of pincers, and the opening battles of a war are destined to take place within the Paris basin, that is to say, in France's most vital parts. To prevent this, the small but independent States of Holland, Belgium and Switzerland had to be created or guaranteed, as the case might be. The advantages of their existence are reserved to France, for they have been established wholly or mainly at the cost of the German people.

Accordingly, a war with France would only be waged under favorable conditions if we were permitted or able to march through Belgium and Holland in the north and through Switzerland in the south. Such an operation would make it possible to circumvent the otherwise probably impregnable French fortresses between the Belgian Meuse and

Belfort and to neutralize one of France's two military weapons (army and eastern fortifications). The pinning down of French army corps in the western Alps and, possibly, also in the Pyrenees, would naturally greatly weaken the French forces on the German front; though the decision must of course be sought in north-east France.

The importance of Switzerland from the point of view of military geography lies in the Jura and in the Bellegarde (or Geneva) gap. The Jura is for the most part a chain of mountains with extensive longitudinal valleys and short transverse passes; the only table-land is in the neighborhood of Basle. The latter can easily be crossed, the mountains not without difficulty. Its capture, however, even if limited to the northern part as far as Porrentruy, would make it impossible to defend Belfort, the value of which depends upon its position between the foothills of the Vosges and the neutral Swiss frontier. This would open for us the Belfort gap, which proved in the world war impossible to force, and would thus make an important breach in the French eastern front. The carrying of the Jura and of its modern French road-barricades would also of course give us the plains of the Doubs and Saône and bring the Paris basin via Langres, and South-eastern France towards Lyons, within our grasp.

Not less important than the north-eastern Jura is the Geneva or Bellegarde gap, through which lies the way from the German shores of the Lake of Constance to south-eastern France. A military offensive from Geneva could be undertaken (1) across the southern Jura in the valley of the Lower Saône; (2) along the Rhône to Lyons, an important commercial city commanding the shortest line of communication between the south-east and the rest of France and only some 30 miles from the factories and arsenal of St. Etienne; (3) south-eastwards into the western Alps, thus circumventing the main passes, the capture of which is of great importance as regards the Italian army, which therefore has the strongest possible interest in seizing the Bellegarde gap after crossing

the Alps in the direction of the Rhône valley (see p. 285).

In the world war Germany respected Swiss neutrality as she did that of the Netherlands. Forcible violation would probably have been more difficult than in the case of Holland, for the German-speaking population anyhow, and perhaps the French population too, is a tougher proposition than the Dutch, while the country offers more serious obstacles (not to entry but to egress into France or Italy). Nevertheless a capable German commander would have had no great difficulty in reaching the table-land of the Jura from Swabia via the Lake of Constance and the Rhine, or from Alsace, although he should presumably have encountered a Franco-Swiss front across the Jura and the central Swiss plateau, which would have held up our advance over difficult country. We should have added considerably to our already extended line without gaining any decisive advantage, unless it were the destruction of Belfort—a result, however, important enough to justify the venture and the effort. Moreover, the capture of the St. Gothard Pass alone would have given us important access to Italy and enabled us to strike at Milan, her industrial center, and to outflank the armies of Venetia. The possible advantages were very great, but the probable results slight, and we cannot therefore blame our higher command for having allowed Switzerland to continue at her private game of soldiers.

As a matter of fact, the Allies in 1916 anticipated a German violation of Switzerland's neutrality as a definite possibility and thought that it was intended to get round the French right wing behind Belfort and to close in on the Italian Army from the west. In the winter of 1916-17 the French reckoned seriously with this danger and conferred with the Swiss army command upon joint measures of defense. The Swiss, however, were at the same time negotiating with German army headquarters with a view to Swiss-German action in face of a French attack. But these conversations did not proceed far, as the German general staff was skeptical of a French invasion of Switzerland. Swiss neutral-

ity, in fact, is of service only to the French, and not to us, which explains the origin of the Confederation's political independence.

TERRITORY AND INDUSTRIES

Switzerland is a much harder nut for any foreign enemy to crack than the Netherlands. This is shown first by the nature of the country, which consists mainly of high-land, some of it high mountains, and contains only a few very small plains. It is divided into three belts: the Jura, the central plateau and the Alps. The Jura is made up for the most part of closely adjacent chains and longitudinal valleys and only becomes flatter table-land as it slopes down towards the Rhine near Basle; it can only be crossed by very narrow, tortuous passes and thus forms an excellent natural barrier against France, though the ground slopes gradually up from the French side and falls steeply away on the Swiss side; the inhabitants, too, are mainly French-speaking. The central plateau, enclosed between the Jura and the Alps, is hilly or mountainous country, forming an extension of the Swabian Alps from the Lake of Constance to Geneva. It is, however, divided into numerous separate provinces or *gaus* by the various Alpine streams and their lakes, by the terraced shores of the latter and by the mountains. Nevertheless, the central plateau, on account of its mainly fertile soil and its fairly mild and often sunny climate, is the chief seat of the Swiss population and of its economic and cultural life. Possession of the central plateau means possession of Switzerland. Both south-westwards and north-eastwards, however, there are many river valleys and hill sectors lying one behind the other, affording the chance of a stubborn defense against foreign invasion. The Lakes of Constance and Geneva should offer no difficulties to a maritime enemy but should rather profit him, since they permit of approach by water. The Alps are high mountains full of great rock masses, precipices and valleys, watered by

rushing torrents and crowned with snowy pinnacles. Such a country precludes all movement of large forces, but may be important by allowing the passage of troops from and to Italy over passes, through tunnels and along mountain paths.

The economic life of so mountainous an area, with its barren rocky soil and its long hard winters, is restricted by nature and can only develop in certain districts by artificial and therefore very vulnerable methods. Agriculture and fruit growing flourish in the central plateau, but the yield is quite insufficient to feed the whole population. Pasturage and cattle-breeding do well on the plateau and in the Alps and supply dairy produce for export; timber and mining are of small importance. Accordingly, industry, except dairy-farming, is entirely dependent on raw materials from abroad and, in the absence of native coal, has only developed to any extent since the abundant water-power has been converted into electricity. Swiss manufactures are limited to silk, cotton, watches and textile machinery. Switzerland is therefore very ill-equipped for war purposes, especially as the collapse of the tourist industry, which is her first source of revenue and business, would speedily lead to national bankruptcy. Compelled as she is to import foodstuffs, coal and all the raw materials for her industries, Switzerland is at all times economically dependent upon one at least of her neighbors.

POPULATION

Like Belgium and the United States of America, Switzerland has no people, but merely a population made up of different races. Two-thirds of the inhabitants are Germans, the rest French, Italians and Rhetians. Racially they consist of Eastern, Dinaric, Nordic and Mediterranean elements. The German element is of Alemannic stock, like the neighboring Alsations and Black Foresters. And yet the German Swiss imagine that in conjunction with the three other racial elements which speak foreign languages they constitute a

single nationality, and they dig an artificial trench between them and ourselves, which is deeper and wider than the Lake of Constance. This conception, which they uphold with all the impartiality of the Eastern race, is the intellectual basis of the Confederation, which would otherwise have no reality, since the Latin elements have no such deep conviction. Further, the ruling patrician and land-owning families, which have for centuries directed the affairs of state and canton, are afraid that by absorption in a larger national unit they will lose their ancient privileges.

From the military point of view, therefore, the character of the German Swiss is the decisive factor. This, like the old German character, is grounded in common sense and is of a very independent mind, enterprising, tough and reserved. Its decisive features, however, are a calculating materialism, unlimited self-reliance and a tendency to criticism, not to say fault-finding. The latter tendency is directed mainly towards their German kinsfolk across the Rhine, and reminds us of the pelican which pecks its own breast. This anti-German feeling is so strong that even in peace-time the German tourist is worse treated in German Switzerland than the British, the French and now the American tourist. This childish dislike needs to be taken very seriously indeed and is an important fact fraught with possible military consequences, being of itself equivalent to a strong army corps and much more dangerous than the anti-German feeling of the Alsatians, since it is based upon the belief, doubtless justified in the Middle Ages but long since obsolete, that liberty and equality, those most sacred of human possessions, are at stake. It is this idea alone that separates us from the German Swiss—only, indeed, until they realize that they are politically in no way superior to their brothers on the right bank of the Rhine.

III. SPAIN

SPAIN played a part in the world war which few countries—Sweden was another—assumed in their relations with Germany, namely, the rôle of an honorable gentleman. She offered the readiest hospitality to Germans compelled to remain there and refused to be intimidated by the Allies into declaring war upon us, unlike her small and sordid-minded neighbor Portugal, who lost her economic independence to England two centuries back.

Unhappily Spain's political and military importance has greatly diminished in the last two hundred years and more, which is one reason why France has so enormously increased her strength. Spain is Germany's natural ally against France, as she was in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the rise of both powers depends upon France's downfall. This being so, it must be our first interest to make Spain strong again, especially as the Spaniards are among the most delightful and chivalrous people on earth. On this account Spain deserves more extensive treatment in this book, but reasons of space limit us to a few short observations.

Spain is a country of mountains, in which the rivers have hollowed out two plains. The high ground in the north is covered with green vegetation and its agriculture is similar to that of Central Europe; but in the central regions and in the south, where the climate is hot and dry in summer and damp in winter, the landscape alternates between treeless plains and wheatfields, rocky mountains and green oases. From the military standpoint the Pyrenees are of greater importance than the fortress of Gibraltar, which protects the Straits. The Pyrenees shut off Spain from France, but they leave a Spanish minority and some of its Basque kinsmen on French soil, without the world's making any such fuss as it would if Germany were concerned. The southern slopes of the Pyrenees are broader than the north side and are

more barren and less thickly populated; they are also more difficult of access by troops. The wall-like and almost wholly inaccessible central portion has few passes, but the western and eastern sides are crossed by several tracks. The few passes and the mountain valleys in the proximity of the sea are Spain's weak points in a military sense.

Although to some extent agriculturally independent, Spain has to import wheat. Moreover, she is too weak industrially to support a war out of her own technical resources. Her mines supply her with coal, iron, lead, copper, zinc and other metals, but some of these ores are exported, as Spain lacks the means of working them. A further obstacle to the waging of war lies in the national character. The Spaniards are a Mediterranean race and, like the southern Italians, are an indolent and easy-going people. They lack vigorous determination and perseverance. If, however, a Mussolini were to arise among them, the Spanish nation might quite possibly play a part worthy of its past.

In the meantime the nation must be judged as it is—an honorable and chivalrous people, but easy-going and dissipated. Even so Spain has a certain value as an ally, since she serves to keep a number of French army corps along the Pyrenees (the worst corps, no doubt—southern French or colonial troops) and prevent them from reënforcing the Rhine front.

The importance to Germany of Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland is that they greatly lengthen the French frontier line, which at present extends only from Luxemburg to opposite Karlsruhe and the Upper Rhine. The results are twofold: in the first place, France is far more exposed to attack and, in the second, her huge army is broken up and cannot be employed on the north-east front in its full strength. Regarded from this point of view, the small and the weak are not to be despised; there will always come a time when numbers count.

IV. DENMARK

SITUATION

THIS small country enjoys a peculiarly favorable position, since it not only commands the passage from the North Sea to the Baltic, but also forms the bridge between Germany and Scandinavia. This is, however, a two-edged weapon, for only a strong Denmark can make due use of her advantages; if she is weak, her very situation will be her political undoing. In other words, Denmark can only pursue a strong policy of her own, if all her neighbors on the North Sea and the Baltic are impotent (through civil dissension, paucity of population, or shortage of shipping). If any two of the powers controlling the German Ocean are large and strong, Denmark will have to dance attendance on one of them. In the middle of last century a policy of expansion in Holstein brought the Danes into conflict with Germany's growing nationalism and force of arms soon drove them back behind their natural frontier. Since then Denmark has courted the favor of the powers less friendly to Germany, and particularly of France, whose culture is more and more replacing the old German culture, formerly paramount in Denmark. Moreover, Denmark is compelled by her long unprotected coastline to keep friends with the strongest naval power in the North Sea. This is Great Britain, with whom she is in close economic relations through the export of her cattle and dairy produce to England.

When the war broke out, therefore, Denmark was already bound to the Allies by inclination and necessity, but she was too afraid of Germany to join them openly. Nevertheless she inflicted injury upon us by her close economic blockade and by her uncertain attitude, which obliged us to keep troops in reserve and to be ever on the watch. She

also did us disservice by placing shipping at Britain's disposal during the period of unrestricted submarine warfare. For this Denmark also received her reward after the war (if only a comparatively small one) in the form of an extension of her southern frontier in Schleswig. It is sad that this sturdy and attractive people, our nearest Germanic relatives, should be thus estranged from us. The most natural thing would be that Denmark should enter as a fully independent state into an offensive and defensive alliance with the German Reich. Two important consequences would follow: the use of her coasts and waters would give us naval supremacy in the North Sea and the Baltic, while her large supplies of cattle and dairy products would make a useful addition to our economic resources in time of war.

In the Great War Denmark's geographical situation was not fully exploited. As an enemy allied with others, she is a constant threat to our seaboard, for she can hand over the North Sea and the Baltic to an enemy fleet and facilitate the landing of invading forces in North Germany. As an unfriendly neutral, such as she was in the war, Denmark severs economic relations with us and constitutes more or less the menace described above—a latent menace at first, but who knows for how long? In the capacity of a friendly neutral she can supply Germany with food from overseas, close the Baltic and, with German reënforcements, oppose any attempts at a landing. As a friend and ally, she gives us command of the whole east coast of the North Sea, together with the Skager Rack, which is of decisive importance for any westward sally or eastward withdrawal. The Skager Rack lies almost as far north as Scapa Flow, and, with Wilhelmshaven and a port in Holland or Flanders, would offer as good a naval base as any of Great Britain's own. Hence the importance of Denmark to Germany's naval supremacy in the future. By the same token Great Britain and France will do everything to keep Denmark at enmity with Germany and attached to themselves.

TERRITORY AND POPULATION

Denmark is a continuation of northern Germany and consists of flat plain. It is, however, divided by the sea into a peninsula and a number of islands, and moraine deposits account for a certain amount of hilly country. The territory is so broken up that it can only be defended in a military sense from the sea or from the adjacent mainland (Germany or Sweden). Jutland and the three largest islands have such a length of coast-line, so small an area of land and what there is so lacking in natural divisions, that they are indefensible against modern engines of war. Denmark today is condemned to be the bondslave of one of the great powers. Her economic life is based upon her pasture land and fields, separated by wooded islands, and upon her shipping. Danish exports include cattle and dairy products, which are exchanged for wheat, industrial commodities, coal and colonial products. There are no workable mineral deposits, and industry is therefore entirely dependent upon foreign countries. Heavy industry in particular is non-existent.

This more or less purely Germanic people resembles the North-German in character. During the last seventy years or so, however, the national character has become softer, with an increased esthetic sensibility, due to an excessive development of popular education and the worship of French culture. The Danes of the islands are more infected by these influences than those of the mainland, who appear to be made of sterner stuff. Materialist tendencies are very marked, as is the case in all cattle-breeding countries.

Fundamentally, however, the Danes are undoubtedly still a vigorous and sturdy people. The process is really the same as in Scandinavia (and even in the Mediterranean and the East): these Germanic peoples grow soft, collectively and individually, as soon as the Prussian N.C.O. or the English clerk is no longer at hand to discipline them in military or commercial ways of thinking. Anyone who has watched Dan-

ish, Swedish or Norwegian soldiers knows that in the absence of foreign influence there can be no national renaissance in these three countries.

V. SCANDINAVIA

THE Scandinavian peninsula with its two kingdoms of Sweden and Norway lies further removed than Denmark from the scenes of the world war, but it bordered at that time upon the Russian Empire. From this quarter alone were military operations within the bounds of possibility.

The two kingdoms, however, are politically somewhat hostile (not as regards individual citizens)—Norway separated from Sweden in 1905—and they watched each other's neutrality suspiciously. Since Sweden's interests and sympathies lie rather with Germany (due to fear of Russian expansionist aims), whereas Norway is closely attached to Great Britain, the entry of either into the war would have involved the entry of the other on the opposite side. Sweden supplies German industry with large quantities of timber and iron ore; Norway's large merchant fleet sails the seas mainly in discharge of British orders and, by carrying food-stuffs, coal and manufactures, has become entirely dependent upon Britain. Norway's long expanse of coast-line, too, is exposed to the guns of the British navy. While these relations of Norway with England have survived, those of Sweden with Germany have undergone a change, insofar as Russian pressure upon Sweden is for the time being relaxed.

Norway is a country of moderately high or lofty mountains, altogether without plains, intersected by deep fjords and surrounded by a coast-line of rocky islands. Access to the interior is confined to a number of valleys in the south, which are comparatively wide and fertile and in which the summer is longer than in the north. There are few roads

and the country is divided into numerous small districts formed by bays and valleys, many of which only communicate by sea. Only $3\frac{1}{2}\%$ of the soil is fertile, and this mainly for grazing. Accordingly the chief industries are tree-felling and sea-fishing, timber manufacture and fish-preserving, and, of course, shipping.

Sweden on the other hand is a country of medium sized mountains and lowlands, protected by the high mountains and much wetter climate of Norway. It has far more forest land, pasture and arable land (the two last represent 12% of the total area) and is preëminently a country of farmers. Nevertheless, foodstuffs have to be imported, as cultivation is very much diminished beyond the line of the lakes. In addition to the timber industry, which exports enormous quantities of timber, Sweden produces iron, silver and copper.

The population of Scandinavia is for the most part purely Germanic, but has a strong East Baltic mixture and in the north has received a Mongolian streak from the Lapps. The people are vigorous, trustworthy, remarkably honest and gifted with creative energy. The Norwegian is inclined to be rougher and grosser, more defiant and quarrelsome, more communicative and unrestrained, also more materially minded than the Swede, whose temperament is quieter and more even, his outlook bigger and wider and his esthetic senses better developed. Whereas a Norwegian will sweat to acquire riches and the feeling of power, a Swede will work to make his existence beautiful and round it off into an artistic whole. The Norwegian is still a Viking, though he may have sheathed his sword, but the Swede is rather the intellectual champion who fought for his share of Germany's trade in the seventeenth century. These Germanic brethren of ours are both full of vigor, but they lack that stern national discipline that countries need if they are to play an important part in history.

During the world war Norway was one of Great Britain's main supports for four reasons. (1), the British blockade

line drawn from the Orkneys rested on the south-west coast of Norway. (2), Norway's merchant shipping went far to secure Great Britain's supplies of food and raw materials, particularly throughout the submarine warfare of 1917, when Norwegian sailors felt almost like Englishmen. (3), the Norwegian port of Narvik helped to supply Russia with valuable war material. (4), Norway did nothing at all to facilitate supplies to Germany. Sweden, on the other hand, did us great services, transporting vast quantities of timber, iron and copper across the German-controlled Baltic, thereby guaranteeing no small share of our wartime necessities. True, she was unable to prevent the use of her Lapland railway, starting from Narvik, for traffic between Great Britain and Russia. Be that as it may, the war taught us the lesson that Sweden is in time of war a neighbor of importance to us in holding pro-British Norway in check. As such she deserves most careful treatment.



PART FIVE

THE NEW STATES



I. AUSTRIA

THIS new country occupies the south-east corner of German territory. The reduction of the former Austria to this small new State is primarily France's work, who wished thereby to create or enlarge her Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Polish satellites; but Italy also took her share. Further, it is France's fault that this small purely German state has not yet ventured to join the German Reich, for once the latter extends its sway from the Danube eastwards to the River March, it envelops the bulk of Czechoslovakia's territory and robs her of much of her military importance as France's ally against Germany. A simultaneous German invasion of Moravia from Upper Silesia and Lower Austria cuts Czechoslovakia into two and isolates the main Czech army in Bohemia, already weakened by a strong admixture of very unreliable German material. Slovakia, the eastern part of the republic, is mainly mountain country, some of it very high, and is sparsely populated. Further, it is threatened by Hungary and cannot play any important military part.

Austrian territory consists mainly of Alpine country. Only the east and north-east contain certain tracts of Alpine foreland. The former is a region of forest and rock, with valleys in which grazing, timber-felling and a certain amount of agriculture are carried on; the latter are hilly or flat, more fertile and more thickly populated. Two facts are noteworthy:—(1) Neither industry nor nature is able to supply Austria with anything like her full requirements of food. Abundance of cattle and timber is an insufficient make-weight, and the existence of a certain amount of iron and of water-power from the Alps, most of which is still undeveloped, cannot help much. (2) The country cannot defend itself. The frontier is throughout so fixed that the

neighboring states have all the advantages of approach and are in possession of most of the main passes, while Austria herself has not even space in which to deploy. Parts of the Alps can be defended, but her most important centers of industry and population,—the Vienna basin and the two Swabian provinces—are helpless in face of invasion. Moreover, Austria unaided is economically unable to wage a war of even a few months' duration.

The population is mainly of mixed Nordic and Dinaric race and of Bavarian stock, with an East Frankish admixture along the Danube. Only in the Alps therefore is the national character purely Bavarian; in the Danube area it is somewhat different: the tough and jovial sturdiness of the Bavarian has yielded something to softer influences and to various more spiritual qualities. A certain leisureliness and a rather negative and skeptical view of life, which so often puts a brake on action, only awaits the spur of Prussian discipline and determination to be incorporated (after some friction, perhaps) in the national consciousness of the new totalitarian German State.

Austria, even in her present amputated state, is still the south-east corner of Germany and as such an important member of the future Reich; by the very fact of her position she is indeed a geographical condition of national revival. From the point of view of foreign policy, Austro-German union would have the following effects:—(1) the intimidation of Czechoslovakia and greater security in face of that country; (2) contiguity of the Reich with Italy and Hungary, both of which countries are of importance to us; (3) direct influence of the Reich in Yugoslavia (influence therefore over yet another French satellite); (4) an addition of more than six millions to the population and thus to the armed forces; (5) the establishment against France and her eastern satellites of a front that would extend without a break from the North Sea to the Mediterranean; (6) the strengthening of Italy against France and Yugoslavia. Compared with these advantages, certain drawbacks, such as the enlargement of

the Centre Party and the infection of German national ambition with Viennese indolence, are quite unimportant.

II. HUNGARY

MODERN HUNGARY, as she emerged after the war from the ruins of the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy, was sacrificed to enlarge Rumania, Serbia and Czechoslovakia, to such an extent, indeed, that she is now a powerless circumscribed little country with only two sources of aid: the indomitable national will of the Magyars and a natural attachment to Germany, Austria and Italy. She is valuable as an ally because she constitutes a threat to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and is by nature fitted to act as a check or restraint on Rumania, although these tasks are beyond her present powers. The main business of a united Austro-Hungarian army would be to invade southern Moravia and thence, acting in concert with a German army advancing through the Moravian Gate, to attack Bohemia from the east and destroy the main Czech armies. As secondary duties, it would be required to watch and hamper the Czech forces in Slovakia and afford protection against Rumania and Yugoslavia. Her frontiers being open on all sides, Hungary cannot be expected to defend her own soil—she is not strong enough to resist the invasion of superior forces from north, east and south. She must first help to keep the enemy away from the inner line; that is to say, she must take her cue from the German army and, acting alongside the Germans and the Austrians, first beat Czechoslovakia, after which the struggle can be pursued against the outer line of enemies (Yugoslavia, Rumania and Poland) in plenty of time to free the soil of Hungary and win for her fresh territory. A dispersal of strength would nowhere be more fatal than in this war of liberation.

Present-day Hungary is a country of plains, but there are some fair-sized mountains in the north and some hilly districts in the west. The only line of defense which can be held against Yugoslavia and Rumania at the same time consists of the Danube-Drave-Mur line. Although the holding of this line involves the sacrifice of quite half the national territory, it has the advantage of resting upon Austria to the west and of being cut off from Czechoslovakia by the Danube to the north.

Industrial activity is concentrated upon husbandry and cattle-breeding, which yield an exportable surplus of cattle, wheat, flour, sugar, poultry, rye, barley, tobacco and wine. Apart from agriculture, industry possesses few native raw materials, except for some lignite and iron ore; but it produces foodstuffs of all sorts and works the ores. For purposes of a modern war, however, Hungary needs to be closely associated with an industrial ally, with whom it is to be hoped that she will exchange her foodstuffs for manufactured goods and armed assistance more willingly and freely than she did in the late war.

The population consists mostly of Magyars but includes a not inconsiderable number of Germans. The former are the descendants of a race of Mongolian horsemen which overran the Puszta in the ninth century and also of numerous immigrant Germans, Turks, Jews and gypsies, with the result that the physiognomy and character of the people are very varied. A conspicuous characteristic is the national consciousness of the Hungarian and the fiery enthusiasm with which he expresses it. Hungary's greatness is to him something that needs no proof, and it is this spirit that will one day restore the shattered fortunes of the State. The Hungarians are a race of peasant farmers still in close touch with nature, with an exuberant vitality and a proud bearing. In some respects they are still rather unpolished, and they have not reached the highest rung in the ladder of the civilization which the Germans have brought into the Puszta; they are also markedly egotistical and quite naïvely self-centered,

but resolutely determined to go their own way, which is indeed the only means by which a nation can effect its revival. In the war the purely Magyar regiments of Austria-Hungary enjoyed the highest reputation after the purely German troops, but the fiery temperament of the Hungarians was not perhaps quite equal to the nervous strain imposed by long years of war.

III. YUGOSLAVIA

THIS Balkan war-profiteer, who, although beaten, at any rate paid a good price in blood, heads the list of those vassal states of France which, with Rumania standing somewhat on one side, were set up to cut the Germans off from the East and hold them in check.

Its territory extends from the south-eastern Alps, where German soil was assigned to it, across the Dinaric mountains and the Morava River as far as Bulgaria and Macedonia; in the north the Croatian and Slavonian hills and the Batchka contain more fertile land than the mountains can offer. It is in fact a series of more or less disconnected regions consisting mostly of deeply fissured, impassable and barren mountains, the high walls of which separate the much-indented coastal strip from the more fertile hinterland. Thus the essential Old Serbian part of the country is in the east, but its most important food-producing area lies in the north, the home of Croats, Germans, Magyars and Slovenes, all of whom have long been saturated with German culture. It is, however, just this variety of soils and economic activities that makes it possible for this not over-populated country to produce a fair proportion of its own food. On the other hand, its industries cannot satisfy the technical requirements of a modern war. The chief exports are wheat, maize, plums, pigs, timber and iron ore, all of which are exchanged for manufactured goods.

The population, which is fundamentally of Dinaric race, is mostly Slav-speaking, although other languages are spoken by the large German, Turkish, Magyar, Bulgarian and Albanian minorities. The Slavs are themselves not a homogeneous race, but are divided into the Catholic and Germanized Croats and Slovenes and the Orthodox, still semi-oriental Serbs. A prominent feature of the Slav character is a quickly aroused excitability in which the voice of reason is drowned. The national temperament is turbulent, pushing forward impulsively in pursuit of a goal, but unable to endure too prolonged a nervous strain. Daring and impetuous, it is strong in attack and in wild irregular warfare. The Serb population, at any rate, is filled with a burning patriotism and with the spirit of sacrifice; they are a people with whom, under good leadership, anything—for a time—is possible.

The rôle of Yugoslavia in a future war is the varied one of holding in check Italy, Austria (Germany), Hungary and Bulgaria. The Bulgarian frontier is so mountainous and by nature so secure that quite weak Serb forces, acting in concert with Rumanians, could hold Bulgaria back. Hungary lies open to Yugoslav invasion and is not much helped by the line of the Drave, which can be turned from east and west. Austria cannot defend either the Carinthian basin or the hills round Graz against a strong assault. Only on the Italian side are the frontier conditions less favorable, for the Italian Carso frontier has been pushed some way eastwards, so that the Yugoslavs are denied the strong Isonzo line which Austria-Hungary was successful in holding against Italian attack. The Adriatic coast is controlled by several Italian observation stations, while the superiority of the Italian navy makes any Yugoslav operations an impossibility in this quarter. Accordingly a Yugoslav offensive can only be directed against Austria and Hungary. The army will adopt a defensive attitude against Italy and Bulgaria, but in the north will try to join up with the Czechoslovakian and possibly the Rumanian armies; its field of operations will therefore lie between the Theiss and the Raab.

IV. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

AMONG the three eastern vassals of France Czechoslovakia occupies the middle place and may be compared to an ulcer in Germany's side. The State was created by France ostensibly for the Czechs, but really in order to harm the Germans, for the plans for a new Slav State for which the Czechs had been working by underground means for a century past, were, needless to say, a matter of the completest indifference to the French.

The nucleus of the new state is formed by the South German province of Bohemia, to which must be added Moravia, the Beskide Mountains, the Erzgebirge of Slovakia, a bit of the Carpathians and parts even of the plains and hill country of northern Hungary. Only Bohemia and Moravia are of military importance; the Slovak inhabitants of the whole of the eastern part of the country (except the Ruthenian, Magyar and German minorities) have only a loose connection with the Czechs.

Bohemia is a kind of square raised trough surrounded on all four sides by mountains, and thus forms, as it were, an enclosure within the South German mountain range. Forest-clad heights and a fertile belt of hills and valleys enclose a dry plain, so that despite its girdle of mountains the interior of the country is of a very varied character. The chief centers of population are the spurs of the northern hills, for their low elevation secures them a mild climate and abundance of wheat, sugar-beet, potatoes, vegetables, fruit, hops and wine. There are also coal and iron mines, around which the weaving and glass industries have grouped themselves. These thickly populated areas are mainly inhabited by Germans.

In contrast to Bohemia, Moravia is an open passage-way between Upper Silesia and Lower Austria, which are connected by the historically and strategically important Morav-

ian Gate. The hills and marshy valleys of Moravia offer excellent facilities for the incursion or through transport of troops, and this province is the weakest point in the defenses of the republic, which can easily be split in two by a simultaneous attack upon Moravia from the north and south (see p. 329).

Czechoslovakia is in a very favorable economic position and her agriculture, timber-trade, mining and industries are all so extensive that she has been able to build up her economic life on sound foundations; the German work of centuries is now standing the Czech authorities in very good stead. The chief exports are sugar, fruit and vegetables, which are exchanged for wheat, flour and cattle. Her flourishing industries further necessitate the import of cotton, wool, silk and metals. Particularly worthy of mention are the heavy industries of the Pilsen district, where the Skoda arsenal is situated.

The population is divided into Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks, who form the ruling elements, and Germans, Magyars and Ruthenians, who constitute the subject races. A deciding factor in a future war will be the antagonism between the Czechs and the Germans in Bohemia, who according to official (and therefore incorrect) figures stand to one another in the relation of two-thirds to one-third. The Czechs are the descendants of the original old Teutonic inhabitants, of Slav shepherds and German immigrants; it is quite likely therefore that there is more German than Slav blood in them. The Czech culture of today—among peasants, townsfolk and intelligentsia—is entirely German. From the thirteenth until the nineteenth century the German element was exclusively predominant. Czech nationalism dates from 1848 and was encouraged by the un-German policy of the Habsburgs. Moreover, the industrialization of those days brought an influx of Czech workers into the towns, the German inhabitants of which were either reduced to a minority or absorbed into the Czech element. Prague and Pilsen, in particular, became Czech towns in this manner.

The Czech national movement depended, of course, for its full success upon the collapse of Austria-Hungary, and the outbreak of the war was therefore a welcome signal. Czech regiments mutinied in the very first days of mobilization, and, once in the field, the Czech troops went over to the Russians in whole units; it was mainly to them that the Austrian armies owed their reputation for unsteadiness. These deserters formed the material of the Czech legions, 100,000 of whom were ultimately fighting against us on the Russian, French and Italian fronts, though without especially distinguishing themselves. May the Czechs pay for this treachery by similar action in the next war on the part of their soldiers of other race!

The Czechs are a nation of peasants and industrial workers, who have only begun to develop a middle class during the last fifty years, through the absorption of Germans and the effects of better education. They have therefore the characteristics of a small subject people who have now become impudent and arrogant. Cunning and spite, pigheaded self-righteousness, distrust and envy, great excitability and frivolous pleasure-seeking, a sullenness that comes from a sense of inferiority, and an overweening arrogance which breaks out in the crudest forms—these are their ruling characteristics. All these qualities, combined with the fanatical national pride of bourgeois renegades, make up the character of one of the greatest enemies of the German people. The military value of the nation must not be judged by its failure in the war, for this was deliberate. It is doubtful, however, whether a state can prosper which is born of mutiny and desertion. In the next war nearly half the Czechoslovak army will consist of non-Czech soldiers, and this must diminish its offensive power and its reliability. Moreover, in spite of their grim determination and their fanatical patriotism, in the heat of battle the Czechs will bethink them of the easy way of escape which their fathers found in the world war—the way of evasion and desertion. We need not therefore over-estimate the Czech's powers of resistance, especially

if he can be isolated in the Bohemian trough from his allies and made to fight on all sides at once. It is, however, of the utmost importance that quick action in the upper reaches of the Oder shall gain possession of the Moravian Gate, so as to prevent Czechoslovakia from establishing contact with her Polish allies.

V. POLAND

POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION

OUR most dangerous enemy in the east is Poland, a country which, with its 27,000,000 inhabitants, is more populous than Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia put together. Nor has Germany anywhere a strong natural frontier against Poland; and on the Warthe the line is not more much than 100 miles from Berlin.

The Poles are an excessively restless, ambitious and greedy nation of western Slavs, whose territory was formerly divided between Prussia, Austria and Russia, because these countries believed that this was the only way in which they could feel secure against this turbulent people; and this is, in fact, the only way of settling the Polish question. It was unfortunately left to Germany to revive the question in a different form, but instead of weakening Russia, which was her purpose, she merely saddled an almost unsuspecting world with a new Polish problem. On November 5th, 1916, we proclaimed the reestablishment of a kingdom of Poland, but it was to be confined to Russian Poland and to await the end of the war, remaining until then under joint German and Austrian military administration. What were the potential and the actual fruits of this policy? The German Governor of Warsaw, General von Beseler, whose work in this connection was honored by the Berlin Geographical Society, anticipated the extensive reinforcement of the German army by Polish troops and reckoned that by the spring

of 1917 voluntary enlistment would furnish five divisions, compulsory service a million men. By holding out this alluring prospect Beseler gained the support of our higher command, which in its turn prevailed upon the Government to proclaim the new Polish Kingdom. In actual fact there were practically no enlistments, with the result that this political move failed in its original purpose and added nothing whatever to the strength of our battle front.

The whole scheme revealed a lamentable ignorance of national psychology. The Poles, who had no love at all for our soldiery, refused to be tempted by the prospect of a small Polish State, but were bent upon the establishment of a united Poland, which could of course only be brought about by the defeat of the Central Powers, and was indeed promised them by Russia as a clever counter-move in the game. The Poles, who are traditionally hostile to everything German, inclined far more towards the Allies, and especially France, whose milder, more attractive and gayer civilization had always appealed to and inspired upper-class Poles. And whereas on the one hand we could not win over Poland, so on the other a separate peace with Russia, which at the end of 1916 was a possibility, was frustrated, since a necessary condition of such a peace was naturally the restoration to Russia of conquered Poland. Further, the situation threatened to disturb Austro-German relations by disputes over the question whether German or Austrian influence should predominate in Poland.

After the War a powerful Poland was created with French support and not only embraced all Polish territory, but annexed German territory from Rixhöft to Bielitz, Ruthenian territory in the neighborhood of the Bug, Dnieper and Goryn, White Russian territory on the Upper Niemen and Lithuanian territory beyond that. Of the total population the Poles represent only 69%, so that one-third of the inhabitants are subject to foreign rule—and a terrorist régime at that.

Modern Poland separates Germany from Soviet Russia

and is therefore the predestined enemy of these two powers. She was indeed created for this purpose. Since she is an inland state, with no natural seaboard, and is bound as an independent state to strive continually to obtain one, Poland tends to expand north-westwards towards the Baltic. At the mouth of her big river, the Vistula, she has practically reached her goal, for the tiny Free State of Danzig is too slight an obstacle to deter her from establishing herself permanently there. A more serious hindrance is the German province of East Prussia, whose lakes and forests can fairly easily be held against forces advancing from the Narev, though the province is rather more exposed in the direction of Kulmerland and the Vistula. Here and, of course, in the wide area between the Lower Warthe and Upper Silesia, Poland will one day have to fight for its life. In the latter district all the strategical advantage lies with Poland, for Germany could only make a stand upon the line of the Oder and the Obra, unless, as the result of Polish delays in mobilization and deployment, we were able to advance our front line as far as the upper and middle Warthe and the Prosna. A people like the Poles, who, though fiery, are dissipated and without organizing ability, may offer a weaker but more resolute opponent unexpected opportunities of victory.

The importance of Poland in the world war was dealt with on pp. 131 *et seq.*, 152 *et seq.*, 154 *et seq.* and 251 *et seq.*

TERRITORY, INDUSTRIES, AND NATIONAL CHARACTER

Poland is mostly plain, but the southern third rises to hilly country and finally to the heights of the Beskide and Carpathian Mountains. The western part, which is our main concern, *i.e.* the Polish Plain and the regions of the lower Warthe, the Vistula and the lower Bug, also the Narev, is mostly flat moraine land of sand or clay, broken up into several very large slabs by wide and often marshy river valleys and containing various ranges of sandy hills

formed by old moraines now covered with vegetation. Particularly noteworthy is the country round Warsaw, where a number of wide river-beds meet in the basin of a former lake and form the chief center of Polish national life. To the south and on the left bank of the Vistula this district adjoins the Polish Upper-Silesian plateau, undulating country with a soil of moraine débris and loam, dotted here and there with low mountain ranges. In the neighborhood of Upper Silesia coal, zinc and lead are mined and a metal industry is carried on, and this is the most densely populated part of the country. The whole of the eastern part is sparsely inhabited, flat bog-land formed by the River Pripet, whose marshes in dry seasons (and of course in winter) are easier to cross than they were thought to be before the war. To the south-east lies the faulted Podolian plateau of Galicia with its fertile loamy soil and hot summers.

The chief occupation is agriculture (rye, sugar-beet and potatoes; in Galicia, maize and tobacco); nevertheless wheat has to be imported, as the numerous Polish small holders only work for themselves. In Upper Silesia, the coal and other mines, most of them stolen from Germany, are successfully worked in connection with the heavy industries. Petroleum is extracted in Galicia. There are also in the west a fairly well-developed weaving industry, which of course only uses imported raw materials, and several centers of timber-felling and timber export. The industrial situation makes it technically impossible for Poland to wage a long war without foreign assistance, though she might manage to provide her own food supply.

The Poles, who represent only two-thirds of the population, have occupied the land since the sixth century, and came under the influence of western civilization in the eleventh, when German immigration took place at the invitation of the Poles themselves. The only purely Polish districts are in the western half of the country, and even here there is a large sprinkling of German settlements. In the East a few Polish landowners and townsfolk live in the

midst of an alien peasantry. Racially, the Poles are an East Baltic people with an Eastern substratum and Nordic and Mediterranean accretions. The mass of the peasantry has therefore very little in common with the small ruling class and there is little understanding between the two. The Poles are filled with a blind hatred of everything foreign, and especially dislike the superior organization, discipline and orderliness of the Germans. Fanatical dreams of Polish greatness still haunt the upper classes, but only find expression in loud words, and although a Polish patriot will be ready enough to sacrifice his life, he is incapable of quiet, systematic and constructive work. The Pole is a queer mixture of slavish obedience and a fiery love of liberty, ready for any deeds of daring and always proclaiming some brave intention, but unmethodical, disorderly, careless and slovenly, so that nothing comes of his bold pronouncements. Moreover, as with Czechoslovakia, treachery presided over the birth of the state; it was not brought into existence by its own efforts—which seed will one day bring forth bloody fruit unto destruction. No Polish legionaries distinguished themselves by their heroism in the world war. It is true that at the outbreak of hostilities a "legion" of three brigades was formed—mainly of Austrian Poles, who were anyhow liable to serve—but their morale was a very doubtful quantity and their valor diminished as they approached the front. Undoubtedly, however, there are plenty of Polish patriots who will gladly go into battle to fight for the Poland of their dreams. But their nerves are unlikely to stand for long the triple strain of probable bad leadership, certain bad organization (especially in the matter of rations and reënforcements) and prolonged exposure to danger and hardship.

VI. THE BALTIC STATES

FROM the Gulf of Finland to the River Niemen there stretches a fairly broad costal belt which is distinguished from its hinterland by its much milder climate, its Nordic population, its Protestant or Catholic creed and thoroughly German culture. Its territory is a continuation of the Russian table-land, covered by glacier débris and made up of forests, lakes and moorland; the fertility of the loamy soil and its cultivation decrease in intensity as one proceeds northwards. A few rivers—the Niemen and the Dvina and, in the north-east, the line of Lake Peipus—and occasional moraine hills offer natural positions for armies at war. The Memel line, part of which lies on German soil, forms a strong position against Germany, while the line of the Dvina, which rests on the Gulf of Riga, divides the Baltic States into two parts—a function which it discharged for a considerable period in the world war. The land is given up mainly to agriculture and yields rye, barley, oats, potatoes and flax. Timber-felling and -manufacture are important industries; foreign trade, indeed, stands or falls with the export of timber.

The population of this small area is very diverse. Of Nordic blood with an East Baltic strain, it is divided into four peoples—the Indo-Germanic-speaking Lithuanians in the south, the Letts in the center, the Finnish-speaking Estonians in the north, and German elements in all parts. The Germans formerly constituted the townsfolk and landowners, but are now no longer represented in the latter class. The three first-named peoples are simple peasant folk distributed sparsely over the country and only ruling themselves since 1919, before which they lived for centuries under Polish, Russian, German or Swedish masters. They owe their contact with western civilization to German immigrants, who have landed on this coast ever since the thirteenth century

but unfortunately failed to elevate the people to a high cultural level or to Germanize them. They preferred to live among them as a feared and respected ruling class rather than to become absorbed in them—and this meant in 1919 the end of German-Baltic landownership and the extirpation of German cultural influence. The national character is modest and reserved, industrious and, so far, lacking in qualities of leadership. The Esthonians constitute a more self-willed and headstrong element, the Letts and Lithuanians being milder and less passionate. Their native subservience, which secured good relations with the German landlords, has been undermined by Russian agitators in the course of the present century and has been transformed into national class-hatred.

In 1919 the former Russian provinces of the Baltic formed themselves into the three Free States of Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia. They are of importance as creating a barrier between Soviet Russia and the Baltic Sea and cutting off the Russians from Libau, the only Baltic port which is free of ice. None of these states, nor all three together, are of course strong enough to stand up against Russia, but British influence has established itself here and, operating from Reval, is strong enough to close the Baltic to the Russian navy at any time.

Germany's particular concern is with Lithuania, the southernmost of the three Free States. After we had recognized her independence under a German prince in 1918, Lithuania proclaimed herself a Free State in the following November and in 1919 stood firm against the Bolsheviks. The bone of contention between the Reich and Lithuania is the Memel territory, that strip of German soil north of the Memel, inhabited by Germans and Lithuanians and the coveted goal of Lithuanian military ambition. In 1920 the Memel territory was torn from us with the help of France and in 1924 was joined to Lithuania as an "autonomus" region. A point of interest to Germany is the conflict between

Lithuania and Poland, the latter having snatched a large portion of Lithuanian territory.

VII. FINLAND

FINLAND is not less important than the Baltic States in keeping Russia out of the Baltic, and ever since she declared her independence in December 1917 and succeeded—only with the help of German troops—in repelling the Bolsheviks in 1918, she has played her part with due circumspection. Finland is the most northerly outpost of western, and predominantly German, civilization against semi-Asiatic Russia.

It is a rocky country, a plateau only partially covered with glacier débris, and the innumerable depressions and gullies are filled by an intricate mass of lakes. The whole of the lakeland area is surrounded by a huge horseshoe of narrow sandhills, the Salpausselkä, and traversed by long sand-ridges. Large pine forests provide material for a flourishing timber industry and export trade, but the short summer so far limits agricultural enterprise that wheat and other foodstuffs, and, of course, manufactured goods of all kinds, have to be imported. Native cattle and sheep, however, are a useful supplement to Finland's food supply.

The inhabitants consist of the Swedes of the coast and the Finns or Suomi of the interior, the latter a little race belonging to the East Baltic group, with a pachyhæmous reserved temperament, which breaks out easily into uncontrolled fanaticism. The population is sparsely distributed and aims at the fusion of the Swedish and Finnish elements into a single nationality.

The Baltic States and Finland call for our most serious attention, since it lies with them to bar the way to Russian expansion in the Baltic. The two together are the counterpart of Sweden across the water and to some extent an east-

ward extension of Scandinavia, having the effect of thrusting Russia back. The best solution for Germany would be a close friendship between these states and ourselves, and even the incorporation of Sweden, Finland and the Baltic States in a Baltic Union, which would be Germany's natural ally against Russia and Poland. This would suit us better than the pushing forward of Germany's frontier into the Baltic States, since such a line might be difficult to hold with only East Prussia behind it. In the former case the Baltic region would have itself, the Baltic Sea, and Finland plus Sweden to fall back upon; in the latter only the line of the Memel.

PART SIX

THE LESSON OF THE WORLD WAR



I. NATIONAL RENAISSANCE

THE WORLD WAR marked the end of an epoch and a turning-point in the history of civilization. It has destroyed old values and attended the birth of new ones. The front of the world's stage is now occupied not by a ruling caste, but by the people; the conception of monarchy is yielding everywhere to the idea of a commonwealth, and subjects have become fellow-citizens.

This change may work itself out in two directions, and is in fact doing so. On one side we have the destruction of all values and the rise of the underworld, ending, as in Russia, in chaos. In the other there is a steady crystallization of positive values; the outer shell breaks and from the inner kernel of the people there emerges a national popular renaissance, a spiritual rebirth of thought and feeling, a realization by the people of their true needs.

This is the road along which the German people, after inevitable convulsions, is now proceeding. It stands on the threshold of a national renaissance. Rejecting the poison of internationalism and pacifism, it dares once again to proclaim itself German on German territory. The German Renaissance has two principal missions: (1) to summon up the soul of Germany from the depths to perform its national, cultural and political task, so that on German soil all thought, all action and all speech shall be German; and (2) to combine German territory throughout its whole extent into a unified and therefore powerful state, whose boundaries will be far wider than those of 1914.

These are the two goals for which every German must strive. And what one man or one people desires with the whole strength of the soul, that he will attain. There is no power on earth stronger than the human will.

The work of renewal must be pursued in every sphere

in which the human brain and the human hand are active. Indeed, a new field of activity lies open, one that will bridge the gulf between brain and hand, the sword and the pen. This is the science of national defense, that science which puts thought and action at the service of the country's defense. This new science must not confine itself to applying chemical knowledge to the improvement of engines of war, but must build up a body of knowledge derived from the earth and from the air, from industry and transport, and from the study of national and individual psychology. Every reader of this book will agree that Germany must not lose another war through ignorance of these matters. Now that wars are waged by whole peoples—this happened for the first time in 1914-18—they will no longer be fought with bayonets alone but with corn and meat, oil and fats, iron and nickel, wool and cotton, railways and lorries, distances and atmospheric pressure, characters and souls—and most of all, with souls, for alongside the separate armies march their country and their people, of whom they are merely the weapons. The time is past when two states thought their work done as soon as they had completed mobilization and sent their armies into the field. The peoples now fight breast to breast, and the victory is won not by the better army but by the stronger character, the stouter heart. The world war has taught us this.

Accordingly, preparation for future wars must not stop at the creation, equipment and training of an efficient army, but must go on to train the minds of the whole people for the war and must employ all the resources of science to master the conditions governing the war itself and the possibility of endurance. In 1914 we had a first-class army, but our scientific mobilization was bad, and the mobilization of men's minds a thing undreamed of. The unveiling of war memorials, parades of war veterans, flag-waggings, fiery speeches and guard-mountings are not of themselves enough to prepare a nation's mind for the dangers that threaten. Conviction is always more lasting than enthusiasm.

II. THE SCIENCE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

IF THE minds and feelings of the nation have been prepared in this way, it will best understand the need for a special science of national defense. Such teaching is necessary at a time and in a world in which countries are no longer represented by monarchs or a small aristocracy or by a specialist army, but in which the whole nation, from the commander-in-chief to the man in the ranks, from the loftiest thought to the simplest wish, from corn to coal, from the Treasury vaults to the last trouser-button, must be permeated through and through with the idea of national defense, if it is to preserve its national identity and political independence. The science of national defense is not the same as military science; it does not teach generals how to win battles or company commanders how to train recruits. Its lessons are addressed first and foremost to the whole people. It seeks to train the popular mind to heroism and war and to implant in it an understanding of the nature and prerequisite conditions of modern warfare. It teaches us about countries and peoples, especially our own country and its neighbors, their territories and economic capacity, their communications and their mentality—all for the purpose of creating the best possible conditions for waging future wars in defense of the national existence. The science of national defense is the systematic application of every branch of human thought and human endeavor to the end of increasing the defensive strength of our people. It is the general mental background out of which strategy and tactics flash their lightning sparks. It collects from every department of thought whatever theories and knowledge can facilitate and improve the preparation, execution and exploitation of war. Its content, therefore, is not drawn from any particular sphere of knowledge. Its constructive feature is a special point of view, *i.e.* the

maximum defensive strength of the nation as such, and the various branches of knowledge are selected, combined, utilized and envisaged from this standpoint. It requires that attention shall be specially directed to such matters as geography, economics, communications and transport, national psychology and politics.

Thus the science of national defense is the intellectual expression of a nation's military will and the symbol of its heroic instincts. It is the consciousness of an awakened desire to assert oneself against neighboring peoples, and is clear, unmistakable confirmation of the old saying that the vanquished of today are the victors of tomorrow. Looked at in this light, it is a new method of fighting, supplementing the old method of generals and armies.

If, however, we pursue this train of thought to the end, we find that the science of national defense grows from a mere branch of knowledge into a general mental atmosphere, in which all knowledge is directed towards a national goal. The value of any special science to a nation is determined by the use that the student of national defense can make of it. This is the furnace in which the mind and spirit of Germany are being tested. The new science is thereby raised to the level of a kind of national philosophy, which claims the first place among all the sciences throughout Germany, as the meeting-ground where the entire will, ability and determination of Germany meet together for the purposes of reconstruction and new creation. Just as in any very primitive tribe a man is judged by his usefulness in upholding and defending the tribe's existence, so in the future every German will be judged first and last, once and for all by the place he fills in the scheme of national defense. Whoever fails in this capacity forfeits his claim to full citizenship.

III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE SCIENCE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

LIKE other sciences, the science of defense is divided into a general part which defines its subject-matter and establishes general principles, and a special part which, on the basis of the former, treats of the various nations and countries of the world from the angle of national defense.

THE GENERAL SCIENCE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

This science selects and brings together from all departments of nature and from human thought and action everything that seems calculated to increase defensive strength and promote sound thinking on the subject.

In the first place, it ransacks literature for works which facilitate this task and maps which give a comprehensive view of all the countries of the world, and the distribution of phenomena possessing military significance, and collates them.

Secondly, it is concerned with the surface of the earth as the groundwork and theater of all history, inasmuch as it teaches people to know, understand, and evaluate from the military point of view the following things:—the general geographical position of a country and its people; the predominantly inland or maritime character of a region; land-forms as such, and the connection between their evolution and their geological formation; water-supply and groundwater; climate and vegetation; fauna, settlement and landscape.

Besides this, the general science of defense deals with the economic and technical preparations for and conduct of war. That is to say, it takes note of what foodstuffs and raw

materials for industry are available at home and which must be imported, and goes into the question of their preparation; it thus makes possible a superior economic equipment, which cannot be taken unawares by any unexpected method of warfare, such as the English blockade was for us in 1914, and gives perfect economic security in advance. This branch of our science is preëminently provident in character.

Further, the science of defense studies all questions of communication, not only in so far as they affect mobilization, deployment, the conduct of operations (strategy) and the conduct of the battle (tactics)—that is, all the ways of defending a country (the art of generalship being in the last resort a sort of applied geography of communications), but also in relation to the transport of merchandise to meet the needs of the fighting forces and the civil population.

A particularly important and, like the economic, new branch of this science is national psychology. Its business is to penetrate into the character and mental life of nations with the object of discovering their whole attitude to war and getting an insight into their heroic or pacific temper, which makes it possible to form right judgments about one's own and other nations in the hour of crisis. It concerns itself with the laws which determine the warlike and the pacific temperaments, the psychological structure of the enemy, and the neutrals, the phenomena associated with the will to victory, the spirit of surrender and collapse respectively. Out of such psychological knowledge it forges weapons of war, by creating the instruments of propaganda, which, based on the most intimate acquaintance with the mentality of its own people, its allies, the enemy and the neutrals, plays upon them in its own interest. The English campaign of lies was founded on first-rate psychological insight.

Finally, it will not neglect the political study of the countries of the world, for the actors on the stage of war are in the first place states; this applies particularly to the diplomatic preparations for war. A country's general position in the world, from which the atmosphere of war proceeds; the

whole weight with which it backs up its political leaders; the moral qualities which brace or weaken them both politically;—all these things need to be studied from the angle of national defense.

The main planks in the platform of the general science of defense must always remain:—(1) the spiritual training of one's own nation and a thorough knowledge of other nations as an instrument of political self-help; (2) the recognition of the fact that all human doings, military, economic or anything else, depend on the attitude of mind and are determined in respect of their strength or weakness by that and that alone.

THE SPECIAL SCIENCE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Here we are no longer concerned with these phenomena in general and considered in themselves, but in their connection with a particular territory, in their geographical uniqueness. Whereas in the general science the main question is the military utility of a phenomenon as such, in the special science it is the topographical features of a particular region and their connection with other features in it. What is required, therefore, is to get a firm grasp of the defensive character of the various regions and countries of the world, and so describe and elucidate it that it can be assessed as an absolutely definite quantity from the military point of view. We must know exactly what our own defensive structure and the defensive structures of other countries are like, so that we can accurately forecast our own and our prospective enemy's chances in a war. We shall thus be spared the disagreeable surprises which otherwise lie in wait for us.

The special, or as one might say, regional science of defense first of all surveys a country from the standpoint and by the methods of the general science, and takes note of the presence of the single elements cursorily mentioned above and of their general nature. This analysis accomplished, it proceeds to synthesis and builds up out of these elements a

picture of the nation in which one sees it as a military power, with all its human and spiritual resources, its economic assets and means of communication, in the round, as it were, and can peer into the innermost arteries and nerve centers of the organism. The general science of defense subdivides its material not merely in accordance with its attitude to the separate auxiliary sciences, but also with the geographical setting; and as this varies from one side of the frontier to the other, these subdivisions are constantly changing. As regards the German Empire today, the following regional classification suggests itself.

A. Germany and the German Empire, *i.e.* German-speaking central Europe, with a present population of 92 millions, the proper territory of a true Third Reich. It is divided into:

(a) Purely German states:—the German Empire; Austria; Danzig; Luxemburg; Holland and her East-Indian colonies; Lichtenstein.

(b) The German portions of other countries:—German Belgium (Flanders, Brabant, Eupen, Malmedy); German Switzerland; German France (Flanders, Alsace and Lorraine); German Italy (especially the southern Tyrol); German Yugoslavia (southern Styria); German Czechoslovakia (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia); German Poland (West Prussia, Posen, Upper Silesia); German Lithuania (the Memel territory); German Denmark.

B. France and her associates, *i.e.* the league for the suppression of Germany which emerged from the world war.

(a) France and the French colonies.

(b) Belgium and its colonies, Luxemburg, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania.

C. The Anglo-Saxon group of powers which control world trade, and without whose support or benevolent neutrality a new European war on a large scale is an impossibility:—

(a) Great Britain, Ireland, the British Empire.

(b) The United States of America.

- D. Italy and its colonies.
- E. Russia.
- F. The remaining countries of Europe:
 - (a) Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland.
 - (b) Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia.
 - (c) Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Turkey.
 - (d) Spain, Portugal and its colonies.
- G. The overseas powers:
 - (a) Japan, China, Siam.
 - (b) Persia, Afghanistan.
 - (c) Abyssinia.
 - (d) Mexico, Brazil, the Argentine, Chile, Peru, and the rest of Latin America.

IV. A GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT FOR THE SCIENCE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

FINALLY we are faced with the question in what form the conclusions of the science of defense can be made available for the service of the Reich and become the common property of the nation. In these days of national and economic struggle life is growing steadily harder for the state no less than for the individual, and the whole atmosphere of danger which surrounds every country today, and particularly our encircled Reich, demands scientific sublimation in order that one may be able to survive it and put it to good use in war. Every form of thought or aspiration or activity which is of use to the country demands every possible support from the state and the nation itself.

A distinction must, however, be made between creative and popular work. Creative work in the science of defense means the extension and deepening its stock of knowledge as such; it is of interest primarily to the government of the Reich, and especially the army command, as providing a

foundation on which both of them may base their policy before, during, and after a war. The creative side of the science demands quiet and retirement for the worker in it. It is his business to travel about his own and other countries, digest the existing literature of the subject, write books and draw maps in which all the relevant material is clearly set forth in a usable form.

The popular side, on the other hand, courts the full glare of publicity; it desires its ideas to become the common property of all Germans, in order that they may be as fully equipped as possible, economically and psychologically as well as militarily, for any future contest. For this purpose, the science of defense must become a recognized subject of instruction, both in the Reichswehr and in our universities and technical institutes; in the case of the last two it might be laid down that each student shall attend a course of lectures in the science and take part in practical work for at least two terms. This involves the immediate foundation of chairs of Defense. The science of defense should also be made a subject in our secondary schools and in the two upper classes of our primary schools.


Since, however, this method of propagating a scientific knowledge of defense and a corresponding attitude to it will necessarily take some years before it can act on the nation as a whole, it is desirable that articles on subjects connected with defense should appear in the newspapers, and that lectures, broadcasting-items and films of a similar character should be arranged. Much may also be done by the distribution at a very low price, or even gratis, of a little book on national defense, as distinct from larger works on the subject.

It is most important that all these activities should be concentrated in a special government department for the science of defense, which would no doubt most conveniently come under the existing Ministry of Defense. Its task would be: (1) To do the scientific spade-work for the central government and the army command, and (2) to carry out the


training of the German people in national defense and supervise all its details. The idea of a research institute for national defense also has much to recommend it.

This is indeed a mighty and a grateful task. May the government of the Reich soon set about it and choose the right men to carry such a scheme through!





MAP 1.—GERMANY'S WESTERN FRONTIER



Line of French fortifications since the 1890's.

Deployment, evolution and right flank of the German right wing according to the original Schlieffen plan.



Diluted Schlieffen plan and German advance in August 1914.



German armies.

French deployment and advance in August 1914.



French armies.



The British army.



The Belgian army.




Furthest point reached by the Germans. Battle of the Marne.

MAP 2.—DEPLOYMENT AND ADVANCE IN THE WEST
IN 1914




- | | |
|--|---|
| ———— The front as established in 1914. | oooo The Hunding-Brunhild Line. |
| Enemy gains on the Somme 1916, and in Flanders 1917. | xxxx The Hermann Line. |
| - - - - German retirement to the Siegfried Line, Spring 1917. | □□□□ The Antwerp-Meuse Line. |
| ===== German gains 1918. | ————— The Michel Line. |
| o-o-o-o-o The Wotan Line. | ▲▲▲▲ The Frontier Line. |
| | Political frontiers of 1914. |

MAP 3.—THE WESTERN FRONT, 1914-18




MAP 4.—FRANCE'S EASTERN FRONTIER TODAY




West

East

Cross-section through the Paris basin.



MAP 5.—GEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF
NORTHERN FRANCE



1-4 Lake- and river-position on either side of the fortress of Lötzen.

I-IX Austro-Hungarian army 1914. — 8 German advance 1914. Russian army 1914.

The front on May 5, 1915, at the beginning of the breakthrough of Tarnov-Gorlice.

The front as established in August 1915. — Gains of Brusilov's offensive in 1916.

Limits of the German advance in 1918.

Extension of the front in Rumania in January 1917.


The Baltic Division in April 1918.

MAP 6.—THE EASTERN FRONT




- The Turks in the north-east, January 1915.
- The front in Mesopotamia, Autumn 1916; in Sinai to the end of 1916; in Armenia from August 1916 to February 1918.
- The front in Syria to November 1917; in Mesopotamia March 1918.
- Turkish advance into Armenia starting in February 1918.
- The Front in Mesopotamia, May 1918; in Syria to September 1918.

MAP 7.—TURKEY 1914-18




- Tertiary
 Chalk
 Jura
 Scarps
- Shortest crossing for an invading force.
 Natural forward-bases and lines of advance.
- Principal industrial areas and centers of population.







MAP 8.—ENGLAND—STRUCTURE, LINES OF INVASION, INDUSTRY




- German U-boat bases.
- Bases of the Grand Fleet.
- Danger-zone under German unrestricted U-boat warfare 1917-18.
- Chief theater of German unrestricted U-boat warfare 1917-18.
- Course of the High Seas Fleet to the Battle of Jutland.
- Course of the Grand Fleet to the Battle of Jutland.
- English blockade-lines.

MAP 9.—THE NORTH SEA



-  German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian armies against Serbia October 1915.
 Serbian lines of defense.
 Established Front in Macedonia and Albania, 1916-18.
 German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian armies against Rumania, September 1916.
 Rumanian lines of defense.
 Established Front in Rumania, January 1917.
 K.u.K. = Imperial (Austria-Hungary).

MAP 10.—SERBIA 1915 AND RUMANIA 1916-17



- Austro-Hungarian Front, end of 1915.
- Territorial gains of the Austrians in the Tyrol, May-June 1916; of the Italians on the Isonzo 1915-1917.
- Advance of the Germans and Austrians, October-December 1917.
- The Front at the end of December 1917.

MAP 11.—THE ITALIAN FRONT







